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ABSTRACT
The objective of this research project was to identify and critically examine the
regulatory mechanisms that authorise, and those that restrict, what is done with water
in the Sydney Region and how it is done. Four principal areas of investigation were
identified: how water is used, where it is sourced, how those water sources are
managed, and how water is supplied to consumers.
The research traced the evolution of a national urban water management framework
through the 1990s and observed how the national framework is implemented in the
Sydney Region.
A complex pattern of urban water regulation emerged from observations made in the
course of the study. The tools of the framework include traditional forms of regulation
(the ‘hard law’ of legislation) and newer forms of controls and inducements (the ‘soft
law’ of intergovernmental agreements, guidelines, non-statutory plans and policy
statements). Two main themes were identified to guide research: the model of
integrated urban water cycle management that applied to new as well as traditional
water sources and water products; and the level of transparency and accountability in
political and administrative decision-making associated with water management in the
Sydney Region.
The study suggests that a regulatory mechanism comprising an amalgam of soft and
hard law is appropriate for the management of water in the Sydney Region. It
proposes that such a mechanism should include all water sources (fresh, saline and
waste) and all water products; it should provide for clear vesting of the right to the
control, use and flow of all water in a single entity – a water manager – to ensure
management of water from all sources transcends political discord; and, it should
incorporate fundamental administrative law values in a system of flexible and
accountable water planning. The study concludes that a regulatory mechanism with
these characteristics would be capable of delivering integrated urban cycle
management for the Sydney Region.

xvii
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PART I

SETTING THE SCENE

2

Chapter 1: Overview of the Research Project
There are few more important issues for NSW families and communities than water supply and security.

1.1

1

Introduction

With increasing pressure being placed on historical supplies of drinking water for
Australia’s urban areas, new sources of water are being developed. Innovative
measures to augment supply such as wastewater recycling, desalination and domestic
reuse are being implemented. At the same time, the water requirements of the
environment and the need for more sustainable use of water resources are being
recognised as management imperatives.
Laws impacting specifically on urban water supply and use have traditionally focused
on ensuring public health and safety through the regulation of water service providers
in the public sector. Contemporary urban water management reforms encourage
development of new water sources and new water products, and private sector entry
into a realm of service provision formerly reserved for government monopoly
operators. Consequently, the legal framework has had to expand and adapt to
accommodate these changes by embracing new forms of regulation and by
incorporating sustainable water use as a clear objective.
This study is about water law in a specific geographic area – the Sydney Region – which
embraces not just the built-up areas of the city of Sydney and its suburbs, but a vast
rural water catchment that for the time being is the most significant source of water
for that area. The Sydney Region thus defined permits the investigation of the laws
applying to all aspects of an integrated urban water cycle – from catchment to tap.2
The analysis presented in this thesis reveals a complex regulatory framework that
comprises elements of ‘hard law’ (‘black letter law’ or legislative provisions) and ‘soft
law’ (such as intergovernmental agreements, guidelines, non-statutory plans and
policy statements).3 It also explores the processes associated with decisions made by

1

Office of Water (NSW), 2010 Metropolitan Water Plan (August 2010), Foreword from the Premier, 1.
The concept of integrated urban water cycle management is explained in Chapter 4.4 on page 69.
3
The distinction between ‗hard‘ and ‗soft‘ law is made in Chapter 3.2 on page 32.
2
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government in the development, implementation and enforcement of those
regulations.
In the process of unravelling the components of the regulatory framework, the study
reveals the significant part played by interdependent national and State water reform
policies in urban water management in the Sydney Region. It also illustrates the
influence that can be exerted by soft laws to regulate conduct in a situation of rapid
change. This study was undertaken at a time when urban water supply suddenly
became a significant national issue. The cumbersome regulatory framework that was
first encountered in research undertaken in early 2006 rapidly expanded as national
urban water initiatives were introduced and implemented in the Sydney Region. The
thesis disentangles relevant policies, laws and guidelines to develop a comprehensive
picture of water regulation that applies in the Sydney Region up to November 2010.4
In doing so, it breaks new ground by focusing specifically on policy and regulation
relating to urban water cycle management in a major urban area.
1.2

Research objective

In 2005 the Hawkesbury-Nepean Catchment, which falls within the Sydney Region, was
examined as a case study to assess the impact of the Water Management Act 2000
(NSW) (‘WMA 2000’) on water management in the catchment.5 The aim of that study
was to assess whether the WMA 2000 was achieving its objective, namely integrated
management of the water sources of that catchment. The study focused on the
planning and community participation provisions of the WMA 2000. The research
concluded that, although the WMA 2000 offered a framework to achieve its objectives
in relation to the Hawkesbury-Nepean water sources, it failed to do so because a
statutory Water Sharing Plan was not in place for the catchment and, consequently,

4

The date of writing is 12 November 2010. The thesis generally comments on water regulation in the Sydney Region
up to 12 November 2010 unless an earlier date is recorded in the discussion.
5
Wendy Ambler, The objective of integrated management under the Water Management Act 2000. The HawkesburyNepean Catchment – a case study (Paper submitted in part fulfilment of the requirements for the award of LLM,
University of New South Wales, May 2005).
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the majority of the provisions of the WMA 2000 could not apply in that area.6 That
plan is still not complete.7
The present research project arose from that earlier study. The existing regulatory
framework pertaining to urban water management and use at the national and State
level was not considered in the earlier study. Indeed, beyond the contemplation of the
WMA 2000 as a tool to support integrated management of the water resources of the
Hawkesbury-Nepean Catchment, the composition of the broader regulatory
framework was not addressed in it at all.
The objective of this research is to identify and critically examine the regulatory
mechanisms that authorise, and those that restrict, what is done with water in the
Sydney Region and how it is done. Two main themes were identified to guide
research: the model of integrated urban water cycle management that applied to new
as well as traditional water sources and water products; and the level of transparency
and accountability in political and administrative decision-making associated with
water management in the Sydney Region.
The research objective is pursued by tracing the development of a national urban
water management framework through the 1990s and observing the manner in which
it is progressively being implemented in the Sydney Region in the 21st century.
A complex pattern of urban water regulation that impacts on the activities of
institutions in the public and private sectors emerges from observations made in the
course of the study. The tools of the new framework are traditional forms of
regulation (the hard law of legislation) and newer forms of controls and inducements
(the soft law of intergovernmental agreements, guidelines, non-statutory plans and
policy statements).
Strong policy directions (soft law mechanisms) pursued by the Commonwealth and the
State both cooperatively and separately are seen to be dictating the form and

6

The NSW Government required water sharing plans to be prepared for water sources before the Water Management
Act 2000 (NSW) (‗WMA 2000‘) could commence in respect of those water sources. Water management planning for
the Sydney Region under the WMA 2000 is examined in Chapter 7 on page 136 and Chapter 8 on page 154.
7
Draft water sharing plans for the Sydney Region were released for public exhibition in June 2010 and are noted as
‗being prepared for commencement‘ see Office of Water (NSW) Draft Water Sharing Plans(Greater Metropolitan
Region Unregulated River and Groundwater Sources) (21 October 2010)
<http://www.water.nsw.gov.au/Home/default.aspx>.
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substance of hard and soft law regulatory instruments designed to accommodate
changing patterns of water management and use brought about by those policies. In
the Sydney Region hard law is demonstrated to be following the directions set by soft
law mechanisms that offer more flexible and adaptive processes to facilitate the
implementation of political water reform strategies.
A dominant concern throughout the discourse is to discover whether the measures
examined operate to ensure proper – that is transparent, accountable and effective –
processes in urban water law. The importance of community engagement as an
element of proper water management processes is highlighted. Specific community
consultation processes are examined in the discussion. Where proper process is not
apparent from the research conducted, possible avenues of redress are explored. The
thesis suggests how new water resources being developed in the Sydney Region can be
accommodated in existing water management law to further the objectives of
integrated urban water cycle management and at the same time provide access to
proper regulatory process.
1.3

The Sydney Region – what is being regulated?

The water and wastewater systems of the Sydney Region offer an opportunity to
examine the implementation of, and emerging regulatory control over, a wide range of
policy options designed to meet the future water needs of the water users in the
region. Fresh water sources (dams, rivers, lakes, aquifers, roof water), desalinated
water (from ocean, not terrestrial, sources), stormwater and recycled water are
components of the water supply system examined. The environment and the
agricultural, industrial, commercial, government and domestic sectors of the region
rely on water ‘fit for purpose’ delivered by these systems to service over 20 per cent of
the Australian population. The regulatory framework to support them provides an
appropriate context in which to explore the emerging reach and emphasis of urban
water law.
1.4

Scope of the research

The research crosses a number of disciplines. The fields of water law and of
administrative law are fundamental but environmental and planning law, institutional
governance and public policy also play their part in management and regulation in the
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urban water sector. The business of the sector involves suppliers, customers and
contractors, and relies on an intricate web of infrastructure. The modern Sydney
water industry is land-based, but relies on water sourced from terrestrial and ocean
catchments. Sewage and wastewater, historically considered to be waste products,
are progressively being recognised and utilised as valuable resources. By-products of
sewage treatment are entering markets as supplementary and alternative sources of
nutrients for agriculture and horticulture.
This study covers developments in urban water management over almost two decades,
from the early 1990s to the present. That period provided fertile ground for reform in
water management, initially in the rural sector but more lately in the urban sector. A
flurry of control responses to manage and regulate the urban water sector in NSW has
emerged since 2000 when the State’s new water management legislation (the WMA
2000) was introduced. Thereafter, looming water scarcity has driven responses, both
in policy and in regulation.
1.5

Investigative method

The research method has relied heavily on reviewing relevant Commonwealth, State
and local government instruments imposing constraints of a regulatory nature on
urban water supply activities, and institutions engaged in those activities, in the
Sydney Region. Legislative instruments (such as Acts of Parliament, regulations and
rules) and guidelines, parliamentary reports and debates, government reports and
discussion papers, and statements of public policy were all examined for the study.
Relevant industry-initiated regulatory instruments were also incorporated in the
review process.
D E Fisher’s Water Law8 offered valuable background for research relating to water law
in Australia prior to the introduction of the WMA 2000 in NSW in 2000 and the
National Water Initiative (‘NWI’) in 2004. In particular, Fisher examined the structure
of the water industry in NSW (within the legal framework applying at the time) that
distinguished between regulation of the broader planning and management (or
allocation) functions of instrumentalities charged with implementing water
management legislation, and the service delivery functions of water supply
8

D E Fisher, Water Law, (LBC Information Services, Sydney, 2000).
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authorities.9 This study proposes the integration of aspects of both of these elements
of water law, that is, regulation traditionally relevant to rural water management and
planning, and regulation applying to urban water service provision, to support
integrated urban water cycle management outcomes for the Sydney Region.
The timely publication of Gardner, Bartlett and Gray’s Water Resources Law10 in 2009
provided an up-to-date analysis of water resources regulation in Australia,
incorporating developments since the introduction of the NWI. Gardner, Bartlett and
Gray examine the history and development of water reform in Australia through the
1990s to mid–2009 and the legislative implementation of those reforms in the States
and Territories. The authors reinforce the separate regulatory treatment of functions
of water service provision and water resource management in recognition of national
water reform objectives of the mid–1990s. However, noting that the delivery of water
services is not the subject of their book, the authors do include pertinent commentary
on water services regulation, acknowledging the possibility that ‘it may intersect with
the framework for the regulation of water resource management’. 11 In contrast to the
work of Gardner, Bartlett and Gray, this study is focused on an urban water system.
Regulation of water service provision forms an integral part of the analysis.
Conclusions reached in the study identify a clear need for water resource management
and for the delivery of water services to be addressed in a process of integrated urban
water cycle management.
Emergence of urban water management as a national issue has produced a growing
body of scholarly commentary relating specifically to activities in the urban water
sector in the Sydney Region. Industry participants and other practical commentators
have disseminated their views widely. Increasingly, under federally driven initiatives,
particular aspects of the law relating to urban water are being adapted to
accommodate innovative water management measures.12 The developing body of
9

Ibid Ch 6. Fisher‘s analysis is discussed in Chapter 5.2 on page 87.
Alex Gardner, Richard Bartlett and Janice Gray, Water Resources Law, (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2009).
11
Ibid 117 [6.24]– [6.25]. The 1994 COAG Water Reform Framework is discussed in Chapter 5.5 on page 96.
12
See for example Master Plumbers and Mechanical Services Association of Australia, ‗Requirements for Installation
of Rainwater and Greywater Systems in Australia‘ (Waterlines Report Series No 10, prepared for the National Water
Commission, November 2008); Master Plumbers and Mechanical Services Association of Australia and Australian
Rainwater Industry Development Association, Rainwater Tank Design and Installation Handbook (National Water
Commission, November 2008); Master Plumbers and Mechanical Services Association of Australia and RMIT
University, Urban Greywater Design and Installation Handbook (National Water Commission, November 2008).
10
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literature specifically addressing urban water regulation was incorporated into the
research as it emerged over the study period.
No formal interviews were conducted in the course of the research – a deliberate
decision taken in view of the strong focus of the research on government policy
instruments, implementation of those policies, and community participation in the
regulatory processes. An assessment was made in the course of the study that pursuit
of formal responses to questions arising in the course of the research would likely elicit
formulaic responses – restatement of the policies being questioned. The decision was
made to rely on documents accessible in the public arena – that accessibility, and
availability, being essential elements of the study.
Nevertheless, an understanding of the complex interaction of the various pieces of the
regulatory jigsaw would not have been possible without patient help and explanation
from the industry regulators and operators who were contacted through normal
channels. Similarly, the free exchange of information which takes place at seminars
and conferences has been invaluable in gaining an understanding of important issues,
some having relevance well beyond the Sydney Region.
In the course of this research, dogged determination to participate in community
consultation associated with the development of Water Sharing Plans for the Sydney
Region was eventually rewarded. However, endeavours to be included in that process
support concerns raised in this thesis about the transparency of that process.13 In the
course of the study several opportunities arose to take part in broader community
consultation on water-related matters, both at the Commonwealth and State level.
Copies of submissions made as an adjunct to this study in response to invitations to
the public for comment are included at the end of this thesis as Appendix: Related
Papers. Sometimes those submissions were made in an individual capacity and
sometimes they were prepared as a member of the NSW Nature Conservation Council
Water Advisory Group and submitted by that organisation. The papers are annotated
accordingly.

13

See discussion in Chapter 8.8 on page 162.
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1.6

General limitations

This study was not concerned with water supply in rural towns in NSW, nor was urban
water regulation in other States investigated. If the supply of water into the Sydney
system from the Shoalhaven River in times of extreme drought is included as a specific
element of a Water Sharing Plan for the Sydney Region under the WMA 2000, the
emergence of intra-state/inter-basin water trading mechanisms under the WMA 2000
may be of limited relevance to urban water regulation in the Sydney Region. Although
water pricing is an important element of water policy, the mechanisms employed to
determine water prices in different sectors were not investigated. However, the role
of pricing mechanisms in managing the demand/supply balance of urban water supply
is acknowledged in the text. Finally, this was not intended to be a study of the impacts
of climate change on urban water supply.
1.7

Thesis outline

The thesis is set out in five parts. Part I outlines the research project. Part II shows
how the soft law of national water reform policy drives water management and
regulation in the Sydney Region. Part III examines how the national water reforms are
being put into practice in the Sydney Region using a mix of hard and soft law
mechanisms. Part IV shows how the law has responded to allow operators from the
private sector to participate in water supply and water service provision in the Sydney
Region as a result of national initiatives. Finally, Part V synthesises the emerging
pattern of water regulation in the Sydney Region and explores possible avenues to
direct the progress of that framework towards achievement of the goals of integrated
urban water cycle management. An outline of each part follows.
Part I: Setting the Scene: The four chapters of Part I set the scene for the study of
urban water law in the Sydney Region.
Chapter 1 sets out the scope and objectives of the study and the investigative method
employed in the analysis.
Chapter 2 identifies and describes the study area, the Sydney Region. The Sydney
Region’s water infrastructure network is illustrated and the bulk water supply and
retail services provided by that network are described.
Chapter 1: Overview of the Research Project
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Chapter 3 explores the broad nature of regulation and introduces the notions of ‘hard’
and ‘soft’ law. The characteristics of effective regulation are outlined and elements of
good regulatory practice are established. Avenues that are available in administrative
law to review regulation and to challenge government decision-making are outlined as
background for discussion in subsequent chapters.
Chapter 4 outlines some of the basic tenets of statutory water regulation and
introduces important soft law elements of urban water regulation relevant to the
Sydney Region. It provides an insight into the concept of integrated water
management and how that concept has been extended to encompass urban water
cycle management. The most influential institutions involved in water management
and regulation in the Sydney Region are introduced in tables at the end of the chapter.
The role of Commonwealth agencies in policy formulation and development and the
State’s operational and regulatory roles are highlighted.
Part II: The Winds of Change: The two chapters of Part II examine the role of the
Commonwealth Government in water regulation in Australia. The national water
reform agenda is shown to exert a powerful influence on urban water regulation in the
Sydney Region.
Chapter 5 begins by outlining national competition policy in Australia. The role of
monetary incentives provided by the Commonwealth to States and Territories to
secure performance of agreed policy objectives is examined. Discussion focuses on the
water reform agenda of the national competition policy and shows how that policy
impacted on water reform from the mid-1990s until the NWI emerged in 2004 to set a
new water reform agenda. The objectives of the NWI are set out and the actions to be
taken by the parties to achieve those objectives are outlined. Particular emphasis is
placed on the gradual emergence of initiatives impacting either directly or indirectly on
urban water regulation. The relevance of components of rural water reforms to water
regulation in the Sydney Region is explained.
Chapter 6 reviews progress made in the Sydney Region to implement the national
water reforms. Discussion focuses on three particular elements of those reforms:
water pricing, institutional reform, and water management planning.
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Part III: Great plans for the Sydney Region: The five chapters of Part III show how the
national water reforms have been addressed in, and are being implemented under,
hard and soft law instruments to regulate water management in the Sydney Region.
The focus of these chapters is to discover how governments have made decisions and
taken actions to implement the agreed initiatives – discussing whether the
administrative processes that were followed were open and transparent, whether they
engaged the community and whether the agencies conducting those processes are
made properly accountable for their actions.
Chapter 7 investigates the formal water management planning framework constituted
under the WMA 2000. Legislative provisions enabling the Minister to prepare water
management plans are examined and are shown to provide a mechanism that
circumvents the inclusive, participatory planning provisions of the Act.
Chapter 8 critically examines the draft Water Sharing Plans that have been produced
for the Sydney Region. The discussion focuses on the way that legislative discretions
available to the Minister under the WMA 2000 that were discussed in Chapter 7 have
been invoked in the processes associated with the preparation of the plans. The
conduct of community consultation to develop the plans is critically analysed. The
discussion shows that legislative constraints in the WMA 2000 restricting its
application to traditional water sources impede its potential to provide a mechanism
for integrated urban water cycle management in the Sydney Region.
Chapter 9 examines the development of the Metropolitan Water Plan 2006 (‘MWP
2006’), a soft law approach to water management planning in the Sydney Region. The
process of development of draft Water Sharing Plans for the Sydney Region discussed
in Chapter 8 contrasts markedly to the approach adopted to prepare the MWP 2006, a
soft law instrument with no basis in law and without a prescribed process for its
delivery. The discussion suggests that the water management planning and water
sharing proposals set out in the MWP 2006 arguably comprise an integrated approach
to urban water cycle management in the Sydney Region by addressing new and
traditional water sources and embracing opportunities for private sector participation
in water service delivery.
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Chapter 10 describes ways that the community can participate in innovative water
management projects encouraged in water management reforms in the Sydney Region.
It discusses user-friendly soft law that has been introduced to support an existing
legislative framework to ensure the safe use of recycled water around the home. Two
demand management measures used to encourage responsible use of water in the
Sydney Region are examined to illustrate how water regulation is being ‘sold’ to the
wider community.
Chapter 11 discusses radical amendments to the hard law of the environmental
planning and assessment framework and local government law that are shown to be
working in concert with soft law guidelines to accommodate the development of major
innovative water projects in the Sydney Region.
Part IV: New Players – New Rules: The three chapters of part IV examine the
response in NSW to policy imperatives for increased competition in the water supply
and services industry.
Chapter 12 recounts the journey of a potential operator who sought access to Sydney
Water Corporation’s (‘SWC’) water industry infrastructure under Part IIIA of the Trade
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (‘TPA 1974’). The chapter examines the interaction of State
soft law (Government policy leading to the development of the Metropolitan Water
Plan 2004) and the provisions of the Commonwealth legislative regime established
under Part IIIA of the TPA 1974 designed to foster competition in Australia.
Chapter 13 describes the access provisions of the Water Industry Competition Act 2006
(NSW) (‘WICA 2006’) that arose in part as a response to the outcome of the
applications examined in Chapter 12, and compares them with those of Part IIIA of the
TPA 1974. The State’s application for certification of the NSW access regime under the
terms of the TPA 1974 is mentioned. The discussion also explores the business of
‘sewer mining’ and how it is being regulated in the Sydney Region. The chapter
reviews the licensing provisions of the WICA 2006 under which licensed private sector
operators are permitted to provide water services in the Sydney Region. The licensing
regime applying to the incumbent public water utilities is also outlined.
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Part V: A Paradigm Exposed
Chapter 14 is a synthesis of the emerging pattern of water regulation in the Sydney
Region. The questions raised in the course of the narrative – not all of which are
resolved along the way, or in this chapter – are collated and analysed in an attempt to
assess progress towards the objectives of integrated urban water cycle management
and accountable and transparent regulatory process in water law in the Sydney Region
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Chapter 2: The Sydney Region
Sydney is an exciting and vibrant city located in a diverse and beautiful region. This is why more than
1
four million people choose to make it their home.

2.1

Introduction

This chapter defines and describes the Sydney Region as the term is used for this study.
It outlines water supply and distribution arrangements in the region, and the system of
management of wastewater and stormwater. The chapter provides a physical context
for the analysis undertaken in subsequent chapters.
2.2

Location

Geographical confines of ‘Sydney’ vary according to context. They may or may not
include its hinterland, but they generally extend beyond the boundary of the Central
Business District. For example, the ‘Sydney Metropolitan’ Catchment Management
Authority has its own area of operation.2 The Metropolitan Water Plan 2006 (‘MWP
2006’)3 refers to ‘Sydney’ without definition, but the influence of the plan extends to
the far reaches of the areas of operations of the Sydney Catchment Authority (‘SCA’)
and Sydney Water Corporation (‘SWC’).4
For the purposes of this study, the Sydney Region is the area shown in Figure 2.1 on
the south-east coast of NSW. It covers about 32 500 square kilometres and it extends
from Shoalhaven Heads in the south to Broken Bay in the north, and from Lithgow and
Goulburn in the west to the coast in the east. The Sydney Region referred to in this
dissertation is physically co-extensive with the area that comprises the Greater
1

Office of Water (NSW), 2010 Metropolitan Water Plan (August 2010), Foreword from the Premier, 1 (‗MWP
2010‘).
2
Sydney Metropolitan Catchment Management Authority (12 November 2010)
<http://www.sydney.cma.nsw.gov.au/> (‗SMCMA‘). The SMCMA is constituted under the Catchment Management
Authorities Act 2003 (NSW).
3
Water for Life (NSW), 2006 Metropolitan Water Plan (April 2006) (‗MWP 2006‘). The document states that it
‗covers an area overlapping the boundaries of three Catchment Management Authorities: the whole of the
Hawkesbury-Nepean Catchment Management Authority, part of the Southern Rivers Catchment Management
Authority and most of the more recently established Sydney Metropolitan Catchment Management Authority‘: at 99.
The MWP 2006 is discussed in Chapter 9 on page 175. The MWP 2010 includes a plan illustrating the area it covers
but offers no specific description of the area nor does it locate the area within the Sydney Region: MWP 2010, above
n 1, ‗What area does the plan cover?‘: see plan at 10, text at 11.
4
The Sydney Water Act 1994 (NSW) (‗SWA 1994‘) defines the area of operation of Sydney Water Corporation
(‗SWC‘) (s10) and the Sydney Water Catchment Management Act 1998 (NSW) (‗SWCMA 1998‘) defines the area of
operation of the Sydney Catchment Authority (‗SCA‘) (s 20). SCA may be authorised under its operating licence to
carry out activities outside its ‗areas of operation‘ (s 20(4)).
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Metropolitan Region for the purposes of water sharing planning for that region under
the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) (‘WMA 2000’).5
2.3

Geographical setting

Stretching from near Cooma in the south to Nowra (south of Wollongong) in the east,
north along the coast to Palm Beach and from there inland towards Lithgow then
south through Goulburn and back towards Cooma, the Sydney Region encompasses a
variety of landforms.
The narrow coastal plains sheltering under the escarpments in the Illawarra Region in
the east are truncated to the south and west by the mountains forming the foothills of
the Great Dividing Range in the Central and Southern Tablelands. To the north, the
deeply incised mouth of the Hawkesbury River separates the water catchments of the
Sydney Region from those serving the Central Coast communities and the Hunter
Region. The highest population density of the Sydney Region is supported by the rich
soils of the Cumberland Plain. To the south of the urban reach of Sydney, the Illawarra
and Woronora plateaux host a rich diversity of flora and fauna whilst supporting a
major portion of the water catchment for the Sydney Region and an active coal mining
industry which has historically been of enormous significance to the economic base of
the Sydney Region.
2.4

Land use

The Hawkesbury-Nepean Catchment Management Authority is responsible for
managing the most extensive catchment in the Sydney Region.6 The Authority’s

5

Draft water sharing plans for the unregulated rivers and groundwater sources of the Greater Metropolitan Region
were finally released for public exhibition in June 2010: Office of Water (NSW), Draft Water Sharing Plan Greater
Metropolitan Region Groundwater Sources: Order (May 2010) and Office of Water (NSW), Draft Water Sharing
Plan Greater Metropolitan Region Unregulated River Water Sources: Order (June 2010) (together referred to as the
‗Draft Orders‘) It was only at that stage that the area referred to as the ‗Greater Metropolitan Region‘ in literature
examined for this study could be identified. Alignment of the Sydney Region (as the term is used in this study) with
the Greater Metropolitan Region provides pertinent geographical confines for the study and is eagerly adopted in the
final version of this thesis. Prior to the release of the Draft Orders, the study area had been defined with reference to
the operating areas of SWC, SCA and the Hawkesbury-Nepean Catchment Management Authority. That earlier
definition incorporated essentially the same geographical area. The Draft Orders are discussed in Chapters 7.9 on
page 151 and Chapter 8 on page 154.
6
Hawkesbury-Nepean Catchment Management Authority is constituted under the Catchment Management
Authorities Act 2003 (NSW) and is to be distinguished from the SCA, a statutory authority responsible for bulk water
supply in the Sydney Region.
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succinct statement of land use in its catchment area notes that it is a source of critical
water, power, agricultural and fisheries produce, tourism and mining resources.7
Each year the Hawkesbury-Nepean catchment produces some 12 per cent of all of
NSW’s agricultural production,8 over $1 billion in agricultural and horticultural produce
including $600 million from irrigated agriculture which supplies a significant amount of
Sydney’s fresh vegetables, flowers and fruit.
Annual production worth over $6 million from commercial seafood industries
supported by the catchment includes NSW’s second largest estuarine trawl industry
for prawns and squid as well as a major oyster industry.
Over 80% of the sand and gravel supplied to the construction industry in the Sydney
Region, worth an estimated $100 million per year, comes from the HawkesburyNepean catchment.
The catchment supports a tourism and recreation industry which generates over $60
million per year.
Twenty-three per cent of NSW’s power is generated in the Wallerawang and Lower
Portland coal-fired power stations using cooling water from the Cox’s River.9
South of Sydney, the Illawarra Region supports a range of activities in the rural,
residential and industrial sectors including a major steelworks and associated
industries and seaport operations in the Port Kembla area. The main urban centre of
the Illawarra Region is Wollongong, the ninth largest city in Australia. Fertile soils,
reliable rainfall patterns and proximity to markets are factors which support an
important agricultural community in the southern part of the region. Strong
manufacturing, retail, education, health and community services have developed
throughout the region which is increasingly becoming a major tourist destination.10
Whether defined by population or geographic spread, Sydney is the largest urban
settlement in Australia. The urban area of the western reach of the city extending to
7

Hawkesbury-Nepean Catchment Management Authority, Catchment values (15 February 2009)
<http://www.hn.cma.nsw.gov.au/> (‗HNCMA‘). Discussion in the text relied on this source.
8
Ibid. Agricultural pursuits in the Hawkesbury-Nepean Catchment include beef and dairy cattle and sheep farming,
soft- and hard-wood forestry and ‗hobby farming‘ pursuits including orchards, goats, alpacas, olives and grapes.
9
Ibid.
10
Southern Rivers Catchment Management Authority, Illawarra (18 February 2009)
<http://www.southern.cma.nsw.gov.au/> (‗SRCMA‘).
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the foothills of the Blue Mountains supports residential growth areas and important
market gardening and other horticultural and agricultural enterprises. Urban land use
of the region includes commercial, residential and industrial developments and major
urban infrastructure such as ports, airports and motorways. Tourism is a major
industry with Sydney Harbour rated as Australia’s premier tourism asset.11
2.5

Ecological significance of the Sydney Region

The Hawkesbury-Nepean Catchment Management Authority notes that its catchment
‘is truly a catchment of national significance’.12 Whilst supporting industries of
substantial importance to the State’s economy, the Authority’s area of activity
embraces over 1 million hectares of national parks and reserves and the Greater Blue
Mountains World Heritage Area.
The Greater Blue Mountains World Heritage Area provides ecologically important
transitional habitat from the mountains of the Great Dividing Range to the western
slopes and plains.
Twenty-eight per cent of all of the designated threatened species in NSW are found in
the Hawkesbury-Nepean catchment, as well as a number of endangered ecological
communities, and the catchment is host to a wide range of native fauna.
The Illawarra Escarpment which forms the western boundary of the coastal plain south
of Sydney supports a large area of rainforest recognised as a regionally significant
habitat corridor. The Illawarra Region as a whole supports a wide range of flora and
fauna species, including a number of threatened species, endangered populations and
endangered ecological communities, three of which are the habitat of several
nationally listed plant species under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity
Conservation Act 1999 (Cth).13

11

SMCMA, above n 2.
HNCMA, above n 7.
13
Ibid. See also information on Estuary and Northern Valleys.
12
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2.6

Population and water usage in the Sydney Region

Table 2.1 compares population, water usage and water consumption trends at the
national level, in NSW and in regional groupings of local government areas within the
Sydney Region.14
At 30 June 2006 the Sydney, Wollongong, and Illawarra (excluding Wollongong)
Regions of NSW15 supported a combined population of 4 697 000 which was almost
70% of the State’s population and 23% of the Australian population.16 In the year
ending 30 June 2006, SWC supplied water to an estimated 4 267 165 people – almost
91% of the population of those three regions and over two thirds of the total
population of NSW.17 The biggest catchment in the Sydney Region, the HawkesburyNepean Catchment, is home to 15.6% of the Aboriginal population of NSW.18
In the year ended 30 June 2005, 18 767 gigalitres of water were consumed in Australia.
NSW consumed 5 922 gigalitres, 32% of that total.19 In the same year, SCA delivered
522 473 megalitres of water to its customers who include SWC , Wingecarribee Shire
Council, Shoalhaven City Council and direct users from the Upper Canal and the
Warragamba Pipeline. SWC was the major customer, taking over 99% of the water
supplied by SCA.20
Regional patterns of water use across Australia vary significantly with population
density, land use and climate. The proportions of water consumed by different sectors
in Australia, as a whole, and in the State of NSW are almost identical. Agriculture is by
14

To permit comparisons between population statistics in Australia, NSW and regional groupings shown in Table
2.1, the following discussion refers to: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 3222.0 – Population Projections, Australia,
2006 to 2101 (2008); and Department of Planning (NSW), New South Wales State and Regional Population
Projections, 2006-2036: 2008 Release (Sydney, 2008)
<http://www.planning.nsw.gov.au/population/pdfs/nsw_state_regional_population_projections_2006_2036_2008rele
ase.pdf> (‗Planning release 2008‘).
For water usage, reference is made to: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 4610.0 – Water Account, Australia, 2004-05
(2006) and Sydney Catchment Authority, Annual Report 2007-08 (31 October 2008) (the Report compares water
supply to customers for the years 2003-04 through to 2007-08). The Australian Bureau of Statistics advised on
13 February 2009 that the Water Accounts were to be updated for the 2008-2009 reference year and would probably
be released late 2010.
15
Planning release 2008, above n 14 Australian Standard Geographical Classification: 11, 12.
16
Ibid. The regions referred to in the publication are defined by reference to the Australian Standard Geographical
Classification areas and the Local Government Areas within each region are set out in the publication. Note that
Goulburn Mulwaree is not included in the relevant area although it does fall within SCA‘s area of operations. NSW
population at 30 June 2006 was 6 816 100.
17
Sydney Water Corporation, Annual Report 2006. Sydney Water Corporation describes its area of operations as
‗Sydney, Illawarra and the Blue Mountains‘: 4.
18
HNCMA, above n 7.
19
Australian Bureau of Statistics, 4610.0 – Water Account, Australia, 2004-05 (2006).
20
Sydney Catchment Authority, Annual Report 2007-08 (31 October 2008), 18.
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far the biggest consumer, taking some 70% of supply. The water supply industry and
households follow with 11% each, the remainder consumed in decreasing proportions
by manufacturing, mining and gas and electricity.21
However, water consumption by sector in the area serviced by SWC is fundamentally
different. In contrast to the State pattern of water consumption, 70% of water usage
in the Sydney Region is accounted for in the residential sector. The industrial sector
consumes 12%, commercial enterprises 10%, and the government and ‘other’, which
include agriculture, account for 4% of water usage each.22
2.7

Water services in the Sydney Region

2.7.1 Introduction
Historically, Sydney’s water supply has been derived from a number of catchment
areas feeding rivers and streams that could be dammed on the way to the ocean north
and south of Sydney. With developments in technology, water has been diverted from
its natural course, through tunnels, along canals and even up hills to bring water from
neighbouring areas to sustain a growing Sydney population. The development and
exploitation of seawater sources off the coast of Sydney is now a reality, an initiative
which will provide Sydney with its first non-rainfall water supply and ease reliance on
terrestrial sources of water.23
2.7.2 The bulk water supply system
Drinking water for the Sydney Region is supplied from five main river systems: the
Upper Nepean, Warragamba, Blue Mountains, Shoalhaven, and Woronora. The water
supply system, illustrated in Fig 2.2, is managed by the SCA.24 Management of the
physical catchments which feed the river systems is shared between three of the
thirteen Catchment Management Authorities (‘CMA’s) formed in NSW under the
Catchment Management Authorities Act 2003 (NSW): their activities extend to the
whole of the Hawkesbury-Nepean, part of the Southern Rivers and most of the Sydney
21

Australian Bureau of Statistics, 4610.0 – Water Account, Australia, 2004-05 (2006), Summary. The ‗water supply
industry‘ is a term used in the statistical data that includes water lost as well as water used by the water supply,
sewerage and drainage services industry.
22
Water for Life (NSW), ‗Securing Sydney‘s Water Supply Metropolitan Water Plan‘ (Progress Report, February
2006), 8. Single dwellings consumed 51% and multi-unit dwellings 19%.
23
The Kurnell desalination plant project is discussed in Chapter 11.5 on page 235.
24
For a detailed explanation of the bulk water supply system see Sydney Catchment Authority (12 November 2010)
<http://www.sca.nsw.gov.au>. The outline which follows in the text was sourced from information on the website.
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Metropolitan areas of responsibility.25 Rivers supplying water for the Sydney Region
are generally classified as ‘unregulated’ rivers rather than ‘regulated’ rivers (where
downstream users are supplied by a series of dams and weirs, as is the case in the
Murray River), a classification which is confusing but persistent as rivers in the Sydney
Region are affected by infrastructure – dams, weirs, canals – used to supply water
throughout the region.
The Upper Nepean Scheme captures water from the Cataract, Cordeaux, Avon and
Nepean rivers for transfer through tunnels, canals and aqueducts (the Upper Canal) to
the Prospect Reservoir or directly to the Prospect water filtration plant. Prospect
Reservoir, completed in 1888 and initially designed to receive water from the Upper
Nepean dams, has largely been bypassed with the introduction of the water filtration
plant at Prospect in 1996, but it is still an integral component of the system and able to
provide drinking water in times of high demand.
Warragamba Dam, located some 65 kilometres west of Sydney, is fed by waters from
the Wollondilly, Coxs, Kowmung, Wingecarribee and Nattai rivers and provides 80% of
the water supply for the population of the Sydney Region.
Six dams in the Blue Mountains west of Sydney capture and divert water from Cascade,
Adams, Greaves, Woodford, and Bulls creeks to supply the population of the Blue
Mountains. Water supplied from the Fish River Scheme further west is also available
to augment the supply to the Blue Mountains and can be diverted to augment supply
to other SCA customers.
The Shoalhaven Scheme supplies water from the Shoalhaven River to local
communities and is capable of hydro-electric power generation. Perhaps most
importantly the Shoalhaven Scheme also enables the transfer of water from the
Tallowa Dam in Kangaroo Valley up the escarpment to the Fitzroy and Wingecarribee
reservoirs in the Southern Highlands to supply water to Sydney, the Blue Mountains
and the Illawarra. Water transferred to Wingecarribee Reservoir can be directed
through the Wollondilly River to Warragamba Dam, or through the Nepean River to
Nepean and Avon dams and thence to the Illawarra.

25

MWP 2006, above n 3, 99.
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The importance of the Shoalhaven Scheme to the water supply system of the Sydney
Region has become apparent since transfers commenced in April 2003, when dam
levels in the Sydney Region fell below 60%. Up to 800 megalitres per day were
transferred from the Shoalhaven scheme in the period from April 2003 to July 2008,
providing a total of 813 gigalitres of water for the Sydney Region – nearly 30% of
consumption over that period.26
In November 2008 the NSW Government announced its intention to implement a
three year moratorium on transfers from the Shoalhaven River for drinking water
purposes. Transfers of up to 100 million litres per day into the Wingecarribee River
were to be continued during the platypus breeding season.27
Woronora Dam on the Woronora River supplies Sydney’s south with water.
The Sydney Region’s water supply system has a full operating storage capacity of about
2 600 000 megalitres of which only about one quarter can be safely withdrawn from
the system each year to meet the needs of the Sydney Region.28
2.7.3 Retail services
Bulk water is delivered by the SCA through its water supply system to its customers for
treatment and distribution to various end-users in the Sydney Region.
As noted above, SWC is the Authority’s largest customer and it is the largest water
utility in Australia. The Corporation’s water treatment and distribution network is
illustrated in Fig 2.3.
Nine water filtration plants in SWC’s area of operations treat water to a standard that
complies with the Australian Drinking Water Guidelines (‘ADWG’).29 Drinking water is
then distributed to customers through a complex system of reservoirs, pumping

26

Department of Water and Energy (NSW), ‗Metropolitan Water Plan 2008 Progress Report‘ (January 2009), 12.
See also discussion in Chapter 2.8.1 on page 23.
27
Minister for Water, Phillip Costa, ‗Sydney Cuts Reliance on Shoalhaven for Drinking Water‘ (Ministerial Media
Release, 7 November 2008).
28
The term ‗full operating storage‘ describes the amount of water that SCA can operationally extract from the dam
storages when they are full. The amount of water that can actually be drawn from Sydney‘s supply system each year
is estimated by the SCA using computer modelling. Annual water availability is estimated by reference to the
system‘s total storage capacity, inflows to the system, expected water savings and releases needed for river health:
See MWP 2006, above n 3, Chapters 1 and 2, especially at 11.
29
National Health and Medical Research Council, Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council,
National Water Quality Management Strategy: Australian Drinking Water Guidelines 2004.
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stations and water mains. SWC’s desalination plant at Kurnell is a new component of
its water treatment and distribution network.
In addition to supplying drinking water in the Sydney Region, SWC is responsible for
wastewater disposal and, in conjunction with local councils, stormwater management,
as well as the treatment and distribution of recycled water in its area of operations.
The wastewater system is illustrated in Fig 2.4. The sewerage system delivers
wastewater to sewage treatment plants for treatment to standards set in SWC’s
licence conditions30 prior to reuse or discharge to rivers or oceans. The three biggest
sewage treatment plants at Malabar, North Head and Bondi process three quarters of
the Sydney Region’s wastewater. Biosolids extracted in the treatment process are
used in agriculture, composting and land rehabilitation.31
Local councils assume a similar role in respect of water and wastewater services in
those areas of the Sydney Region outside SWC’s area of operations, and for most of
the stormwater infrastructure in the Sydney Region. The stormwater system is
illustrated in Fig 2.5.
2.8

Responding to drought in the Sydney Region

The first decade of the 21st century brought challenges to the water supply system of
the Sydney Region in the form of long periods of little rain and consequent decreases
in dam levels. Short reprieves came with welcome rains from time to time. To ensure
the availability of adequate supplies of water to meet Sydney’s water needs then and
in the future the NSW Government initiated several innovative water supply projects,
some to augment traditional rain-fed sources and others to utilise non-traditional
sources of water, such as seawater and wastewater. Some of those initiatives are
outlined in the following paragraphs to provide a complete picture of the
contemporary water supply system of the Sydney Region for the purposes of this study.

30

SWC‘s operating licence is discussed in Chapter 13.4.1 on page 289.
Sydney Water Corporation, Annual Report 2009: At a Glance: Operations and At a Glance: Principal Statistics
available at <http://www.sydneywater.com.au/Publications/Reports/AnnualReport/2009/index.html>.
31
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2.8.1 Extending traditional fresh water sources
Deep water in dams
Additional supplies of water have been sourced from SCA’s storages by accessing deep
water storage in dams. In mid-2006 the SCA completed works to Warragamba and
Nepean Dams to enable the supply of an additional 40 billion litres of water per year
from those storages.32
Shoalhaven Transfers
Water from the Shoalhaven Scheme contributed almost 30% of the Sydney Region’s
water supply from 2003 until November 2008.33 Proposals to expand the Shoalhaven
transfers were considered during that time. To accommodate the increased transfers
two phases of infrastructure construction were suggested, one of which involved
increasing the capacity of Tallowa Dam by raising the dam wall. The Tallowa dam
proposal in particular gave rise to strong community opposition and has not been
pursued.34 On 7 November 2008, the NSW Minister for Water announced a three-year
moratorium (at least) on transferring water from the Shoalhaven to augment Sydney’s
water supply, with transfer levels after that time to be re-assessed.35 However,
transfers of water from the Shoalhaven Scheme can provide water for the Sydney
Region in the future.
Groundwater sources
Investigations of the Sydney basin groundwater sources undertaken since 2004 have
confirmed the identification of one major groundwater resource (the Kangaloon
aquifer) that can be accessed to augment water supply for the Sydney Region by 15
billion litres per year over two to three years during severe drought. 36

32

SCA reported the completion of a deep access point at the base of Warragamba Dam on 15 April 2006. Source :
Sydney Catchment Authority, Bulk Water Storage & Supply Report 27 April 2006, available at
<http://www.sca.nsw.gov.au> .
33
MWP 2006, above n 3, 84. See also Minister for Water Phillip Costa, ‗Sydney cuts reliance on Shoalhaven for
drinking water‘ (Ministerial Media Release, 7 November 2008).
34
Ibid [7.4] 83–85.
35
Minister for Water, Phillip Costa, ‗Sydney cuts reliance on Shoalhaven for Drinking Water‘ (Ministerial Media
Release, 7 November 2008).
36
The original version of the Metropolitan Water Plan, released in October 2004, included groundwater investigation
in its suite of proposals to secure Sydney‘s water into the future: Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural
Resources (NSW), Meeting the Challenges — Securing Sydney‘s water future: The Metropolitan Water Plan 2004
(October 2004) 11.
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2.8.2 Tapping into new sources of water
Desalination
A desalination plant that can produce 90 billion litres per year of drinking water for
supply into SWC’s distribution system has been constructed at Kurnell, a southern
suburb of Sydney. The plant has been designed so it can be upgraded to produce up to
180 billion litres of water each year.37
Recycling
Wastewater recycling initiatives being pursued in the Sydney Region are aiming to
contribute up to an additional 70 billion litres of water fit for purpose38 to the Sydney
Region water supply by 2015.
Water savings
The NSW Government has promoted initiatives in the Sydney Region to achieve water
savings estimated at 145 billion litres of water by 2015. Those initiatives include:
savings made through programs to reduce leakage in existing water supply systems;
modifications to residential and non-residential water use habits; mandated water
efficiency requirements for homes; and the application of labelling and standards to
water appliances.
2.9

Discussion

The Sydney Region supports a wide range of natural features and human activities.
Over 20% of Australia’s population lives and works there, consuming a little over 2% of
Australia’s water. In Australia generally, and across NSW as a whole, agriculture is the
major water user, but in the Sydney Region over 70% of the water consumed is used in
and around the houses in which its population lives. That water has historically been
sourced from rainwater capture and storage. The Government is exploiting new
sources of water for the Sydney Region to augment rainfall-dependent supply.
Recycling of wastewater and desalination of seawater are already making a

37

MWP 2010, above n 1, 35. There is also scope to construct another plant of the same capacity on the site at Kurnell.
NSW Government policy at the time of writing does not include either direct or indirect potable re-use of treated
wastewater. In recycling processes, wastewater is treated to appropriate standards to produce water products that are
fit for use outdoors or in specific indoor applications. Recycled water is also contributing to replace environmental
flows in the rivers in the Sydney Region. The locations for recycling initiatives taking place in the Sydney Region
are shown on Fig 10.1.
38
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contribution to supply. Water fit for drinking is now being joined in the market place
by water ‘fit for purpose’. From a regulatory perspective, this means that public health
and safety have been, and must remain, the foremost objectives of water regulation in
the Sydney Region – whether that regulation is hard or soft.
The Sydney Region as defined and described in this chapter permits the investigation
of the laws applying to all aspects of an integrated urban water cycle — from
catchment to tap.
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Table 2.1: Comparison of population, water usage and water consumption trends across Australia, in
New South Wales and in certain regional groupings of local government areas in the Sydney Region.
Region and Local Government Areas

Sydney
Ashfield, Auburn, Bankstown, Baulkham Hills,
Blacktown, Blue Mountains, Botany Bay, Burwood,
Camden, Campbelltown, Canada Bay, Canterbury,
Fairfield, Gosford, Hawkesbury, Holroyd, Hornsby,
Hunter’s Hill, Hurstville,
Kogarah, Ku-ring-gai, Lane Cove, Leichhardt, Liverpool,
Manly, Marrickville, Mosman,North Sydney,
Parramatta, Penrith, Pittwater, Randwick, Rockdale,
Ryde, Strathfield, Sutherland, Sydney, Warringah,
Waverley,
Willoughby, Wollondilly, Woollahra, Wyong

Population
30 June 2006
4 282 000



1

21% of
Australia’s
total
63% of
NSW total

Wollongong
Kiama, Shellharbour, Wollongong

278 000

1

Illawarra excl. Wollongong
Shoalhaven, Wingecarribee

137 000

1

Total Sydney + Wollongong + Illawarra (ex
Wollongong)

4 697 000

New South Wales

6 816 100

Annual water
consumption
2004–05 (ML)
5
522 473



4

5 922 000


Australia

20 697 900

4

3% of
Australia’s
total
9% of NSW
total

8

32% of
Australia’s
total

18 767 000

8

Consumption by
sector (%)
70% - residential
12% - industrial
10% - commercial
4% - government
4% - other
including
7
agriculture

70% - agriculture
10% - households
11% - water
supply industry
4% manufacturing
2% - mining
1% - gas &
8
electricity
65% - agriculture
11% - households
11% - water
supply industry
3% manufacturing
2% - mining
1% - gas &
8
electricity

1. Source: Department of Planning New South Wales State and Regional Population Projections, 2006–2036: 2008 Release, 11–12.
2. Source: NSW Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal 2008, SWC Operational Audit 2007/08, Appendix B, 6. SWC does not
supply water to the Wingecarribee Shire, Gosford or Wyong.
3.Source: NSW Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal 2008, Hunter Water Corporation Operational Audit 2007/08,
Appendix B, 10.
4. Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 3222.0 – Population Projections, Australia, 2006 to 2101 (at 12 February 2009).
5. Source: Sydney Catchment Authority, Annual Report 2007–08, 18. The water supplied to customers by the SCA in the year
2004–05 is used here for the purposes of comparison.
6. Source: Hunter Water Corporation, 2007/08 Annual Report: Building a Better Future.
7. New South Wales Government, Water for Life, ‘Securing Sydney’s Water Supply: Metropolitan Water Plan’ (Progress Report,
February 2006) Single dwellings consumed 51% and multi-unit dwellings 19%.
8. Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 4610.0 – Water Account, Australia, 2004–05.
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Figure 2.1: The Sydney Region
Source: Adapted from Office of Water (NSW), Draft Water Sharing Plan Greater Metropolitan Region
Unregulated River Water Sources: Background Document (June 2010) 53

Chapter 2: The Sydney Region

28

Figure 2.2: Sydney Catchment Authority’s Bulk Water Supply System for the Sydney Region
Source: Adapted from: Sydney Catchment Authority, ‘Water Supply System Diagram’ (7 September
2010) <http://www.sca.nsw.gov.au/dams-and-water>
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Figure 2.3: Sydney Water Corporation’s Water Treatment and Distribution System for the
Sydney Region
Source: Adapted from map provided by Sydney Water Corporation (31 August 2010)
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Figure 2.4: Sydney Water Corporation’s Wastewater System
Source: Adapted from map supplied by Sydney Water Corporation (31 August 2010)
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Figure 2.5: Sydney Water Corporation’s Stormwater System
Source: Adapted from map supplied by Sydney Water Corporation (30 August 2010)
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Chapter 3: Law, its Forms and Administrative Accountability
Resort to administrative law (especially by groups of citizens) may be as much a form of public
1
protest as a means of obtaining redress.

3.1

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to outline an administrative law framework within which to
examine the regulations applying to the management and use of the water resources
of the Sydney Region.
A definition of regulation is developed and the various forms that regulation can take
are identified. The concepts of ‘hard law’ and ‘soft law’, used in this thesis to describe
instruments that regulate water activities in the Sydney Region, are explained. The
processes of monitoring and review that are used to assess the relevance and
effectiveness of regulations are outlined.
The legal mechanisms by which administrative decisions can be challenged are
described. The discussion then addresses the difficulties that can be encountered
when attempting to apply administrative law principles, developed to ensure
accountability under hard law, to issues arising from decisions made under soft law
instruments.
3.2

Characteristics of regulation

The literature outlines a number of characteristics of regulation.2 Regulation is used to
bring order to or to alter behaviour by permitting or restricting various activities.
Ideally, it is systematic, intentional and goal-oriented, even when there are multiple
goals, and even if the goals are forgotten. In practice, it is institutionalised, mainly in
the public sphere in a bureaucracy that brings expertise to bear on its field of work, but
it also includes self-regulation by non-state groups.
Most importantly regulation often involves the exercise of discretionary judgment – in
making rules, in deciding their application in practice, and in enforcement. It is
1

Justice Keith Mason, ‗Sunrise or Sunset? Reinventing Administrative Law for the New Millennium‘ (Keynote
Address delivered at the 2000 Administrative Law Forum, Adelaide, 15 June 2000).
2
The following discussion is based on the analysis in Barry Barton et al (eds), Regulating Energy and Natural
Resources (Oxford University Press, 2006) at 13.
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implemented through a complex interaction of politics, law, regulated parties and
parties intended to benefit.
In the Sydney Region, urban water regulation is responding to contextual change –
changing rainfall patterns, changing demand for water, the development of new
technology, and new water products. Thus it is often reactive, meeting needs as they
arise. Regulation is sometimes described as a balancing act, trying to manage a range
of risks including potentially adverse impacts on the environment, public health and
business interests. In the Sydney Region it is possibly more appropriately viewed as an
attempt at formulating compromise between competing uses. The notion of balancing
the ‘risks’ suggests that the outcome of the relevant process ought to produce a stable,
‘balanced’ system but this study of water regulation in the Sydney Region supports a
rather different notion. Its outcome signals that the process of accommodating
competing interests in the water sector – those of water managers, users, service
providers and the environment – while ensuring essential outcomes such as public
health and safety can at best be seen as a compromise, and one not necessarily
reached by the parties concerned but imposed through regulation.3
In 1997 a Commonwealth Interdepartmental Committee on Quasi-regulation
(‘Interdepartmental Committee’) offered a succinct and useful definition of regulation
that neatly encapsulated the foregoing elements:
Regulation includes any law or ‘rule’ which influences the way people behave.
Regulation is not limited to government legislation; and it need not be mandatory.4

Expressing the view that regulation could take many forms, the Interdepartmental
Committee suggested industry-created and enforced self-regulation fell at one end of a
spectrum of increasing government involvement in regulatory mechanisms, with the
‘black letter’ law of legislation enforced by government falling at the other extreme.
The present study of water regulation in the Sydney Region provides an opportunity to
examine the development and implementation of regulatory instruments across the
3

This idea is explored and developed in discussion of draft water sharing plans for the Sydney Region in Chapter 8
on page 154 and the Kurnell desalination project in Chapter 11.5 on page 235.
4
Commonwealth Interdepartmental Committee on Quasi-regulation ‗Grey-Letter Law‘ (Report, 19 December 1997)
3 (‗Grey Letter Law Report‘). The influence exerted by water regulation in the Sydney Region ranges from the
blatant mandating of behaviour (licensing of Sydney Water Corporation; standards for drinking water) to the userfriendly encouragement of behaviour (education programs to encourage the adoption of Government water savings
initiatives).
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spectrum described by the Interdepartmental Committee. In the course of that study,
accountability of governments emerges as a major issue to be addressed across the
range of regulatory forms.
The following paragraphs explore the nature of hard and soft law. The manner in
which regulatory review is conducted and the reasons for such review are outlined in
Chapter 3.3. The principles of administrative law, and the different avenues for
challenging administrative decision-making, are set out and the broad characteristics
of remedies available under administrative law mechanisms are introduced in Chapter
3.4.
3.2.1 Hard law
The black letter law of primary and subordinate legislation is the body of law that is
familiar to most people. Primary legislation consists of Acts of Parliament. It is
regulation that has been devised and scrutinised by Parliament. Subordinate
legislation comprises instruments in various forms such as rules, regulations,
ordinances, by-laws and statutory plans that have the force of law and are made under
the authority of individual Acts in which Parliament has explicitly delegated part of its
legislative power.5
A body of law that is not black letter law is frequently referred to as ‘soft law’, a term
that sits easily with the notion of black letter law as being ‘hard law’. 6 Justice Downes
has indicated that the Administrative Review Council (‘ARC’) is using the descriptions
‘hard law’ and ‘soft law’ to distinguish legislation from policy.7 Aronson’s analysis of
soft law allows hard law to go beyond the realms of black letter law to include
instruments with ‘contractual force’.8

5

Ibid 5-6. The draft water sharing plans for the Sydney Region discussed in Chapter 8 on page 154 are draft statutory
plans.
6
Ibid 2. The Interdepartmental Committee refers to the ‗black letter law‘ of legislation formulated and enforced by
government. It does not offer a definition of ‗hard law‘.
7
Justice Garry Downes, ‗Good Decision-Making‘ (Speech delivered at the Australian Public Service Commission
Forum of Commonwealth Agencies Conference, Novotel Brighton Beach, 7 March 2008) 8. Examples of hard law
water regulation in the Sydney Region are the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) (‗WMA 2000‘) and the Water
Industry Competition Act 2006 (NSW) (‗WICA 2006‘).
8
See Mark Aronson, ‗Private Bodies, Public Power and Soft Law in the High Court‘ (2007) 35 Federal Law Review
1, 3 (‗Private Bodies, Public Power‘). It is significant to note Aronson‘s reference to contracts here. The law of
contracts deals with legally enforceable relationships between the contracting parties. Contracts are not black letter
law but for the purposes of the present study, they are hard law – regardless of the level of government involvement
in their creation or execution. See also the discussion of soft law in Chapter 3.2.2 on page 36 and self regulation in
Chapter 3.2.3 on page 38.
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The discussion in this thesis adopts the term ‘hard law’ in preference to ‘black letter
law’. It accepts Aronson’s approach to include contracts as hard law although they are
not part of the traditional body of ‘black letter law’. Examination of water law in the
Sydney Region illustrates how the divide between hard and soft law is closing in some
important areas, including water planning law – where invitations to implement soft
law initiatives are becoming increasingly persuasive, if not quite mandatory, but most
definitely not legislative.9
Hard law frequently takes a ‘command and control’ approach to regulation, prohibiting
or restricting certain activities, while at the same time putting in place monitoring and
enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance with its constraints. 10 More
commonly, hard law is permitted to go beyond such narrow confines of ‘command and
control’ regulation to include greater discretion for adaptive management within the
regulation itself and to allow the adoption in legislation of aspirational objectives that
often may not be capable of attainment, notwithstanding policy imperatives, without
further definition, or directions for implementation beyond those already embodied in
the legislation.11

9

However Creyke stresses that there are difficulties even in determining what is ‗legislative‘ in character. Creyke
proposes that if an instrument is legislative in character then it can be ‗assumed‘ to fall outside the category of soft
law. Creyke‘s article explores difficulties that can be encountered in determining whether an instrument is legislative
in character concluding that ‗identifying what is soft law as distinct from what is an instrument of a legislative
character remains an uncertain task‘: see Robin Creyke, ‗‗Soft Law‘ and Administrative Law: A New Challenge‘,
(2010) 61 Australian Institute of Administrative Law Forum 15, 16 (‗―Soft Law‖ and Administrative Law‘). See also
the discussion of the definition of ‗soft law‘ below in Chapter 3.2.2 on page 36.
10
See generally Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy, (Oxford
University Press, 1998). The impact of command and control regulation was explored by Gunningham and Grabosky
in an environmental law and policy context. They considered two phases of environmental regulation (principally
with reference to developments in the United States). The first phase in the early 1970s witnessed governments
responding to public environmental concerns with hard law instruments designed to prohibit or restrict
environmentally harmful activities. The second phase commenced in the late 1970s and was one of substantial deregulation reacting to pressures for governments to cut spending and to provide more competitive business
environments. This second phase gave rise to a range of different types of policy instruments through the 1990s: selfregulation and co-regulation, environmental audits, environmental management systems, eco-labelling schemes,
liability rules for banks and insurers, environmental reporting, community right-to-know legislation and good
neighbour agreements.
Despite the development of this new range of policy instruments, the hard law elements of environmental
regulation remained in place in the late 1990s. Gunningham and Grabosky suggested that although attempts to move
away from the command and control approach of hard law in the second phase met substantial opposition in relation
to environmental management, the regulatory climate had been substantially changed. The new forms of regulation
offered an alternative for regulators that were reluctant to introduce new or tougher regulation ‗for fear of alienating
either their political masters or influential business lobbies who are never reticent to suggest that such regulation will
make them less competitive, or hasten their move to another jurisdiction‘. The holy grail for the authors was a ‗third
phase of regulation: one which still involves government intervention, but selectively and in combination with a
range of market and non-market solutions, and of public and private orderings‘. Government intervention in third
phase regulation would not be confined to hard law mechanisms: at 8, 10.
11
See for example discussion in Chapter 10 on page 200 of soft law initiatives under the Metropolitan Water Plan
2006 that are incorporated into draft water sharing plans for the Sydney Region; and in Chapter 13.4.1 on page 289.
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3.2.2 Soft law
Between the two regulatory extremes of self-regulation and hard law, the
Interdepartmental Committee located a body of regulation (now variously known as
‘quasi-regulation’, ‘grey-letter law’ and ‘soft law’)12 that consisted of
a range of rules, instruments and standards where government influences business to
comply, but which does not form part of explicit government regulation.13

Rules that have no legally binding force but which are intended to influence conduct,
and policy that is intended to change behaviour, are soft law.14 Soft law can be rules
‘with neither statutory nor contractual force’ that appear in both the public and the
private spheres.15 Other more contextually specific definitions saw soft law as: shaping
administrative decision-making;16 rules in the public and private spheres with neither
statutory nor contractual force;17 and agreements between governments that have no
legal effect either as contracts or under legislation but that may serve to guide
executive action, or complement legislation or affect the interests of third parties.18
Creyke faced the challenge of distinguishing between policy and soft law, proposing
that ‘soft law both encompasses policy and is also a special subset of policy
instruments, distinguished by its intention to change behaviour’.19
The concept of ‘soft law’ is well developed in international law although even in that
context there is much debate about definitions and purpose. One approach is to view
discussion of proposals to include such references as part of the licensing conditions for water service providers in the
Sydney Region.
12
The Grey-Letter Law Report referred to ‗quasi-regulation‘ and ‗grey-letter law‘ as one and the same thing but,
other than in the report title, used the term ‗quasi-regulation‘: see Grey-Letter Law Report, above n 4, ix. Sossin and
Smith preferred the term ‗soft law‘ to ‗quasi-legislation‘: see Lorne Sossin and Charles W Smith, ‗Hard Choices and
Soft Law: Ethical Codes, Policy Guidelines and the Role of the Courts in Regulating Government‘ (2003) 40 Alberta
Law Review 867, 869. Robin Creyke provided a nexus between ‗grey-letter law‘ and ‗soft law‘: see ―Soft Law‖ and
Administrative Law, above n 9, 15.
13
Grey-Letter Law Report, above n 4, 7. Examples of soft law water regulation in the Sydney Region include
elements of the National Competition Policy (‗NCP‘) (discussed in Chapter 5); the National Water Initiative
(discussed in Chapters 5 and 6); and the Metropolitan Water Plan 2006 (discussed in Chapter 9).
14
See discussion in ―Soft Law‖ and Administrative Law, above n 9, 15-16. The discussion of urban water policy as
soft law in the Sydney Region in later chapters develops Creyke‘s analysis.
15
See Private Bodies, Public Power, above n 8, 3.
16
Sossin and Smith, above n 12, examine ethical codes and policy guidelines that constrain the exercise of
administrative discretion.
17
See discussion of the facts and the decision in Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99 in Private Bodies,
Public Power, above n 8, 2: Aronson comments that the decision to refuse to enforce the University‘s non-statutory
student misconduct code signalled ‗doubts about the possibility of seeking judicial protection of any kind under
relationships covered only by ‗soft law‘ – guidelines, procedure manuals, internal disciplinary codes, and so forth‘.
18
See the discussion of the legal nature of intergovernmental agreements in Cheryl Saunders, ‗Intergovernmental
agreements and the executive power‘ (2005) 16 Public Law Review 294, 299. Intergovernmental agreements that
have played a major role in urban water regulation in the Sydney Region are discussed below in Part II.
19
―Soft Law‖ and Administrative Law, above n 9, 16. The distinction between policy and soft law, if one can be
maintained, is foremost in the analysis of water management law in the Sydney Region.
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soft law as comprising nonbinding rules or instruments that interpret or inform
understanding of binding legal rules or represent promises that in turn create
expectations about future conduct. On this analysis, soft law is something more than a
political strategy but less than hard law, it is hortatory rather than legally binding, but
it can have legal significance when it shapes expectations as to what constitutes
compliance with legally binding rules.20
The role of government in the regulatory process – either through its participation in
the development or monitoring of regulation or through the provision of funding for its
development or implementation – was a fundamental criterion used by the
Interdepartmental Committee to distinguish between self-regulation and quasiregulation, the absence of government involvement characterising the former. The
scope for progression from one category of regulation to another was also recognised,
for example in circumstances where widespread acceptance and use of a particular
industry self-regulation could lead to its adoption by government as a guideline (quasiregulation) that might then be formalised in legislation.21
Commentators recognise that the distinction between soft law and hard law is unclear
at times. Creyke notes that:
If an instrument is legislative in character it can be assumed to fall outside the soft law
category. However, even determining whether an instrument is legislative or
administrative in character is to enter contested territory.22

The discussion in this thesis adopts the term ‘soft law’ in preference to ‘quasiregulation’ or ‘grey-letter law’ to encompass those instruments where government
seeks to influence behavior but that have no legally binding force, that are persuasive
but not mandatory. In this thesis classification of regulatory instruments as hard or
20

See discussion in Andrew T Guzman and Timothy L Meyer, ‗International Soft Law‘, (2010) 2(1) Journal of Legal
Analysis, 171.
21
See generally Grey-Letter Law Report, above n 4, 9 [1.6]. The development of guidelines for plumbers by the
Master Plumbers Association of Australia is relevant: Master Plumbers and Mechanical Services Association of
Australia and Australian Rainwater Industry Development Association, Rainwater Tank Design and Installation
Handbook (National Water Commission, November 2008); Master Plumbers and Mechanical Services Association of
Australia and RMIT University, Urban Greywater Design and Installation Handbook (National Water Commission,
November 2008); see also discussion of recycling guidelines in Chapter 10.2.2 on page 207.
22
―Soft Law‖ and Administrative Law, above n 9, 16. Creyke discussed the efficacy of the Legislative Instruments
Act 2003 (Cth) in providing certainty as to what was a legislative instrument. According to Creyke the application of
the definition of a legislative instrument under that Act (as ‗legislative‘ if it determines the law and has an indirect
effect on rights and interests) led to registration of instruments with doubtful legislative character and inclusion on the
register of ‗many instruments which could be categorised as soft law since they are executive, not legislative, in
nature‘: at 15.
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soft law struggles at times under the Interdepartmental Committee’s analogy of a
continuous spectrum of regulation, the notion of boundaries on a continuum being
oxymoronic. Yet that analogy provides some explanation for the difficulties
encountered not only in identifying what is soft law but the dilemma faced in
administrative law by those needing to categorise instruments to be of a legislative
nature – the boundary between the two is indeed amorphous.
3.2.3 Self-regulation
The Interdepartmental Committee provided a definition of self-regulation as:
any regulatory regime which has generally been developed and funded by industry,
and is enforced exclusively by industry.23

Having set out this definition, the Interdepartmental Committee then grappled with
the degree to which government could be involved in formulating self-regulation,
before that regulation changed character sufficiently to become soft law or to leap into
hard law.
The defining characteristics of self-regulation for the purposes of the present study are
that it is limited in application (often to a specific part of an industry sector, for
example residential plumbing), it is minimalist in substance and in form (sometimes to
the extent that it may well be incapable of implementation), and it is devoid of
government involvement in its implementation and enforcement. Attempting to draw
a distinction between soft law and self-regulation in some circumstances might well be
a matter of semantics were it not for the essential consideration of government
involvement.
3.3

Regulating regulation

The Interdepartmental Committee was established in response to concerns about
inadequate review and scrutiny of soft law in Australia, part of its terms of reference
being to inquire into ‘processes for monitoring and reviewing quasi-regulation to

23

Grey-Letter Law Report, above n 4, 6 [1.4]. Examples of such soft law instruments in the present study include the
NSW Blue Guidelines discussed in Chapter 10.2.2.1 on page 208 and NSW Purple Guidelines discussed in Chapter
10.2.2.2 on page 210.
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ensure that it is current, effective and efficient’.24 The following paragraphs describe
the monitoring and review processes that it addressed. These processes are distinct
from administrative law processes discussed in subsequent paragraphs that act to
ensure lawful government activity. Examination in later chapters of monitoring and
review of the processes of development of water regulation in the Sydney Region
serves to demonstrate the increasing influence of soft law mechanisms in regulation
and highlights some of the emerging issues arising from the growing reliance on those
mechanisms as a form of regulation.25
3.3.1 Monitoring regulation
According to the Interdepartmental Committee ‘monitoring’ is intended to address
how a regulatory scheme is working. The monitoring process involves the collection of
information, on an ongoing basis, to assess whether specified objectives of the scheme
are being achieved. Monitoring is conducted by those administering the scheme. The
process expects that participants will receive feedback and respond by adjusting their
behaviour to achieve the stated objectives of the scheme. The outcomes of the
monitoring process seek to change behaviour.
3.3.2 Reviewing regulation
‘Review’ is intended to address how a scheme has been performing up to a particular
point in time. It provides an opportunity to assess progress made towards achieving a
scheme’s objectives. Most importantly, it also invites consideration of whether a
scheme should be modified or abandoned and, if the latter, whether other alternatives
should be considered. The outcomes of the review process therefore relate both to
the history and the prospects of the specific regulatory scheme.
24

Grey-Letter Law Report, above n 4, iii. The inquiry conducted by the Interdepartmental Committee came about at
a time when regulatory reform took the shape of government policies guiding regulation away from hard law options
to less heavy handed regulatory options. The rationale for the move was stated to be:

a need to remove unnecessary obstacles to dynamic forces that drive efficiency, innovation and growth;

concerns about reducing unreasonable compliance costs imposed on some business, particularly small business;
and

finding better ways to achieve legitimate public policy goals.
The preferred option was self-regulation so that industry could take ownership and responsibility for developing
effective and efficient self-regulation. In so far as the Interdepartmental Committee could characterise self-regulation
as industry monitored and enforced then it was not the prime focus of the inquiry. However as the divide between the
types of regulation blurred, the scope of the review encompassed concerns about and recommendations for
monitoring and review of self-regulation, all the time attempting to resist government involvement.
25
See for example the discussion below of reviews and monitoring conducted in relation to the NCP and the National
Water Initiative (‗NWI‘) (Chapter 6 on page 113) and the role of the Independent Review Panel appointed by the
NSW Government to review the Metropolitan Water Plan 2006 (Chapter 9.7 on page 194).
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The use of ‘sunset clauses’ in legislation strengthens the outcome of regulatory
reviews. If a review indicates that legislation that is due to expire is still relevant, and
its objectives remain current, then a further instrument will need to be made.26
Recognising that monitoring and review are complementary processes, the
Interdepartmental Committee summarised the desired outcome from these activities:
Fundamentally, monitoring and review of a regulatory scheme should ensure that its
benefits to the Australian community continue to outweigh any costs.27

3.3.3 Effective regulation
The concepts of regulatory effectiveness and efficiency and the cost/benefit analysis of
regulatory schemes raised by the Interdepartmental Committee reflect a particular
approach to the assessment through monitoring and review of the merits or otherwise
of a regulatory scheme. The NSW Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal
(‘IPART’)28 saw effective or ‘best practice’ regulation as essential to a well-functioning
economy – helping to create a safe and just society and providing a means of achieving
the ‘triple bottom line’ of social, economic and environmental goals.
Effective or ‘best practice regulation’, according to IPART, is regulation which is
transparent, accountable, targeted, consistent and proportionate to need.29 It is
regulation that is fully justified and effective, provides the greatest net benefit to the
community, is clear and concise, is consistent with other laws and regulations, is
capable of being enforced, is administered fairly and consistently by accountable
bodies and is not unduly prescriptive.30 According to IPART, it is delivered through
good regulatory practice which includes:


Identification of the problems and the desired objectives or outcomes to establish a
clear case (or otherwise) for action

26

Grey-Letter Law Report, above n 4, 77.
Ibid 76. By way of example, examination in Chapter 6 of the impact of monitoring and review of NSW‘s
performance firstly under the water reform agenda of the NCP and then under the NWI illustrates how these processes
can bring about changes in behaviour of the parties affected by particular regulations and changes to the regulations
themselves. Review provisions included in hard law of water regulation in the Sydney Region and sunset clauses
included in hard and soft law are identified in discussion in this study.
28
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (NSW), ‗Investigation into the Burden of Regulation in NSW and
Improving regulatory efficiency‘ (Other Industries — Final Report S9-24, October 2006) 1 (‗IPART Burden of
Regulation Report‘).
29
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (NSW), ‗Investigation into Water and Wastewater Service Provision
in the Greater Sydney Region‘, (Final Report S9-17, October 2005) 86 (‗IPART Services Report‘).
30
IPART Burden of Regulation Report, above n 28, 43.
27
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Consideration of regulatory or non-regulatory (eg market or self-regulation) options to
achieve the desired outcome



Assessment of costs and benefits of the alternatives to consumers, business,
government and the community



Community consultation and participation



Decisions based on transparent criteria and adoption of the option of greatest net
benefit to the community



Development of a strategy of implementation, enforcement and review to ensure
relevance and effectiveness over time.31

Where regulation is excessive, overlapping, duplicated, inconsistent, or unnecessarily
complex or burdensome the system will fail to be effective.
Monitoring and review of water regulation in the Sydney Region has been an ongoing
task for various government agencies since the early 1990s. The outcomes of these
processes and the impact they have had on adapting and reforming water
management in the Sydney Region are examined in chapters that follow, and the
processes themselves are questioned. The study does not attempt an assessment of
whether or not water regulation in the Sydney Region meets IPART’s ideals of best
practice regulation. Rather discussion focuses on the extent to which administrative
practice associated with delivery of that regulation has embraced two of IPART’s
elements of good regulatory practice: community consultation and participation, and
transparent decision making.

31

Ibid 2. Conclusions reached in this report are discussed in Chapter 14. See also the discussion of best practice
regulation in relation to licences issued to Sydney Water Corporation and Sydney Catchment Authority in Chapter 13
on page 267.
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Figure 3.1

Pyramid of Business Rules

Source: Administrative Review Council, ‘Administrative Accountability in Business Areas Subject to
Complex and Specific Regulation’ (Report to the Attorney-General of Australia, Report No
49, November 2008) x
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3.4

Challenging government decisions

Scrutiny of the relationship between the regulator and the regulated under soft law
instruments has been identified as one of the challenges presented by the increasing
trend towards soft law regimes.32 This section outlines the administrative law
mechanisms that are available to challenge government decision-making with
particular reference to NSW, and to the difficulties that can be encountered when
attempting to apply those administrative law principles to issues arising from decisions
made under soft law instruments. Figure 3.1 illustrates the spectrum of regulation
referred to by the Interdepartmental Committee and the availability of review
mechanisms explored in this part of the discussion to challenge actions and decisions
arising from different types of regulation.
3.4.1 The basic tenets of administrative law
Administrative law as a process to contain government administrative activity within
lawful bounds is concerned with the relationship between governments and the
people governed. Groves and Lee state that:
Administrative law is all about what the agencies of the executive government
(ministers, departments, agencies and the individual officers who work within these
bodies) can and cannot do. More particularly, administrative law encompasses the
different mechanisms and principles that enable people to question or challenge the
decisions of these agencies of government.33

Although administrative law in Australia had its roots in common law imported into
the colonies from England at settlement, ‘the protection of the public against
executive error or abuse now has a firm legislative foundation’.34

32

See for example the discussion in ‗‗Soft Law‖ and Administrative Law, above n 9; and Robin Creyke and Matthew
Groves, ‗Administrative Law Evolution: an Academic Perspective‘, (2010) 59 Admin Review 20. The problems with
soft law that are identified in these papers include: the lack of Parliamentary scrutiny of the creation of soft law
instruments; inadequacies in drafting that may lead to problems with clarity of intent and legal error; difficulties of
accessing soft law; and excessive discretions granted to regulators. The focus of the papers is the failure of
administrative law mechanisms to provide an adequate avenue to challenge executive decision-making under soft
law.
33
Matthew Groves and H P Lee (eds), Australian Administrative Law: Fundamentals, Principles and Doctrines
(Cambridge University Press, 2007) 1.
34
John McMillan, ‗Parliament and Administrative Law‘, (Research Paper No 13 2000-01, Parliamentary Library,
Parliament of Australia, 2000) 2. McMillan provides an overview of the emergence of the current administrative law
framework in Australia.
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According to McMillan there are three principles that underpin the Australian
administrative law system:


administrative justice, which at its core is a philosophy that in administrative
decision-making the rights and interests of individuals should be properly
safeguarded



executive accountability, which is the aim of ensuring that those who exercise
the executive (and coercive) powers of the state can be called on to explain and
to justify the way in which they have gone about that task, and



good administration, which is the principle that administrative decision-making
should conform to universally accepted standards, such as rationality, fairness,
consistency, and transparency.35

The underlying goals of administrative law, common to all institutions involved in its
delivery, seek to ensure that the values of transparency, accountability, consistency,
rationality, impartiality, participation, procedural fairness and reasonable access to
judicial and non-judicial grievance mechanisms are maintained in administrative
decision-making. 36
This study is principally concerned with the extent to which administrative decisionmaking in urban water regulation is transparent and participatory. It also lays the
foundation for further exploration of mechanisms that might be invoked by those
aggrieved by decisions made in the development and implementation of soft law
components of that regulatory framework.
3.4.2 Administrative review mechanisms
The Australian Constitution established original jurisdiction in the High Court to
undertake judicial review in relation to certain matters involving the Commonwealth.37
Reforms initiated in the 1970s produced a comprehensive legal framework embodying
specific legal rights to challenge government decisions and to scrutinise government
35

Ibid 24.
The goals of administrative law are discussed in Matthew Groves and H P Lee, above n 33, 2. See also Mark
Aronson, Bruce Dyer and Matthew Groves, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (Lawbook, 4th ed, 2009) 1-2.
37
Australian Constitution s 75(iii) confers jurisdiction on the High Court in relation to matters in which the
Commonwealth, or a person suing or being sued on its behalf, is a party. Section 75(v) of the Australian Constitution
confers original jurisdiction on the High Court in matters ‗In which a writ of Mandamus or prohibition or an
injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth‘.
36
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processes: a statutory code for judicial review by the courts, merits review by
administrative tribunals, and investigation of administrative action by ombudsmen.
Different remedies were made available through the various mechanisms: a decision
could be quashed or set aside without a new decision being made through judicial
review; new decisions emanated from tribunals; recommendations were amongst the
outcomes available from Ombudsmen. In addition, the Commonwealth scheme
established a right for a person aggrieved by a government decision to be entitled
upon request to be given a written statement of reasons for the decision. 38
In NSW, the Supreme Court exercises jurisdiction both at common law (judicial review
of actions and decisions)39 and under statute (appeals and applications to the Court
from decisions of tribunals and other bodies) in relation to public bodies and officials.
The Land and Environment Court of NSW has jurisdiction to determine a range of
disputes, including matters arising under the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) and
the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW). The Administrative
Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW) established the NSW Administrative Decisions
Tribunal to make decisions at first instance, and to review decisions made by
administrators, in circumstances where the Tribunal is given jurisdiction ‘by an
enactment’.40 The NSW Ombudsman, appointed under the Ombudsman Act 1974
(NSW), is an independent review body that conducts administrative, compliance and
38

The Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) conferred jurisdiction on the Federal Court (created
by the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)) to undertake judicial review in relation to most Commonwealth
decisions made under enactments; the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) established the Administrative
Appeals Tribunal to undertake merit review of a general range of Commonwealth decisions and an Administrative
Review Council (‗ARC‘) to carry out research, advisory and coordination functions; and the Ombudsman Act 1976
(Cth) established the Commonwealth Ombudsman to investigate complaints relating to administrative actions of
Commonwealth Government agencies. Creyke and Groves refer to more recent additions to the administrative law
framework: the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth); the creation of the Australian Human Rights Commission;
the establishment of the Privacy Commissioner; and the ‗whistleblower laws‘ (Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) section
16): Creyke and Groves, above n 32, 20. In relation to reasons for decisions see for example Administrative
Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 13.
39
Supreme Court of New South Wales, Practice Note SC CL3 — Supreme Court Common Law Division —
Administrative Law List, 16 July 2007 sets out the common law grounds for judicial review as follows: ‗ultra vires‘,
lack of jurisdiction; lack of procedural fairness; acting under dictation; real or apprehended bias; inflexible
application of a policy; taking into account irrelevant considerations; failing to take into account relevant
considerations; extraneous (improper) purpose; error of law on the face of the record; no evidence; bad faith; and
‗Wednesbury‘ unreasonableness: at [6]. With regard to statutory appeals and applications, the Practice Note also
advises that, among others, matters arising under the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW), ss118-119
and the Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), ss 21A, 35A, 35B are assigned to the Administrative Law List of the Supreme
Court: at [8]. The grounds of appeal and applications from administrative tribunals arise from the terms of the statute
setting up the relevant body. They will generally include excess of jurisdiction and denial of natural justice. Error of
law is also available in relation to the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Appeal Panel: at [13].
40
Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW) (ADTA) s 5 defines an enactment variously as an Act or a
statutory rule. The Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) s 3(1) defines a statutory rule as a regulation, by-law, rule or
ordinance made by the Governor or required to be approved or confirmed by the Governor, or a rule of court.
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legislative reviews. The role of the Ombudsman is not to replace or oppose decisionmaking by agencies but to assist agencies to ‘be aware of their responsibilities to the
public, act reasonably and comply with law and best practice in administration’.41
Information concerning, and access to, government documents, formerly facilitated by
the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (NSW), is now covered by the Government
Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW)42, and protection is afforded to
‘whistleblowers’ under the Protected Disclosures Act 1994 (NSW).
3.4.3 Review in practice: neither judicial nor merits?
In Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin, Brennan J provided a now often-quoted statement
of the scope and nature of judicial review:
The essential warrant for judicial intervention is the declaration and enforcing of the
law affecting the extent and exercise of power: that is the characteristic duty of the
judicature as the third branch of government…The duty and jurisdiction of the court to
review administrative actions do not go beyond the declaration and enforcing of the
law which determines the limits and governs the exercise of the repository’s power. If,
in so doing, the court avoids administrative injustice or error, so be it; but the court
has no jurisdiction simply to cure administrative injustice or error.43

Judicial review is available for all decisions of an administrative nature. If a decision is
found to be made unlawfully, the powers of the court are usually restricted to setting
the decision aside and remitting the matter to the decision-maker for reconsideration
according to law. In the process of judicial review the courts are not concerned with
re-hearing the merits of a case, merits review has become the bailiwick of

41

The administrative review role of the Ombudsman includes dealing with complaints about administrative conduct
of public sector agencies. The Ombudsman reviews compliance by agencies with the law and good practice in
performance of their functions; handling of and response to allegations/complaints; and in standards of service
provision. Legislative review is limited to review of implementation of certain legislation that expands the powers of
police and correctional staff. Source: NSW Ombudsman, ‗Jurisdiction and Functions of the Ombudsman‘ (Public
Sector Agencies Fact Sheet No 10, first printed June 2005).
42
The Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) which commenced on 1 July 2010 is part of a
package of reforms replacing existing Freedom of Information laws in NSW. The reforms are intended to open
government information to the public by authorising and encouraging proactive release of government information by
agencies; providing an enforceable right to members of the public to access government information; and restricting
access only when there is an overriding public interest against disclosure.
43
(1990) 170 CLR 1, 35. Mark Robinson offered the following summary of the process of judicial review: ‗Judicial
review involves a court assessing or examining a decision or purported decision of the executive, a tribunal or a lower
court and upon finding an unlawful error or want of jurisdiction in the making of that decision setting that decision
aside or otherwise declaring the decision invalid or void and, in some cases, commanding the decision maker to
reconsider the principal application or matter according to law.‘ See: Mark Robinson, ‗Judicial Review of Decisions
by State Tribunals‘ (Paper presented to NSW Legal Aid Conference: Civil Law – A Focus of Human Rights, Sydney,
6-7 November 2002) 1.
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administrative tribunals and, in relation to some matters that arise under hard law, the
Land and Environment Court of NSW.
Attempts to define an administrative tribunal as distinct from courts or other review
agencies have been relatively unsuccessful.44 The characteristic generally accepted as
setting tribunals apart from other agencies is that tribunals generally make decisions
on the merits of the specific matter – taking into account law, facts and policy.45 Merits
review ‘involves the capacity to ‘step into the shoes’ of government decision makers
and to remake the administrative decisions according to the merits of individual
cases’.46
According to Landrigan47 merits review provides a means by which public
administrators can be held accountable, thus boosting community confidence in a
system of public administration – an important outcome where broad discretionary
powers are conferred on decision-makers, significant personal or commercial rights
are at stake, or decisions are politically contentious.

44

Creyke explores various definitions finally opting to treat a ‗tribunal‘ as ‗a body which closely parallels the
conventional court‘: Robin Creyke, ‗Administrative tribunals‘ in Matthew Groves and H P Lee (eds), Australian
Administrative Law: Fundamentals, Principles and Doctrines (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 77, 79. Cane said
of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal that it ‗looks and acts more like a court with lay members than a tribunal with
judicial and legal members‘: Peter Cane, ‗Merits Review and Judicial Review – the AAT as Trojan Horse‘ (2000) 28
Federal Law Review 213, 215.
45
See Robin Creyke, ‗Administrative tribunals‘ above n 44, 82. Creyke explains that the separation of powers under
the Commonwealth Constitution prevents the High Court and other federal courts from exercising non-judicial power
– thus there can be no review by those courts on the merits of a case. There was a need for merits review functions to
be undertaken by other agencies at the Commonwealth level, giving rise to a hierarchy of tribunals. Although the
constitutional constraint does not apply to state courts, NSW has created tribunals to conduct merits review: at 77–83.
46
Administrative Review Council, ‗Better Decisions: Review of Commonwealth Merits Review Tribunals‘ (Report
No 39, 1995) viii. For example, s 63 of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW) provides that:
(1) In determining an application for a review of a reviewable decision, the Tribunal is to decide what the
correct and preferable decision is having regard to the material then before it, including the following:
(a) any relevant factual material,
(b) any applicable written or unwritten law.
(2) For this purpose, the Tribunal may exercise all of the functions that are conferred or imposed by any
relevant enactment on the administrator who made the decision.
(3) In determining an application for the review of a reviewable decision, the Tribunal may decide:
(a) to affirm the reviewable decision, or
(b) to vary the reviewable decision, or
(c) to set aside the reviewable decision and make a decision in substitution for the reviewable
decision it set aside, or
(d) to set aside the reviewable decision and remit the matter for reconsideration by the
administrator in accordance with any directions or recommendations of the Tribunal.
The tribunal is to have regard to the material ‗then before it‘ which, as Creyke notes, may bear little resemblance to
that before the original decision-maker: see Robin Creyke, ‗Administrative tribunals‘, above n 44, 85.
47
See the analysis of merits review by Mitchell Landrigan, ‗The Merits of Merits Review‘ (2002) 52(2)
Telecommunications Journal of Australia 55. Landrigan stresses that the role of merits review in promoting public
confidence in administrative decision-making is particularly significant when the potential costs of regulatory error
are substantial; the commercial consequences of such error potentially very large; and the implications for the value
of shareholdings in an enterprise significant: at 60.
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However, O’Connor J suggested that there were factors working against the continuing
success of merits review in driving openness and transparency in government
administration. In a climate of public policy and public sector management where
there is increasing emphasis being placed on economic goals, O’Connor J observed
that:
less worth is attached to values that cannot be measured in dollar terms such as
administrative justice for individuals, openness and transparency in decision making or
the normative effect of administrative review decisions, particularly when
implementing such values costs money.48

O’Connor J cited other factors in play to counter this economic rationalist approach, in
particular government actions to develop a greater ‘client focus’ for the public sector.
Refocusing service delivery in this way would bring the interests of the community to
the fore and create awareness in public administrators of their responsibilities and
commitments to the community.49
The future of merits review ultimately lies in the hands of the legislators since:
a right to merits review can exist only where a legislative enactment creates a decision
making power and also provides that a person may apply to an administrative tribunal
for review of that decision. Quite properly the Parliament creates the right. Where
decisions are made under a non-statutory scheme, there can be no right to merits
review.50

The issue that is immediately apparent from the foregoing quotation, and that is a
focus of the discussion in chapters to come, is whether (and how) government
accountability can be maintained under soft law (non-statutory) regulatory
mechanisms that are part of the water law framework in the Sydney Region.
3.4.4 Accountability in soft law
In 2008 the ARC was asked to inquire into and report on the most effective and
efficient administrative accountability mechanisms for decisions in areas of complex

48

Justice Deirdre O‘Connor, ‗Lessons from the Past/Challenges for the Future: Merits Review in the New
Millennium‘ (Paper presented at the 2000 National Administrative Law Forum — Sunrise or Sunset? Administrative
Law in the New Millennium, June 2000) (‗Lessons from the Past‘).
49
Ibid. In this context Justice Deirdre O‘Connor referred to the development of service charters by government
bodies, providing services to the public, in consultation with their customers.
50
Ibid (emphasis added).
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and specific business regulation. In order to do so, the ARC was asked to consider the
circumstances in which Commonwealth administrative review mechanisms should be
available in business areas; any adaptations to merits review that might be made to
maximise its efficiency and effectiveness; and whether national guideline principles
could be developed for administrative review in areas of complex and specific
regulation.51 ‘Business rules’ were defined as legislation (including subordinate
legislation), soft law materials developed by government agencies, and soft law
materials developed by co- and self-regulation. ‘Soft law’ was said to refer to a vast
and varied range of instruments that in practice could be as influential in modifying
behaviour as hard law.52
Figure 3.1 summarises the accountability mechanisms that the ARC considered were
available to challenge actions and decisions emanating from the full spectrum of
regulation – from the hard law of regulation to purely aspirational edicts (the latter
somewhat extending the reach of the ‘spectrum’ contemplated by the
Interdepartmental Committee). The ARC also produced a framework of guideline
principles and recommended actions directed towards the achievement of
effectiveness and efficiency in all aspects of regulation – from development and
application through to review and monitoring.
The five components of that framework were:
1. The development of all business rules should be open and transparent, and there
should exist procedures for effective and timely consultation with people whose
interests are likely to be affected by the application of its rules.
2. All business rules should be expressed in clear, understandable language and be
readily accessible.
3. All business rules should be applied in a manner consistent with administrative law
values of lawfulness, fairness, rationality, openness (or transparency) and
efficiency.

51

Administrative Review Council, ‗Administrative Accountability in Business Areas Subject to Complex and
Specific Regulation‘ (Report to the Attorney-General of Australia, Report No 49, November 2008) (‗Business Rules
Report‘) Terms of Reference.
52
Ibid 5.
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4. There should be an opportunity to seek review of any decision that applies a
business rule in a way that directly affects the rights or interests of a person or
business.53
5. There should be continuing monitoring of the accountability mechanisms that
apply to action taken on the basis of soft law business rules, whether the action is
taken by a government or a non-government agency.54

According to ARC guiding principle 3, protection for individual interests and
maintenance of public confidence requires that regulation should be applied
consistently with the administrative law values of lawfulness, fairness, rationality,
openness (or transparency) and efficiency.55 This guideline principle is couched in
terms that recommend it to government agencies, and non-government entities, as a
mantra for business conduct nationally. It sets an overarching objective for the
development of business rules, while the remaining guiding principles outline steps
that can be taken by regulators in the development, application, review and
monitoring of regulation to achieve that objective. Achievement of its aspirations
relies on regulators acting within the powers conferred on them and according to
procedures that are open and transparent. Fundamental to its relevance is the
existence of effective and efficient avenues for the review of decisions. For the
purposes of the present discussion, this principle is accepted as a reference point
against which all regulation and decision-making can be examined.
Water regulation in the Sydney Region is a form of ‘business rule’. It is complex and
specific. It encompasses instruments across the spectrum of regulation identified first
by the Interdepartmental Committee in its report56 and then somewhat extended by
the ARC. Water regulation in the Sydney Region has the potential to affect the
interests of many individuals and businesses in many ways. The conclusions reached
by the ARC embodied in the five guideline principles set out above are thus relevant to

53

Ibid. The five principles and recommended actions are set out in the summary to the report. Only the principles
are listed here. Although the notion of accountability for decisions made under all forms of regulation was palatable
for the ARC, that accountability was constrained in discussion of guiding principle 4 by recognition of a need to
balance cost and accountability in review mechanisms: Business Rules Report, above n 51, xiii. The costs of judicial
review are discussed in Justice Keith Mason, ‗Sunrise or Sunset? Reinventing Administrative Law for the New
Millennium‘ (Keynote Address delivered at the 2000 Administrative Law Forum, Adelaide, 15 June 2000). See also
Chapter 3.3.3 on page 40.
54
Business Rules Report, above n 51, xii–xiii.
55
Ibid xiii.
56
Grey-Letter Law Report, above n 4.
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water regulation in the Sydney Region. Indeed they offer some direction for future
water regulation in the Sydney Region, and are discussed again in Chapter 14.57
3.4.5 Stretching the limits of review
In the words of Chief Justice Spigelman:
judicial review extends to ensuring that powers are exercised for the purpose, broadly
understood, for which they were conferred and in the manner in which they were
intended to be exercised.58

Robin Creyke examined the availability of judicial review for soft law instruments and
actions taken under them.59 Creyke’s view was that where there is no statutory
authorisation for a soft law regulation (that is, the instrument cannot be construed as
‘hard law’ under the definition of the term adopted in this study) then the instrument
and actions taken under it are not reviewable under judicial review.60 Aronson also
expressed doubts about the availability of judicial protection of any kind under soft
law.61
The literature also points to further deterrents to seeking review of decisions made,
and actions taken, under soft law instruments through the Courts. The ARC
commented that its consultations in the course of the inquiry had confirmed that:
despite their non-binding character, soft law ‘guidelines’, ‘practice notes’, and so on,
developed by government agencies are treated in practice little differently from black
letter law. Some of those consulted said that only people with ‘deep pockets’ would
be in a position to mount a legal challenge to the validity of soft law produced by
government agencies.62

57

Business Rules Report, above n 51, Appendix A: notes that the Department of Water and Energy – New South
Wales and the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of New South Wales were consulted with/and or made
submissions in relation to the inquiry: at 42.
58
Chief Justice Spigelman, ‗Judicial Review and the Integrity Branch of Government Address‘ (Address to the World
Jurist Association Congress, Shanghai, 8 September 2005).
59
―Soft Law‖ and Administrative Law, above n 9, 19.
60
Ibid. However as Creyke points out soft law instruments may be indirectly reviewable by the courts in some
circumstances: for example Australian Standards where they have evidentiary status: at 19; ‗if couched in promissory
form, [soft law instruments] may raise a legitimate expectation, which if not complied with could give rise to a breach
of natural justice‘: at 20; ‗failure to follow a soft law standard may also be unreasonable, be a failure to take account
of a relevant consideration, or indicate that a policy has been applied inflexibly‘: at 20.
61
But see Private Bodies, Public Power, above n 8. Aronson held the view that Griffith University v Tang (2005)
221 CLR 99 signalled doubts about the availability of judicial protection of any kind under soft law: at 2.
62
Business Rules Report, above n 51, 14. The ARC‘s comment is somewhat cryptic. There is no explanation of what
is meant by ‗treated in practice‘, but reference to the list of organisations consulted and submissions received in
Appendix A to the report suggests that the comment may well extend to treatment in relation to administrative
review, at least in NSW, to get matters before the Court.
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There are several factors that militate against successful recourse to judicial review in
relation to soft law instruments, other than the need for ‘deep pockets’ referred to by
the ARC.
Predicting likely developments in Australian administrative law, Creyke and Groves
suggested that there may be a reduced emphasis on adjudication of disputes by courts
not only because of the inevitable costs, but also in view of the ‘forensic’ hazards of
litigation, and the personal toll that the process takes on complainants.63 As a
consequence of the retreat from litigation, Creyke and Groves pointed to an increased
focus on getting decisions right the first time, citing several (perhaps anticipatory)
publications that have emerged to assist decision makers to better perform their
tasks.64 The publications listed appear to be soft law themselves, and thus will rely for
their efficacy on uptake by administrators.
For those aggrieved by decisions made under the hard law of water regulation in the
Sydney Region, the most persuasive reason for avoiding adjudication by the courts lies
in the decisions that have emanated from those courts. Gardner, Bartlett and Gray
examined decisions relating to challenges to provisions in Water Sharing Plans
developed under the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW). The challenges were
spectacularly unsuccessful and offered little incentive for future complainants to
pursue their grievances through administrative review mechanisms in the courts.65 As
appealing as it might be to the writer, it is unlikely that there will be any court action
taken to challenge the development process or the substance of Water Sharing Plans
for the Sydney Region if they emerge in the same form as the drafts. But it is early
days.66
Flexible procedures; ability to tailor proceedings to the needs of applicants; emphasis
on substantive outcomes rather than technical evidentiary matters; and a cheaper, less
formal dispute resolution mechanism were characteristics of tribunals that led Creyke
63

Robin Creyke and Matthew Groves, ‗Administrative Law Evolution: An Academic Perspective‘ (2010) 59 Admin
Review 20, 23–24.
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Ibid 24.
65
Alex Gardner, Richard Bartlett and Janice Gray, Water Resources Law (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2009). See
generally Chapters 14–16. Of particular interest are: Murrumbidgee Groundwater Preservation Association v
Minister for Natural Resources [2004] NSWLEC 122, and on appeal [ 2005] NSWCA 10 (re Minister‘s plans);
Nature Conservation Council v Minister Administering the Water Management Act 2000 (2004) NSWLEC 33 and on
appeal [2005] NSWCA 9; Upper Namoi Water Users Association Inc & Ors v Minister for Natural Resources [2003]
NSWLEC 175 and Harvey & Anor v Minister Administering the Water Management Act 2000 [2008] NSWLEC 165.
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The draft water sharing plans for the Sydney Region are discussed below in Chapter 8 on page 154.
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and Groves to suggest that tribunals might be chosen over courts for administrative
review.67 Such an avenue of redress would sit comfortably with the notion of soft law
as a flexible regulatory mechanism. However, merits review is clearly a creature of
statute: the availability of merits review is derived from statute and is therefore not
available to challenge decisions made under the authority of soft law instruments. 68
Commentators have grappled with the dilemma presented by the lack of opportunity
for formal review of decisions made under soft law and produced aspirational
guidelines for the development of soft law instruments. It would be putting the cart
before the horse to bring those proposals into the discussion here – they are left for
Chapter 14 where they can be considered in the context of the framework of water
regulation in the Sydney Region that is pieced together in the intervening chapters.
3.5

Discussion

Parts II to IV of this thesis will show that water regulation in the Sydney Region in the
21st Century is an extremely complex mix of instruments that exhibit the
characteristics of regulation: they have the effect of modifying behaviour, they may or
may not be legislative mechanisms, and adherence to their terms need not be
mandatory. Water regulation in the Sydney Region comprises hard and soft law
mechanisms that fall within the broad spectrum of regulation set out by the
Intergovernmental Committee and somewhat extended by the ARC. Those that are
considered in this thesis are instruments created by governments.
In Part II, nationally agreed water reform initiatives embodied in the soft law of
intergovernmental agreements will be seen to have driven water management policy
in the Sydney Region since the early 1990s. Soft law instruments adapting those
policies to specific needs in the Sydney Region are examined in Chapters 9 and 10
where they are shown to be influencing the formulation of Water Sharing Plans for the
Sydney Region developed under the hard law of water management (which is
discussed in Chapters 7 and 8).
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Creyke and Groves, above n 32, 23, 24.
See ―Soft Law‖ and Administrative Law, above n 9, 19. Merits review is normally only accessible to persons
whose individual rights are affected by a decision, eg decision to refuse an application for grant, amendment or
transfer of a licence: Gardner, Bartlett and Gray, above n 65, 124–125 [6.43].
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The delivery of water supply and wastewater disposal services in Sydney has
traditionally been the business of government agencies regulated under institutionspecific statutory instruments.69 In recent times increasing demand pressure on
natural water resources and a move towards a more competitive water services
market have required changes to these patterns of water management and water
service delivery. Private sector operators are appearing on the scene albeit in limited
roles, and new water products (recycled water and desalinated seawater) are being
offered to consumers.
Specific legislation has been introduced in NSW (discussed in detail in Part IV) to
encourage the entry of private sector operators into the water industry – it is a hard
law response to a soft law imperative. It created a system of licensing for network
operators and water retailers and an access regime to facilitate access to water
industry infrastructure services.
With new sources of water becoming significant in the demand/supply balance in the
Sydney Region, regulation is increasingly concerned with the intended use for water
products and the disposal of wastewater and wastes generated in water treatment
processes. In this context public health and safety remain foremost objectives of
regulation. The form of that regulation is shown in discussions in Chapter 10 to be
moving away from an historically prescriptive hard law approach with the introduction
of a series of soft law guidelines to address risks associated with the production and
use of new water products. Chapter 13 demonstrates how access to new sources of
water that are not included in the hard law of NSW water management legislation (for
example wastewater) is being accommodated by a different form of hard law: under
contracts between service providers and recyclers.
The newer forms of soft law regulation that are emerging in the urban water sector in
the Sydney Region are less formal – and often more flexible – than hard law
mechanisms. They are arguably better suited to the challenges of new and developing
knowledge than those usually categorised as hard law and they can target quite
specific policy goals. These new forms of soft law in urban water regulation are an
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See for example the discussion of the operational frameworks of Sydney Water Corporation and Sydney
Catchment Authority in Chapter 13.4.1 on page 289.
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integral part of the complementary combinations of policy instruments envisaged by
Gunningham and Grabosky. 70 In the urban water sector of the Sydney Region they will
be seen to include intergovernmental agreements, guidelines, policy statements, selfregulation, and forms of grants and incentives which may be available to a regulatory
authority by virtue of its ownership of assets or its control of public funds.
Discussion in the chapters that follow has a strong focus on the processes associated
with the development and implementation of water regulation in the Sydney Region.
Soft law and the processes associated with its delivery may well be beyond the reach
of traditional mechanisms of administrative review ab initio. However, administrative
reliance on discretionary provisions in the hard law of water management in the
Sydney Region presents yet another opportunity to remove administrative decisionmaking from scrutiny under administrative law mechanisms. Soft and hard water law
alike in the Sydney Region may fail to deliver transparent and participatory regulation.
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Chapter 4: Water Law and Institutions in the Sydney Region
There are, no doubt, good reasons why particular institutions are clothed with the legal status
with which they are endowed. The result, however, is a somewhat complex and rather subtle
set of arrangements for the management of water resources and for the delivery of water
1
services in New South Wales.

4.1

Introduction

Chapter 3 explored the meaning of regulation, paying particular attention to the
distinction that has been drawn in the literature between hard and soft regulation.
The discussion in this chapter carries on from there, outlining some specific aspects of
water law that are relevant to the analysis of the regulatory framework that applies in
the Sydney Region. Institutions involved in water management and water service
provision in the Sydney Region are also introduced.
The first part of the chapter explores some basic tenets of statutory water regulation
relevant to the Sydney Region: the nature of ‘water’ and what water laws regulate;
the rights of the State with respect to water; and, the purpose of water licensing and
water management planning. Specific provisions of the hard law of water
management planning and implementation in the Sydney Region found in the Water
Act 1912 (NSW) (‘WA 1912’) and the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) (‘WMA
2000’) are addressed to provide background for discussions that follow in Parts II, III
and IV.2
Some of the most important soft law elements of urban water management are
introduced briefly in Tables 4.1.1–4.1.3. They are examined in more detail in Part III.

1

D.E Fisher, Water Law, LBC Information Services, Sydney, 2000, 148.
With new sources of water becoming significant in the demand/supply balance for the Sydney Region, regulation
specific to the water industry is increasingly concerned with the intended use for water product and the disposal of
wastewater and wastes generated in water treatment processes. Regulation of these aspects of the water industry is
intended to ensure public health and safety and environmental health. Chapter 10 on page 200 and Chapter 11 on
page 224 review the application of some of the more important regulatory instruments to specific water activities in
the Sydney Region. Part IV examines legislation introduced in NSW to encourage the entry of the private sector into
the water industry, particularly into water recycling initiatives, by creating a system of licensing for network
operators and water retailers and an access regime to facilitate access to monopoly water industry infrastructure
services.
2
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The aims of integrated urban water cycle management are also set out here to
establish a benchmark against which the development and implementation of water
laws in the Sydney Region can be examined in the chapters that follow.
The second part of the chapter identifies the principal Commonwealth and State
institutions operating in the water sector in the Sydney Region. They are listed in
Tables 4.2.1–4.2.2 where their roles in water management and regulation and water
service provision are outlined. The part played by Commonwealth agencies in policy
formulation and development is discussed in detail in Part II of the thesis. The State’s
regulatory and operational role is examined in Part III.
The tables at the end of the chapter are intended to provide a quick reference to the
soft law and institutions listed in them.
4.2

The hard law of water management in the Sydney Region

4.2.1 Introduction
The WA 19123 and the WMA 20004 both have roles in water management planning in
the Sydney Region – one more immediate than the other. The WA 1912, introduced to
consolidate earlier legislation relating to water rights, water and drainage and
groundwater extraction, provided the legislative framework for water management in
NSW for most of the 20th century. The WMA 2000, enacted in response to reform
objectives pursued through the 1990s to provide for the protection, conservation and
ecologically sustainable development of the water sources of NSW, is slowly replacing
the WA 1912. Although some parts of the WA 1912 have been repealed, and the
WMA 2000 already operates in those parts of NSW where Water Sharing Plans are in
operation, the Sydney Region is yet to be brought fully into the new regulatory
regime.5 Licensed water access and use in the Sydney Region are still governed by the
provisions of the WA 1912 and hence the major public utilities providing water services
3

The version of the Water Act 1912 (NSW) (‗WA1912‘) referred to in this thesis is current for 8 January 2010 to the
date on which it was accessed (8 March 2010).
4
The version of the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) (‗WMA 2000‘) referred to in this thesis is current for
26 February 2010 to the date on which it was accessed (9 March 2010).
5
The WA 1912 consisted of ten Parts, five of which have been repealed. Parts 3, 4, 6, 7 and 10 were repealed on
1 January 2001 by Schedule 7 of the WMA 2000. The remaining provisions of the WA 1912 cease to have effect as
water sharing plans are prepared for various water sources in the State. The Sydney Region is not yet subject to the
management regime of the WMA 2000. In Chapter 8 the relevance of water sharing plans in the Sydney Region is
examined in detail. The NSW Government conducted targeted consultation on draft proposals for surface water and
groundwater sharing plans for the Sydney Region at the end of 2009. Draft Water Sharing Plans for the Sydney
Regions were released for public exhibition in June 2010 but are yet to be finalised.
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in the region – Sydney Water Corporation (‘SWC’) and Sydney Catchment Authority
(‘SCA’) – are still licensed under that Act.
In the following sections those elements of the WA 1912 and the WMA 2000 most
relevant to urban water management in the Sydney Region, and to subsequent
discussions in this dissertation, are examined. The discussion explores the idea of
what is ‘water’ and what is actually regulated, the nature of the State’s water rights,
and the water licensing and water management planning regime under each Act.
4.2.2 Water and water sources
Although ‘water’ was not defined in the WA 1912 there were definitions of ‘water
source’, and the components of water sources, scattered throughout the document.
Section 187 of the WA 1912 defined a water source as ‘a river, lake or sub-surface
water basin’. A river, defined in section 5, included:
(a) a stream of water, whether perennial or intermittent, flowing in a natural channel, or
in a natural channel artificially improved, or in an artificial channel which has changed
the course of the stream,
(b) an affluent, confluent, branch or other stream of water into or from which a stream
referred to in paragraph (a) flows, and

(c) anything declared by the Ministerial Corporation by order in the Gazette to be a river.
The section 5 definition excluded anything declared not to be a river, and those waters
of a tidal river that at any time are not capable of being used for irrigation or for
watering stock. As a result, except for brackish waters in a tidal river that were fit for
use, only fresh water sources were covered by the legislative management regime.
A lake, also defined in section 5, included ‘a lagoon, swamp, or other collection of still
water, whether permanent or temporary, not being water contained in an artificial
work’.
Section 105 of the WA 1912 defined sub-surface water as ‘water under the surface of
the ground whatever may be the geological structure in which it is standing or moving’.
A sub-surface water basin was then defined as the land overlying a distinct body of
sub-surface water.
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Water sources defined in the WA 1912 included water in artificially constructed
channels (for example water carried to Sydney from storages in the HawkesburyNepean system and transported through canals) in the management regime of the
legislation. However, water retained in dams in that system did not constitute a ‘lake’
and was unlikely to be considered a ‘river’ where the natural channel was ‘improved’.
Further, wastewater (if it can be considered to be ‘water’) in artificial channels that
have no connection to flow in a natural channel was not covered by the definitions in
the management regime.
Definitions of terms used in the WMA 2000 were set out in a Dictionary to the Act.6 As
in the WA 1912, ‘water’ was not itself defined. Water sources were the whole or any
part of:
(a) one or more rivers, lakes or estuaries, or
(b) one or more places where water occurs naturally on or below the surface of the
ground,
and include the coastal waters of the State.

Inclusion of the coastal waters of the State extended the potential application of the
water management regime of the WMA 2000 from freshwater sources to seawater
(without restriction as to fitness for use as had been the case with tidal waters under
the WA 1912). Wastewater was still outside the regime.
The Dictionary to the WMA 2000 56defined a river to include:
(a) any watercourse, whether perennial or intermittent and whether comprising a natural
channel or a natural channel artificially improved, and
(b) any tributary, branch or other watercourse into or from which a watercourse referred
to in paragraph (a) flows, and
(c) anything declared by the regulations to be a river,
whether or not it also forms part of a lake or estuary, but does not include anything
declared by the regulations not to be a river.

Artificial channels that changed the course of streams under the WA 1912 were not
explicitly included in the definition under the WMA 2000, although the definition in
6

The Dictionary appears at the end of the WMA 2000. It has no specific section reference nor is it included as a
Schedule.
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the Act appears to be open to interpretation to include the intent of the former
provision, so long as the artificial element is an improvement to the natural channel.7
However a ‘lake’, defined to include a wetland, lagoon, saltmarsh and ‘any collection
of still water, whether perennial or intermittent and whether natural or artificial’,
could bring water in the dams supplying the Sydney Region within the purview of the
legislative management regime.
Both the WA 1912 and the WMA 2000 beg the question of what is ‘water’. When the
WA 1912 was enacted, rainwater was the primary source of water collected in rivers,
lakes and sub-surface water basins and the regulatory scheme was focused on water
use throughout rural NSW. Since the introduction of the WMA 2000, urban water
supply has become a matter of major interest and focus, particularly in the Sydney
Region, with security of supply threatened by prolonged periods of drought. Recycling
of wastewater (stormwater and sewage) and desalination of seawater have been
included in a suite of measures intended to provide a secure water supply for the
Sydney Region. The hard law of the WMA 2000 can be used to regulate management
of the coastal seawater sources when it is given effect in the Sydney Region. In the
period covered by this study, no statutory water management framework controlled
extraction from seawater sources – the WA 1912 could not and the WMA 2000 did not.
Regulation of the first desalination project to supply drinking water in the Sydney
Region was achieved by other hard law measures.8 Furthermore, management of
sources of wastewater was beyond the contemplation of both hard law regimes.9
Chapter 15 of this thesis advocates the inclusion of wastewater sources as ‘water
sources’ under the hard law instruments and extension of the hard law water
management framework to those sources.
4.2.3 The State’s water rights
Problems identified in the administration of water resources under the scheme of the
WA 1912 led to an audit of water agencies in 1984 which in turn led to the enactment
7

Water in artificial channels is important in the context of sewer mining and stormwater harvesting activities in the
Sydney Region: see discussion in Chapter 13.3.1 on page 281.
8
Pollution control regulations and land use planning provision apply to various aspects of the Sydney desalination
project. Contractual obligations regulate the relationships between the government agencies and private sector
operators that are carrying out the project. See discussion in Chapter 11.5 on page 235.
9
Chapter 10 on page 200 illustrates how a mix of hard and soft law instruments have been invoked to create a
management regime of sorts for wastewater. See also how Sydney Water Corporation (‗SWC‘) allocates sewage flow
for sewer mining in Chapter 13.3.1 on page 281.
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of the Water Administration Act 1986 (NSW) and the creation of the Water
Administration Ministerial Corporation (‘WAMC’) under section 7 of that Act. 10
Section 12 of the Water Administration Act 1986 (NSW) vested the right to the use and
flow, and to the control, of specific ‘water’ in the WAMC.11 The water over which the
Corporation could exercise its rights was water in rivers and lakes, water conserved by
‘works’ as defined in the Act, water occurring naturally on the surface of the ground,
and sub-surface water. The Water Administration Act 1986 (NSW) included definitions
of rivers, lakes and surface water that were substantively the same as those in the WA
1912. The State’s water rights were vested in the WAMC. It effectively administered
the WA 1912 and so responsibility for decision making with regard to water
management in NSW was clear and unambiguous: it rested with a single corporate
entity.
The clarity afforded from 1986 by the role of the WAMC in the management scheme of
the WA 1912 has been clouded with the introduction of the WMA 2000, especially in
relation to water management in the Sydney Region. Section 392(1) of the WMA 2000
defined the State’s water rights not simply by reference to the water sources of the
State as they were defined in the same legislation (which specifically included the
coastal waters of the State) but as ‘the rights to the control, use and flow of:
(a) all water in rivers, lakes and aquifers12, and
(b) all water conserved by any works that are under the control or management of the
Minister, and
10

The history of water reform in NSW in the periods 1975-1994 and 1995-1999 showed responses to different issues
in water management. Reforms that emerged in the earlier period primarily addressed fragmentation of responsibility
for water management resulting in structural changes in the legislative framework. More far reaching reforms were
proposed following an audit conducted in 1988. However, it was not until 1994 that proposals for water management
reform gained real momentum with the involvement of the Commonwealth, through the Council of Australian
Governments. The reforms that were developed from 1994 that relate to urban water are discussed in detail in Part II.
For a discussion of the history of water reform in NSW generally in the periods 1975–94 and 1995–99 see Poh-Ling
Tan, ‗An Historical Introduction to Water Reform in NSW — 1975 to 1994‘ (2002) 19 Environmental and Planning
Law Journal 445; and Poh-Ling Tan, ‗Water law reform in NSW — 1995 to 1999‘ (2003) 20 Environmental and
Planning Law Journal 165.
11
Section 1(1) of the Water Rights Act 1896 (NSW) first vested the ‗right to the use and flow and to the control of the
water in all rivers and lakes which flow through or past or are situate within the land of two or more occupiers, and of
the water contained in or conserved by any works…‘ in the Crown providing the platform for public management of
the State‘s water resources. The effect of this vesting on private rights to the use of water is discussed by Fisher and
Gardner et al: see D E Fisher, above n 1, Chapter 5; Alex Gardner, Richard Bartlett and Janice Gray, Water
Resources Law, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2009, Chapter 9. Private water rights have now either been recognised and
accommodated, or extinguished, by legislation in NSW: see for example WMA 2000, Ch 3, Pt 1 that deals with basic
landholder rights (domestic and stock rights, harvestable rights and native title rights); WMA 2000, s 393 which
abolishes common law riparian rights.
12
An aquifer is defined in WMA 2000 Dictionary as ‗a geological structure or formation, or an artificial landfill, that
is permeated with water or is capable of being permeated with water‘.
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(c) all water occurring naturally on or below the surface of the ground’.
Section 392(2) vests the State’s water rights (that by definition do not include the
coastal waters of the State) in the Crown.13 Decision making in the WMA 2000
principally rests with the Minister.14 A corporation that is a statutory body
representing the Crown is constituted by Chapter 8, Part 2 of the WMA 2000 with the
corporate name of ‘Water Administration Ministerial Corporation’. Schedule 9 Division
4 of the Act then informs that the corporation so constituted ‘is a continuation of, and
the same legal entity as, [the Corporation] constituted by the [Water Administration
Act 1986 (NSW)+’. The functions of the ‘new’ entity under the WMA 2000 are limited
to those set out in section 372 of the Act – they do not extend specifically to the
exercise of the State’s water rights; they do not extend to functions under the WMA
2000 that are to be carried out by the Minister; and they do not extend to functions
under the WA 1912.
Under the WA 1912, the WAMC continues to have authority over water management
in the Sydney Region but to exercise that authority it must retain the powers given to it
under the Water Administration Act 1986 (NSW). It has issued water management
licences to Sydney Water and SCA and bore licences to SCA. However, the Water
Administration Act 1986 (NSW) has been repealed and the WAMC’s authority over the
State’s water rights in the Sydney Region is unclear. 15 The role of the WAMC under
the WA 1912, predecessor of the WMA 2000, is being progressively assumed by a
growing number and variety of government institutions that are also taking on
regulatory roles for ‘water’ resources that are not covered by the WA 1912 or the
WMA 2000.16
The NSW Office of Water (‘NOW’) administers the WMA 2000. Sydney Water
Corporation (‘SWC’) controls wastewater and stormwater in its infrastructure and has
the capacity to enter into agreements to permit the taking of wastewater and
13

The State can rely on the Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 1980 (Cth) for power to make laws applying to the
coastal waters of the State. Section 5 of that Act empowers the State to make ‗all such laws of the State as could be
made …if the coastal waters of the State…were within the limits of the State‘.
14
The Governor has some role in decision making under the WMA 2000. For example the establishment of a State
Water Management Outcomes Plan (‗SWMOP‘) was at the discretion of the Governor: WMA 2000 s 6(1).
15
The Water Administration Act 1986 (NSW) was repealed by Schedule 7 of the WMA 2000. No reference can be
found to the Water Administration Act 1986 (NSW) on the NSW Legislation website (Acts in Force or Repealed).
16
See for example discussion of the role of Sydney Water Corporation in relation to sewer mining agreements in
Chapter 13.3 on page 278.
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stormwater that it collects and disposes of in the Sydney Region for treatment and
reuse. It is controlling these sources of water outside the legislative regime. Sydney
Catchment Authority (‘SCA’) controls water in its infrastructure and can supply water
to third parties. Local councils can grant access to wastewater in infrastructure that
they control and can authorise water supply works in certain areas. At the same time,
the Minister is responsible for the preparation of Water Sharing Plans for the Sydney
Region under the WMA 2000.
The situation is at best awkward, and has been so for a decade. Real or apparent
difficulties with transitional provisions relating to the continuation of the WAMC under
the WMA 2000 are curable. The speedy conclusion of Water Sharing Plans for the
Sydney Region will clarify responsibility for water management in the region. However,
the proper allocation of rights to access and use new water sources in the Sydney
Region requires deliberate action. Part V of this thesis explores opportunities to bring
the new sources of water in the Sydney Region into the hard law water management
framework.
4.2.4 Accessing water for use
Until the water entitlement and licensing provisions of Chapters 2 and 3 of the WMA
2000 apply to the water sources of the Sydney Region (when a management plan is in
place for the area) the WA 1912 continues to regulate licensed access to and use of the
water resources of the region.17 This section outlines certain provisions of the WA
1912 and those of the WMA 2000 that arise in relation to water management in the
Sydney Region as it has been implemented through the 1990s to date to familiarise
the reader with terms and concepts relevant to subsequent discussions in this thesis.
Access to and use of water in rivers and lakes in the Sydney Region is permitted under
the WA 1912 on the terms and conditions of various licences, permits and authorities.
Significantly, licences to access and use water in rivers and lakes are related to the
licensee’s occupation of the land. 18 Rights to extract and use sub-surface water are
17

See above n 5.
Part 2 of the WA 1912 contains the licensing provisions for extraction and use of water in rivers and lakes. The Act
specifies uses for which licences can be obtained, for example in relation to: water conservation, irrigation, water
supply or drainage, or for changing the course of a river: WA 1912 s 10(1). The licence authorises not only the taking
of water but the construction and operation of works necessary to extract the water such as dams, locks, reservoirs
and channels. WMA 2000 Ch 3, Pt 1 applies in the Sydney Region to regulate the exercise of basic landholder rights
– stock and domestic rights, harvestable rights and native title rights.
18
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obtained under bore licences issued under Part 5 of the WA 1912. A bore licence is
deemed to be held by, and to operate for the benefit of, the lawful occupier of the
land in which the bore is located.19 Approvals for flood control works (such as
construction of earthworks, embankments or levees that may affect the flow of water
to or from a river or lake) can be obtained under Part 8 of the WA 1912. Again, the
right to apply for an approval is tied to land occupation20 and the benefit of the
approval lies with the occupier of the land.21 Entitlements to take and use water under
the WA 1912 are granted for specific periods of time. However, provisions are
included in the WA 1912 for renewal, amendment, suspension and cancellation of the
various entitlements. Embargoes have been placed on any further applications for
licences with respect to specific groundwater sources in the Sydney Region.22
Perhaps the most important provisions of the WA 1912 operating in the Sydney Region
are those contained in Part 9 of the Act. It is under this Part that water management
authorities listed in Schedule 3 to the Act are licensed. SWC and SCA are both
Schedule 3 water management authorities. A water management licence issued under
Part 9 authorises the holder to take and use water from any water source and to
construct or use a water management work in accordance with its terms. The licences
can be granted for periods up to 20 years and are to be reviewed at five-yearly
intervals. The SWC and SCA water management licences are discussed in Chapter
13.3.1. The licensing scheme of the WA 1912 is compared with the new licensing
regime introduced by the NSW Government to encourage private sector operators to
enter the water service industry in the Sydney Region.
Water management planning, other than for floodplain management under Part 8, was
not a feature of the WA 1912. That Act was a legislative mechanism used to regulate,
and arguably encourage, water use to achieve an economic return on investment in

19

WA 1912, s 117. A bore licence authorises the holder to sink, enlarge, deepen or alter a bore and to take and use
any water obtained by means of the bore in accordance with the licence conditions: s116D.
20
Ibid s 167.
21
Ibid s 177.
22
Embargoes are in place on applications being made for new commercial licences in the Hawkesbury Alluvials,
Botany Sandbeds, Blue Mountains Sandstone and Nepean Sandstone (Southern Highlands) groundwater sources in
the Sydney Region: source Office of Water (NSW), Water Act 1912 (NSW) (12 November 2010) <
http://www.water.nsw.gov.au/Water-management/Law-and-Policy/default.aspx >.
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infrastructure.23 The WMA 2000, on the other hand, was introduced to the NSW
Parliament for consideration in terms of its fundamental difference from the WA 1912
due to its ‘integrated water management nature’:
The holistic approach provides for truly sustainable management of water, not just as
a valuable resource for industry but as a key element in the natural systems from the
catchment to the ocean which sustain our culture, our communities and our
economy.24

The following discussion introduces the planning and licensing regime of the WMA
2000, leaving room for detailed discussion of the development of water management
plans in the Sydney Region in Chapters 7 and 8.
Basic landholder rights created under the WMA 2000 do not require any form of
licence or authorisation. These rights are available to support domestic and stock
watering needs for landholders with direct access to surface or groundwater sources;25
to provide harvestable rights on certain farms for rainwater run-off collection and
storage; 26 and to secure native title rights to access and use water for non-commercial
purposes in communities.27
In all other cases the WMA 2000 creates offences of taking water from a water source
without an access licence and of using water without a water use approval, or in each
case otherwise than as authorised to do so.28
The water management planning provisions of Chapter 2 of the WMA 2000 set out
water management principles to guide the administration of the management regime
established under the Act. The scheme of Chapter 2 envisages the establishment of
water management committees to prepare water management plans in accordance

23

See for example the discussion of the historical emphasis of water law in NSW (to secure consumptive needs,
principally for irrigation) and the impact of water reforms in NSW in the last quarter of the 20th century (intended to
address problems of overallocation that resulted from this historical focus) in Poh-Ling Tan, ‗An Historical
Introduction to Water Reform in NSW – 1975 to 1994‘ (2002) 19 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 445.
24
Water Management Bill, Second Reading Speech: New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative
Assembly, 22 June 2000, 7498 (Mr Amery).
25
WMA 2000 Ch3 Pt 1 Div 1.
26
Ibid Ch 3 Pt 1 Div 2. The harvestable right for an area is specified in an order constituting the harvestable rights
area and is expressed as a proportion, to be not less than 10%, of the average rainwater run-off for that area: WMA
2000 s 54.
27
Ibid Ch 3 Pt 1 Div 3.
28
Ibid Ch 3, Pt 2 Div 2.
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with those principles and with State-wide targets set out in a State Water
Management Outcomes Plan (‘SWMOP’).29
Chapter 3 of the WMA 2000 then establishes a licensing regime to enable authorised
access to and use of water in accordance with the rules established by the planning
framework. Specific categories of access licences can be granted under Part 2 of
Chapter 3. Access licences comprise a share component and an extraction
component.30 Access licences are granted for indefinite periods and cease to be in
force when cancelled; and they are transferrable. Most importantly, an access licence
is not tied to land ownership or occupation. Licences are classified into different
categories which are then accorded relative levels of priority among one another. The
categories of licences are set out in section 57 of the WMA 2000. Of particular
relevance to the present research are the ‘major utility licence’ and the ‘local water
utility licence’ referred to in that section. 31
The significance of the priorities attaching to the different categories of access licences
is found in the rules of distribution of available water determinations set out in section
60(1) of the WMA 2000.32 However, in times of severe water shortage the Minister
may suspend the operation of these rules of distribution. Priority is then allocated first
to the exercise of basic landholder rights and the taking of water for domestic
purposes or essential town purposes under the authority of a licence and then to the
needs of the environment. Among those activities granted third priority – presumably
in equal ranking of importance – are ‘the taking of water for the purposes of supply of
commercial and industrial activities authorised by a major utility access licence or local
water utility access licence, subject to the water made available being in accordance
29

Ibid. The State Water Management Outcomes Plan is discussed in Chapter 7.4 on page 140. WMA 2000, Ch 2 Pt 4
introduces the concept of a ‗Minister‘s plan‘ into the water planning framework established by the WMA 2000. The
Minister can make a plan for any part of the State that is not within a water management area; or for which a
management plan is not in force; or, if there is a management plan in force for the relevant area, then in respect of
matters not already dealt with in the plan: s 50(1). Minister‘s plans are discussed in Chapter 7.6 on page 143.
30
Ibid s 56: the share component refers to an entitlement to a specified share of available water in specified
management areas or from a specified water source; the extraction component is an entitlement to take water as
specified in the licence.
31
Ibid ss 57(1)(i) and 57(1)(j) respectively.
32
Ibid s 60(1): An ‗available water determination‘ may be made from time to time by the Minister under section
59(1) in relation to the water which is available for the various categories of access licence in accordance with the
following rules of distribution:
(a)
the rules of priority established by section 58,
(b)
the provisions of any relevant bulk access regime,
(c)
the provisions of any relevant management plan,
(d)
the provisions of any relevant implementation program.
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with any drought management strategy established by the Minister for that
purpose’.33
Significantly, section 58 (1) accords local water utility access licences, major utility
access licences and domestic and stock access licences priority over all other access
licences. However, the priorities set out in section 58 (1) may be re-ordered by
provisions in a management plan.34
A water access licence obtained under Chapter 3, Part 2 of the WMA 2000 does not
carry with it the right to use that water, or to construct and operate infrastructure to
extract, store or distribute that water. Part 3 of Chapter 3 sets out a scheme for
obtaining approval either to use water or to construct and use a water management
work or to undertake an activity for a particular purpose at a particular location.
Approvals are granted for specific periods but they can be renewed.35 Approvals
generally run with the land to which the approval applies.36
Chapter 6 of the WMA 2000 applies to the activities of public utilities that fall into two
categories: ‘major utilities’37 and ‘water supply authorities’.38 Major utilities are
defined by reference to Schedule 2 of the WMA 2000 and include SWC and the SCA.
Water supply authorities are the corporations listed in Schedule 3 of the WMA 2000
and include the Sydney Olympic Park Authority.
For major utilities, Chapter 6 of the WMA 2000 simply provides for periodic review of
activities undertaken by them, including activities conducted pursuant to water use
and water management works approvals granted to them. There is provision for
submissions to be made by ‘interested persons’.39
Despite the brevity of the specific provisions relating to major utilities, the WMA 2000
does impinge on their activities in a number of ways – the licensing and approvals
provisions discussed above will provide the means by which major utilities can gain

33

Ibid s 60(3)(c).
Ibid s 58(3),(4).
35
Ibid s 104(3): Water supply works approvals used solely for accessing sub-surface water pursuant to a basic
landholder right in the Sydney Region would have effect until cancelled by virtue of the section.
36
Ibid s 106. However, the Regulations made under the Act may prescribe circumstances in which, or types of
approvals to which, these provisions do not apply: s 106(4).
37
Ibid s 281 – 282.
38
Ibid s 283 – 322.
39
Ibid s 282(2). There is no prescription in the section of the qualifications of ‗interested persons‘.
34
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access to, and the approval to use water and construct and use water infrastructure
when the relevant provisions of the WMA 2000 become operative in the Sydney
Region. A major utility access licence is a specific category of access licence under the
WMA 2000 and may only be granted, or transferred, to a major utility.40 The
temporary transfer provisions of the WMA 2000 do not apply to major utility access
licences.41 Special provisions apply to major utilities in circumstances where a major
utility access licence may be liable to suspension or cancellation.42 Approvals granted
to a major utility can be granted for a longer time than other approvals. 43
The provisions of Chapter 6 relating to water supply authorities are premised on the
assumption that water will be taken by such authorities pursuant to an access licence
and water supply works approval.44 The functions of a water supply authority include
the construction, maintenance and operation of water management works and the
conduct of research, collection of information and development of technology in
relation to water management.
4.3

The soft law of water management in the Sydney Region

Soft law in the form of policy instruments, plans, guidelines and strategies promoting
aspects of water management and use in urban areas abound at Commonwealth and
State levels. The principal instruments that play a significant role in driving water
reform and regulating activities arising from the implementation of actions under
those reforms in the Sydney Region – the instruments that comprise the ‘soft law’ of
urban water regulation in the Sydney Region and that appear most frequently in
discussion throughout this thesis – are outlined in Table 4.1. Overarching water
reform policies developed by the Commonwealth and the State are introduced, and
then important strategies impacting on urban water management developed under
those policies are mentioned. Finally the Commonwealth Government’s current
financial assistance strategy relating to water initiatives is noted. The overviews
provided in Table 4.1 are derived from statements about each initiative accessed on
40

Ibid s 57(1)(i). There are restrictions on who can be granted a major utility access licence: s 63(3)(b); transfers of
major utility licences: s 71M(3).
41
Ibid s 71N(1).
42
Ibid s 78(2). The section provides for the imposition of a monetary penalty in addition to, or in place of, the
cancellation or suspension of a licence.
43
Ibid s 104(2) provides for a 20 year term for a major utility licence rather than the maximum 10 year term for other
categories of access licence.
44
Ibid s 284.
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the website of the relevant responsible agency. There is no comment, express or
implied, in the information presented in Table 4.1 that relates to the success or
otherwise enjoyed in achieving the aims of the various strategies – that discussion is
saved for ensuing chapters.
One element of soft law included in the National Water Initiative (‘NWI’) 45 does
however require specific consideration here to provide essential context for later
discussion. The research objectives of this study set out in Chapter 1 referred to two
main themes that were identified to guide research. One of those was the model of
integrated urban water cycle management, in particular its applicability to traditional
and new water sources and water products. The following paragraph introduces
IUWCM.
4.4

Integrated management for the urban water cycle

Integrated management as an objective of natural resources regulation generally, and
specifically water, is only a recent development. Fisher reviewed this development
from the starting point when legal systems treated natural resources individually to
the emergence of a legislative regime intended to produce integrated catchment
management in NSW and finally to a direction being forged in legislation that Fisher
believed could achieve sustainability in integrated management.46 In Fisher’s view
natural resources needed to be managed on an inter-sectoral rather than an intrasectoral basis so that management of individual resources would recognise the
relevance and significance of other resources to which they were physically and
biologically related. Fisher’s scheme for integrated natural resource management
when applied to water resources required recognition of the range of uses for the
resource and the different perspectives that should be accommodated in the
management scheme.47

45

Council of Australian Governments, Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Water Initiative (25 June 2004)
(‗NWI‘), para 92 sets out agreed urban water actions relating to ‗Innovation and Capacity Building to Create Water
Sensitive Cities‘. One of the agreed innovative actions set out in NWI para 92 iv) is to ‗review the institutional and
regulatory models for achieving integrated urban water cycle planning and management, followed by best practice
guidelines by 2006‘. The action is ongoing! The NWI is discussed in Chapters 5.6–5.8.
46
Fisher, above n 1, 10–11. Fisher cites s 11(1A) of the Water Administration Act 1986 (NSW) as an example of a
legislative requirement moving in his preferred direction. The provision set out the matters to be taken in to account
by the Water Administration Ministerial Corporation when carrying out its functions.
47
Ibid 12.
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The WMA 2000 took a significant step towards the goal of integrated water
management setting ‘the sustainable and integrated management of the water
sources of the State for the benefit of both present and future generations’ as one of
its section 3 objectives. However, as noted earlier in this chapter and for reasons that
become more apparent in Chapters 7 and 8, the WMA 2000 is yet to become fully
effective in the Sydney Region. Nevertheless the objective of integrated management
was to be pursued in hard law.
Integrated urban water cycle management (‘IUWCM’) is also a creature of the 21st
century – a concept that has developed with the increased emphasis on urban water
supply security as a consequence of prolonged drought experienced across Australia in
the early part of that century. IUWCM is referred to in paragraph 92 of the NWI.48
Acknowledging that the ‘precise definitions’ of the term can vary,49 the NWC advises
that the parties to the NWI have agreed that IUWCM has the fundamental objectives
of minimising the impacts of urban development on the water balance and the
environment; and, diversification of supply options to include all components of the
urban water cycle (surface water, groundwater, recycled wastewater, stormwater and
desalinated seawater) to address water scarcity in cities.50 IUWCM is not expected to
achieve those objectives in isolation but in concert with ‘water sensitive urban design’
(also referred to in paragraph 92 of the NWI) the form of which is progressively
crystallising.
To assist the parties to the NWI to interpret and implement the relevant actions, the
NWC set out an agreed working definition of IUWCM:
Integrated urban water cycle management is the integrated management of all water
sources, to ensure that water is used optimally within a catchment resource, state and
national policy context. It promotes the coordinated planning, sustainable
development and management of water, land and related resources (including energy
use) that are linked to urban areas.51

48

NWI, above n 45.
National Water Commission, ‗Institutional and Regulatory Models for Integrated Urban Water Cycle Management‘
(Issues and Scoping Paper, February 2007), 8.
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid 9.
49
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IUWCM in practice is without doubt a ‘work in progress’. The obvious difficulties
associated with the attempts to define it do not auger well for its implementation.
Nevertheless, it is an admirable ambition finding expression in soft law. It is one which
fuels discussion and analysis throughout this dissertation.
4.5

Institutions in water in the Sydney Region

The hard and soft laws of water regulation in the Sydney Region are administered by
Commonwealth, State and local council agencies. A water agency may be a
Commonwealth or State Government Department, a State-owned Corporation, a
Tribunal, a statutory authority or a local council. A Minister may be solely responsible
for specific water matters. Private industry is taking on a role in self-regulation
developing its own rules or codes of corporate operation in the water sector.
Committees, water customers, industry associations and other stakeholders also play a
part in water management in the Sydney Region. The roles performed by these bodies
are complex and varied.
The Commonwealth Government’s role in water management is essentially one of
leadership in the development and implementation of policy. That role has been
strengthened in the past by tying Commonwealth financial grants to the States and
Territories to the implementation of agreed rural and urban water reforms. The
increasing importance of water as a national issue became apparent in January 2007
when water was elevated to a portfolio of its own in the Commonwealth Government
with the creation of the Department of the Environment and Water Resources (now
the Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts (‘DEWHA’)). 52
The Commonwealth agencies most influential in delivering water reform objectives are
the Council of Australian Governments (‘COAG’) and several of its sub-groups; the
National Water Commission (‘NWC’); the Department of Water, Heritage and the Arts
(‘DEWHA’)53; the Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council (‘NRMMC’); the

52

Gerard Carney and Alex Gardner examined the roles of the Commonwealth and the States in water resource
management in Australia: Gerard Carney and Alex Gardner, ‗The Constitutional Framework for Water Resources
Management‘ in Alex Gardner, Richard Bartlett and Janice Gray, Water Resources Law, (LexisNexis Butterworths,
2009) 81. The Commonwealth Government‘s role in water policy development and implementation through the
Council of Australian Governments‘ agreed reforms is examined in Part II of this thesis.
53
The Commonwealth Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities was
established on 14 September 2010. References in this thesis are to the former department that embraced water
matters — Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts (‗DEWHA‘).
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Environment Protection and Heritage Council (‘EPHC’); and the National Competition
Council (‘NCC’). Numerous sub-committees and working groups established to assist
high level committees come and go to deal with specific issues. Their trails are not
easy to follow and their work only reaches the public domain once it is sanctioned at
ministerial level. Examples of such committees include the NWI Committee, the Urban
Water Advisory Committee and the Joint Steering Committee for Water Sensitive
Cities.54
Management and regulation of water resources in Australia is, however, the
prerogative of the States. For the time being at least, the role of the Commonwealth
in relation to water relies on the cooperation of the States in the development and
implementation of agreed policy initiatives. The States are strongly influenced in the
development of their own strategies for water management and use by these
nationally agreed policies (soft laws). This area is explored further in Parts II and III of
this thesis.
In the Sydney Region the principal functions of public institutions involved in water
matters include policy formulation and implementation, water asset management,
bulk water supply, retail water treatment and distribution, and provision of
wastewater and stormwater services. Private sector operators licensed under the
Water Industry Competition Act 2006 (NSW) (‘WICA 2006’) are involved in the delivery
of some water supply services in the Sydney Region.55
In July 2009 the NSW Government was restructured with the creation of 13 ‘super
agency clusters’ or ‘super departments’. Under those arrangements the water
resources of the State are regulated and managed within the Department of
Environment, Climate Change and Water (‘DECCW’). DECCW incorporates two
portfolios – environment and climate change, and water – each of which is the
responsibility of a different Minister.56 The NSW Office of Water (‘NOW’), an agency
within the water portfolio of DECCW, is the lead agency in water management. The
54

National Water Commission, Annual Report 2007–08 (Canprint Communications, 2008), Table 8 summarised the
Commission‘s input to 26 committees. The roles of the committees and the Commission‘s role in relation to those
committees were identified. The table did not indicate the likely lifespan of each committee nor the reporting chain
for each committee.
55
The licensing and access provisions of the Water Industry Competition Act 2006 (NSW) are examined in Part IV.
56
At 12 November 2010 the Hon. Frank Sartor is Minister for Climate Change and the Environment. The Hon
Phillip Costa is Minister for Water.
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two principal public institutions providing water services to the Sydney Region, the
SWC and the SCA, are ‘other key related bodies’ in DECCW that remain separate
reporting bodies for statutory and other purposes. The NSW Independent Pricing and
Regulatory Tribunal (‘IPART’) has a role in price determinations for suppliers of bulk
water and retail water services and a regulatory role in licensing and the conduct of
operational compliance audits.
Water reforms in the last 20 years have placed considerable emphasis on the
separation of the regulatory and business functions of public institutions operating in
the water industry, as well as the separation of responsibility for water asset
management and natural resource management. The corporate structure of urban
water agencies has changed to accommodate these reforms. Nevertheless, there
remains some overlap of functions among institutions and a multiplicity of functions
within individual institutions.
Some of the main Commonwealth and State institutions involved in water
management in the Sydney Region are introduced in Table 4.2. Their roles and
responsibilities are outlined.
4.6

Discussion

The foregoing discussion explored some important aspects of the hard law of water
management in the Sydney Region – as it applies now and as it will apply when the
WMA 2000 comes into force in the region. Management challenges posed by the
introduction of new non-rainfall dependent water sources into the water supply
options for the Sydney Region were raised in passing for consideration in later
chapters. The concept of integrated urban water cycle management was outlined. Its
objectives are accepted as desirable outcomes for water regulation in the Sydney
Region.
The chapter also briefly outlined the roles of the Commonwealth and State
Governments in water regulation in the Sydney Region. The main agencies involved in
water resource management and in the supply of drinking water and stormwater and
wastewater services in the Sydney Region were introduced. Some of those agencies
are also involved in managing the managers: monitoring and enforcing regulatory
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provisions that modify the behavior of public utilities and private sector operators
engaged in the water industry.
Tables included at the end of the chapter provide a quick reference to the main soft
law instruments and the principal agencies referred to throughout the study – they do
not provide an authoritative list of either the regulatory instruments applying to water
management in the Sydney Region or the agencies that are involved. It is not the
names of the agencies themselves that are most relevant in the discussions that follow
but the powers that they exercise. If the integrity of the system of regulation is to be
sustained, it is essential to ensure effective and on-going separation of resource
management functions from water service provision and from regulatory functions.
When names change and agencies move within or across portfolios these functions
must not merge. When new sources and new water products are developed they
must be managed in such a way that the separation of functions is maintained. The
process of allocating access to and rights to use water resources, whether traditional
or new, must be transparent and participatory.
The institutional and regulatory frameworks outlined in this chapter are, of necessity,
complex and dynamic; they have had to deliver and regulate innovative urban water
management in a period of prolonged drought in the Sydney Region.
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Table 4.1.1 Soft law in the Sydney Region – Water reform policy

(a) National Competition Policy
The National Competition Policy (‘NCP’) is embodied in a package of measures comprising: the
Competition Policy Reform Act 1995 (Cth); two agreements to implement the policy (namely the
Competition Principles Agreement and the Conduct Code Agreement); and a third agreement recording
the Parties’ commitment to continuing microeconomic reform in key industries (Agreement to
Implement the National Competition Policy and Related Reforms). The NCP and the water reforms
adopted in that policy are discussed in Part II.
(The full text of the Inter-governmental Agreements is contained in National Competition Council, Compendium of
nd
National Competition Policy Agreements (2 ed, June 1998). But note that the Competition Principles Agreement as
amended (Competition Principles Agreement – 11 April 1995 (As amended to 13 April 2007) can be found on the
Council of Australian Governments (‘COAG’) website).

(b) Council of Australian Governments Water Reform Framework
This framework is an agreed outcome reached at the Council of Australian Governments (‘COAG’)
meeting held on 25 February 1994 to reform the management and regulation of Australia’s water
resources. The outcomes were incorporated into the Agreement to Implement National Competition
Policy and Related Reforms.
(The Water Resource Policy is set out in Attachment A to the Council of Australian Governments, Communiqué,
(Hobart, 25 February 1994)).

(c) Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Water Initiative
The National Water Initiative (‘NWI’) was considered at the COAG meeting in June 2004 and signed by
the Commonwealth Government and the governments of NSW, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia,
the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory on 25 June 2004. Tasmania signed the
agreement on 3 June 2005 and Western Australia on 6 April 2006.
The NWI builds on the 1994 COAG Water Reform Framework and works with the National Action Plan
for Salinity and Water Quality, and the Natural Heritage Trust. It provides for the continuation of the
National Water Quality Management Strategy. However where there is any inconsistency between
these initiatives, the NWI is to prevail.
The NWI sets out the objectives, outcomes and actions for the ongoing process of national water reform
in Australia. A timetable for implementation of the agreed actions is included in the agreement
(Schedule A). Eight key elements are addressed in the NWI one of which is urban water reform (para 24
vi), paras 90–92).
(d) NSW National Water Initiative Implementation Plan
Preparation of an implementation plan by each NWI signatory (including the Australian Government) is
a requirement of the agreement. These plans include steps and timelines for implementation of key
actions under the NWI. The NSW Implementation Plan was accredited by the National Water
Commission on 18 August 2006.
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Table 4.1.2 Soft law in the Sydney Region – Urban water strategies and guidelines

(a) National Urban Water Planning Principles
At its meeting on 29 November 2008, COAG agreed to an enhanced urban water reform framework,
including the National Urban Water Planning Principles. These Principles provide Australian
governments and water utilities with the tools to better plan the development of urban water and
wastewater service delivery in a sustainable and economically efficient manner. Proper planning will
facilitate a balance in supply and demand and build on community confidence in diverse sources of
water supply.
It was agreed that the key principles to achieve optimal urban water planning outcomes are:
 deliver urban water supplies in accordance with agreed levels of service
 base urban water planning on the best information available at the time and invest in acquiring
information on an ongoing basis to continually improve the knowledge base
 adopt a partnership approach so that stakeholders are able to make an informed contribution
to urban water planning, including consideration of the appropriate supply/demand balance
 manage water in the urban context on a whole-of-water-cycle basis
 consider the full portfolio of water supply and demand options
 develop and manage urban water supplies within sustainable limits
 use pricing and markets, where efficient and feasible, to help achieve planned urban water
supply/demand balance; and
 periodically review urban water plans.
(b) NSW State Plan: A New Direction for NSW
The NSW State Plan is a ten year strategic plan for NSW that includes State Targets for Natural Resource
Management. The plan identifies secure and sustainable water supply for all users as a priority area and
includes targets for metropolitan demand management and recycling.
(c) Metropolitan Water Plan
The first metropolitan water plan for the Sydney Region was introduced in 2004. It was a 25 year
strategic plan to provide a secure supply of water that can meet the long term needs of Sydney. It
included strategies to reduce demand, increase supply and improve river ecosystem health. The most
recent edition of the plan was produced in August 2010. The key initiatives set out in the plan relate to
contributions to the urban water system from dams, recycling, desalination and water efficiency.
(d) Australian Guidelines for Water Recycling
The Environment Protection and Heritage Council (‘EPHC’), the Natural Resource Management
Ministerial Council (‘NRMMC’) and the National Health and Medical Research Council (‘NHMRC’) have
developed guidelines for the safe use of recycled water. They were developed in two phases:
Phase 1:
EPHC, NRMMC and the Australian Health Ministers’ Conference, National Guidelines for Water
Recycling: Managing Health and Environmental Risks (National Water Quality Management Strategy,
Document No 21, November 2006)
Phase 2:
 EPHC, NHMRC and NRMMC, Australian Guidelines for Water Recycling: Managing Health and
Environmental Risks: Augmentation of Drinking Water Supplies (National Water Quality
Management Strategy, Document No 22, May 2008) (‘Augmentation Guidelines’)
 NRMMC, EPHC and NHMRC,
 Australian Guidelines for Water Recycling: Stormwater Harvesting and Reuse (National
Water Quality Management Strategy, Document No 23, July 2009) (‘Stormwater
Guidelines’)
 Australian Guidelines for Water Recycling: Managed Aquifer Recharge (National Water
Quality Management Strategy, Document No 24, July 2009) (‘MAR Guidelines’).
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(e) Blue Guidelines, New South Wales Government, Department of Water and Energy, NSW Guidelines
for Greywater Reuse in Sewered, Single Household Residential Premises (May 2008)
(f) Purple Guidelines, New South Wales Government, Department of Water and Energy, Interim
Guidelines for Management of Private Recycled Water Schemes (May 2008)
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Table 4.1.3 Soft law in the Sydney Region – Investment in water management

(a) Water for the Future
Under the Water for the Future programme, the Commonwealth Government is investing $12.9 billion
over ten years to secure the long-term water supply of all Australians. Water for the Future is the first
national plan that addresses both rural and urban water.
The plan is built on four priorities:
 taking action on climate change
o monitoring, assessing and forecasting the availability, condition and use of water resources
through the Improving Water Information Program
o establishing the Murray-Darling Basin Authority
 using water wisely
o investing in key rural water projects through the Sustainable Rural Water Use and
Infrastructure Program
o helping households and surf lifesaving clubs save drinking water through the National
Rainwater and Greywater Initiative
o supporting businesses with high water usage through the Water Efficiency Opportunities
Program
 securing water supplies
o supporting desalination, water recycling and stormwater reuse through the National Urban
Water and Desalination Plan
o funding practical projects (pipelines, water saving infrastructure and water treatment
plants) through the National Water Security Plan for Cities and Towns
 healthy rivers (focused on Murray-Darling Basin water buy-back)
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Table 4.2.1 Commonwealth Institutions in Water

(a) Council of Australian Governments
The Council of Australian Governments (‘COAG’), formed in 1992, is the peak inter-governmental forum
in Australia. COAG’s role is to initiate, develop and monitor the implementation of policy reforms of
national significance that require cooperative action by all Australian governments.
COAG comprises the Prime Minister, State Premiers, Territory Chief Ministers and the President of the
Australian Local Government Association. It is chaired by the Prime Minister. COAG meets on an asneeded basis. The outcomes of meetings are published in communiqués released at the end of each
meeting. Where formal agreements are reached on issues addressed through COAG they may be
embodied in intergovernmental agreements such as the NCP and the NWI, both of which include
significant elements directly and indirectly relating to urban water reform. (The National Competition
Policy (‘NCP’) and its role in delivering water reform, and the emergence of the National Water Initiative
and the manner of its adoption in NSW are discussed below in Chapter 5).
COAG oversees implementation of the NWI. In December 2007 COAG established a Working Group on
Climate Change and Water (‘WGCCW’) to implement its work agenda on climate change and water. The
WGCCW’s water objective is to ensure sustainable water use across Australia. The WGCCW undertook a
comprehensive review of water reform progress in March 2008. A new work program that emerged
from that review, adopted by COAG in November 2008, included specific actions to progress an
enhanced urban water reform framework under the NWI.
(b) Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts (Cth)
Development and implementation of national water policy, programs and legislation, including reforms
under the NWI, is undertaken by the Australian Government Department of Environment, Water,
Heritage and the Arts (‘DEWHA’). DEWHA advises the Minister for Climate Change, Energy Efficiency
and Water and administers water policy and laws at the Commonwealth level. The Department is
responsible for implementation of the Commonwealth Government’s Water for the Future program,
which is a ten-year, $12.9 billion program to address four key areas: taking action on climate change;
using water wisely; securing water supplies; and supporting healthy rivers. DEWHA became the
Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities was established on 14
September 2010.
(c) Environment Protection and Heritage Council
The Environment Protection and Heritage Council (‘EPHC’), established in June 2001 by COAG, is an
agency within the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts portfolio. The objective of the EPHC is to
ensure the protection of the environment and heritage of Australia and New Zealand. The members of
the EPHC are ministers, not necessarily environment ministers, from participating jurisdictions –
Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments, the New Zealand Government and the Papua New
Guinea Government.
The EPHC addresses broad national policy issues relating to environmental protection, particularly
relating to air, water and waste matters. It is involved in a number of projects under the National Water
Quality Management Strategy including the development of Australian Guidelines for Water Recycling,
the Water Efficiency Labelling Scheme and National Guidelines for Residential Customer Water
Accounts.
(d) National Competition Council
The National Competition Council (‘NCC’) was established on 6 November 1995 by the Competition
Policy Reform Act 1995 (Cth), an outcome of COAG deliberations. Its functions and powers are set out in
section 29B of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (‘TPA 1974’). It is a federal statutory authority which
acts as an independent advisory body for all governments on the implementation of the NCP reforms.
Its main function relating to urban water management has been to assess the performance of the
Australian and State and Territory Governments in meeting agreed water reform commitments under
the NCP. The NCC also makes recommendations under Part IIIA of the TPA 1974 concerning access to
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services provided by major water infrastructure facilities and the certification of State access regimes.
(e) National Water Commission
The National Water Commission (‘NWC’) was established by the National Water Commission Act 2004
(Cth) specifically to assist with the effective implementation of the NWI. It also provides advice to COAG
and to the Minister for Climate Change, Energy Efficiency and Water, the Australian Government and
the States and Territories on national water issues. The NWC is an independent statutory authority
within the Commonwealth Government Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts portfolio. The Chair
and CEO (currently the same person) of the NWC report directly to the Australian Government Minister
for Climate Change, Energy Efficiency and Water and are accountable to the Minister for the effective
and efficient operation of the NWC. The full responsibilities of the NWC are set out in section 7 of the
National Water Commission Act 2004. The NWC provides an annual report of its operations to the
Minister for presentation to Parliament.
The NWC participates in and is assisted by a number of committees including the National Water
Initiative Committee, the Water Accounting Development Committee, a Joint Steering Committee on
Water Sensitive Cities (National Water Commission, Water Sensitive Australian Cities,
<http://www.nwc.gov.au/nwi/water_sensitive_cities.cfm>), and an Urban Water Advisory Group
(National Water Commission, Urban Water Advisory Group, <http://www.nwc.gov.au/www/html/192urban- water-advisory-group.asp>. Formed in 2006 to provide expert advice to support urban water
reform, the Urban Water Advisory Group has met three times since, most recently in late 2007).
The NWC assumed responsibility for the completion of the 2005 assessment of water-related reform
commitments under the NCP. In addition the NWC is to undertake three biennial assessments of
progress towards achieving the objectives and outcomes of the NWI. As part of the third of these
assessments the NWI is to be ‘comprehensively’ reviewed by the NWC in 2010–2011. Based on the
outcome of this third assessment the objectives and operation of the NWC are to be reviewed in 2011.
(Chapter 6 discusses the National Water Commission (‘NWC’) assessments of progress with the National
Water Initiative and with the implementation plans of the States and Territories as completed to
30 June 2009).
(f) Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council
The Natural Resources Management Ministerial Council (‘NRMMC’) was established in 2001. It is made
up of Australian, State and Territory and New Zealand Government ministers responsible for natural
resource management matters. Papua New Guinea and the Australian Local Government Association
participate in meetings as observers.
The objective of the NRMMC is to promote the conservation and sustainable use of Australia’s natural
resources. The NRMMC’s specific functions under the NWI are to provide annual reports of progress to
COAG and to develop national performance indicators for the NWI. The NRMMC is supported by a
Natural Resource Management Standing Committee which in turn is supported by the National Water
Initiative Committee. (The Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council resulted from the
amalgamation and reorganisation of the Agricultural and Resource Management Council of Australia
and New Zealand (ARMCANZ), Australia New Zealand Environment and Conservation Council (ANZECC)
and Ministerial Council on Forestry, Fisheries and Aquaculture (MCFFA)).
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Table 4.2.2 New South Wales Institutions in Water

(a) Catchment Management Authorities
Thirteen Catchment Management Authorities (‘CMA’s) have been established across NSW under the
Catchment Management Authorities Act 2003 (NSW) to coordinate natural resource management in
each catchment and to prepare Catchment Action Plans (‘CAP’) for their areas of operation. CAPs are
strategic, statutory plans prepared under the Catchment Management Authorities Act 2003 (NSW).
They provide a framework for natural resource management in a catchment. Plans include provisions
that relate to water quality. CMAs monitor Water Sharing Plans (where they exist) for progress in
achieving standards and targets in CAPs and other issues affecting overall catchment health.
The Hawkesbury-Nepean Catchment Management Authority is responsible for managing the most
extensive catchment area in the Sydney Region. Three CMAs in the Sydney Region (HawkesburyNepean, Southern Rivers and Sydney Metropolitan) have participated as observers in the development
of draft Greater Metropolitan Region Water Sharing Plans and assisted with public consultation on
proposed water sharing rules.
(b) Department of Environment Climate Change and Water (NSW)
The Department of the Environment Climate Change and Water (‘DECCW’) is one of 13 NSW
Government ‘super departments’ created in July 2009. NOW and the Office of the Hawkesbury-Nepean
(‘OHN’) are agencies of DECCW falling within the water portfolio as are the SCA and SWC. The
Environment Protection Authority (‘EPA’) and 13 Catchment Management Authorities (‘CMA’s) in the
State fall within the portfolio of environment and climate change of DECCW. All of these agencies within
DECCW have significant roles in water management in the Sydney Region as outlined in the following
sections.
(c) Department of Health (NSW)
The Department of Health (‘NSW Health’) is a ‘super department’ of the NSW Government. The
Environmental Health Branch of NSW Health works in collaboration with the Public Health Network of
16 Health Units.
NSW Health is involved in developing standards for: monitoring drinking water quality to ensure the
availability and adequate supply of water for drinking, food preparation and personal hygiene; water
quality suitable for recreational use (in rivers, lakes and dams, at beaches and in swimming pools and
spas); and household water quality where wastewater and sewage are reused for specific purposes.
Other than its role to accredit sewage management facilities under the Local Government (General)
Regulation 2005, NSW Health has limited regulatory authority in relation to recycled water. Its major
role is to provide public health guidance and advice to other State and local government authorities to
support and promote the safe use of recycled water.
The Minister for Health has powers to issue orders and direct public authorities to take action to
prevent public health risks in drinking water supplies.
(d) Environment Protection Authority
The Environment Protection Authority (‘EPA’) is responsible for administering the Protection of the
Environment Operations Act 1997 (NSW) (‘POEOA 1997’). Statutory functions and powers in the Act
continue to be exercised in the name of the EPA. EPA responsibilities include monitoring and regulating
wastewater discharges (for example from sewerage systems operated by water utilities) that may
impact on the water quality of streams, rivers, coastal waters or groundwater.
(e) Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal
The NSW Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal was established in 1992 by the Independent
Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal Act 1992 (NSW) (‘IPART Act 1992’). IPART is a key related body in the
NSW ‘super department’ of Premier and Cabinet. Its principal function at inception was to determine
the maximum price for monopoly services supplied by government agencies in the electricity, water and
transport sectors. The legislative objective was to ensure that monopolies did not abuse the power they
had from being the sole supplier of a good or service. This objective was to be achieved through the
implementation of a de-politicised and rational pricing-setting procedure which would encourage
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efficiency, equity and the appropriate allocation of resources. Formerly known as the Government
Pricing Tribunal, IPART’s name change in 1996 reflected an expanded role for the authority. IPART now
has a regulatory role in the water, gas, electricity and public transport industries in New South Wales.
IPART’s role in the water sector in the Sydney Region includes the power to determine prices in respect
of water, sewerage and stormwater services provided by SWC and prices for bulk water supplied by SCA
and the WAMC.
IPART monitors the performance of the authorities to establish the level of compliance by each
authority with such price determinations. In addition, IPART has the power to conduct periodic reviews
of pricing policies under Part 3A of the IPART Act 1992.
Secondly, IPART has a regulatory role to make recommendations relating to the corporate operating
licences of SWC and SCA and to conduct operational compliance audits of those entities. IPART also has
a significant licensing and regulatory role under the WICA 2006 in relation to private sector entities
operating in the water industry in the Sydney Region.
(f) Independent Review Panel
The NSW Government established an Independent Review Panel in December 2006 to provide expert
advice on, and monitor progress under, the Metropolitan Water Plan 2006 (‘MWP 2006’). The Panel’s
independent expert advice to the Government was intended to form a significant input to four-yearly
reviews of the MWP 2006 and the development of subsequent iterations of the Plan. As the MWP 2006
intended that community input was to be an important part of water planning for Sydney, the Panel was
also to consider how community views on water saving, recycling, supply and river health options could
best be integrated into ongoing planning to balance water supply with demand. (The Panel does not
appear as a NSW Government agency or other body in the NSW Government Directory accessed at
<http://www.directory.nsw.gov.au/index.asp> at 26 April 2010).
(g) Local Councils and Local Water Utilities
Local Councils and Local Water Utilities provide some stormwater drainage services in Sydney and they
provide water and wastewater services (and stormwater drainage in some areas) to towns outside the
major metropolitan areas of the Sydney Region. Local Council water utility operations are governed by
the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) (‘LGA 1993’). Local water utilities are not subject to operating
licences. The NSW Government’s Best-Practice Management of Water Supply and Sewerage Guidelines
encourage the effective and efficient delivery of water supply and sewerage services and promote
sustainable water conservation practices and water demand management throughout NSW. The
guidelines are not mandatory.
Local water utilities monitor drinking water quality against the 2004 Australian Drinking Water
Guidelines (‘ADWG’). Under the LGA 1993 local councils regulate the installation and operation of onsite sewage management systems. Regulations under the LGA 1993 specify performance standards and
require councils to supervise the operation of on-site sewage management systems. (Water supply and
service provision by local councils has been the subject of an inquiry: see NSW Department of Water
and Energy, ‘Inquiry into secure and sustainable urban water supply and sewerage services for nonmetropolitan NSW’ (Discussion paper, January 2008)).
(h) Natural Resources Commission
The Natural Resources Commission (‘NRC’), an independent body established by the Natural Resources
Commission Act 2003, is a key related body in the NSW Government ‘super department’ of Premier and
Cabinet. The NRC reports to the Premier and is responsible for providing the NSW Government with
independent advice on a range of natural resource management issues, including state-wide standards
and targets for natural resource management that are included in CAPs.
The NRC is responsible for auditing Water Sharing Plans. Information and data for the review of each
Water Sharing Plan and CAP are provided to the NRC by CMAs, the Division of Primary Industries in the
Department of NSW Industries and Investment, and DECCW.
(i) Office of the Hawkesbury-Nepean
The Office of the Hawkesbury-Nepean (‘OHN’) was established in March 2009 as a statutory
corporation. It is an agency of DECCW in the water portfolio. The functions of the OHN are set out in
the Hawkesbury-Nepean River Act 2009. It is intended to improve the co-ordination and
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implementation of management strategies in relation to the health of the river system, to improve
public access to information about those strategies and to provide increased opportunities for public
involvement in their development.
(j) Office of Water (NSW)
The water functions of the Department of Water and Energy, established in April 2007 to coordinate
water and energy management in NSW, were assumed by the NSW Office of Water (‘NOW’) in July
2009.
NOW delivers the NSW Government’s policy and reform agenda for water and provides policy,
legislative, regulatory, technical and management advice in relation to water to the Minister for Water.
Key urban water services provided by NOW include: development of elements of the water planning and
management framework under the WMA 2000 for the Sydney Region to replace the scheme currently in
place under the WA 1912; planning and policy development for urban water industries; coordination
and review of the Metropolitan Water Plan; and facilitation of water recycling across NSW. NOW also
administers water savings measures in the Sydney Region such as the development of Water Savings
Action Plans and administration of the Water Savings Fund. (NOW operates within the NSW
Department of the Environment, Climate Change and Water. It has assumed the water management
responsibilities of the former Department of Water and Energy which in turn incorporated most of the
functions of the former Department of Energy, Utilities and Sustainability, the water-related functions of
the former Department of Natural Resources and the Metropolitan Water Directorate from the former
NSW Cabinet Office. The Metropolitan Water Directorate was established in 1999 to provide technical
information to its members who represent all councils and county councils providing water supply
and/or sewerage services to local government areas in NSW. In 2007 the Directorate confirmed as one
of its strategic directions: ‘a stronger presence in shaping and influencing of Government policy’. These
activities are amongst the programs and initiatives under the Metropolitan Water Plan 2006 (discussed
below in Chapter 9) that are administered by the NSW Office of Water.).
(k) Sydney Catchment Authority
Sydney Catchment Authority is a state-owned statutory authority established by the Sydney Water
Catchment Management Act 1998 (NSW) (‘SWCMA 1998’). SCA is responsible for managing and
protecting Sydney’s water supply catchments, and supplying bulk water to its customers, which include
SWC and a number of local councils. SCA is obliged to charge for water in accordance with price
determinations made by IPART unless the approval of the Treasurer is obtained to set a lower price.
(l) Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Limited
Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Limited is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Sydney Water Corporation. It was
incorporated in 2007 to investigate and develop alternative sources for water supply, including
recycling, desalination and stormwater harvesting.
(m) Sydney Water Corporation
Sydney Water Corporation (‘SWC’), formerly known as Sydney Water Corporation Limited, was
constituted by the Sydney Water Act 1994 (NSW) (‘SWA 1994’) as a statutory state-owned corporation
now under the State Owned Corporations Act 1989 (NSW). The conduct of its operations in the Sydney
Region is governed by these two Acts, by an operating licence issued under the SWA 1994 and by
management licences issued in accordance with the WA 1912. SWC provides drinking water, recycled
water, wastewater services and some stormwater services to more than four million people in Sydney,
Illawarra and the Blue Mountains.
SWC receives water from SCA under a bulk water supply agreement.
SWC is obliged to charge for water in accordance with price determinations made by IPART unless the
approval of the Treasurer is obtained to set a lower price.
(n) Water Administration Ministerial Council
The Water Administration Ministerial Corporation (WAMC) was created by the Water Administration Act
1986 (NSW) and continues its existence under the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW).
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Chapter 5: The Power of Persuasion
According to Commonwealth officials, the Commonwealth roles in urban water management
are primarily in national leadership, standard setting, intellectual contribution and financial
1
management.

5.1

Introduction

Although the Commonwealth was not given specific power over water in the
Australian Constitution, it has the capacity to affect water resource management,
directly and indirectly, in several ways. This chapter begins with a brief discussion of
Constitutional opportunities for Commonwealth participation in State matters and
then explores how the Commonwealth has secured a role in water management
through the reform agendas of the National Competition Policy and the National
Water Initiative.
An explanation of competition policy in Australia, and how payment incentives assisted
implementation of its objectives, is provided as background to discussion of the water
reform agenda included in that policy. The emergence of urban water as a significant
item on the policy agenda in its own right is highlighted.
The discussion then addresses the most recent intergovernmental agreement on water
reform, the National Water Initiative (‘NWI’). 2 Adoption of the reforms in NSW under
the New South Wales National Water Initiative Implementation Plan (‘Implementation
Plan’) is considered with particular reference to the Sydney Region.
The chapter concludes with a review of recent developments in national urban water
reform policy. Shortcomings of the NWI urban water provisions that are brought out
earlier in the chapter are seen to drive calls for further, more specific actions to secure
urban water supplies. The new reforms are shown to be increasingly focused on
integrated urban water cycle management. The need to adapt traditional, regional
water planning priorities to incorporate management of a diverse range of non-rainfall

1

Senate Environment, Communications, Information Technology and the Arts References Committee, The Value of
Water: Inquiry into Australia‘s Urban Water Management (2002) 213.
2
Council of Australian Governments, Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Water Initiative (25 June 2004)
(‗NWI‘).
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dependent water resources emerges as a major hurdle for water management
planners in the Sydney Region.
The Commonwealth Government’s influence over water sector reform, particularly
over the last 15 years, has been ‘persuasive’ – guiding but not mandating direction.
The extent of that influence on water resource management in the Sydney Region is
demonstrated in Chapter 6 where the implementation of national reforms in NSW,
particularly in the Sydney Region, is examined.
5.2

A role for the Commonwealth?

The Commonwealth was not given an explicit power over water at federation but it
can influence water resource management by the States, directly and indirectly, in
several ways.
According to Gardner et al:
it is for constitutional reasons that state law remains the foundation for water
resources entitlement regimes in Australia. These reasons are not just the historical
legacy of constitutional arrangements. Despite the broadening interpretation of the
Commonwealth’s specific legislative powers, the states alone have plenary legislative
power to make law about the management of natural resources. Alongside their
legislative powers, the states have inherited the colonial sovereign title to terrestrial
lands and the proprietary ownership of Crown lands. The states (except South
Australia) used their plenary legislative powers to claim public ‘ownership’ of
terrestrial water resources to re-enforce the foundations of the state authorisation of
water access rights.3

Water management is indisputably a matter for the State. The nature of the State’s
water rights, now expressed in legislative provisions in NSW, was discussed in Chapter
4. There it was noted that the rights claimed by NSW were extended beyond
terrestrial water resources to include the coastal waters of the State in 2000.

3

Alex Gardner, Richard Bartlett and Janice Gray, Water Resources Law, (LexisNexis Butterworths, (2009) 104–105,
[5.69]. The Commonwealth is granted express powers under the Australian Constitution. However, there is only
one limited specific reference in the Constitution to water (section 100) and it is expressed as a restriction on a rule
and not a positive power of itself: see discuss of the section 100 restriction: at [5.31]–[5.41].

Chapter 5: The Power of Persuasion

88

Accepting the analysis of Gardner et al and acknowledging the legislative foundations
of the State’s water rights how far then can the Commonwealth now venture into the
field of water management?
Fisher is pragmatic in his approach to the question:
If the Commonwealth was minded to become “actively involved” in the management
of the natural resources of Australia, it is likely to have two options open to it. The
first is reliance upon the external affairs power … The second option is for the
Commonwealth and the States and Territories to undertake this management function
on a co-operative basis. Developments since 1992 suggest that it is the second option
that has, for the most part, been adopted.4

The practical implications of the Commonwealth taking Fisher’s second approach are
demonstrated in relation to urban water throughout this study, particularly in relation
to the use of financial incentives permitted by the Constitution to achieve desired
outcomes. The Commonwealth is observed to be achieving an increasing degree of
cooperation with States to drive policy and reform in difficult areas of administration,
with implementation of that policy being firmly the mandate of the States. The
following discussion examines the way the Commonwealth has been able to influence
water management reforms through the 1990s to the present in the absence of
specific Constitutional power.
5.3

Competition policy in Australia – a brief history

Competition policy as it emerged in Australia in 1995 was based on the premise that
the interests of consumers and the wider community are generally best served by
providing strong incentives for suppliers to operate efficiently and be price competitive
and innovative. 5
The first law to promote competition in Australia was enacted in 1906. It sought to
protect the freedom of interstate trade and to promote a competitive market for
Australian industries by prohibiting monopolisation.6 Subsequently, the Trade
Practices Act 1965 (Cth) (‘TPA 1974’) used the mechanism of administrative
4

D E Fisher, Water Law, (LBC Information Services, Sydney, 2000) 47 (footnotes omitted).
For a complete history of Australia‘s competition policy and its achievements see Productivity Commission,
‗Review of National Competition Policy Reforms‘ (Inquiry Report No 33, February 2005).
6
See Australian Industries Preservation Act 1906 (Cth).
5
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investigation of business conduct to ensure competitive practice. The TPA 1974 took a
new approach, fostering competition through the prohibition of anti-competitive
conduct.
Major competitive reforms through the 1970s and 1980s brought about import tariff
cuts, the floating of the Australian dollar and the virtual elimination of foreign
exchange controls, while moves to corporatise government enterprises and
progressively deregulate industry sectors such as transport and telecommunications
formed the basis of ‘microeconomic reform programs’ adopted by the Commonwealth
as well as the States and Territories to progress the competition policy agenda.7
The need for continued and expanded co-operation at all levels of government to
foster competition in an increasingly global market was highlighted in 1991 with the
Hawke government’s ‘new federalism’ initiative under which ‘the Commonwealth
sought to form a closer partnership between the three tiers of government…’. 8
In 1992 an independent inquiry into competition policy in Australia was conducted. A
report arising from that inquiry (known as the Hilmer Report9) was presented to the
Heads of Government on 25 August 1993.
The Council of Australian Governments (‘COAG’) meeting in April 199510 agreed to
adopt a national competition policy reform package to implement the
recommendations of the Hilmer Report and meet previous commitments to reforms in
the areas of electricity, gas, water, and road transport.
This reform framework, known as the National Competition Policy (‘NCP’), was
embodied in a package of measures comprising a hard law element in the Competition
Policy Reform Act 1995 (Cth), and soft law in the form of agreements to implement the
policy (the Competition Principles Agreement and the Conduct Code Agreement) and a
third agreement recording the Parties’ commitment to continuing microeconomic

7

Parliament of Australia, ‗Australia‘s National Competition Policy: Its Evolution and Operation‘ (Current Issues EBrief: Online Only, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, June 2001)
<http://www.aph.gov.au/library/intguide/econ/ncp_ebrief.htm> 1-2.
8
Ibid.
9
Independent Committee of Inquiry into Competition Policy in Australia, National Competition Policy, (Australian
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1993).
10
Details of the reform agenda can be found in Council of Australian Governments, ‗Communiqué‘ (11 April 1995).
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reform in key industries (Agreement to Implement the National Competition Policy and
Related Reforms).11
The Competition Policy Reform Act 1995 (Cth) amended the TPA 1974 to introduce
agreed competitive conduct rules (extending the rules to unincorporated enterprises
and government businesses) and to provide for third-party access to essential
infrastructure services with natural monopoly characteristics.12 The Prices Surveillance
Act 1983 (Cth) was amended to extend its application to State and Territory
government businesses, to broaden the existing provisions relating to prices
surveillance and price inquiries, and to include a prices monitoring function. The Trade
Practices Tribunal became the Australian Competition Tribunal (‘Competition Tribunal’)
and assumed responsibility for dealing with appeals under the access provisions of the
TPA 1974. The Trade Practices Commission and the Prices Surveillance Authority were
merged to form the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (‘ACCC’) to be
responsible for the enforcement of the provisions of the TPA 1974 and the provisions
of the Competition Code. A new advisory body, the National Competition Council
(‘NCC’), was established to make recommendations in relation to access matters under
the TPA 1974 and to undertake reviews of competition policy issues for COAG.13 The
NCP was implemented at State and Territory level by associated application
legislation.14
The key elements of the NCP were:


an extension of competition law to all business activity in Australia, ensuring measures
to prevent anticompetitive conduct apply to professions, unincorporated businesses
and the business activities of governments



reform of public monopolies, including the separation of regulatory and commercial
activities and an examination of the desirability of separating monopoly activities from
potentially competitive ones

11

The full text of the Inter-governmental Agreements is contained in National Competition Council, Compendium of
National Competition Policy Agreements (Australian Government Publishing Service, 2nd ed, June 1998) (‗NCP
Agreements‘). The Competition Principles Agreement as amended Competition Principles Agreement —
11 April 1995 (As amended to 13 April 2007) (‗Competition Principles Agreement‘) is available on the Council of
Australian Governments (‗COAG‘) website.
12
The access regime established under Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and the creation and
certification of an access regime relating to water infrastructure in NSW are examined below in Chapters 12 and 13.
13
For further detail see: Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 29 March 1995, 2434; Department of the
Parliamentary Library (Cth), ‗Hilmer, the National Competition Policy; A Layperson‘s Introduction‘, (Research Note
Number 35, 28 November 1995) Schedule.
14
New South Wales adopted the reforms in the Competition Policy Reform (New South Wales) Act 1995.
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competitive neutrality, so government businesses compete with the private sector on
a fair basis



the creation of independent regulators to oversee or set prices for services supplied by
monopoly suppliers



legislation review and appropriate reform



the introduction of ‘gatekeeping’ arrangements, to maintain the quality of regulation



a national access regime, to provide effective third party access to essential
infrastructure



specific reforms in the energy, water15 and road transport sectors.16

In addition to the specific provisions in the NCP concerning water (as well as energy
and road transport), the general policy elements set out above clearly encompassed
reforms which would affect the urban water sector in the Sydney Region, a sector
historically dominated by government monopoly bodies. The reform of public
monopolies, the creation of independent regulators, and, finally, the development of a
framework to secure access to essential infrastructure were core initiatives of reform
in the water sector in the Sydney Region from 1995.
The NCC has offered a note of caution:
The NCP reforms are based on a pro-competitive presumption, but with competition
as a means rather than an end in itself. Foremost, the NCP aims to promote the public
interest. Its reform elements, therefore, are subject to safeguards to weigh the costs
and benefits on a case basis [sic]. The NCP provides for consideration of efficiency,
social, environmental, equity and regional objectives in the assessment of reform
options.17

Accordingly, reforms introduced with the objective of promoting competition in all
forms of business activity were constrained by considerations of the public interest –
the elements of sustainable development were emerging as factors in the business
equation.

15

The initial competition policy reform agenda included water as a specific reform item. For details of the water
reforms framework adopted under the National Competition Policy (‗NCP‘) see NCP Agreements, above n 11, 37,
40–41, 99; Council of Australian Governments, ‗Communiqué‘, (Hobart, 25 February 1994) Attachment A; and
discussion in Chapter 5.5 on page 96.
16
National Competition Council, Annual Report 2004-05 (Commonwealth of Australia, Melbourne, 2005) A1, 1.
17
National Competition Council, Assessment of Governments‘ Progress in Implementing the National Competition
Policy and Related Reforms (October 2005), ix. The Productivity Commission also stated that arrangements that
‗detracted‘ from competition should only be retained if they were shown to be ‗in the public interest‘: Productivity
Commission, above n 5, xiv.
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5.4

The National Competition Policy in practice – the role of incentives to perform

According to the NCC 2004–2005 Annual Report:
The success of the NCP lies in a combination of three elements. First, an agenda is
essential. Second, it is also necessary to ensure progress is assessed and reported in a
rigorous, transparent and independent manner. This assessment role is critical. Third,
the role of incentives in progressing and encouraging reform, stiffening government’s
resolve and distributing the gains from reform is important.18

The role of assessing progress with the whole of the agenda fell to the NCC until 2005
when responsibility for assessing the implementation of ongoing water reforms was
assumed by the National Water Commission (‘NWC’).19
Although the NCC saw the assessment of performance as critical to the success of the
competition policy, it is perhaps the third element set out above that provided the
most persuasive reasons for States and Territories to work towards the reform
objectives. The provision of incentive payments clearly established a role for the
Commonwealth in the reform process.
The Agreement to Implement the National Competition Policy and Related Reforms
(‘NCC Implementation Agreement’) provided for three tranches of general purpose
payments to be made by the Commonwealth to the States and Territories in the form
of a series of ‘Competition Payments’. Payments were to be made according to an
agreed timetable commencing in 1997–1998 with the final payment to be made for
the 2005–2006 year. Governments’ progress in implementing the reforms was to be
assessed prior to the commencement of each round of payments: prior to 1 July in
1997, 1999 and 2001. The Commonwealth could retain a State’s share of the
Competition Payments in certain circumstances. 20

18

National Competition Council, above n 16, 4 (emphasis in original).
NWI, above n 2, para 11.
20
The Competition Payments were in addition to Financial Assistance Grants which were payable under the NCP
Agreements. However, a State‘s share of the Financial Assistance Grants could be retained by the Commonwealth if
the State did not undertake required action to implement the NCP and related reforms within the specified time: NCP
Agreements, above n 11, NCC Implementation Agreement, 35-41. In 2000, COAG agreed that annual assessments
should be undertaken from 2001 up to and including 2005, and that a review of the reform agenda and the policy
arrangements should be conducted in 2005: see National Competition Council, above n 16, 31.
19
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Payments in the period commencing in 1997–98 were not tied to implementation of
the water reform agenda21 but water reform became an important component of the
agenda for the second round of payments in 1999–2000. The benchmarks against
which performance was assessed included the ‘effective implementation of all COAG
agreements on … the strategic framework for the efficient and sustainable reform of
the Australian water industry’22.
The final round of payments commencing in 2001–02 required, amongst other things,
continued, effective observance of reforms in water. 23
The mechanism for allocating incentive payments, and how those payments reflect
progress on reforms, was summarised by the NCC as follows:
The Australian Government decides on the actual payments after considering the
National Competition Council’s advice on jurisdictions’ progress in meeting their NCP
commitments. State and territory governments are not compelled to implement the
NCP reforms, but the Council may recommend a reduction or suspension of
competition payments if it assesses that governments have not met their agreed
commitments.
The 2003 NCP assessment was the first time the Council recommended substantial
payment reductions for all state and territory governments, reflecting the
commitment to have completed the legislation review and reform program – a
significant element of the NCP package – by 30 June 2002. The Council also
recommended payments reductions in the 2004 NCP assessment. The Australian
Government accepted all recommendations arising from both assessments. The scope
and magnitude of the reductions reflected that the NCP was drawing to a close so
governments needed to meet all commitments …24

The NCC recommendations for payment reductions took three forms:


Irrevocable permanent deductions that applied to specific compliance failures.



Specific suspensions that were a temporary hold on competition payments until a
government complied with the relevant reform requirement. If the relevant reform

21

NCP Agreements, above n 11, Conditions for Payments to States, 37.
The strategic framework referred to here is the framework agreed to by COAG in 1994: Council of Australian
Governments, ‗Communiqué‘, (Hobart, 25 February 1994) Attachment A.
23
NCP Agreements above n 11, Conditions for Payments to States, 37.
24
National Competition Council, above n 17, Overview and recommendations, viii.
22
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was not implemented, the specific suspensions could become permanent
deductions.


Pool suspensions that applied to a pool of outstanding compliance failures and
could be released when compliance was achieved, or converted to permanent
deductions.25

The 2005–06 payments were the last under the NCP. In the 2005 Assessment the NCC
expressed the view that it would not be appropriate to suspend payments for the final
period pending further review, and so it recommended that only permanent payment
deductions should be implemented for that period.26
The impact of payment reductions was clearly demonstrated in relation to rice
marketing in NSW. In 2005 the NCC recommended a five per cent permanent
deduction of payments suspended from the NSW 2004–05 competition payments for
noncompliance with obligations relating to rice marketing legislation. The NCC also
recommended a permanent deduction of five per cent from the NSW 2005–06
payments, again for noncompliance relating to rice marketing regulation. However,
provision was made in the Assessment that if NSW enacted appropriate reforms to the
relevant legislation by 30 November 2005, the NCC would recommend release of the
2004–05 suspended payments and payment in full of the 2005–06 competition
payments.27
This seems to have been effective. An addendum to the NCC 2005 Assessment advised
as follows:
On Wednesday 16 November 2005 the New South Wales Parliament passed legislation
amending the Marketing of Primary Products Act 1983 to allow, from 1 July 2006,
competition in the domestic marketing of rice grown in New South Wales. The
legislation was assented to on 24 November 2005. 28

Almost at the final hour New South Wales met its NCP obligations in relation to rice
marketing and satisfied the conditions for release of its competition payments.

25

Ibid. See further discussion at xix.
Ibid xix-xx.
27
Ibid xxv. The terms used in this discussion of the rice marketing issue to refer to the nature of the suspended
payments reflect the approach taken by the NCC in the 2005 Assessment: at xix-xx.
28
Ibid Addendum.
26
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Chapter 6 shows that payment suspensions relating to water reform implementation
in NSW were similarly effective. The emergence of the Water Management Act 2000
(NSW) (‘WMA 2000’) was a timely response to meet conditions imposed by the
Commonwealth for release of suspended payments.
Although the merits of incentive payments were apparent they did cause some
concern. COAG commented in 1994 that adverse consequences could arise from the
practice of tying grants to performance through duplication of effort and confusion of
roles and responsibilities between States, Territories and the Commonwealth. COAG
concluded that their continuance should be considered in future reviews of
Commonwealth/State roles and responsibilities.29
However, by 2005, with the 1995 NCP agenda complete and a new agenda forecast,
incentive payments (in some guise) were foreshadowed as a part of any new package.
Their significance as an element to ‘stiffen resolve’ was acknowledged:
Elements of any new reform agenda are likely to pose political problems for at least
some governments; some may give rise to fiscal issues. State and territory
governments receive significant funding from the Australian Government, and it is a
legitimate question to ask why financial incentives are needed to persuade
governments to take actions that will produce significant benefits.
Financial incentives can assist governments in meeting legitimate demands for
adjustment assistance and stiffen their resolve to undertake reform. The Council’s
experience with the NCP suggests that, on balance, there is a legitimate role for
financial incentives to assist implementation of a next reform agenda. The form of the
incentives may be different however from that which operated under the NCP.30

The deduction or suspension of incentive payments under the NCP clearly had a
persuasive influence on compliance with the reform agenda. Its impact on reforms in
the rice industry is illustrated above and is further illustrated by the impact that
payment suspensions had in relation to water reform in NSW.31 It is interesting to
note one Senator’s insistence in Parliamentary debate that the intention of the NCP

29

See discussion of the issue in Council of Australian Governments, Communiqué, (Hobart, 25 February 1994).
National Competition Council, above n 16, 4.
31
An example of the impact of withholding payments against water reform initiatives is examined in Chapter 6.5 on
page 121.
30
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was to be precisely that – persuasive but not compelling.32 Indeed, without the carrot
of payments, withheld or otherwise, it is open to conjecture whether proposals for
reform would have been so enthusiastically embraced by the parties concerned. There
was no other ‘penalty’ for non-compliance. Indeed, there was no requirement for
compliance, and no element of compulsion; there was merely an agreement amongst
governments to strive to reach the goals of the NCP. The Commonwealth Government
wielded the ultimate power to drive reform progress.
COAG agreed to a new National Reform Agenda at its meeting on 10 February 2006.
The new agenda emphasised the ‘nation’s human capital’. 33 The competition stream
of the new agenda focused on reforms in the areas of transport, energy, infrastructure
regulation and planning, and on climate change, and technological innovation and
adaptation.34 Water had fallen off the national competition reform agenda, having
firmly established its place in reforms elsewhere35. Apparently, water would not form
a part of the assessment process in any incentive scheme worked out for the new
agenda streams.
5.5

Water and the national competition policy

Water reform was imported into the NCP as a package of measures already being
implemented by COAG.36 The first meeting of the newly formed COAG in 1992 had
reviewed progress on water policy development at Commonwealth and State and
Territory levels and requested a report on urban and rural water use for the following
meeting. 37 The report was duly presented to the COAG meeting in June 1993,
resulting in a request for a working group to develop a report on:

32

Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 29 March 1995, 2434 (Rosemary Crowley): In relation to the
Competition Principles Agreement Senator Crowley stated that: ‗The Agreement does not compel specific reforms by
Governments. It is not about competition for competition‘s sake.‘ The Senator continued: ‗In particular the
Agreement, and indeed the package of reforms in total, does not compel, or even encourage, Governments to
privatise government business enterprises…‘.
33
Council of Australian Governments ‗Communiqué‘ (Canberra, 10 February 2006) 1.
34
Ibid 4-5.
35
The water reform agenda was encapsulated in the NWI, above n 2, which is considered in Chapters 5.6–5.8.
36
Water reform has provided fertile ground for formal reviews. In NSW the Second Reading Speech to the Water
Management Bill 2000 tells us that between 1855 and 1960, 30 royal commissions or select committees inquired into
water, sewerage, irrigation and related matters. Between 1984 and 1995 there were 10 major reports into the NSW
water industry: New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 22 June 2000 (Mr Amery) 7498.
The history of water reform in NSW from 1975 to 1994 was examined in Poh-Ling Tan, ‗An Historical Introduction
to Water Reform in NSW – 1975 to 1994‘ (2002) 19 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 445.
37
Council of Australian Governments, ‗Communiqué‘, (Perth, 7 December 1992).
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a strategic framework for efficient and sustainable reform of the water industry, which,
at the same time, takes account of the technical and policy diversity that exists across
the States and Territories.38

The report from the Working Group on Water Resource Policy was presented to the
COAG meeting on 25 February 1994, and the strategic framework contained therein –
the 1994 COAG Water Reform Framework – was adopted.39 COAG’s objective in
adopting the policy was to achieve an efficient and sustainable water industry by
addressing the economic, environmental and social implications of future water
reform to arrest widespread natural resource degradation (to which water use
contributed) in all jurisdictions.40
The 1994 COAG Water Reform Framework aspired to national reform in six principal
areas: pricing reform, clarification of systems of water allocations and entitlements,
adoption of water trading arrangements, institutional reform, enhanced public
consultation and education, and the allocation of water to the environment.
Specific reforms relating to urban water pricing, institutional reform, and stormwater
and wastewater management in urban areas were of direct relevance in the Sydney
Region. Environmental reform initiatives called for investigation into the potential for
greater use of wastewater in urban areas and strategies for handling and using
stormwater. The reforms supported the development of the National Water Quality
Management Strategy to establish water quality monitoring and catchment
management policies, including strategies to address town wastewater and sewage
disposal to sensitive environments. While other reform initiatives, for example those
relating to water allocations and entitlements and water trading, had little direct
bearing on the urban water sector at the time, they clearly were (and are) relevant to
urban water management and planning in the Sydney Region, particularly in the
broader context that includes its catchments.

38

Council of Australian Governments, ‗Communiqué‘, (Perth, 8-9 June 1993).
Council of Australian Governments, ‗Communiqué‘, (Hobart, 25 February, 1994) Attachment A – Water Resource
Policy (‗1994 COAG Water Reform Framework‘).
40
Ibid [1].
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Institutional reforms agreed to in the 1994 COAG Water Reform Framework were
intended to bring about administrative arrangements and decision-making processes
to support:


development of an integrated approach to natural resource management



integrated catchment management of water resources incorporating arrangements
for consultation with representatives of local government and the wider
community in individual catchments;



separation of the roles of water resource management, standard setting, and
regulatory enforcement and service provision;



further development of comparisons of inter-agency performance, with service
providers seeking to achieve international best practice; and



commercially focused service delivery in metropolitan areas, whether achieved by
contracting-out, corporatised entities or privatised bodies.41

Reforms to the States’ frameworks of water allocation and entitlements were to be
embodied in comprehensive systems that would achieve the separation of water
property rights from land title and clear specification of entitlements in terms of
ownership, volume, reliability, transferability and quality (if appropriate).42 The
environment was to have formal allocations or entitlements to water as a legitimate
water user that were to be determined wherever possible on basis of:
the best scientific information available and have regard to the inter-temporal and
inter-spatial water needs required to maintain the health and viability of river systems
and groundwater basins.43

In particular, significant future dam construction or irrigation activities were to be
assessed to ensure the environmental requirements of the river systems would be
adequately met before any water was harvested.

41

Ibid. The agreed institutional reforms are set out in paragraph 6.
In 1994 the Water Act 1912 (NSW) regulated access to and use of water in NSW. Chapter 4.2.4 on page 63
highlighted the connection between water rights and land ownership under that Act. It still applies to access to and
use of water in the Sydney Region but draft water sharing plans have finally been prepared for the water sources of
the Sydney Region. They are discussed in Chapter 8.
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1994 COAG Water Reform Framework, above n 39, [4d].
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Once a system of water entitlements or allocations was in place, trading in water
entitlements was to be used to maximise the contribution of water use to national
income and welfare. The reforms contemplated inter-State water entitlement trading
where that was socially, physically and ecologically sustainable and called on
jurisdictions to put the necessary institutional arrangements in place to facilitate
trading. The 1994 COAG Water Reform Framework optimistically called for the trading
frameworks to be in place by 1998.44
A five to seven year period for implementation of these reforms was envisaged at the
time, with the first of five annual reports on progress towards implementation to be
provided by the Working Group on Water Resource Policy to the COAG meeting in
1995.45
Water reform was only one element of the NCP, but pricing and institutional reforms
were to be implemented in all sectors. It should not be surprising then that, as is
shown in Chapters 6 and 7, reform in these general areas in the water industry
outpaced the implementation of some of the more specific water reforms. The
objectives of broad pricing and institutional reforms were clear and achievable across
jurisdictions. The objectives of some of the more specific reforms – for example,
integrated catchment management and systems of water entitlements to facilitate
cross-border trading – were encroaching on State regimes already in place and called
for a high level of cooperation between the States to produce consistent regimes
across borders.

44

Issues concerning the implementation of the water reform framework and the timeframe for implementation were
addressed at a meeting in January 1999. With regard to the objectives for water allocation and trading the meeting
recommended that the ‗comprehensive system‘ contemplated by the reforms should recognise both consumptive and
environmental needs and should be applicable to both surface and groundwater sources. To assess performance of the
parties for the second round of payments the legislative and institutional framework to enable determination of water
entitlements and trading of those entitlements was to be in place. The legislative and institutional frameworks were
to include appropriate allocations to the environment as a legitimate user of water in order to enhance or restore river
health. If legislation was not in place then the NCC was to recognise progress with such legislation. In addition
detailed implementation programs setting priorities to address overallocated or stressed river systems were to be
submitted in that period. The meeting agreed for the third round of payments the parties would have to demonstrate
substantial progress with implementation of those programs and that by 2005 allocation and trading needed to be
substantially completed for all river systems and groundwater resources identified and included in the implementation
programs. Source: Council of Australian Governments Tripartite Meeting Outcomes: Tripartite Meeting
14 January 1999.
45
Council of Australian Governments, ‗Communiqué‘, (Hobart, 25 February, 1994). COAG recognised that
implementation of the water industry reforms was dependent on the availability of financial resources and included
water reforms in the second tranche of payments under the NCP Agreements, Implementation Agreement, above n 11,
37, 40.
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The 1994 COAG Water Reform Framework, expanded in 1997 to include further
groundwater, wastewater and stormwater proposals from the Agriculture and
Resource Management Council of Australia and New Zealand, 46 formed the basis of
the water reform agenda under the NCP until mid-2003. It called for specific reforms
to water management that would see the environment recognised as a legitimate
water user, ensure community participation in the reform processes where change or
new initiatives were contemplated, and would identify opportunities for sustainable
management and use of previously untapped sources of water – wastewater and
stormwater. Institutional and pricing reforms were to be implemented to support
integrated management objectives. The package as a whole if applied to an urban
area was capable of delivering integrated urban water cycle management by means of
an administrative process that was to be transparent and participatory. All of these
agenda items were to impact water management in the Sydney Region.
5.6

The emergence of a National Water Initiative

The dawn of the 21st century brought a groundswell of support for a revitalised
approach to water management. COAG directed its attention to rural matters –
salinity, particularly dryland salinity, and deteriorating water quality – to develop the
National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality at the end of 2000.47 The Natural
Resource Management Ministerial Council (‘NRMMC’) was created in 2001 to oversee
the implementation of the action plan through to June 2008.
In 2002 the Wentworth Group of Concerned Scientists produced its Blueprint for a
Living Continent, challenging all Australians to start to learn to live with their country
rather than to try to fight it. 48 The Blueprint for a Living Continent outlined key
changes needed to achieve this goal, including proposals for water reform.
Clarification of water property rights, restoration of environmental flows to stressed
rivers, including the Murray River, and the development of a National Water Plan
46

The expanded framework was endorsed as the ‗1996 framework for the strategic reform of Australia‘s water
industry‘. The terms agreed to by COAG are referred to in a letter from the Prime Minister to Premiers and Chief
Ministers on 10 February 1997: NCP Agreements, above n 11, 110. Governments agreed that competition payments
under the NCP would continue to be assessed against progress on the implementation of the original 1994 COAG
Water Reform Framework: at 111.
47
Council of Australian Governments, ‗Communiqué‘, (Canberra, 3 November 2000). The National Action Plan for
Salinity and Water Quality was absorbed into the Commonwealth Government‘s Caring for our Country initiative
which has now been absorbed into the Water for the Future programme.
48
Wentworth Group of Concerned Scientists Blueprint for a Living Continent: A Way Forward from the Wentworth
Group of Concerned Scientists (WWF Australia, 2002) 3.
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focusing on improving the health of damaged rivers, protecting healthy rivers and
improving water use efficiency across Australia were the broad elements of the water
reforms promoted by the Wentworth Group, echoing the direction of the 1994 COAG
Water Reform Framework.
In July 2003, the Wentworth Group produced its Blueprint for a National Water Plan.49
The Wentworth Group called on COAG to commit to three specific reforms at its ‘next’
meeting: the protection of river health and the rights of all Australians to clean usable
water; the establishment of a new, nationally consistent water entitlement and trading
scheme; and the engagement of local communities in the reform process.50 The
Blueprint for a National Water Plan matched outcomes needed to achieve these
reforms with actions to produce the desired results and urged COAG to take up the
challenge.
The timing of the release of the Wentworth Group Blueprints was remarkable. The
passion and commitment of the group caught the attention of the public and the
media with unprecedented success and ‘*in+ the process they launched a new
phenomenon in the formulation of Australian public policy – the unpaid, independent
expert group’.51 Julian Cribb attributed the trustworthy and objective image presented
by the Wentworth Group at the time to the scientific credentials of the members and
the fact that they had nothing personal to gain. Cribb also noted that politicians and
senior public servants had been briefed on what was to be said and support from
senior Ministers, heads of department and key policymakers was critical to the
acceptance of the messages in the Blueprints.
Referring to the Blueprint for a Living Continent, Cribb observed further that:
It wasn’t rocket science and it wasn’t even new. It built on, and lent fresh impetus to
core ideas about what should be done evolved [sic] in Landcare, the National Heritage
Trust and the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality, among many others.

49

Ibid.
Ibid 2-3.
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Julian Cribb, ‗The Wentworth Group and the Great Water Debate‘: Paper prepared for the 2006 Australian State of
the Environment Committee, Department of Environment and Heritage, Canberra, (2006), Department of the
Environment <http://www.environment.gov.au/soe/2006/publications/emerging/water-debate/pubs/waterdebate.pdf>. The paper reviews the process behind the development of the Wentworth Group Blueprints.
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But it delivered a public receptiveness that gave policymakers a chance to move
forward.52

Water was firmly on the agenda with impressive new champions. The reform focus
was familiar: environmental water needs, water management planning and
community engagement in the reform process. But the focus was not on issues
specific to urban water.
At its meeting in August 2003, COAG acknowledged that there was a ‘pressing need’ to
revisit the 1994 water reform agenda. The meeting set out the scope of a national
water initiative to be embodied in an intergovernmental agreement and to be
presented to the first COAG meeting in 2004. Measures to increase the productivity
and efficiency of water use, sustain rural and urban communities, and to ensure the
health of rivers and groundwater systems were heralded. The initiative was to build
on the 1994 COAG Water Reform Framework and the achievements of the Natural
Heritage Trust and the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality. The urban
component of the reform was to reinforce the need for efficient water use by various
means including the promotion of water reuse and recycling, and the adoption of more
efficient technologies. The effectiveness of urban water pricing policies was also to be
assessed.53
On 25 June 2004, COAG agreed to the new water reform framework of the NWI’.54
The Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Water Initiative was signed by most
governments on that day; Tasmania became a signatory on 3 June 2005 and Western
Australia joined on 6 April 2006.
The NWI was an agreement between governments framed in the language of
consensus. It is the record of negotiations to settle a new agenda for water reform in
Australia, albeit again with a very familiar focus. By signing the NWI, all parties
indicated their support for the reforms and a willingness to implement them in a spirit
of cooperation to achieve a common objective:
Full implementation of this [NWI] will result in a nationally-compatible, market,
regulatory and planning based system of managing surface and groundwater resources
52

Ibid.
Council of Australian Governments, ‗Communiqué‘, (29 August 2003).
54
NWI, above n 2. The NWI builds on the 1994 COAG Water Reform Framework: at para 6.
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for rural and urban use that optimises economic, social and environmental
outcomes.55

How this objective was to be achieved is not easily distilled from the language of the
NWI by those who do not live and breathe the intent.
Full implementation of the NWI was premised on the achievement of ten specific
objectives set out in paragraph 23:
i)

clear and nationally-compatible characteristics for secure water access
entitlements

ii)

transparent, statutory-based water planning;

iii)

statutory provision for environmental and other public benefit outcomes, and
improved environmental management practices;

iv)

complete [sic] the return of all currently overallocated or overused systems to
environmentally-sustainable levels of extraction;

v)

progressive removal of barriers to trade in water and meeting other requirements
to facilitate the broadening and deepening of the water market, with an open
trading market to be in place;

vi)

clarity around the assignment of risk arising from future changes in the availability
of water for the consumptive pool;

vii)

water accounting which is able to meet the information needs of different water
systems in respect to planning, monitoring, trading, environmental management
and on-farm management;

viii)

policy settings which facilitate water use efficiency and innovation in urban and
rural areas;

ix)

addressing future adjustment issues that may impact on water users and
communities; and

x)

recognition of the connectivity between surface and groundwater resources and
connected systems managed as a single resource.56

The NWI asserted in its Preamble that:
In Australia water is vested57 in governments that allow other parties to access and use
water for a variety of purposes58.

55
56

Ibid para 23.
Ibid (emphasis in the original).
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It also pointed out that rights and responsibilities are attached to these benefits.
Governments making water available to users are, in turn, responsible for achieving
‘socially and economically beneficial outcomes in a manner that is environmentally
sustainable’ in the process of allocation and use.59 Against this background, the parties
to the NWI stated that a specific objective of their participation in the NWI was to
‘underpin the capacity of Australia’s water management regimes to deal with change
responsively and fairly’60.
The NWI set out desired outcomes and actions in eight key areas: water access
entitlements and planning frameworks; water markets and trading; best practice water
pricing; integrated management of water for environmental and other public benefit
outcomes; water resource accounting; urban water reform; knowledge and capacity
building; and community partnerships and adjustment.61
The NWI was to be implemented over a 10 year period and States and Territories were
to develop detailed implementation plans within 12 months of signing the agreement
to indicate how the NWI would be ‘rolled out’ in each jurisdiction.
The NWC was created to report to COAG on progress with the implementation of the
initiative and to recommend ways to ensure the objectives of the NWI were met. 62
Implementation of the NWI, particularly in those areas requiring collective national
action,63 was to be overseen by the NRMMC in consultation with other Ministerial
Councils where necessary.64
The Commonwealth’s role (through COAG) as facilitator of the ‘new’ reform package
was patent – the NWI was a product of co-operative federalism. A new authority, the
NWC, was created to monitor and report on the States’ performance. The reform
agenda was formally documented in an intergovernmental agreement – a soft law
57

Ibid. The nature of this ‗vesting‘ is perhaps expressed more clearly in paragraph 27 of the NWI. There, the parties
recognise that States and Territories ‗retain the vested rights to the use, flow and control of water‘. The issue of
ownership, or property, in water itself is not addressed.
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Ibid paras 10, 19.
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The NWC considers that collective national actions under the NWI encompass reforms to achieve nationally
consistent water accounts, metering standards, nationally compatible water registers, and consistent water pricing:
National Water Commission, ‗Progress on the National Water Initiative‘ (A Report to the Council of Australian
Governments, 1 June 2006).
64
NWI, above n 2, para 18.
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mechanism with no enforcement provisions and only residual incentives that could be
applied under the NCP. There were no new carrots to encourage progress.
5.7

Implementation of the National Water Initiative in NSW

The NSW National Water Initiative Implementation Plan (‘Implementation Plan’) was
accredited by the NWC on 18 August 2006. With respect to the effect of accreditation,
the NWC stated:
By accrediting plans, the Commission is not saying that the plans – or the process of their
development – are perfect. In fact, the plans have highlighted a number of areas where
jurisdictions will need to further develop their water management arrangements to
meet the requirements of the NWI.65

The Implementation Plan addressed each of the eight key elements of the NWI
indicating which of those had already been completed and detailing the timeframe for
completing the remaining commitments and the context within which the actions
were to be implemented.
Although there was limited reference to urban water in the NWI, the influence of the
whole of the reform agenda has been evident in evolving water management policy for
the Sydney Region. Chapter 6 examines how NSW has incorporated the national water
reform agenda into its water management strategy in the Sydney Region, including
those rural and regional initiatives that impact on urban water management. The
discussion is structured around the assessments of performance under the NCP and
the NWI.
5.8

Urban water in the National Water Initiative

The agreed outcomes from urban water reform under the NWI were to:
i) provide healthy, safe and reliable water supplies;
ii) increase water use efficiency in domestic and commercial settings;
iii) encourage re-use and recycling of wastewater where cost effective;
iv) facilitate water trading between and within the urban and rural sectors;
v) encourage innovation in water supply sourcing, treatment, storage and discharge;
and

65
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vi) achieve improved pricing for metropolitan water…66

Actions to achieve these outcomes were specified in the NWI, in a form that bears
little relationship to the statement of the outcomes, under the headings of Demand
Management (paragraph 91) and Innovation and Capacity Building to Create Water
Sensitive Australian Cities (Water Sensitive Cities) (paragraph 92). The NWC stepped in
to assist parties to meet the objectives envisaged when the urban water elements of
the NWI were settled by expanding upon the brief statement in the NWI. Chapter 6
examines the NWC’s interpretation of these elements of the NWI and looks at
assessments of progress with these objectives in the Sydney Region.
5.9

An enhanced framework for urban water

In 2007 the Chairman of the NWC urged governments to avoid complacency with
implementation of the NWI and highlighted 15 areas where action was needed. The
last, but certainly not the least, of these actions read as follows:
[T]he Commission is concerned about disappointing performance across most
Australian jurisdictions in urban water planning. Urban water shortages in the current
drought and the rush to invest in new urban water infrastructure are evidence of
planning failure. The fundamental NWI outcome of reliable urban water supplies has
not been delivered. … the Commission recommends that Australian governments
should now consider supplementing the NWI with an enhanced set of urban water
reform commitments to:


lift the standard of future urban water supply planning (especially to meet the
risks of climate change)



remove ‘policy bans’ on any water supply option and require objective
consideration of all options (including recycled water, desalination, rural-tourban trade, new dams, inter-basin transfers, and cross-border transfers)67



encourage diversification towards less climate dependent water supply
options

66

NWI, above n 2, para 90 (emphasis in original). Metropolitan water reforms are to be consistent with water storage
and delivery pricing actions in paragraphs 66.i) to 66.iv).
67
Policy bans on water supply options seem to have come and gone in the Sydney Region although sometimes they
are simply repackaged. Prescriptive (hard law) water restrictions have been repackaged as ‗water wise rules‘ (see
discussion in Chapter 10.3.2 on page 216). Indirect potable reuse is still a policy ban (see discussion in Chapter 10.2
on page 201).
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consider a floor under urban water shortages by adoption of a national
minimum reliability benchmark for water supply for Australia’s major
population centres



reduce the widespread public confusion associated with water restrictions



encourage fundamental reforms [detailed in the report] to institutional and
market arrangements for water supply…, and



review the role of local government in urban water delivery.68

The First Biennial Assessment set out in some detail the elements that an enhanced
urban water reform agenda should cover specifically addressing water planning,
institutional and market arrangements and onground delivery of water supply and
demand management options.69
The election of the Rudd Government in November 2007 saw a wave of reform
enthusiasm sweep through the nation. The December 2007 meeting of COAG
recognised that there was a unique opportunity for Commonwealth – State
cooperation, to end the blame game and buck passing, and to take major steps
forward for the Australian community.70

Seven areas were identified for the COAG 2008 work agenda, one of which was
‘climate change and water’.71 A Working Group on Climate Change and Water
(‘WGCCW’) was established with the objective of ensuring ‘sustainable water use
across Australia’. The WGCCW was to deliver a Commonwealth/State implementation
plan to the March 2008 COAG meeting which would include a stocktake of key
challenges facing urban water supply.72
In February 2008 the Council for the Australian Federation (‘CAF’) endorsed draft
principles (‘CAF Principles’) for urban water planning to be released for further
consultation. They were to:
1. Deliver urban water supplies in accordance with agreed levels of service including
specified levels of reliability and safety.

68

National Water Commission, National Water Initiative First Biennial Assessment of Progress in Implementation,
(National Water Commission, Canberra, August 2007) 4 (‗First Biennial Assessment‘).
69
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2. Base urban water planning on the best information available at the time and invest in
acquiring information on an ongoing basis to continually improve the knowledge base.
3. Adopt a partnership approach so that the community is able to make an informed
contribution to urban planning, including consideration of the appropriate
supply/demand balance.
4. Manage water in the urban context on a whole-of-water-cycle basis.
5. Consider the full portfolio of water supply and demand options, from both natural and
manufactured water sources.
6. Develop and manage urban water supplies within sustainable limits.
7. Use pricing and, where efficient and feasible, market mechanisms to help achieve
planned urban water supply/demand balance.

8. Periodically review the assumptions upon which urban water plans are based and
make adjustments if the assumptions change.73

The CAF Principles were intended to assist government and large metropolitan and
regional utilities to undertake long term planning for urban water supplies to ensure
future demand would be met and were to be forwarded to the WGCCW ‘to inform
their work’.74 There was no explanation in the CAF Communiqué to indicate how the
‘further consultation’ referred to in that Communiqué was to take place.
The WGCCW presented a 51 page report on water to COAG for consideration at its
March 2008 meeting.75 The urban water component of the report, having been
informed by the CAF Principles, was also supported by an update of progress in water
reform prepared by the NWC in February 2008 for the Water Sub Group to the
WGCCW.76
The COAG meeting in March 2008 agreed to release ‘eight key principles for urban
water reforms’ for consultation and commissioned the development of a

73

The purpose and intent of the Principles drafted by the Council for the Australian Federation (‗CAF Principles‘)
were referred to, but not included, in: Council of Australian Governments, ‗Communiqué‘, (Adelaide,
26 March 2008). The CAF Principles as set out here were included in: Working Group on Climate Change and
Water, ‗Water‘ (Report to Council of Australian Governments, March 2008) 12.
74
Council for the Australian Federation, ‗Communiqué‘, (Adelaide, 21 February 2008) 2-3.
75
Working Group on Climate Change and Water, ‗Water‘ (Report to Council of Australian Governments, March
2008).
76
National Water Commission, ‗Update of Progress in Water Reform‘ (Input into the Water Sub group (WSG)
Stocktake Report, 15 February 2008).
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comprehensive new work program of water reform to address inter alia ‘key
challenges in urban water’ to be prepared for consideration in October 2008.77
Despite the frenetic activity on the part of the Council of the Australian Federation and
COAG from December 2007 to March 2008, publications released in July and August of
2008 continued the assault on urban water reform progress.
Acknowledging the findings of the First Biennial Assessment and the subsequent 2008
COAG Update Report on implementation of the urban water provisions of the NWI, the
NWC commented that:
in retrospect, NWI provisions for urban water were insufficiently challenging. Urgent
action is required to tackle urban planning, pricing, market and institutional reforms.78

The areas identified for policy reform focused primarily on pricing, although
transparency of security of water supply, institutional and structural reform and
increased opportunities for competition were also placed on the reform agenda.79
The NWC again took a dim view of urban water reform progress in August 2008:
Based on its experience, the Commission has concluded that the NWI provisions about
urban water were too modest. While the states have grappled with metropolitan
water shortages in the face of protracted drought conditions, the fundamental NWI
objective of reliable urban water supplies has not been achieved. Continuing water
restrictions demonstrate this failure.80

The NWC added to the outline for enhanced urban water reform put forward in the
First Biennial Assessment, offering support for national measures to increase
competition (including examination of the possibility of a national third-party access
regime), greater collaboration to implement water-sensitive urban design and the
establishment of a single national health regulator, or at least a consolidated national

77

Council of Austarlain Governments, ‗Communiqué‘, (Adelaide, 26 March 2008) 6. Telephone enquiries to the
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet and the Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts
(Cth) (‗DEWHA‘) in June 2009 failed to elicit a copy of the Enhanced Urban Water Reform Framework (file notes
17–23 June 2009). The documents were not available on the web at the time.
78
Frontier Economics, ‗Approaches to Urban Water Pricing‘ (Waterlines Occasional Paper No 7, prepared for the
National Water Commission, July 2008) iv.
79
Ibid. The NWC proposals in relation to pricing seek stronger independent oversight, greater transparency,
increased use of scarcity pricing, improved pricing for new water sources, a move away from inclining block tariffs
to a two-part tariff and improved metering and billing: at iv-v.
80
National Water Commission, Annual Report 2007–08 (Canprint Communications, 2008) 9.
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health regulatory regime specifically for urban water supplies.81 It seemed that the
NWC saw an expanded role for the Commonwealth in water management.
The ‘Development of an enhanced urban water reform framework’ was to be
completed by October 2008. The proposals were to focus on areas in which the
Commonwealth was well placed to lead reform and where nationally cooperative
action was likely to deliver the greatest benefits: improved information-sharing and
research coordination in relation to climate-change impacts, development of urban
water supply and demand planning (taking account of the CAF Principles), principles for
water pricing and the process by which prices are set, measures to build community
confidence, and/or appropriate market and institutional reforms.
Water management planning, pricing, institutional reform and transparency and
accountability of process were still very much on the agenda. New National Urban
Water Planning Principles were released in November 2008 ‘to enhance and build on
the National Water Initiative’. They are in essence the CAF Principles set out above.
They were intended to be ‘universally applicable when developing plans to manage the
supply/demand balance of a reticulated supply for an urban population’. 82
Looking back at the various measures, it is easy to see that the CAF Principles were not
new. There was no panacea, there was no compelling new direction, in fact there was
little direction at all. The CAF Principles were, in practice, a restatement of well-worn
objectives that, even with the passage of more than a decade and the increased
imperative to implement reform in the urban sector, remained unfulfilled.
5.10

Discussion

The influence of the Commonwealth Government in shaping water reform policy
through the 1990s and into the 21st century is apparent in the foregoing recounting of
events. Without the leadership, intellectual contribution and, most importantly,

81

Ibid 10.
The development of the enhanced urban water reform framework was shrouded in secrecy — or more properly
enveloped in many layers of bureaucratic procedures. Information became available progressively on webites
(mainly the Commonwealth Environment portal). However the basic source documents were not made available for
some time after they were first mentioned in COAG meetings and by the National Water Commission. The urban
water reform elements of the NWI are conveniently grouped on one site at 30 August 2010, the reference is included
here, for as long as it might be useful: <http://www.environment.gov.au/water/policy-programs/urbanreform/index.html>.
82
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financial contribution of the Commonwealth the will to forge co-operative reforms
would surely have languished.
Water reform policy was consistently themed through the late 1990s and into the 21 st
century. The 1994 COAG Water Reform Framework set objectives for the separation of
water entitlements from land to facilitate water trading, and determination of
environmental water requirements to maintain healthy river systems. These
objectives had greater relevance at the time in rural areas than in cities but are now
critical elements of urban water management policies striving to deliver safe and
secure water supplies to urban areas. Specific reforms in the urban water sector
addressed pricing (an ongoing issue); institutional changes to enable integrated natural
resource management; groundwater, stormwater and wastewater management;
consultation and public education; and protection of the environment. The 1994
COAG Water Reform Framework envisaged delivery of water services in metropolitan
areas by contracting out of government services, by corporatised entities and by
privatised bodies – all now represented in the urban water services industry in the
Sydney Region.
Nearly a decade later, these reforms were revisited and the NWI emerged. The eight
key areas of the 2004 initiative were familiar: water access entitlements and planning;
water markets and trading; best practice water pricing; integrated management of
water for environmental and other public benefit outcomes; water resource
accounting; urban water reform; knowledge and capacity building; and community
partnerships and adjustment.83 Notably urban water was finally elevated to a reform
focus in its own right but only with two vaguely expressed objectives, ‘Demand
Management’ and ‘Innovation and Capacity Building to Create Water Sensitive Cities’.
In retrospect that vagueness may have held back cooperative progress in urban water
reform. As governments and the NWC struggled to find meaning and intent for the
proposed actions, attention had focused on the seven other key areas in a rural
context. Integrated urban water cycle management in fact needed to address all the
key areas including those peculiar to urban water.

83

NWI, above n 2, para 24.
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A nationally consistent approach to water management has been the objective of
water reforms embodied in soft law in intergovernmental agreements for nearly two
decades, initially through the NCP and currently under the influence of the NWI.
Implementation of the reforms has brought change throughout the industry, across
jurisdictions, in the rural sector and increasingly in the urban sector. The power of
political persuasion has produced a subtle shift in the ethics of water resource
management – from regarding water as a resource to be exploited to recognising that
water must be managed to optimise economic, social and environmental outcomes
from its use. A trend towards growing cooperative federalism can be discerned in
relation to water management.
Nevertheless nationally consistent water management regimes are still to be achieved.
Whilst the logic of a uniform approach to the management of a scarce resource
apparently enjoys popular community support and has certainly been nominally
adopted by governments, the implementation of attendant actions has not been
consistent across jurisdictions. Water management remains firmly the mandate of the
States. The development of urban water reform policy since 2007 seems to show an
inclination for a greater role for the Commonwealth – at least in the eyes of the policy
makers. Whether that role will become more one of control than of persuasion
remains to be seen.
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Chapter 6: Imperatives for Review
State and territory officials are acutely aware of the issues of institutional capacity, individual capacity
1
and community capacity to achieve the NWI outcomes.

6.1

Introduction

An essential component of the National Competition Policy (‘NCP’) reforms was the
assessment of progress with implementation in ‘a rigorous, transparent and
independent manner’.2 Assessments were conducted by the National Competition
Council (‘NCC’). Performance relating to the water reform component of the package,
the 1994 COAG Water Reform Framework3 was first assessed in 1999 and then each
year from 2001 until 2005, the last assessment under the NCP. Payments to the States
and Territories under the NCP were distributed on the basis of these assessments with
the final payment made following the 2005 Assessment. 4
The signing of the National Water Initiative in 2004 (‘NWI’)5 ushered in a new round of
reviews of policy implementation but there were no new incentive payments to induce
performance under the regime of the NWI. The newly created National Water
Commission (‘NWC’) became the watchdog of implementation, taking over from the
NCC for the final assessment under the NCP. The NWC’s role in monitoring and review
under the NWI required the completion of biennial assessments of progress with the
agreement and with the implementation plans of the States and Territories for 2006–
07 and 2008–09, and a third biennial assessment in 2010–11 that was to include a
comprehensive review of the NWI itself. The regulators would be reviewing the
regulation.6

1

National Water Commission, ‗Progress on the National Water Initiative‘ (A Report to the Council of Australian
Governments, 1 June 2006) 10 (‗2006 Progress Report‘).
2
National Competition Council, Annual Report 2004-05, (Commonwealth of Australia, Melbourne, 2005) 4.
3
Council of Australian Governments, ‗Communiqué‘, (Hobart, 25 February, 1994) Attachment A – Water Resource
Policy (‗1994 COAG Water Reform Framework‘).
4
See generally National Competition Council, Compendium of National Competition Policy Agreements (Australian
Government Publishing Service, 2nd ed, June 1998) 36 (‗NCP Agreements‘). Performance with respect to water
reform was assessed against the objectives of the 1994 COAG Water Reform Framework, above n 3. See also
discussion of the payments to be made, and the schedule of assessments to be conducted, as part of the National
Competition Policy reforms in Chapter 5.4 on page 92.
5
Council of Australian Governments, Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Water Initiative (25 June 2004)
(‗NWI‘).
6
See discussion of the mechanisms for reviewing regulation in Chapter 3.3 on page 38.
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Assessments conducted by the NCC, and ultimately by the NWC, in relation to the 1994
COAG Water Reform Framework addressed the main components of the NCP: cost
reform and pricing, institutional reform, water allocations and trading, and
environment and water quality. Assessment of progress with the NWI reforms in the
Sydney Region relied on the State’s representations in the NSW National Water
Initiative Implementation Plan (‘Implementation Plan’) with regard to implementation
of the various elements of the 1994 COAG Water Reform Framework and proposals for
implementation of the NWI actions.
In the discussion that follows assessments of NSW’s implementation of elements of
the NCP and NWI that significantly impact on urban water management in the Sydney
Region are reviewed. The discussion addresses the three main areas of reform that
are most relevant to the Sydney Region: assessments of performance with respect to
water pricing, institutional, and water management planning reforms. The discussion
shows how these broad reforms have been incorporated into urban water
management strategies in the region.
Chapter 2 highlighted the environmental, commercial and cultural diversity of the
Sydney Region and the pressures placed on the water resources of the region by the
population it supports and the activities that those people undertake. Whereas the
agricultural sector is the major consumer of water on a national scale, water
consumption in the Sydney Region is concentrated in the residential sector. This
pattern of consumption presents challenges that are peculiar to the urban water
sector. However, nationally agreed water management planning reforms, although
principally intended to underpin new water trading regimes in rural areas, emerge in
the following analysis as critical issues for the Sydney Region. If implemented as
intended under the NCP and NWI soft law policies, formal statutory water
management planning offered the potential to accommodate the environmental,
social, cultural and economic needs of the community. The overall water reform
framework could deliver the objectives of integrated urban water cycle management
(‘IUWCM’) for the Sydney Region. Despite good intentions for the timing of
implementation of both the NCP and NWI reforms, the discussion that follows
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demonstrates that NSW has been tardy in delivering agreed water management
planning reforms, especially in the Sydney Region.
6.2

The assessment process

The NCC had worked with jurisdictions to ‘increase understanding’ of the water reform
commitments and to develop a ‘cooperative, sensible and fair’ assessment process
from the date of adoption of the 1994 COAG Water Reform Framework until the initial
assessment of performance in 1999.7 The Second Tranche Assessment of
Governments' Progress with Implementing National Competition Policy and Related
Reforms8 (‘Second Tranche Assessment’) was the first assessment to consider progress
in respect of water reforms.
The Second Tranche Assessment focused on the systems and structures in place to
achieve reforms and an assessment of their ability to deliver real benefits to the water
industry in the future. The NCC forecast that subsequent assessment would look for
evidence that the benefits had been realised.
The criterion for assessment of implementation of the reforms under the NCP and
subsequently under the NWI was the extent to which implementation met a
committed objective. The mechanism for implementation was not assessed for its
effectiveness per se.9 The assessment process involved bilateral discussions between
the NCC and each of the participating States and Territories and each jurisdiction was
provided with a draft assessment for comment and correction in the belief that:
this ‘no surprise’ assessment process engenders confidence in both the assessments
themselves and any conclusions drawn or recommendations made by the Council.10

7

National Competition Council, Second Tranche Assessment of Governments' Progress with Implementing National
Competition Policy and Related Reforms, Volume Two: ‗B10.1 Water Reform Assessments‘ (30 June 1999) 271
(‗Second Tranche Water Reform Assessment‘). The National Competition Council (‗NCC‘) worked though the
Standing Committee of Agriculture and Resource Management Taskforce in the period 1996 – 1998 to conduct
voluntary reviews of reform implementation and the development of full cost recovery guidelines. A High Level
Steering Group replaced the Taskforce in 1998 to focus on water reform: at 272.
8
Ibid.
9
This is particularly relevant in relation to discussions on the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) (‗WMA 2000‘)
where the NCC and National Water Commission (‗NWC‘) assessments rely on information provided by the NSW
Government. It is also pertinent to the distinction between the use of management plans prepared by water
management committees and the procedures adopted in the NSW, and now being applied to plan preparation in the
Sydney Region, for the Minister to produce water sharing plans often through a ‗macro planning‘ process. See further
discussion of the macro planning process in Chapters 7.7 on page 149; and 8.7 on page 160.
10
Second Tranche Water Reform Assessment, above n 7, 272.
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The discussion that follows suggests that this cooperative approach to assessment of
NSW’s performance may well have resulted in milder criticisms of the State’s water
management planning implementation than would have otherwise been the case.
Harsher criticisms of NSW’s performance might have ensured that the real potential of
the ‘comprehensive system’ introduced into NSW with the passage of the Water
Management Act 2000 (NSW) (‘WMA 2000’) was achieved according to popular
expectations.
6.3

Water pricing reform

Pricing reforms in the 1994 COAG Water Reform Framework were specific. Criteria to
be adopted in pricing regimes were set out. A system of two part tariffs was to apply
in urban areas with charges to be determined on a volumetric basis. Service provision
by public utilities in urban areas, whether effected by contracting-out or through
corporatised entities or privatised bodies, was to be commercially focused.
NSW was well placed to meet the objectives set out in the NCP with regard to pricing
reform, especially in the urban sector which was a major focus of the 1999 process. By
that time, practice in the Sydney Region supported the NCC’s conclusions that:


water service providers (which included Sydney Water Corporation (‘SWC’)) under
the jurisdiction of the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (NSW) (‘IPART’)
had substantially achieved full cost recovery



SWC had implemented an effective two part tariff regime and was working to
remove cross-subsidies



NSW had a clearly defined and well targeted Community Service Obligation11



Service providers ‘on the whole’ had a real rate of return on assets



Metropolitan bulk water and wastewater pricing was moving to a volumetric
basis.12

11

Community service obligations, now known as social programs, are explained by Sydney Water as follows:
‘Social program reimbursements
The Corporation provides a number of non-commercial social programs at the direction of the NSW Government.
These include pensioner rebates, properties exempt from service and usage charges and expenditures for priority
sewerage areas. The Corporation seeks full cost reimbursement for all social programs provided at the request of the
NSW Government that result in costs and/or revenues foregone for the Corporation. Where the portfolio Minister,
with the approval of the NSW Treasurer, directs the Corporation to undertake activities of a non-commercial or social
nature in the public interest under Sections 20N or 20P of the State Owned Corporations Act 1989, the Corporation
may seek reimbursement of costs incurred in complying with such a direction.‘: Sydney Water Corporation,
Financial Report for the year ended 30 June 2009, 9.
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Subsequent assessments in 2001 and 2002 confirmed progress in the Sydney Region.
The NCP assessment conducted in 2003 (‘2003 NCP Assessment’) acknowledged the
ongoing implementation of consumption-based pricing by SWC and confirmed that
NSW had satisfied requirements to ensure that service delivery organisations in
metropolitan areas were commercially focused and that they had implemented
performance-monitoring arrangements.13 The NSW Implementation Plan recorded
these achievements.14
In an historical water management context, the NCC assessments accepted NSW’s
submissions that pricing reforms of the NCP and the NWI had been satisfactorily
accommodated in the Sydney Region with undertakings in place to ensure ongoing
improvement. However, developments in the water industry in the Sydney Region
from 2004 provide cause for reflection. New sources of water (in particular recycled
water, desalinated seawater and groundwater) were being investigated as ongoing
drought conditions placed pressure on urban drinking water supplies. Regulators
responded to address issues arising from these new endeavours and to determine
prices for water that would be supplied from these new sources. Pricing policies were
to be developed for recycled water and stormwater that would stimulate efficient
water use regardless of source.15 IPART investigated the use of pricing structures to
curb demand for water in the Sydney Region, and the potential for private sector
involvement in the delivery of water and wastewater services in the region. Both
reports were completed16 – the latter investigation providing impetus for the
introduction of the Water Industry Competition Act 2006 (NSW) (‘WICA 2006’) which is
discussed in Part IV.
12

See Second Tranche Water Reform Assessment, above n 7, 283-284.
National Competition Council, Assessment of Governments‘ Progress in Implementing the National Competition
Policy and Related Reforms: Volume Three: ‗Water Reform‘ (2003) xiii, xvii (‗2003 NCP Assessment‘).
14
See New South Wales Government, NSW Implementation Plan for the National Water Initiative 2006 46-48 (‗NSW
Implementation Plan‘) where implementation of the COAG pricing reforms is addressed.
15
Water pricing reforms and associated institutional arrangements in the NWI were, in part, intended to promote
economically efficient and sustainable use of: a) water resources; b) water infrastructure assets; and c) government
resources devoted to the management of water: see Council of Australian Governments, Intergovernmental
Agreement on a National Water Initiative (25 June 2004) (‗NWI‘), paras 64i), 65 and 66. In September 2006 the
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal released final price determinations for recycled water and sewer mining
for Sydney Water Corporation and other major utilities: see Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (NSW),
‗Pricing Arrangements for Recycled Water and Sewer Mining Sydney Water Corporation, Hunter Water Corporation,
Gosford City Council and Wyong Shire Council‘ (Water — Final Determinations Nos 8 and 9, September 2006).
16
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (NSW), ‗Investigation into Price Structures to Reduce the Demand
for Water in the Sydney Basin‘ (Other Paper OP24, July 24); Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (NSW),
‗Investigation into Water and Wastewater Service Provision in the Greater Sydney Region‘ (Final Report S917, October 2005) (‗IPART Services Report‘).
13
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The NSW Government sidestepped the implications of paragraph 69 of the NWI for
new water sources of the Sydney Region in the Implementation Plan. The objective of
paragraph 69 was to ensure that proposals for investment in new or refurbished water
infrastructure would be assessed to be economically viable and ecologically
sustainable before an investment was made. To this end, governments were to
conduct appropriate assessments as an ongoing action. The Implementation Plan
addressed this action with reference to the activities of the State Water Corporation
and non-metropolitan water supply and sewerage infrastructure. There was no
reference to any activities that might have been contemplated at the time in the
Sydney Region that would fall within the ambit of the paragraph 69 objective. Given
the level of creative water sourcing that has emerged in the Sydney Region since the
NWI was adopted (such as SWC’s desalination plant and Sydney Catchment Authority’s
(‘SCA’) groundwater investigations) it is of some concern that this important element
was given such scant treatment in the Implementation Plan. Fortunately it did not
escape critical comment in the course of the assessments.17
Of further interest in the context of the pricing reforms is the comment made by NSW
that in its view:
[NWI] paragraphs 70–72 [do not] refer to anything other than water from natural water
sources, and so policies for the release of unallocated water are not required to cover
stormwater and recycled water.18

Urban water initiatives in place in the Sydney Region now include recycling of sewage
for use as replacement environmental flows – an initiative that was under

17

Desalination as a source of drinking water for the Sydney region had been contemplated as early as 2004: See
Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources (NSW), Meeting the Challenges — Securing Sydney‘s
water future: The Metropolitan Water Plan 2004 (October 2004) (‗MWP 2004‘). The NWC questioned whether the
level of public consultation on the proposed desalination plant for Sydney was adequate to engender public
confidence in the project‘s economic viability and ecological sustainability. The NWC took the position that it would
monitor decisions on the project to assess the extent to which the economic viability and ecological sustainability of
the plant were established before construction commenced. The NWC had explained the economic viability test as
involving a consideration of whether a project will deliver an overall public benefit to Australia. Although
commercial or financial viability was important, the NWC stressed that ‗a project that is not commercially viable may
still satisfy the economic viability test if there is robust evidence that the project will deliver a net social benefit that
outweighs the costs of not being commercially viable‘: National Water Commission, 2005 National Competition
Policy assessment of water reform progress (National Water Commission, Canberra, April 2006) vi and [2.50-2.52].
The process associated with the decision to proceed with the desalination plant is discussed in Chapter 11.5 on page
235.
18
NSW Implementation Plan, above n 14, Implementation Timetable, 58.

Chapter 6: Imperatives for Review

119

consideration from 2004.19 Water from ‘other than natural water sources’ is becoming
a significant factor in sustainable water supply for the Sydney Region and an integral
part of the Sydney Region urban water cycle. If integrated urban water cycle
management is to be achieved in the Sydney Region then all water sources must
logically be part of that management regime. Perhaps the comment reproduced
above might have received more attention if it had appeared in other sections of the
Implementation Plan. For example, urban water resource accounting for the Sydney
Region must surely take into account water becoming available from sources such as
stormwater and sewage – the system ‘ins’ and ‘outs’ of the entire cycle must balance.
If the water available from such sources is not measured or quantified then it cannot
be part of – integrated into – the management framework.
6.4

Institutional reform

Institutional reforms included in the 1994 COAG Water Reform Framework were
intended to develop administrative processes to support integrated natural resource
management. Processes for consultation with local councils and the wider community
in individual water catchments were to be part of integrated catchment management
for water resources. The roles of water resource management, standard setting and
regulatory enforcement and service provision were to be separated institutionally.
Impetus to complete these reforms came from an unexpected quarter. Contamination
in Sydney’s water supply in July 1998 was the subject of an inquiry conducted by Peter
McClellan QC (McClellan Inquiry).20 Included in the recommendations arising from
that inquiry were specific institutional changes to catchment management in the
Sydney Region. At the time of the incident it was reported that there were nine
government agencies (including SWC which was responsible for the inner catchments),
at least eight local government authorities and ‘any number of ancillary regulatory
organisations, community interest groups, and private interests’ involved in the

19

See MWP 2004, above n 17. The plan referred to investigations underway into recycling projects to release ‗up to
40 billion litres of high grade recycled water per year to rivers, in a natural flow pattern, for environmental benefit‘:
at 13.
20
The nature of the contamination incident and the outcomes of the inquiry are comprehensively reported in five
reports referenced in the Bibliography to this thesis. All Sydney Water Inquiry reports can be accessed from:
<http://www.dpc.nsw.gov.au/publications/publications/publication_list_-_new#15235> at 30 August 2010.
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management of the drinking water catchment supplying water to Sydney.21 The
recommendations from the McClellan Inquiry called for the establishment of a single
organisation to be responsible for the drinking water catchments – establishment of
the Sydney Catchment Authority (‘SCA’) was the NSW Government’s response.
When introducing the Sydney Water Catchment Management Bill to the NSW
Parliament, the responsible Minister commented that:
The establishment of a single catchment management authority empowered to oversee the
health and wellbeing of [the] catchments represents a paradigm shift in governance. Ironically,
it is a shift that would be unlikely to be achieved if it had not been for the recent water
contamination incident.

22

In the Second Tranche Water reform Assessment the NCC reviewed the findings of the
McClellan Inquiry and concluded that the recommendations for institutional
arrangements contained therein were consistent with the water reform commitments
under the 1994 COAG Water Reform Framework.23
At the time of the assessment, certain actions recommended in the McClellan Inquiry
had already been effected. The SCA had assumed responsibility for Sydney’s water
catchment. SWC, which at the time of the contamination incident was a company
State-owned corporation, became a statutory State-owned corporation in 1998.24
SWC as a company State-owned corporation had been able to stray too far from
government oversight and control. As a statutory State-owned corporation, the
Government was able to bring it ‘and its people back closer to the core functions of
government’.25 The relationship between SWC and the NSW Department of Health
(‘NSW Health’) had been placed on a formal basis with procedures set in place to
address the shortcomings identified in the handling of the 1998 contamination event.
According to the NCC, SWC was also commercially focused.
From 2001 the focus of assessments shifted from the implementation of the
recommendations of the McClellan Inquiry to the progressive implementation of the
21

Second Reading Speech, Sydney Water Catchment Management Bill: New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates,
Legislative Assembly, 18 November 1998, 10286 (Mr Knowles), 10287.
22
Ibid.
23
Second Tranche Water Reform Assessment, above n 7, 284.
24
An overview of the corporate structure of Sydney Water is provided above in Table 4.2.2.
25
New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 18 November 1998, 10286 (Mr Knowles)
10287.
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broader institutional framework for managing water resources established under the
provisions of the WMA 2000.
Chapter 4 identified some of the many agencies that are now involved in the
management of water sources and water service delivery in the Sydney Region and
provides some history of the predecessors of those agencies. Even though names have
changed over time, the essential separation of responsibility for water resource
management, for asset management and for regulation has largely been maintained in
the Sydney Region since the end of the 1990s.
However, that does not imply that the objective of integrated urban water cycle
management has been achieved in the Sydney Region, it merely indicates that an
element of the reform has been capable of implementation. Many agencies still have
roles in the control and use of water in the Sydney Region indicating significant
potential for inefficiencies. The development of new sources of water such as
recycling of wastewater and stormwater in the Sydney Region has complicated the
roles of institutions. SWC is again a water service provider and a water manager as it
controls access to and use of wastewater and stormwater in its infrastructure.
Management of new sources of water will increasingly challenge the achievements of
institutional reform in the Sydney Region.26
NSW undeniably completed a substantial process of institutional reform although the
extent to which those reforms were inspired by the NCP is unclear. The NCC accepted
that the course taken by NSW in the Sydney Region after the water contamination
incident was consistent with the 1994 COAG Water Reform Framework. However,
whether those institutional reforms would have been achieved under the NCP
framework alone is open to conjecture. While the response ultimately came as a
matter of necessity, the preferred direction for institutional change had been made
clear as a matter of policy throughout the 1990s.
6.5

Water management planning reform

The water management framework in place in the Sydney Region at the time of the
Second Tranche Water Reform Assessment was, and still is, the Water Act 1912 (NSW)

26

These issues are discussed more fully in Chapters 13.3 on page 278 and 13.4 on page 288.
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(‘WA 1912’) and under that Act water entitlements were tied to the land. The WA
1912 did not constitute a ‘comprehensive system of water entitlements backed by
separation of water property rights from land title and a clear specification of
entitlements in terms of volume, reliability or transferability’ as contemplated by the
1994 COAG Water Reform Framework.27 The management scheme of the 1912 Act
itself embodied many of the elements requiring change.
Although NSW had commenced a review of its water management legislation prior to
the Second Tranche Water Reform Assessment, the NCC concluded that because the
anticipated legislative reform was not in place the State had not met its commitment
under the 1994 COAG Water Reform Framework in respect of water allocations and
trading. Even though the Water Management Bill 2000 (NSW) had been introduced to
the NSW Parliament on 22 June 2000 the new legislation was still not in place for a
supplementary assessment in June 2000.28
The NCC acknowledged the complexity of the task faced by NSW but it stressed that
the allocation framework was a lynchpin of the COAG reforms and that water reform
was an area ‘that *extended+ beyond competition policy matters to embrace social
policy issues and recognition of the environment as a legitimate user of water.’
Accordingly the NCC considered that high priority was to be given in the assessments
to the timely implementation of agreed water reforms. The NCC wielded the stick – it
proposed a further supplementary assessment in December 2000 at which time it
expected to see new legislation consistent with the water framework substantially in
force. If that were not to be the case then the NCC would recommend a 10%
reduction in NSW’s NCP payments for failure to meet the reform commitments.29

27

Second Tranche Water Reform Assessment, above n 7, 285. The 1994 COAG Water Reform Framework set out
the agreement reached on water resource policy with respect to water allocations or entitlements in paragraph 4 and
in relation to trading water allocations or entitlements in paragraph 5: Council of Australian Governments,
‗Communiqué‘, (Hobart, 25 February, 1994) Attachment A – Water Resource Policy (‗1994 COAG Water Reform
Framework‘). Water access entitlements and planning framework objectives and water markets and trading
objectives were distinct key elements of the NWI, above n 15, paras 24 i) and ii).
28
The introduction and implementation of the new legislation would ensure NSW met the commitments of the 1994
COAG Water Reform Framework. Water entitlements in the Sydney Region are still issued under the Water Act 1912
(NSW). The following discussion draws out the obstacles encountered by the NSW Government over the last 10
years in its attempts to implement a new system of water management in rural NSW. In the course of the discussion
issues that are to be addressed to bring the ‗new‘ legislation into operation in the Sydney Region are highlighted.
29
See generally Second Tranche Water Reform Assessment, above n 7, National Competition Council, Supplementary
Second Tranche Assessment (30 June 2000): internal quote at 69; and National Competition Council, Supplementary
Second Tranche Assessment of Governments‘ Progress with Implementing National Competition Policy (February
2001) (‗2001 Supplementary Assessment‘).
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The WMA 2000 emerged in December 2000 as NSW’s ‘comprehensive system’ of
water management under the 1994 COAG Water Reform Framework – the penalty for
non-performance (reduction in NCP payments) was avoided. In the course of its
review of the new legislation to ensure that the reform met the NCP commitments the
NCC acknowledged NSW’s achievement:
The New South Wales Government has engaged in extensive public consultation on all
aspects of the reforms contained in the Act dating back to 1997, and through
the December 1999 White Paper…*that] alone generated some 70 meetings in Sydney
and regional centres, and over 800 submissions.
The Act was introduced in June 2000 and passed in November 2000. Debate on the
Bill in the New South Wales Legislative Council was the second longest in New South
Wales Parliamentary history, reflecting the seriousness with which New South Wales
has approached reform. In the course of passage of the legislation, some 380
amendments were moved, based on further input from key stakeholder groups.
The Act enshrines the central role of area water management committees in
formulating plans. This represents a clear partnership between government and the
community based on a whole of catchment approach.30

The legislative response was timely but implementation of the system proved far more
demanding of time and resources than was anticipated by the legislators. For the
period from 2001 to 2004 the NCC’s assessments of NSW’s performance in
implementing the water allocation and entitlements reforms under the regime
established by the WMA 2000 were less than complimentary.31

30

2001 Supplementary Assessment, above n 29, 15. The Act was assented to on 8 December 2000. As part of a
subsequent assessment the NCC undertook a review of the legislation to assess its consistency with the water reform
commitments. The quoted comments were made in the context of assessment of NSW‘s consistency with the public
consultation and education objectives of the reforms. The NCC concluded that NSW had fully met its water reform
obligations against the reform commitments. However, it indicated that the efficacy of the water property rights
arrangements would be considered in the assessment for third tranche payments.
31
The following discussion provides a critical review of the principal issues raised in the NCC assessments of NSW‘s
implementation of the water management planning provisions of the WMA 2000 from 2001 to 2004. In that period
the State Water Management Outcomes Plan Order 2002 (NSW) (‗SWMOP‘) was introduced and over 30 water
sharing plans were finalised for rural water sources covering some 80% of the State‘s water. The issues that emerge
in the discussion are relevant to the development of a water sharing plan for the Sydney Region. See generally
National Competition Council, Assessment of Governments‘ Progress in Implementing the National Competition
Policy and Related Reforms: New South Wales (June 2001); National Competition Council, Assessment of
Governments‘ Progress in Implementing the National Competition Policy and Related Reforms: Volume Two:
‗Water reform‘ (August 2002); National Competition Council, Water Reform in New South Wales: National
Competition Policy Supplementary 2002 Water Reform Assessment (April 2003) (‗2002 Supplementary Assessment‘);
and National Competition Council, Assessment of governments‘ progress in implementing the National Competition
Policy and Related Reforms: Volume Three: ‗Water reform‘, (2003) (‗2003 Assessment‘).
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NSW was repeatedly found wanting in its implementation of key elements of the water
management planning scheme under the WMA 2000 – in the preparation of the
overarching State Water Management Outcomes Plan (‘SWMOP’),32 water
management plans for specific water sources, licence conversion and licence approval
policies, and allocation of water for the environment – the delays being generally
recognised as inevitable given the magnitude of the task to transition to the new
scheme of management.
Importantly the NCC’s concerns recognised the potential conflict between the need for
timely introduction of allocation measures and the requirement for a rigorous
approach to the determination of relevant water sharing principles – statutory
provision of water for the environment was a major concern. The 1994 COAG Water
Reform Framework was adamant that ‘environmental requirements, wherever
possible, will be determined on the best scientific information available’. 33 Public
consultation, transparency and accountability were essential components of the
process.
The NCC reported the process of plan preparation in NSW as follows:
The plans were developed by water management committees, which had access to a
range of scientific and other information, and involved an extensive public
consultation process. The plans incorporate processes for monitoring environmental
outcomes and provide for increased environmental allocations if monitoring outcomes
indicate this is warranted.34

Recognising that decisions might be made to allocate an amount of water for
environmental flows that was less than the best available science recommended, the
NCC suggested that, in making such decisions, it must be implied that the community

32

The significance of the SWMOP in the overall water management planning regime of the WMA 2000 is explored
below in Chapter 7.4 on page 140.
33
See particularly 1994 COAG Water Reform Framework, above n 27, para 4: The paragraph discusses ‗available
science‘. The need for transparent accountability was reinforced in Principle 7 of the National Principles for the
provision of water for ecosystems developed by ARMCANZ/ANZECC (reproduced in the 2002 Supplementary
Assessment, above n 31, 7). Consultation with ‗all relevant environmental, social and economic stakeholders‘ on
environmental water provisions was promoted in Principle 12.
34
2003 Assessment, above n 31, xiv. It is not clear in the document whether this is the NCC‘s own assessment of
how they were prepared or whether the account relies on information provided by NSW. The water management
committees referred to were not committees for water management areas established under the WMA 2000 but were
ongoing committees that had been involved in water management during the 1990s.
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has agreed to accept the potential consequences. To reach this position, the NCC
argued that:
there must be sufficient public information on the environmental risks posed by the
negotiated flow regimes to allow the community to understand and comment on the
water management committee’s decisions on water use. Moreover, the water
management committees need to be representative of all interests, and the flow
regime and associated river health activities must be likely to deliver recommended
environmental flow objectives within a reasonable period.35

The NCC outlined the nature and content of guides and fact sheets which were
published by NSW to explain its Water Sharing Plans and concluded that the
information was not sufficient to assess whether the Water Sharing Plans satisfied the
requirements of the 1994 COAG Water Reform Framework. Significantly the NCC
stated that there was little information provided on the extent of, or rationale for, the
trade-offs made in deciding on environmental allocations or on the manner in which
the water management committees considered and incorporated the available
science.36
The dilemma that faced the NSW Government arose in large part from the
interdependence of the provisions of the new regime. Preparation of water
management plans, or at least the water sharing component of those plans, was
essential to enable the commencement of the water allocation and trading provisions
of the WMA 2000.37 Because the right to use water under the WMA 2000 was linked
into the water planning process through the allocation process, the NCC considered
that the relevant security for water entitlements would only arise when the reliability
of the share component of the right was made clear – that is, when the Water Sharing
Plans were in place. Environmental water provisions were also delayed as a
consequence of this interdependence of activities.38 It was a classic ‘chicken and egg’
situation. Anticipation of agreement on a new national reform agenda (the NWI)
provided NSW with justification for delays into 2004. But matters were brought to a
35

Ibid, xiv.
Ibid, xv.
37
See National Competition Council, Assessment of Governments‘ Progress in Implementing the National
Competition Policy and Related Reforms: New South Wales (June 2001), 20 (‗June 2001 Assessment‘). See also
discussion of the draft water sharing plans for the Greater Metropolitan Region below in Chapter 8.
38
Ibid 20.
36
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head in the assessment of performance conducted by the NCC in 2004 (‘2004
Assessment’). 39
The 2004 Assessment referred to the previous requirements set out by the NCC for
NSW to demonstrate that the environmental allocations under its Water Sharing Plans
either met the test of using the best available science or, if they departed from that
objective, that the allocations were based on robust socioeconomic analysis.40
The NCC clearly stated that NSW had neither provided information to show that its
Water Sharing Plans allocated appropriate water to the environment, nor had it
responded to an invitation from the NCC to verify its understanding of the effects of
the environmental allocation provisions in a sample of plans. Commenting on the
paucity of scientific and socioeconomic evidence on the public record, the NCC
concluded that it was not possible to determine if the environmental allocations in the
gazetted plans would go as far as they might to meet the water regimes necessary to
sustain ecological values while recognising the existing rights of other users. 41
Having skirted around the possibility of doing so as early as 2001,42 the NCC finally
recommended a suspension of part of the NSW 2004–05 competition payments. The
suspended payments would be released if NSW provided:
(1) robust information to support its current arrangements or
(2) environmental allocations that are within a range of outcomes that could

reasonably be reached on consideration of the best available science and
robust socioeconomic evidence.43

The 2005 assessment of water reform progress under the NCP was conducted by the
NWC (‘2005 NWC Assessment’). To assess how the environmental water requirement
was determined the NWC relied on information provided by NSW for the purposes of
the 2005 NWC Assessment.44 The NWC concluded, in part, that:

39

National Competition Council, Assessment of Governments‘ Progress in Implementing the National Competition
Policy and Related Reforms: Volume Two: ‗Water‘, (2004) (‗2004 Assessment‘).
40
Ibid xv.
41
Ibid xvi.
42
June 2001 Assessment, above n 37. The possibility of suspending competition payments to NSW was considered
in the course of the 2001 Assessment: at 20–24.
43
2004 Assessment, above n 39, xvi.
44
National Water Commission, 2005 National Competition Policy Assessment of Water Reform Progress (National
Water Commission, Canberra, April 2006) 2.18 (‗2005 NWC Assessment‘). All assessments have relied on
information provided by the States and Territories for the purposes of the relevant assessment.
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The information provided indicates that no single or specific methodology was
used…Rather, it appears that existing environmental flow objectives from 1998 were
modified in light of expert opinion and verbal presentations. There is little formal or
publicly available record of the decision process.45

In relation to the role played by the committees, which it refers to as Water
Management Committees,46 the NWC noted in passing that:
The deliberations of the committees were recorded in minutes of meeting, which have
been archived but records of which are not available publicly.47

Significantly, the NWC advised in the 2005 NWC Assessment that all submissions
received in relation to the NSW planning processes were critical of its water sharing
planning processes. These criticisms were, apparently, leveled at the ‘macro’48
planning process (as well as at the initial water planning process) and highlighted the
lack of transparency as a major concern.
Indeed, the NWC indicated its opinion that:
there remain serious problems with New South Wales’ approach to public consultation
in relation to: the timeliness of information provided to stakeholders; the type and
quality of information provided to stakeholders; and the transparency of the process in
which stakeholders are invited to participate.49

In the course of the assessment the NWC noted that a Water Sharing Plan for the
greater metropolitan Sydney area had still not been prepared. The NCC commented
that the Sydney Region plan would require specific water-sharing rules to be
developed, not the generic rules under the macro process.50 The implementation of
such a plan and associated licence conversion was not expected to be completed
45

Ibid.
See discussion in Chapters 7 and 8 of the nature of Minister‘s plans and the constitution of advisory committees
under the WMA 2000.
47
2005 NWC Assessment, above n 44, 2.19.
48
Ibid 2.22. The NSW Implementation Plan, above n 14, forecast that with some exceptions (that included the
Sydney Region) water management planning in NSW was to follow a ‗macro‘ planning approach in 2006. The aim
of the approach was to ensure that water sharing rules for areas with similar value mixes (eg high ecological and low
economic values) would meet similar objectives across the State. The NSW Implementation Plan referred to an
Attachment A that would explain the macro process. In essence the macro planning approach was a way to speed up
the planning process in the face of repeated criticisms of the State‘s progress. ‗Group C‘ plans are referred to at 12.
For further discussion of macro plans see Chapter 7.7 on page 149 and Chapter 8.
49
2005 NWC Assessment, above n 44, 2.27.
50
Ibid 2.5, 2.13, 2.17. The Sydney Metropolitan area includes the Hawkesbury/Nepean River, Shoalhaven River,
Illawarra area and Coxs River and is categorised in the assessment as a ‗complex unregulated river area or system‘: at
2.17.
46
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before 2008! The NWC urged consultation in the development of these plans that
would ‘provide for high levels of transparency and engender greater confidence’ in the
product.51 Further, the NWC acknowledged that, although it was desirable that the
outstanding plans should be introduced as quickly as possible, it should not be at the
expense of the rigour and transparency of the planning process, sentiments similar to
those expressed in the initial assessment of water reform implementation in NSW in
1999.52
Despite all of these concerns, the NWC was able to conclude that NSW had provided
sufficient information on its water planning processes to warrant payment of half of
the payments suspended as a consequence of the 2004 Assessment.
However, the NWC did report that the information so provided had reinforced its
concerns that:


the ecological science that was used was inadequate to inform decision-making in
some water systems for which plans were being prepared



allied with the point above, New South Wales did not appear to have a consistent
and coherent methodology for assessing environmental water needs and
developing environmental water allocations…,and



planning has lacked transparency in terms of the amount and type of publicly
available information, the reasonable documentation of planning considerations,
and the way in which trade-offs were reached between consumptive and
environmental water plans.53

The stick was a feather. The decision relied on the provision of information rather
than on the ultimate achievement of the process. Although the Sydney Region
remained without a Water Sharing Plan, and administration of its water resources still
relied on the provisions of the 1912 Act, the framework to prepare the plan was in
place – provided that non-rainfall dependent water sources remained outside the
process.
There was still some incentive for performance on NSW’s part. The NWC
recommended the ongoing suspension of the remaining half of the previously
51

Ibid 2.8.
Ibid.
53
Ibid III.
52
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suspended competition payments. The payments could be recouped if NSW could
demonstrate improvement in the ecological science used in developing Water Sharing
Plans and improved transparency of science and process, in each case in both the
‘macro’54 and individual planning processes. NSW would also have to demonstrate
that it was monitoring the outcomes of plans that were already in place.
The Australian Government agreed to the NWC’s recommendation in the 2005 NWC
Assessment that suspension of part of the competition payments should be continued,
and the conditions upon which the payments could be redeemed. In June 2007 the
NWC completed a follow-up of its 2005 assessment of water planning reform in NSW
against the conditions so imposed (‘2007 NWC Follow-up Assessment’).55
The 2007 NWC Follow-up Assessment focused on the macro planning system and was
essentially concerned with progress in the rural water sector. However, the NWC
commented that NSW did not provide any information in relation to the preparation of
Water Sharing Plans for the more complex systems that were not covered by the
macro planning process. The NWC questioned whether these ‘other’ plans, which
included the Water Sharing Plan for the Sydney Region, would be prepared in the
same way as the first round of Water Sharing Plans (which had provided the basis for
the 2005 NWC Assessment, and the attendant comments of concern as to process) or
along the lines of the macro planning process. Indeed, the NWC surmised that, for
some unregulated sources, Catchment Management Authorities (‘CMA’s) might be
charged with developing the plans.56
NSW gave an assurance to the NWC as reported in the 2007 NWC Follow-up
Assessment that:

54

The NSW Government prepared the first round of water sharing plans as Minister‘s Plans under the WMA 2000 in
consultation with water management committees that had been operational prior to the introduction of the new
framework. As the enormity of the task of plan preparation became increasingly apparent a method of ‗macroplanning‘ was developed and employed. A draft version of the NSW Implementation Plan included a ‗detailed
explanation of the macro planning process‘ as Attachment A. The current version of the plan refers to the
explanation contained in the attachment (see NSW Implementation Plan, above n 14, 12) but the final Attachment A
does not include this explanation. The macro planning process is discussed further below in Chapters 7 and 8.
55
National Water Commission, 2005 National Competition Policy Follow-up Assessment of Water Reform Progress:
Water Planning in New South Wales (National Water Commission, Canberra, September 2007) (‗2007 NWC Followup Assessment‘).
56
Ibid 3.5. The role eventually played by Catchment Management Authorities (‗CMA‘s) in the development of water
sharing plans for the Sydney Region is noted in Chapter 8.
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the state is improving the documentation surrounding water sharing plans: similar (sic)
to macro plans, the remaining individual water sharing plans will be released in
conjunction with a guide or background report that explains the planning process used
to develop the plan and the issues that were addressed through the consultation
stage.57

The NWC concluded that NSW had made ‘adequate progress’ and consequently had
met its outstanding commitments under the 1994 COAG Water Reform Framework in
relation to the issues of improved scientific information, transparency of process and
monitoring. However, it stressed that the determination was based on the suitability
of the macro planning process for unstressed, ‘less competitive’ systems. The NWC
offered a note of caution, stating that there remained some doubt that these
improvements would be translated into the planning process for those systems,
including those of the Sydney Region, still to be addressed.58
The NWC called on NSW to address a number of issues in order to improve its water
planning across all systems, in particular recommending that a schedule of proposed
timetables for the preparation, completion and review of the Water Sharing Plans
should be made publicly available, with the aim of facilitating ‘greater community
engagement and scrutiny of process’.59 The NWC forecast further review of the
performance of NSW with respect to water planning in the course of biennial
assessments to be carried out by the NWC in accordance with the NWI.60
The 2007 NWC Follow-up Assessment recommended the release of the suspended
competition payments.61 The moneys have been released.62 As the NCC so elegantly
stated, ‘The NCP program ended in 2005–06’.63 The cash cow had dried up after ten
long years of diligent milking.
The NCC subsequently echoed at least one of the ongoing concerns with water reform
across all jurisdictions and particularly in relation to NSW’s performance. In relation to

57

Ibid.
Ibid 4.4. The draft water sharing plans for the Sydney Region is discussed below in Chapter 8.
59
Ibid 4.4.
60
NWI, above n 15, para 106.
61
2007 NWC Follow-up Assessment, above n 55, iii.
62
See Australian Government, Budget 2007-08, Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook 2007-08, Pt 4, Attachment
F: Federal Financial Relations.
63
National Competition Council, Annual Report 2006-2007, (Commonwealth of Australia, Melbourne, 2007) 1.
58
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the quality and adequacy of the science underpinning the development of plans, the
First Biennial Assessment stated:
It is essential that the process required under the NWI to develop plans, not only
makes use of the best available science but is transparent about how decisions using
that science are made. This will also mean taking the initiative to obtain new
knowledge before plans are developed/reviewed.64

NSW had a commitment to complete outstanding Water Sharing Plans. One of them
was to cover the Sydney Region. It was still to come.65 Although the Water Sharing
Plan for the Sydney Region was only one of a number of plans to be completed to deal
with the remaining 20% of the State’s water use, the water sources of that region
provided water to almost two thirds of the State’s population. The planning
framework was in place under the WMA 2000 to permit preparation of the plan and
thus the State was considered to have met its reform commitments. The fact that the
plan was not in place in June 2007 when the recommendation was made to release the
suspended payments apparently was not sufficient reason to convert the suspension
to a permanent deduction, or at least leave payments suspended against completion
of that plan by the end of the following year.
6.6

Discussion

Pricing and institutional changes called for under the 1994 COAG Water Reform
Framework and adopted and expanded under the NWI were reforms that the NSW
Government could achieve in the Sydney Region – at least in respect of water from
natural sources. Water management planning with its attendant requirements of
open and transparent processes, clear entitlements to secure water for environmental
needs, and sound science was a greater challenge, especially in the Sydney Region.
Although incentive payments withheld against the State’s performance on this agenda
item in other parts of the State were finally released, the reasons supporting that
release lack conviction. The NCP reform program had come to an end. The States had
experienced extraordinary challenges to their water management capabilities in rural

64

See: National Water Commission, National Water Initiative First Biennial Assessment of Progress in
Implementation, (National Water Commission, Canberra, August 2007) 4 (‗First Biennial Assessment‘) 22.
65
Chapter 8 examines progress made to August 2010 with the preparation of a water sharing plan for the Sydney
Region.
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and urban areas due to the impact of prolonged drought. Water sources in the Sydney
Region were still administered under legislation introduced in 1912.
Although the NWC’s comments on performance with urban water reform were by
many standards surprisingly hard-hitting, especially in relation to NSW, they were
perhaps softened by acknowledging that governments had encountered challenges
not contemplated at the time that the NWI was negotiated. The lack of emphasis
placed on, and definite direction given for, urban water reform in the NWI did not
anticipate the urgency that was to overtake the urban water industry as the impact of
drought became increasingly apparent in the cities, especially in the Sydney Region.
The NWC commented:
The range of actions being taken by states in response to urban water scarcity are [sic],
understandably, often in the nature of an emergency response and vary in their
strategic focus and reform nature. The future water security of our major urban
centres in the face of climate variability and growing population warrants the coherent
national policy framework that an extension of the NWI in the urban area would
provide.66

The National Urban Water Planning Principles discussed in Chapter 5 emerged in
response to the NWC’s criticisms of the urban water provisions of the NWI. But have
they achieved anything beyond what was already underway in the Sydney Region?
Issues arising from the utilisation of water from ‘non-natural’ sources have imposed an
additional layer of complexity on the challenges facing water management planners,
price regulators and institutions involved in water supply and service provision in the
Sydney Region. Discussion in Chapters 7 and 8 demonstrates that those challenges
remain for future statutory water management planners.
Chapter 7 outlines the water management planning principles of the WMA 2000 and
how an opportunity for the Minister to step in to make plans under the statutory
provisions has been exploited in NSW, effectively circumventing the inclusive
consultative framework created by the same legislation.
Chapter 8 is finally able to examine the process associated with the development of
statutory (hard law) Water Sharing Plans for the Sydney Region under the WMA 2000.
66

First Biennial Assessment, above n 64, 21.
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Despite the cautious optimism expressed to the NWC for the 2005 NWC Assessment
that those plans would be competed in 2008, they remain ‘draft plans’
in November 2010. The discussion illustrates how the water management planning
process has fallen short of community expectations and urban water reform objectives
in the Sydney Region.
Chapter 9 then examines the Metropolitan Water Plan (a soft law plan) that, at least
according to the NSW Government, was an integral part of its planning response to the
objectives of the national reform agenda and one that attempts to integrate the
management of water from all sources, a fundamental objective of integrated urban
water cycle management.
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Chapter 7: A Statutory Framework for Water Planning
The Act provides for explicit, strategic decisions for protection of water for the environment.
Achieving this protection at the front line embraces the key concept of water management being
achieved through a community/government partnership. It provides for community-based planning
through representative committees and their work is to be supported by the expertise, resources and
1
information of government agencies.

7.1

Introduction

The NSW Government comprehensively revised its water management regulation in
response to its commitment to water reform elements of the National Competition
Policy (‘NCP’). The new management framework was contained in the Water
Management Act 2000 (NSW) (‘WMA 2000’), legislation which emerged after long and
complex consultations with stakeholders and the community.2
The water management planning provisions of the WMA 2000 offered a clearly stated
framework for future community and stakeholder consultation, an essential
component of an integrated approach to the challenges of water management. The
water management principles espoused in the legislation ensured that the
environment and public interest were paramount considerations in decision making in
relation to water management in the State. The practical implementation of the
legislative provisions however took a different course from that anticipated by
stakeholders (but perhaps no different from that intended by the regulators) when the
WMA 2000 was introduced.
This chapter outlines the provisions of the WMA 2000 that regulate water
management planning and implementation, and how those provisions are being put
into practice to develop a statutory water management plan for the Sydney Region
that encompasses not only extensive urban areas but significant rural catchments. The
utilisation of discretionary powers under the WMA 2000 is observed in the course of
the discussion to have been a powerful tool for government to implement the WMA
2000 in a manner that suited its policy agenda and according to its own preferred
1

New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 22 June 2000, 7498 (Mr Amery).
The evolution and implementation of a national water reform agenda under the impetus of the National Competition
Policy and the implementation of those initiatives in NSW are examined in Chapters 5 and 6.
2
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timetable. The consequences for the Sydney Region were significant – even though
administration of the natural water sources of the region has been accommodated
under the Water Act 1912 (NSW) (‘WA 1912’) for almost a decade after the
introduction of the WMA 2000 rather than through positive implementation of the
new legislative scheme in the spirit in which it was originally expected.
7.2

The objectives of the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW)

The WMA 2000 received assent on 8 December 2000 and is being progressively
implemented across NSW. As noted earlier, by virtue of the lack of a Water Sharing
Plan under the scheme of the WMA 2000 for the Sydney Region, that region remains
regulated under the WA 1912.3 The following discussion addresses aspects of the hard
law water management scheme that will apply in the Sydney Region when Water
Sharing Plans are in force for that area.4
The purpose of the WMA 2000 was:
to provide for the sustainable and integrated management of the water sources of the
State for the benefit of both present and future generations and, in particular:
(a)

to apply the principles of ecologically sustainable development, and

(b)

to protect, enhance and restore water sources, their associated
ecosystems, ecological processes and biological diversity and their water
quality, and

(c)

to recognise and foster the significant social and economic benefits to the
State that result from the sustainable and efficient use of water, including:
(i) benefits to the environment, and
(ii) benefits to urban communities, agriculture, fisheries, industry and

recreation, and

3

See also discussion in Chapter 4.2 on page 57. Since the introduction of the Water Management Act 2000 (‗WMA
2000‘) it has been the rule that the provisions of the WMA 2000 will not come into force in respect of a water
management area unless a Water Sharing Plan is in place for that area. The WMA 2000 does not define a Water
Sharing Plan, although as explained in the following discussion water sharing is one aspect which is to be dealt with
in a water management plan under the WMA 2000, and detailed water sharing provisions to be covered in a water
management plan are included in the WMA 2000.
4
The NSW Government released draft water sharing plans for the Sydney Region on 7 June 2010: Office of Water
(NSW), Draft Water Sharing Plan Greater Metropolitan Region Groundwater Sources: Order‘ (May 2010) (‗Draft
Groundwater Order‘); Office of Water (NSW), Draft Water Sharing Plan Greater Metropolitan Region Unregulated
River Water Sources: Order (June 2010) (‗Draft Rivers Order‘). The Draft Groundwater Order and the Draft Rivers
Order are jointly referred to in the text as the ‗Draft Orders‘. The Draft Orders are examined in Chapter 8.
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(iii) benefits to culture and heritage, and
(iv) benefits to the Aboriginal people in relation to their spiritual, social,

customary and economic use of land and water,
(d)

to recognise the role of the community, as a partner with government, in
resolving issues relating to the management of water sources,

(e)

to provide for the orderly, efficient and equitable sharing of water from
water sources,

(f)

to integrate the management of water sources with the management of
other aspects of the environment, including the land, its soil, its native
vegetation and its native fauna,

(g)

to encourage the sharing of responsibility for the sustainable and efficient
use of water between the government and water users,

(h)

to encourage best practice in the management and use of water.

In Chapter 6 it was observed that the WMA 2000 met the objectives of the water
reform components of the National Competition Policy (‘1994 COAG Water Reform
Framework’) and it offered a hard law platform for water management reform in NSW.
7.3

The water planning framework

The water planning framework of the WMA 2000 was designed to help deliver the
broad objectives of the legislation. Water management plans were to be consistent
with water management principles set out in section 5 of the WMA 2000. The
principles were intended to guide, and in some cases mandate, outcomes to be
achieved when provisions relating to water sharing, water use, drainage and floodplain
management, and the conduct of certain types of activities that can impact water
sources were included in plans. The water management principles were to be applied
in the implementation and administration of the Act.
General water management principles set out in section 5(2) aspired to:


protect and restore water sources, floodplains and dependent ecosystems, and
where possible prevent degradation to land (s5(2)(a)); 5

5

Land management in the Sydney Region is distinct from water source management — the former largely being
implemented by Catchment Management Authorities constituted under the Catchment Management Authorities Act
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protect and enhance water quality of all water sources (s5(2)(c));



consider and minimise cumulative impacts of entitlements to access and use water
(s5(2)(d));



protect features of indigenous significance and major cultural, heritage or spiritual
significance (ss5(2)(e), (f));



maximise social and economic benefits to the community (s5(2)(g)); and



apply adaptive management principles that would respond to monitoring and
improvements in understanding of ecological water requirements (s5(2)(h)).

Specific principles to be applied in relation to water sharing and use, drainage and
floodplain management, controlled activities and aquifer interference activities were
also set out in section 5. The water sharing principles set out in section 5(3), intended
to inform the development of water sharing rules in water management plans, are
considered in relation to the development of a Water Sharing Plan for the Sydney
Region in Chapter 8.
To provide a policy context and to establish targets and strategic outcomes for water
management in the State, section 6 of the WMA 2000 proposed the development of a
State Water Management Outcomes Plan (‘SWMOP’) that would also promote the
water management principles established under the Act. To set priorities for
implementation of the various elements of the planning framework, section 7 of the
WMA 2000 called for classification of the State’s water sources and identification of
water sources that were high risk, high stress or high conservation value.
Environmental water provisions now set out in sections 8 and 8A–8E of the WMA 2000
create a mechanism for allocation of planned and adaptive environmental water to the
environment.6
Having established a general context for implementation of its provisions the WMA
2000 then set out a process in Chapter 2, Part 3 for water management planning that
involved a partnership between the community and government. The following

2003 (NSW) (‗CMA‘s) in the region. However, there is growing momentum for greater integration of catchment
(land) and water management evident in updated NSW Government policy statements: see discussion of the
Metropolitan Water Plan 2006 in Chapter 9.
6
Allocation of water for the environment under the Draft Orders is discussed in Chapter 8.10 on page 166.
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paragraphs describe how water can be managed under those provisions of the WMA
2000.
7.4

A State Water Management Outcomes Plan

The establishment of a SWMOP was not mandated in the WMA 2000 but left to the
discretion of the Governor. It had to be consistent with government policy;
regulations could provide for public consultation procedures in relation to its
establishment or amendment; and, once established, a SWMOP would take effect for 5
years from the date of Gazettal.7
A SWMOP was in fact established for NSW on 20 December 2002.8 It was a creature of
statute – hard law. The objective of the SWMOP was consistent with the requirements
set out in section 6(2) of the WMA 2000. It provided policy context, targets and
strategic outcomes for the management of the State’s water sources and 'clear
direction for all water management in New South Wales including …the creation of
management plans’.9 Recognising the importance of an adaptive approach to the
management of the State’s water resources, the SWMOP was to be reviewed after five
years and updated to respond to new directions and priorities.10 The targets set out in
the SWMOP were not exhaustive but were designed to ‘take a significant but practical
step in the process of continuous improvement’, and were set up as long term
outcomes and 5 year management targets. In some cases the targets were seen as
‘enabling’, or a prerequisite, to be assessed within the time frame of the currency of
the SWMOP, for determining more specific outcomes in the long term.11
The SWMOP contemplated that management plans developed under the WMA 2000
would be consistent with relevant targets, and longer term outcomes, and that those
plans would indicate the contribution they would make to achieving the targets set out
in the SWMOP.12

7

See WMA 2000 s6. Note that Government policy also includes matters that are declared by the regulations to be
government policy: s 6(4).
8
State Water Management Outcomes Plan Order 2002 (‗SWMOP‘).
9
Ibid Ch 1 Pt 1.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid. Long term water outcomes for the environment, society and economic prosperity are set out in three
Divisions in Chapter 2 Part 1 of the SWMOP. Thirty-eight five year management targets are set out in detail in 11
Divisions Chapter 2 Part 2 of the SWMOP. These outcomes and targets are explained in the remainder of the
document in Chapter 3.
12
Ibid Ch 1, Pt 4.
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The intent of the WMA 2000 was reflected in the form and substance of the SWMOP
and clearly gave the SWMOP a significant role in the water management framework
for NSW. It was to be a living document, established, reviewed and updated in
consultation with the community, and capable of implementation to achieve
measurable outcomes. It seemed to be an essential element of the framework, yet its
creation was at the discretion of the Governor and there was no obligation to review
and renew it at the end of its term.
As provided in section 6(6) of the WMA 2000, the SWMOP established in 2002 ceased
to have effect on 20 December 2007.13 There is no indication from the NSW
government that the document has been or is to be replaced.14 One plank in the
platform for reform has crumbled.
The development of a water management outcomes plan for the Sydney Region to
provide a broad policy context, targets and strategic outcomes for the management of
all water sources of the region as well as a legislative backing for the objectives now
embodied in soft law planning for the Sydney Region – the Metropolitan Water Plan
2006 (‘MWP 2006’) – is considered in Part V of this thesis.
7.5

Water management areas and management committees

The inclusion of broad discretionary powers in the WMA 2000, already noted in the
discussion of the SWMOP in the previous section, carried through to the consultation
provisions of the legislation.
The WMA 2000 provided for the designation of ‘water management areas,’ and the
establishment of ‘management committees’ in relation to those areas, at the
Minister’s discretion.15 A management committee could also be abolished at any time
at the Minister’s discretion, whether or not it had completed its task.16
Although the WMA 2000 did not mandate the creation of water management areas,
the former NSW Department of Land and Water Conservation (‘DLWC’) saw water
13

Ibid Related Information.
The Office of Water (NSW) website advised on 30 August 2010 that although the SWMOP has ceased to be in
effect many of its principles and targets remain relevant. See: <http://www.water.nsw.gov.au/WaterManagement/law-and-Policy/Key-policies/default.aspx>.
15
WMA 2000, Ch 2 Pt 2 deals with the creation of water management areas and the establishment of management
committees. Water management areas are covered in one section, s11, in two sentences. WMA 2000 s 12-14 are
concerned with the establishment, membership and functions of management committees.
16
Ibid s 12(3).
14
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management areas as an essential component of the planning framework to be
developed under the WMA 2000. Indeed according to DLWC:
The planning provisions of the Water Management Act 2000 are enabled by
constituting water management areas.17

Twenty water management areas were duly constituted in 2001.18
The WMA 2000 contemplated that management committees would be appointed to
carry out specific tasks such as the preparation of draft water management plans and
the review of existing plans for the water management area in relation to which they
were appointed. A management committee was to exercise its functions consistently
with the principles of ecologically sustainable development.
Only one management committee was established under section 12 of the WMA 2000.
The Coxs River19 Water Management Committee was established in 2001 to prepare a
draft water management plan, pursuant to Chapter 2, Part 3 of the WMA 2000.20
Although the Water Sharing Plans now in place in NSW were prepared in consultation
with management committees, they were advisory committees only, and not
constituted under section 12 of the WMA 2000.21 The membership of the relevant
committee is specified in each of the Water Sharing Plans and is broadly
representative of the parties to be included under section 13. These committees are
no longer functional although apparently they have not been formally disbanded.22
The Minister’s discretion to appoint management committees under Chapter 2 Part 2
was unfettered in the legislation, even though it was the embodiment of a process that
included the community as partners in the water management process.

17

This statement was available at Department of Land and Water Conservation (NSW), Caring for our Natural
Resources Water Management Areas (2001, accessed 11 May 2005)
<http://www.dlwc.nsw.gov.au/care/water/wma/index.html>.
18
See New South Wales, New South Wales Government Gazette, No 180, 23 November 2001, 9389.
19
The hydrologic catchment of the Coxs River is within the Sydney Region.
20
New South Wales, New South Wales Government Gazette No 135, 7 September 2001, 7632-7634. The Order
establishing the committee specified the water sources to be covered by the plan to be prepared by the committee.
The plan was not intended to be developed for a ‗water management area‘.
21
The Department of Land and Water Conservation published a list of management committees established under the
WMA 2000 on its website in March 2005. The Coxs River Water Management Committee was the only section 12
management committee listed. Advisory committees listed as appointed under WMA 2000, s 388 to prepare draft
water sharing plans comprised seven for regulated rivers; seven for unregulated rivers; nine for groundwater systems;
and seven for combined surface and groundwater plans.
22
Enquiries of the Department of Water and Energy in July 2008 confirmed that all committees (other than the Coxs
River committee) had been disbanded at that time but did not reveal any formal source of notification of that
termination.
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7.6

Water management plans under the WMA 2000

Chapter 2 of the WMA 2000 provided that the Minister could choose when, and
whether or not to develop a management plan, and could then decide which process
would be followed to develop that plan. Chapter 2 set out mechanisms for the
preparation of management plans either by a management committee pursuant to an
order of the Minister under Part 3 or as Minister’s plans under Part 4.
Part 3 plans
The Minister can direct management committees set up under Part 2 of the WMA
2000 to prepare draft management plans (‘draft plans’) relating to any aspect of water
management including water sharing, water source protection, drainage management
and floodplain management. The Minister may also set the terms of reference for
preparation of draft plans and, if the management committee fails to prepare a draft
plan in accordance with those terms, a Minister’s plan may take its place.23
Part 3 plans prepared as drafts by a management committee were to be consistent
with the SWMOP, with State environmental planning policies and protection of the
environment policies, with certain regulations (including the Sydney Water Catchment
Management Act 1998) and with ‘State government policy’.24 Plans might include
provisions for the preservation and enhancement of water quality; monitoring and
reporting requirements to apply as conditions for approvals; mandatory conditions to
apply to access licences and approvals; and circumstances in which the Minister might
amend a management plan during the period for which it is in force.25
A management plan was to include a vision statement, objectives consistent with the
vision statement, strategies for achieving the objectives, and performance indicators

23

WMA 2000 s 15. See also management plans: Ch 2 Pt 3 ss 15–49A. Discussion in the following paragraphs relates
to those provisions of the Act. ‗Core‘ provisions (s 20) that must be included, and ‗additional‘ provisions (s 21) that
may be included, in water management plans are set out in relation to water sharing (Division 2), water use (Division
3), drainage management (Division 4), floodplain management (Division 5) and controlled activities and aquifer
interference activities (Division 6). Draft plans may apply to the whole or any part of a water management area (see
for example WMA 2000 s 22(2) in relation to water use), and, in relation to water sharing provisions only, to the
whole of any part of one or more water sources within a management area (s 19(2).
24
Ibid s 16. ‗State government policy‘ includes policy relating to environmental objectives for water quality and
river flow and any matters declared by regulation to be government policy.
25
Ibid s 17. The provisions are applicable to all water management plans. The Dictionary included in the WMA 2000
informs that an ‗approval‘ means a water use approval, a water management work approval, or an activity approval.
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to measure the success of those strategies. Management plans were also to adhere to
any additional format requirements determined by the Minister.26
In formulating a draft plan, the management committee was to have ‘due regard’ for
the socio-economic impacts of the proposals in the draft plan; the provisions of any
relevant Catchment Action Plan (‘CAP’); and the impact of activities conducted outside
the area to which the plan relates on the proposals contemplated under the
management plan.27
In the course of preparation of a draft plan, certain persons were to be notified of the
general aims and objectives of the draft plan and those parties could make written
submissions in relation to its preparation. 28
Once prepared, a draft management plan was to be submitted to the Minister, and
placed on public exhibition when the Minister was satisfied that it was suitable to be
exhibited. Any person can make written submissions to the Minister on a draft
management plan. 29 Submissions were to be dealt with in accordance with sections
39 and 40 which required the management committee to consider the submissions
and, with its comments on the submissions, resubmit the draft plan to the Minister.
It is not clear from the wording of these sections whether the management committee
can make changes to the draft prior to submitting it to the Minister with comments on
the submissions. However, it seems that the discretion lies with the Minister, not the
management committee, to include or not to include any changes to the draft. Section
41 of the WMA 2000 gives the Minister discretion to determine the fate of a draft
management plan. The Minister can make a management plan in accordance with the
draft plan ‘as finally submitted to the Minister’,30 or in accordance with such a plan but

26

Procedures to be followed by management committees to make management plans are set out in Chapter 2 Part 3
Division 8 of the WMA 2000. Procedures for the making of Minister‘s plans are set out in Chapter 2 Part 4.
27
WMA 2000 s 18. The obligation to have ‗due regard‘ arises under the hard law of the WMA 2000 and can thus be
seen as hard law itself, although what constitutes ‗due regard‘ is open to debate. As the provision is embodied in
statute, its implementation could conceivably give rise to questions to be considered under administrative law.
28
Ibid s 36: local councils, CMAs and holders of access licences or approvals under the WMA 2000 within the water
management area to which the draft plan will apply are to be notified along with such other persons or bodies as
determined by the Minister. The provisions may well be the basis of the current practice of ‗targeted consultation‘ in
respect of Minister‘s plans developed under Part 4: see discussion below in Chapter 8.8 on page 162.
29
Ibid ss 37, 38. A draft plan is to be resubmitted to the management committee that prepared it if the Minister is of
the opinion that it does not comply with the requirements of Ch 2, Part 3: s37(2).
30
Ibid s 41(1)(a): it is open to debate whether this is a plan which is to the Minister‘s satisfaction under s 38 or
resubmitted to the Minister under s 40 (with or without amendment after considering submissions).
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with such alterations ‘as the Minister thinks fit’,31 or re-exhibit the draft plan (with or
without amendment) and resubmit it under Pt 3,32 or decide not to proceed with the
draft management plan at all. Section 41(2) requires that management plans may only
be made with the concurrence of the Minister for Climate Change and the
Environment although there is no formal procedure for notification to, and
submissions by, that Minister or a delegate, except in so far as they may be construed
as being part of the public, in Part 3.
Part 3 of the WMA 2000 provided for all plans to have a term of 10 years although
management plans containing water sharing provisions could be extended for further
periods of 10 years.33
Once made, a management plan was only to be amended by a subsequent
management plan made in accordance with Pt 3. However the Minister was
empowered by Division 9 of Part 3 to amend a management plan in the public interest,
or as provided in the plan itself, or to give effect to a decision of the Land and
Environment Court relating to the validity of the plan.34 Plans, other than plans dealing
with water sharing, were able to be repealed by the Minister. The Minister must
obtain the concurrence of the Minister for the Environment and Climate Change
before amending a plan. There is no requirement for any form of public consultation
when a plan is amended after its original gazettal, unless the amendment is in the form
of a new plan.
There is little scope to challenge a plan once made:
The validity of a management plan may not be challenged, reviewed, quashed or
called into question before any court35 in any proceedings, other than before the Land
and Environment Court in proceedings commenced within the judicial review period.36

31

Ibid s 41(1)(b): it is not clear whether the Minister is limited to alterations which have arisen from the public
submissions.
32
Ibid s 41(1)(c): this sub-section suggests that alterations to the plan may be made in response to submissions,
although this may well be referring to a plan altered by the Minister under the previous sub-section.
33
Ibid s 43A: A management plan that deals with water sharing may only be extended on the recommendation of the
Natural Resources Commission (s43A(1)).
34
Ibid s 45(1). The circumstances in which a management plan can be amended or repealed and the manner in which
such actions are to be taken is set out in detail in section 45 which comprises the entirety of Division 9.
35
Ibid s 47 (8): A court is defined to include any court of law or administrative review body.
36
Ibid s 47(1).
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The judicial review period is three months from the date of gazettal of the plan, or
gazettal of an amendment to a plan, but does not arise on renewal of the term of a
plan. The period cannot be extended by the Land and Environment Court or any other
court.
Similarly, provisions apply to restrict challenges, including those which may arise under
the rules of procedural fairness, in relation to the exercise (including the purported
exercise, non-exercise or improper exercise) of plan-making functions by a designated
person, to proceedings in the Land and Environment Court commenced within the
judicial review period. 37
The Minister is obliged to ‘take all reasonable steps’ to give effect to the provisions of
management plans and to ensure that environmental water rules established by
management plans are observed.38 Public authorities, on the other hand, are obliged
to ‘have regard’ to management plans to the extent to which they apply to them.
However, the WMA 2000 expressly provides that this does not restrict the exercise of
statutory discretions invested in a public authority.39 However prepared, a
management plan might be seen to be ‘persuasive’, albeit hard law, in these
circumstances.
Only one draft water management plan (as distinct from the water sharing plans
prepared as Minister’s plans that are in force across the State) has been prepared
under Part 3 of the WMA 2000 by a management committee. Terms of reference for
the preparation of the Cox’s River draft water management plan included a
requirement to make provisions for water sharing in accordance with Ch 2, Pt 3, Div 2
and aquifer interference in accordance with Ch 2, Pt 3, Div 6 of the WMA 2000.40 The
Coxs River Water Management Committee was also required to make
recommendations to the Minister on any additional aspects of water management
(including but not limited to water use, controlled activities, environmental protection,
and protection and enhancement of water quality) that should be considered in the

37

Ibid s 47(4)-(8). A designated person is defined to be the Minister, a management committee, the Director-General
or any person or body assisting or otherwise associated with any of them: s47(8).
38
Ibid s 48.
39
Ibid s 49.
40
New South Wales, New South Wales Government Gazette No 135, 7 September 2001, 7632 [2a)].
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draft plan preparation.41 Although the focus of the Committee’s terms of reference
was water sharing, there was scope to broaden that task to produce a comprehensive
water management plan encompassing all of the elements contemplated by Part 3.
The decision to extend the terms of reference on the basis of any recommendations
the Committee might make was, however, a matter for the Minister’s determination.
The Committee’s tasks were to be considered complete once the plan was made.42
A draft Water Sharing Plan was prepared by the Coxs River Water Management
Committee in accordance with the terms of reference given to it, and was submitted to
the Minister in 2005. The Coxs River Water Management Committee is now referred
to by the NSW Government as a ‘former’ committee and the fate of the draft plan
appears to be that it forms some part of the foundation for the current draft Water
Sharing Plan for the Greater Metropolitan Region.43
An essential component of the water management planning scheme of the WMA 2000
– the actual preparation of plans – was at the discretion of the Minister. Nationally
agreed reforms had called on States to develop statutory water plans to secure water
entitlements and thus provide a sound basis for water trading to take place. The NCC
and the NWC expressed no concerns with regard to the legislative reform put in place
in NSW to give effect to its reform undertakings even though there were broad
Ministerial discretions in that scheme that could defeat the intent of the scheme. The
overall planning scheme was founded in statute — its source met the reform
objectives even if its function could be bypassed by recourse to less transparent and
less inclusive mechanisms provided in the statutory scheme. How plan preparation
will actually proceed under the scheme of Part 3 remains to be seen. All current Water
Sharing Plans in NSW are Minister’s plans under Part 4 of the WMA 2000.
Part 4 plans
Part 4 of Chapter 2 of the WMA 2000 introduces the concept of a ‘Minister’s plan’ into
the water planning framework established by the WMA 2000. The concept is
embodied in one section, section 50, comprising five brief sub-sections.
41

Ibid 7634 [3a)].
Ibid 7634 [5a)].
43
Draft Rivers Order, above n 4, cls 37(15), 58(2). See for example the Ministers‘ notes after the clauses. The
Minister‘s foreword to the Draft Rivers Order states that ‗The draft plan builds on the work done by the former Coxs
River Water Management Committee‘.
42
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Under section 50(1) of the WMA 2000, the Minister can make a plan for any part of the
State that is not within a water management area; or for which a management plan is
not in force; or, if there is a management plan in force for the relevant area, then in
respect of matters not already dealt with in the plan.
The Minister must obtain the concurrence of the Minister for the Environment before
making a Minister’s plan. A Minister’s plan must ‘in general terms’ deal with matters
that a management plan is required to deal with and may deal with other matters that
a management plan is authorised to cover. 44 However, as noted in the discussion of
Part 3 plans above, the Minister effectively determines what is to be covered in a
‘management plan’ to be prepared by a management committee. Thus the logical
conclusion is that the Minister is free to determine the matters to be covered in a
Minister’s plan.
Although Part 3 of the WMA 2000 is generally to apply to a Minister’s plan, section 36,
which contains the notification and consultation provisions for stakeholders in the
course of preparation of the plan, does not apply to Minister’s plans by virtue of
section 50(2A). Section 50(2A) also excludes the application of the provisions relating
to public exhibition and the making of submissions on a Minister’s plan which are
contained in sections 38 and 39 of the WMA 2000.
Finally, section 50 (5) of the WMA 2000 permits the Minister to decide whether to
make a ‘Minister’s plan’ or a ‘management plan’ in respect of any matter. A
management plan is defined by reference to section 15 of the WMA 2000, and
includes a Minister’s plan made in relation to land which is not part of a water
management area or land which is part of a water management area but for which a
management plan is not in place.
It is difficult to determine the effect of a decision by the Minister to make a
‘management plan’ rather than a ‘Minister’s plan’ under section 50. In either event
the plan would be a plan under section 50, and by definition, a Minister’s plan.45
44

WMA 2000 s 50(2): This presumably refers to the ‗core provisions‘ and ‗additional provisions‘ set out for each of
the elements addressed in Ch 2, Pt 3,Divs 2–6 of the WMA 2000. When making a plan under section 50, the Minister
is obliged to address the core provisions set out in Pt 3 of the WMA 2000 relating to the specific elements of water
sharing, water use, drainage management, floodplain management and controlled activities and aquifer interference
activities if they are to be included in that plan.
45
Ibid ‗Dictionary‘ definition a ‗Minister‘s plan‘: a plan referred to in section 50.
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Accordingly, the public exhibition and consultation provisions are excluded from the
plan making procedure, whatever the plan may be called, if it is made under section 50.
No doubt there is some specific intent behind the provision, but it is far from obvious.
Clearly, Part 4 provided an alternative approach to water management planning that
was less open and inclusive than that of Part 3. It could be invoked without the
involvement of formally constituted management committees and it could circumvent
the consultation provisions set up in Part 3. It provided what might be seen as the
preferred path for the State Government to follow – preparation of Minister’s plans
dealing with only one aspect of water management: water sharing. To achieve its
objectives the State Government also adopted a method of plan preparation not
contemplated at the time that the WMA 2000 was introduced – the ‘macro’ planning
process – a process which came under close scrutiny in the course of reviews of NSW’s
performance under the 1994 COAG Water Reform Framework and then in its
implementation of the National Water Initiative (‘NWI’).46
7.7

A macro approach to planning

The concept of ‘macro water planning’ was introduced to the public in 2004, when
amendments were being made to the WMA 2000 and before the NWI emerged, as a
process that would ‘allow NSW to complete its water sharing arrangements quickly,
thoroughly and cost effectively.’47 Subsequently, in an annexure to the NSW National
Water Initiative Implementation Plan (‘Implementation Plan’) the NSW Government
advised that:
In the first round of water sharing plans for unregulated rivers, water management
committees intensively assessed 20 subcatchments. As there are well over 600
remaining subcatchments [sic] in New South Wales, it would take more than 10 years
to complete further water sharing plans using the same intensive assessment used
previously. 48

46

Council of Australian Governments, Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Water Initiative (25 June 2004)
(‗NWI‘). See discussion above in Chapter 6.5 on page 121.
47
Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources (NSW), NSW Water Reforms: A Secure and
Sustainable Future (Ministerial Statement) (DIPNR, August 2004) 9.
48
New South Wales Government, NSW Implementation Plan for the National Water Initiative 2006 (‗NSW
Implementation Plan‘), Attachment A, 1. The published final of the implementation plan does not have the annexure
attached. However there is reference to it in the final document at page 12 in the discussion of Group C plans. A
hard copy of the document is held by the author. The information contained in the annexure was subsequently
adapted and reproduced: see Department of Natural Resources (NSW), ‗Overview of Macro Water Plans: Water for
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Macro water planning was a means to speed up the planning process in NSW. It was a
method of strategic planning, not a form of statutory plan. Macro planning used ‘a
more practical approach,’ building on knowledge gained from community consultation
in the original process, and setting standard water sharing rules for different types of
catchments classified on the basis of their social, economic, cultural and ecological
values49. The process was intended to balance the water needs of the environment
with water for social and economic needs and to achieve the same results as the
earlier process – plans would set extraction limits (the volume of water that can be
extracted annually); dealing rules (to control trading of water licences); and daily
access rules to specify when extraction is allowed. 50
The NWC summarised the differences between the original planning process invoked
in NSW and the macro approach. Macro plans were developed by regional panels
comprising NSW Government staff and regional catchment management authority
representatives, not by community-based management committees; the plans
produced generic outcomes classifying rivers and aquifers according to social,
economic and ecological values; and they applied a standard set of water sharing rules
based on these classifications that were then tailored to local needs but were not
formulated from the outset on an individual basis.51
Catchment Management Authorities (‘CMA’s) were to be involved in community
consultation to provide opportunities for comment on specific draft plans. All issues
raised in submissions were to be considered before plans were finalised. 52
The remaining unregulated catchments across the State would be covered by macro
Water Sharing Plans but the ‘greater Sydney metropolitan area’ was not to be amongst
them.53
the Future‘ (2005) (‗Macro planning overview‘). The NSW Government has produced additional publications setting
out the elements of macro planning in some detail: see for example Office of Water (NSW), ‗Macro Water Sharing
Plans — The Approach for Unregulated Rivers‘ (Report to Assist Community Consultation, February 2010).
49
Macro planning overview, above n 48.
50
Ibid.
51
National Water Commission, 2005 National Competition Policy Assessment of Water Reform Progress (National
Water Commission, Canberra, April 2006), 2.15.
52
Macro planning overview, above n 48. Although there is no clear role for CMAs under the WMA 2000
responsibility for completion of community consultation had been clearly placed on catchment management
authorities elsewhere. The task was to be undertaken through ‗targeted community discussions‘: see Department of
Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources (NSW), Meeting the Challenges — Securing Sydney‘s Water Future:
The Metropolitan Water Plan 2004 (October 2004) (‗MWP 2004‘), 25.
53
MWP 2004, above n 52.
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7.8

Water sharing or water management?

Water sharing plans as distinct from water management plans were not recognised in
the management scheme of the WMA 2000. However, Division 2 of Chapter 2, Part 3
of the WMA 2000 contemplates the inclusion of water sharing provisions in water
management plans. Water sharing provisions can apply to all or any part of a water
management area, or to the whole or any part of one or more water sources within a
water management area.54
Water trading initiatives promoted under the NWI and adopted by NSW in the
Implementation Plan rely on the development of a regulatory framework such as that
included in the WMA 2000 for water sharing. It seems that the broad concept of water
management plans developed under the WMA 2000 has been modified to
accommodate economic imperatives to facilitate water trading. Water sharing as a
component of the whole has taken on a life of its own and become the whole. There
has not been one ‘water management plan’ prepared by a management committee
and approved under the process established by Parts 2 and 3 of Chapter 2 of the WMA
2000 since it was enacted in 2000.
7.9

Discussion

NSW relied on the preparation of Water Sharing Plans regulating approximately 80% of
the State’s water use to demonstrate its commitment to on-ground implementation of
the NWI and to trigger the application of the WMA 2000 in the areas covered by those
plans.55 Completion of the water planning and licence conversion process for the
remaining 20 per cent of the State’s water use was at the top of the NSW
Government’s list of actions still to be completed under the NWI when it prepared its
Implementation Plan. 56

54

WMA 2000 s 19(2).
Since the introduction of the WMA 2000 it has been the rule that the provisions of that Act will not come into force
in respect of a water management area unless a Water Sharing Plan is in place for that area. The logical sequence for
the operation of the WMA 2000 would be the creation of a management committee for each water management area;
the preparation of management plans for the water management area, one component of which would be the water
sharing principles; and the ongoing implementation of those plans. The WMA 2000 does not define a Water Sharing
Plan. Water sharing is only one aspect which may be dealt with in a water management plan under the WMA 2000,
and detailed water sharing provisions that may be covered in a water management plan are included in the WMA
2000.
56
NSW Implementation Plan, above n 48, Introduction, 5-6.
55
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Of those plans that remained to be prepared most were to be dealt with by way of
‘macro’ Water Sharing Plans.57 However there were some plans (the Group D plans)
that would require ‘very specific water sharing rules’ – one of them was the plan for
the complex unregulated river system of greater metropolitan Sydney where water
authorities including Sydney Water Corporation (‘SWC’) and the Sydney Catchment
Authority (‘SCA’) accounted for over 75% of total water extraction.58
The Group D plans were to be developed using locally based committees to ‘examine
all the scientific and socio-economic evidence to devise the objectives most suited to
[the] local water source and community, and the plan rules to meet those
objectives’.59 However it was acknowledged that it would be a learning process:
The definition and extent of overuse and the on-going evaluation of the impacts of the
plans to address overuse are areas where existing knowledge is limited.60

In 2007 the Commonwealth Government offered an incentive to the NSW Government
to complete a Water Sharing Plan for the Sydney Region. Funding for work to be
carried out on the Hawkesbury-Nepean River was made contingent upon the
completion of ‘a Water Sharing Plan for the Sydney region consistent with the NWI
and bringing forward decisions on environmental flow releases from Warragamba
Dam’.61
There was a change of Commonwealth Government in November 2007. The Water
Sharing Plan had not been prepared at that time although progress with preparation of
the plan was reportedly ‘on track’.62 By 2008 the situation had changed and the
development of the plan was ‘delayed’.63

57

Ibid 12. The water sources to be covered by macro plans are referred to throughout the NSW Implementation Plan
as ‗Group C‘.
58
Ibid. These plans were referred to as ‗Group D‘. The greater metropolitan Sydney plan was to cover the
Hawkesbury / Nepean / Coxs / Shoalhaven / Woronora / Illawarra region rivers – in effect the Sydney Region.
59
Ibid 18.
60
Ibid Implementation Timetable, 7.
61
Prime Minister of Australia John Howard, $132.5M to Rescue the Hawkesbury Nepean River (Media Release 23
August 2007).
62
Department of Water and Energy (NSW), ‗Metropolitan Water Plan 2007 Progress Report‘ (September 2007) 21,
25.
63
Department of Water and Energy (NSW), ‗Metropolitan Water Plan 2008 Progress Report‘ (January 2009) 35.
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May 2010 saw the proposals for the plan subjected to ‘targeted consultation’ with the
expectation that there would be an opportunity for full public consultation when the
plan was completed.64
On 7 June 2010 the NSW Office of Water (‘NOW’) released draft Water Sharing Plans
for the unregulated river water sources and groundwater sources of the Greater
Metropolitan Region for public exhibition.65 Despite all undertakings that it would not
do so, the NSW Government has developed these plans as Minister’s plans under
section 50 of the WMA 2000 using the macro planning process. The draft Water
Sharing Plans are examined in Chapter 8.

64

NSW Implementation Plan, above n 48. Work on the Group D plans commenced in January 2005 and completion
was forecast for 1 July 2008. Licence conversion under those plans was to be completed by June 2009. The plan for
metropolitan Sydney was expected to commence in July 2006: at 14, 17, 19. The National Water Commission
(‗NWC‘) reported in 2009 that NSW had advised that the outstanding water sharing plans for the State are to be
completed by 2012 (not June 2009 as originally scheduled). There is no indication where the plan for the Sydney
Region fits in this timeframe: National Water Commission, Australian Water Reform 2009 Second Biennial
Assessment of Progress in Implementation of the National Water Initiative (National Water Commission,
Canberra, September 2009) 18.
65
The period of exhibition was to run until 16 July 2010 but was extended to 30 July 2010. Eight public information
sessions were proposed to be held over the exhibition period. At least two additional presentations were added to the
scheduled sessions. Separate information packages for each of the plans were made available. They included: draft
legal plans (Orders) ; plain English guides to the plans; background documents detailing the plan preparation process;
report cards for each water source (six water sources for the unregulated rivers and 13 for the groundwater sources);
guidelines explaining format of the report cards; a manual explaining the ‗macro‘ water planning process; and a
generic submission form.
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Chapter 8: Big plans for a big area?
Effective consultation is time-consuming and resource hungry…*but it+ will always remain
1
critical to improving water management.

8.1

Introduction

The long awaited drafts of two Water Sharing Plans for the Greater Metropolitan
Region emerged for public scrutiny on 7 June 2010. The area known as the Greater
Metropolitan Region, often referred to but not defined, became an area on a map with
recognisable boundaries. Initially the public was given a period of six weeks to digest
and comment on the outcome of many years of work on the part of the NSW
Government, but the Minister bowed to gentle pressure from interested parties and
extended the period by two weeks.
This chapter is the final iteration of many versions that anticipated the emergence of
draft plans for the Sydney Region. The sections that follow examine those plans,
focusing on the administrative process associated with their development, particularly
the way that the legislative discretions available to the Minister have been invoked.
Neither the science behind the plans nor its likely impact on the sustainable use of the
water resources of the region is analysed. That task is beyond the scope of this
research. However, the method chosen for the purpose of determining water sharing
rules in the plans is subject to further comment in this chapter. Finally the discussion
brings together issues that will be pursued in Chapter 14: the accountability of public
bodies for decisions made in the exercise of legislative discretion.
8.2

The Greater Metropolitan Region defined

The Greater Metropolitan Region is the area of land contained within four water
management areas in NSW: the Southern, the Hawkesbury-Nepean, the Southern
Sydney and the Sydney Harbour Water Management Areas. It covers an area of
approximately 32500 square kilometres and extends from Shoalhaven Heads in the
south to Broken Bay in the north and from the coast westward to Lithgow and
1

National Water Commission, ‗Progress on the National Water Initiative‘ (A Report to the Council of Australian
Governments, 1 June 2006) 10.
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Goulburn. The Greater Metropolitan Region is shown on Figure 2.1 – it is the Sydney
Region in this study.
Two draft Water Sharing Plans for the Greater Metropolitan Region were released for
public exhibition on 7 June 2010. 2 The Draft Water Sharing Plan: Greater
Metropolitan Region unregulated river water sources Order 2010 (‘Draft Rivers Order’)
is stated to apply to only parts of the Greater Metropolitan Region encompassing six
water sources divided into a total of 78 management zones. 3 The Draft Water Sharing
Plan: Greater Metropolitan Region groundwater sources Order 2010 (‘Draft
Groundwater Order’) applies to all of the Greater Metropolitan Region encompassing
13 groundwater sources two of which are each divided into two management zones.4
In the discussion that follows the Draft Rivers Order and the Draft Groundwater Order
are referred to collectively as the ‘Draft Orders’. The Minister has considerable
discretion under the Draft Orders to change and create management zones, and
consequently to amend the plans of the zones.5
To compare the consistency of plans delivered by the macro process in two similar
urban areas of NSW some provisions of the Water Sharing Plan for the Central Coast
Unregulated Water Sources 2009 (‘Central Coast Plan’) are included in the discussion.
The Central Coast Plan covers an area adjoining the Greater Metropolitan Region.6

2

Office of Water (NSW), Draft Water Sharing Plan Greater Metropolitan Region Groundwater Sources: Order
(May 2010) (‗Draft Groundwater Order‘); Office of Water (NSW), Draft Water Sharing Plan Greater Metropolitan
Region Unregulated River Water Sources: Order (June 2010) (‗Draft Rivers Order‘). The Draft Groundwater Order
and the Draft Rivers Order are jointly referred to in the text as the ‗Draft Orders‘.
3
Draft Rivers Order, above n 2. The water sources covered by the Draft Rivers Order are the Shoalhaven River;
Illawarra Rivers; Upper Nepean and Upstream Warragamba; Hawkesbury and Lower Nepean Rivers; Southern
Sydney Rivers; and, Northern Sydney Rivers Water Sources. The management zones are listed in cl 5(2).
4
Draft Groundwater Order, above n 2. The 13 groundwater sources are listed in cl 5 of the Draft Groundwater
Order. The Botany Sands and the Sydney Basin Nepean Groundwater sources are each divided into two
management zones that are variously affected by embargoes on the grant of commercial bore licences imposed under
the Water Act 1912 (NSW) (‗WA 1912‘).
5
See for example Draft Groundwater Order, above n 2, cl 5(3)–(5).
6
The Central Coast is an area to the north of the Sydney Region that has some similar characteristics to the Sydney
Region. It includes some rural areas and a significant urban area. It is within commuting distance of Sydney and
joins the north-east boundary of the Sydney Region on the northern side of the Hawkesbury River. A comparison of
the Draft Rivers Order with the Water Sharing Plan for the Central Coast Unregulated Water Sources 2009
(‗Central Coast Plan‘) confirms that standard provisions apply in these two macro plans. Similarities between the
vision statements and objectives of the plans are noted below in Chapters 8.4 and 8.5 . The strategies to be pursued
under the two plans and the performance indicators adopted in them are similar (but specific references to meeting
urban water needs are included in the Draft Rivers Plan strategies (cl 10(c)) and performance indicators relating to
reasonable use restrictions to be imposed on basic landholder rights are included in the Draft Rivers Order (cl
11(1)(e)). Significantly, assessment of the performance of the Draft Rivers Order against its performance indicators
is to be undertaken by the Minister (cl 11(2)). The Central Coast Plan (Note to cl12) relies on the audit provisions of
s 44 of the Water Management Act 2000 (‗WMA 2000‘) for this purpose, as does the Draft Groundwater Order.
Flow classes for the water sources are specific to each water source and for the management zones in each source and
will not be addressed in this study.
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8.3

Omission or commission?

The Draft Orders were made under section 50(1A) of the WMA 2000. They are
Minister’s plans developed pursuant to a subsection of the WMA 2000 that gives the
Minister discretion to dispense with requirements of Part 3 that might otherwise apply
to a Minister’s plan made under section 50(1).7 The Draft Orders are specifically Water
Sharing Plans8 that are stated to deal generally with sections 20, 21(a)–(c) and 21(f) of
the WMA 2000. The Draft Orders did not deal with matters set out in sections 21(d) or
(e) of the WMA 2000, ‘additional provisions’ that do not have to be covered. Was this
a deliberate decision to side-step two issues that were significant in an urban water
context or merely a statement of fact?
Section 20 of the WMA 2000 sets out matters that must be dealt with in water sharing
provisions of a management plan – the core provisions of water sharing. The Central
Coast Plan is less constrained than the Draft Orders, applying generally to sections 20
and 21, thus addressing all of the core provisions and all of the additional provisions of
section 21.
Notably, there is no specific reference to or specific application of section 21(d) in the
Draft Orders. That section seeks to incorporate measures for the protection and
enhancement of water quality and for the restoration and rehabilitation of water
sources and their dependent ecosystems into Water Sharing Plans. It would seem to
be imperative that the Draft Orders prepared in respect of the water sources of the
Sydney Region would have water quality as a primary focus and deal with it as a
specific issue.9
The objects of the WMA 2000 specifically seek to ‘protect, enhance and restore water
sources, their associated ecosystems, ecological processes and biological diversity and

7

See also WMA 2000 s 50(2A)(b): the Minister can dispense with any particular requirement of Part 3 that is not
already excluded by virtue of the general provisions of section 50(2A). By way of contrast the Central Coast Plan is
made under section 50 and did not offer the Minister additional discretion to choose which parts of the water
management framework of Part 3 would not apply in the preparation of that plan. The Minister can make a
Minister‘s plan for all or parts of more than one water management area or more than one water source: s 50(1A) See
also the discussion of Minister‘s plans in Chapter 7.6 on page 143 (Part 4 plans).
8
Draft Rivers Order, above n 2, cl 2(2); Draft Groundwater Order, above n 2 cl 2(2).
9
Problems with water quality provided the impetus for institutional reform in the Sydney Region and resulted in
substantial changes to the management of the water catchments of the region. The provision of drinking water to
Sydney Water Corporation by Sydney Catchment Authority from the water sources that are to be regulated by the
Draft Orders has significant impact on the water sharing rules developed in the Draft Orders.
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their water quality’.10 This objective is again promoted in the water management
principle espoused in the WMA 2000 that water sources and their dependent
ecosystems should be protected and restored and the water quality of all water
sources should be protected and, where possible, enhanced.11 Section 21(e) suggests
that Water Sharing Plans might also include measures ‘to give effect to the water
management principles and the objects’ of the WMA 2000. This section too has been
omitted from the matters stated to have been generally dealt with in the Draft Orders.
The omission of two interrelated, albeit optional rather than mandatory, provisions
from general coverage in the Draft Orders that were included in the Central Coast Plan
suggests that this was deliberate. It may well exhibit a new and expansive trend in the
exercise of Ministerial discretion in plan making under Part 4 of the WMA 2000. It
raises the question of whether the Minister effectively excluded coverage of a
fundamental principle underlying the water management scheme of the WMA 2000.
It would no doubt be argued by those who prepared them that the provisions of the
Draft Orders, when considered in their entirety, will make a positive contribution to
water quality in the Sydney Region. The Draft Orders say as much – but the statement
relies on the legislative objectives relating to water quality being met by actions
primarily directed towards other outcomes.12
8.4

Limited vision

The Central Coast Plan included a respect statement for Aboriginal values in its water
sources in the following terms:
(a) life-giving water is of extreme significance to Aboriginal culture for its
domestic, traditional and spiritual values, and
(b) whilst water supplied for the environment will provide protection for native
flora and fauna, water for fishing, food gathering and recreational activities, it

10

WMA 2000 s 3(b).
Ibid s 5(2)(a), (c).
12
See Draft Rivers Order, above n 2 cl 9(i). The note to the clause advises that ‗Although there are no specific
strategies directly related to this objective in this Plan, the environmental water provisions would make a positive
contribution to maintaining or improving water quality‘. The Draft Groundwater Order, above n 2, includes an
objective only to maintain water quality (cl 9(i)) again differing from the rivers provision. Improving water quality is
a desirable ambition in relation to some of the groundwater sources covered by the Draft Groundwater Order, for
example the Botany Sands. Schedule 5 to the Draft Groundwater Order lists some contamination sources in the
Greater Metropolitan Groundwater Sources.
11
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is important that the community respects the spiritual significance of water to
the Aboriginal people.13

The Draft Orders have not included such a statement. The objects of the WMA 2000
recognise and foster benefits arising from sustainable and efficient use of water
including benefits to the Aboriginal people in relation to their spiritual, social,
customary and economic use of land and water.14 The objectives of the Draft Orders
do seek to protect, preserve, maintain or enhance Aboriginal, cultural and heritage
values of their water sources. Provision is made in the Draft Orders for Aboriginal
community development access licences and Aboriginal cultural access licences to be
granted in some circumstances. Nevertheless, omission of a respect statement for
Aboriginal values from the Draft Orders is lamentable.
8.5

Noble objectives

The objectives set out in the Central Coast Plan, with one exception,15 are incorporated
in broad terms into the objectives expressed in the Draft Orders. However, substantial
differences between the planning approach adopted in the Central Coast Plan and the
Draft Orders are evident in the aspirations of the plans in relation to urban water
supply.
The Central Coast Plan seeks to ‘manage local water utility/major utility water supply
security for the benefit of the community whilst recognising the environmental needs
of the water source.’16
The objectives of the Draft Rivers Order are more expansive. According to the
objectives relating to water supply set out in clause 9, the Draft Rivers Order is to:
(a) provide for the water supply for the people of Sydney, the Illawarra, the
Shoalhaven, the Southern Highlands, and the Blue Mountains, which [sic]
comprise 70% of the NSW population,
13

Central Coast Plan, above n 6, cl 9(2).
WMA 2000 s 3(c)(iv). The water management principles seek to protect features of indigenous significance:
s 5(2)(f).
15
Draft Rivers Order, above n 2, cl 9: adaptive management of the river water sources in not specifically included as
an objective.
16
Central Coast Plan, above n 6, cl 10(e). The Draft Rivers Order, above n 2, should include similar recognition of
the environmental needs of the water sources in Clause 9(a). In particular subsequent clauses that accommodate the
needs of major utilities (Sydney Catchment Authority in particular) should specifically recognise and incorporate the
needs of the environment in decision making: See for example: cl 16(1)(n) [Minister‘s note]; cl 16(3)(b) [Minister‘s
note]; cl 16(3)(d) [3rd Note]; cl16(3)(e) [2nd Note and Minister‘s note]; cl16(4)(b)[Minister‘s note]; cl19(9)[Minister‘s
note]; cl21(10)[Minister‘s note]; cl 22(9)[Minister‘s note]; and, cl23(9)[Minister‘s note].
14
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(b) contribute to the sustainable and integrated management of the water cycle
across the Greater Metropolitan Region Unregulated River Water Sources, …
(f) contribute to the sustainable development of those industries that are reliant
on surface water, …
(k) manage inter-basin water transfers to levels and timing that do not
compromise the flow required for sustainable river health in source
catchments,
(l) implement Government decisions on environmental flow regimes for the
Hawkesbury-Nepean River Water Source and the Shoalhaven River Water
Source, and
(m) implement Government policy of establishing a long-term average annual
extraction limit within the life of the Plan.17

The Draft Groundwater Order includes augmentation of urban water supply in its
objectives.18
The urban water supply objectives of the Draft Rivers Order raise two important issues:
whether those rivers really are ‘unregulated’ and whether the macro planning method
is appropriate for those water sources, or for the groundwater sources.
8.6

Unregulated rivers?

The Draft Rivers Order applies to water sources that have been categorised as
‘unregulated rivers’. The term ‘unregulated river’ is not defined in the Dictionary to
the Draft Rivers Order. The Dictionary to the WMA 2000 defines an ‘unregulated river’
as ‘a river that is not a regulated river’, a ‘regulated river’ being ‘a river that is declared
by the Minister…to be a regulated river’. These definitions are not only circular but
indicate that there is some discretion as to which rivers the Minister will declare to be
regulated rivers for the purposes of the WMA 2000.
The Background Document to the Draft Rivers Order (Rivers Background Document) is
more helpful, expanding on the definition offered by the WMA 2000 to inform in its
definition of ‘regulated river’ that:
17

The Draft Groundwater Order, above n 2, includes the rivers objective 9(b) in relation to the groundwater sources
of the region and undertakes to ‗supplement‘ the water supply for all of the people referred to in rivers objective 9(a).
18
Ibid cl 9(d): the clause is in the same terms as Draft Rivers Order cl 9(a) but is to ‗supplement the water supply‘.
Proposals for extraction of those resources are obviously being pursued. Part 14 of the Draft Groundwater Order
deals with extraction from groundwater by Sydney Catchment Authority — the clause simply anticipates the issue of
a major utility (urban water) access licence under the WMA 2000 to the Authority and attendant system operation
rules that would be put in place.
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Typically rivers where state owned [sic] storages catch water during wetter periods
and the river is used to supply stored water to meet downstream user’s *sic+ orders
during dry times are declared as regulated rivers.19

The Rivers Background Document also notes in its introductory statement that:
The supply of water in unregulated rivers is typically not controlled by releases of
water from dams but is dependent solely on rainfall and natural river flows.

The supply of water from the river water sources covered by the Draft Rivers Order is
controlled by releases from state-owned storages. That supply is augmented by nonrainfall dependent flow from sewage treatment plants and from stormwater channels
that discharge into the rivers. Water from the rivers is supplied by a statutory
authority to downstream users including Sydney Water Corporation (‘SWC’), a
statutory State-owned corporation that supplies drinking water to the 70% of NSW’s
population referred to in the objectives of the Draft Rivers Order. 20
The river water sources of the Sydney Region are clearly not ‘unregulated’ and
although their treatment as such may not be a fundamental flaw in the construction of
the Draft Rivers Order,21 it has had significant consequences for the manner in which
the Draft Rivers Order has been prepared.
8.7

Macro plans for micro outcomes – the best information?

The Draft Orders have been prepared as macro water plans. The WMA 2000 does not
define a ‘macro water plan’, nor do the Draft Orders. Macro planning for the river
water sources is explained in two documents made available with the Draft Rivers
Order: ‘Macro water sharing plans – the approach for unregulated rivers’ (‘Rivers
Macro Report’),22 and ‘Overview of macro water plans: Water for the Future’ (‘Macro
Overview’).23 A publication to explain the macro approach to development of

19

Office of Water (NSW), Draft Water Sharing Plan Greater Metropolitan Region Unregulated River Water
Sources: Background Document (June 2010) Glossary, 51.
20
See the description of Sydney Catchment Authority‘s bulk water supply system and Sydney Water Corporation‘s
water treatment and distribution, wastewater and stormwater systems in Chapter 2.7 on page 19. See also Figs 2.2–
2.5.
21
A Minister‘s plan will be difficult to challenge. As has been discussed in Chapter 7.6 on page 143, the Minister has
broad discretion to determine the substance and form of the plan.
22
Office of Water (NSW), ‗Macro Water Sharing Plans — The Approach for Unregulated Rivers‘ (Report to Assist
Community Consultation, February 2010) (‗Rivers Macro Report‘).
23
Department of Natural Resources (NSW) ‗Overview of Macro Water Plans: Water for the Future‘ (2005) (‗Macro
Overview‘). The publication was distributed with information relating to the Draft Orders.
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groundwater sharing rules was being prepared at the time of public exhibition of the
Draft Orders. 24
The Rivers Macro Report advises that macro planning is a broad approach to the
development of Water Sharing Plans adopted to cover ‘much larger areas than…single
sub-catchment, unregulated river water sharing plans’.25 A peer review of the NSW
macro water sharing planning process was commissioned by the National Water
Commission in 2007 (‘Peer Review’).26 The Peer Review concluded that ‘the macro
planning process was deemed adequate to prescribe flow rules in unregulated streams
under circumstances in which there is no significant competition for water between
environmental and other uses.’27 However, the NWC also reported, and concurred
with, the Peer Review finding that although the ecological science for the development
of macro plans was acceptable for less competitive systems ‘it is too simplistic for
competitive water allocation systems’.28
According to the Macro Overview:
Macro water plans will not include the greater Sydney metropolitan area…Other water
planning processes will deal with these areas.29

The Greater Metropolitan Region river water sources are characterised by highly
competitive demands on supply. They provide drinking water to Australia’s largest
urban agglomeration. They have been identified by the NSW Government as complex
systems that required individual attention to develop Water Sharing Plans.
Based on the NSW Government’s recognition of the need to treat these water sources
individually, and the conclusions reached in the Peer Review that support the
Government’s stated intentions, the use of the macro planning approach for the water
sources of the Greater Metropolitan Region requires an explanation that has not been

24

See Office of Water (NSW), Draft Water Sharing Plan Greater Metropolitan Region Groundwater Sources:
Background Document (May 2010), 2. The macro planning method is discussed in Chapter 7.7 on page 149.
25
Rivers Macro Report, above n 22, 1.
26
National Water Commission, 2005 National Competition Policy Follow-up Assessment of Water Reform Progress:
Water Planning in New South Wales (National Water Commission, Canberra, September 2007), 34.
27
Ibid 34.
28
Ibid. 4.2.
29
Macro Overview, above n 23, ‗What is a macro water plan?‘ A similar statement appears in the NSW
Implementation Plan where ‗Greater metropolitan Sydney‘ is referred to as one of four complex unregulated river
systems that require very specific water sharing rules and that would not be dealt with as macro water plans: see New
South Wales Government, NSW Implementation Plan for the National Water Initiative 2006 (‗NSW Implementation
Plan‘), 12, 17.
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provided to the public. Without full justification for its use, the integrity of the
planning process behind the development of the Draft Orders is questionable.30
As noted in Chapter 7, Commonwealth Government funding was offered as an
incentive for the completion of the Draft Orders.31 Although it is not highlighted by the
NSW Government, there is still Commonwealth funding that is contingent upon
completion of these plans.32 Those funds should not be released unless the planning
method (the macro planning process) used in the preparation of the plans has
delivered water sharing rules for the Greater Metropolitan Region river water sources
that can meet the objectives of the WMA 2000 and the National Water Initiative
(‘NWI’). Arguably an adverse finding would be unlikely if the NCC’s ‘no surprise’
approach were adopted to conduct such an assessment.33
8.8

Targeted consultation

Although the COAG National Urban Water Planning Principles34 recognise that ‘urban
water planning should be based on a process that is transparent and inclusive’ they
also recognise that different consultation approaches may be appropriate in different
circumstances.35
The consultation provisions set out in sections 36 and 38 of the WMA 2000 provide for
notification of ‘each holder of an access licence or approval in respect of land within
the water management area’ for which a draft plan is being prepared and other
persons as the Minister may determine. Those who are notified can make written
submissions in relation to the preparation of the draft plan. The draft plan is to be
publicly exhibited when prepared.

30

The documentation made available with the Draft Orders does not demonstrate the adequacy of the ecological
science applied through the macro planning process to inform decision making for the Greater Metropolitan Region.
It merely outlines the decision-making process. No other evidence is offered to indicate to the community that the
macro planning process adopted has provided a sufficiently robust scientific basis for development of the water
sharing rules for a complex river system that is highly regulated and impacted by urban water demands.
31
See discussion in Chapter 7.9 on page 151.
32
The existence of the funding was confirmed in response to a question asked by the author at the presentation on the
Draft Orders at Moss Vale on 29 June 2010.
33
The ‗no surprise‘ approach to reviews of performance under the National Competition Policy 1994 COAG Water
Reform Framework and the National Water Initiative is examined in Chapter 6.2 on page 115.
34
Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts (Cth), National Urban Water Planning Principles, (5
August 2008) <http://www.environment.gov.au/water/policy-programs/urban-reform/nuw-planning-principles.html>
(‗Urban Water Planning Principles‘). The Urban Water Planning Principles expanded commitments made by
Governments in the National Water Initiative: see discussion below in Chapter 5.9 on page 106.
35
Ibid Principle 3.
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These provisions do not apply when a plan is prepared under section 50. In the case of
the Draft Orders it seems that the Minister relented (as provided in section 50(2A)(a))
and decided to consult. Consultation in relation to the Draft Orders was undertaken by
way of ‘targeted consultation’36 prior to their release for public comment. Presumably
the persons nominated in section 36 were included as ‘targets’ of this largesse.37
In the process invoked to develop a Minister’s Plan there has been no opportunity for
proactive and participatory planning involving management committees for the region
as contemplated by Chapter 2 Part 3 of the WMA 2000 in the early stages of the
process. Indeed, unless one was a ‘target’ it was only when the plans were in a final
form that any opportunity for comment arose. However, lack of community
involvement in the development of the Draft Orders until so late in the planning
process limits the usefulness of submissions to the outcome of the planning process.
The process associated with the preparation of the plans was certainly not a
partnership between Government and the community.
8.9

Integrated urban water cycle management

The National Urban Water Planning Principles call for water management planning to
be undertaken on a ‘whole-of-water-cycle’ basis, so that the management of potable
water supplies can be integrated with other contributors to the cycle such as
stormwater and wastewater. All water supply options are to be considered so that
water use at different stages of the urban water cycle can be optimised.

36

The background documents issued with the Draft Orders explain that targeted consultation is informal consultation
held with key stakeholders to test the suitability of the proposed water sharing rules and provide feedback on the
potential impacts of the rules. Each of the documents refers to7 stakeholder meetings that were conducted as part of
the targeted consultation. As a result of the process 34 submissions were received in relation to the rivers proposals
and 24 for the groundwater proposals. See Office of Water (NSW), Draft Water Sharing Plan Greater Metropolitan
Region Groundwater Sources: Background Document (May 2010), 29–30; Office of Water (NSW), Draft Water
Sharing Plan Greater Metropolitan Region Unregulated River Water Sources: Background Document (June 2010),
29–33.
37
A request to take part in the consultation process was made by the author to the Department of Water and Energy
(NSW) verbally on 12 May 2008 and followed up in writing on the following day. That request was declined on
28 May 2008 on the grounds of confidentiality issues associated with the process. A further request was made in
writing on 21 July 2009, confirming assurances already made to the Department that confidentiality would be
respected. The request was refused on 7 August 2009. The author subsequently attended a presentation on the Draft
Orders by the Office of Water (NSW) on 11 November 2009 as a member of the NSW Nature Conservation Council
Water Advisory Group. Information sessions arranged as part of the public exhibition process were at limited venues
(two additional venues were included in response to requests from the communities concerned), addressed local
issues, and offered little opportunity for meaningful interaction with Office of Water (NSW) representatives. The
author attended two presentations. All discussion about the water sharing plans for the Sydney Region in this thesis
relies on information that is in the public domain or that has been provided to the author in writing on request. The
author collaborated on the preparation of a submission made by the Nature Conservation Council Water Advisory
Group following the consultation (see Appendix Related Paper E (c)).
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What is to be managed under a water management plan? As discussed in Chapter 3
the planning provisions of the WMA 2000 referred variously to ‘water sources’, ‘water
resources’, ‘water’, and ‘water from water sources’. The function of a plan was to
regulate, or manage, the extraction of water. Yet, the WMA 2000 did not define
‘water’.
The intention of the statutory provisions was that they would regulate primary water
sources – fresh and saline but not recycled or waste – and that water sources were
different in fact from water stored by artificial means such as dams, tanks, weirs,
sewers, or stormwater drains.
The Draft Orders comprise two plans: one for surface water sources and one for
groundwater sources – both currently being within the purview of the WMA 2000.
However the Draft Orders in their current form38 do not account for water supplied
from ‘new’ sources such as wastewater, stormwater and seawater.39
The relative contributions to be made to water supply in the Sydney Region by various
water sources (fresh and otherwise) are set out in the Metropolitan Water Plan 2006
(‘MWP 2006’)40 which is discussed in Chapter 9. The MWP 2006 was clearly persuasive
Government policy. The WMA 2000 requires a management plan to be consistent
with ‘government policy, including government policy in relation to the environmental
objectives for water quality and river flow’.41
The ‘Minister’s foreword’ to both Draft Orders refers to the MWP 2006. One of the
Objectives of the Draft Rivers Order is ‘to implement Government policy of establishing
a long-term average annual extraction limit within the life of the *Draft Rivers+ Plan’.
The policy referred to in that objective was the predecessor of the MWP 2006.42 A
38

But see Draft Rivers Order, above n 2, cl 90: Amendments can be made to include changes to accommodate
stormwater harvesting. The Draft Rivers Order gives no indication of what the process of stormwater harvesting may
entail or what the likely amendments would be to the Draft Rivers Order. Potential contributions from other nonnatural resources (such as wastewater) have not been so contemplated and accommodated in the Draft Rivers Order.
39
The coastal waters of the State are in fact a ‗water source‘ for the purposes of the WMA 2000: see WMA 2000
Dictionary.
40
Water for Life (NSW), 2006 Metropolitan Water Plan (April 2006) (‗MWP 2006‘).
41
WMA 2000 s 16(1)(e).
42
See Draft Rivers Order, above n 2, cl 9(m). The instrument referred to is Department of Infrastructure, Planning
and Natural Resources (NSW), Meeting the Challenges — Securing Sydney‘s Water Future: The Metropolitan Water
Plan 2004 (October 2004) (‗MWP 2004‘). The MWP 2004 stated that a Sydney Metropolitan water sharing plan
would include a water benchmark that indicated how much water Sydney residents, businesses and irrigators can
sustainably use within the life of the plan: at 25. The objective as expressed in the Draft Rivers Order indicates that
the water benchmark ‗correlates‘ to the long-term average annual extraction limit (LTAAEL) that is to be established
within the life of the plan rather than quantify usage for the period of the plan. The distinction is important since the
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note to Clause 20(f) of the Draft Rivers Plan advises that the NSW Government will
determine certain environmental flows in accordance with ‘the schedule of the
Metropolitan Water Plan’ and that environmental flows from Warragamba Dam
adopted by the Government will be included in the plan. Policy has clearly been
incorporated into the Draft Orders, even policy that is yet to be announced. At the
time of public exhibition there was no schedule to the MWP 2006 to which the Draft
Rivers Plan could relate.
This study supports the conclusion that objectives for the ‘management’ of the new
sources, or resources, of wastewater and stormwater, set out in the MWP 2006 should
be a focus of the WMA 2000 and that regulation of access to and use of those new
water sources should fall within the water management provisions of the WMA 2000.
In 2005 the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (NSW) (‘IPART’) considered
whether a system of property rights should be established for sewage and stormwater.
IPART said yes, but then changed its view.43 Frontier Economics was of the opinion
that it was not necessary to extend the State’s rights to water to all parts of the urban
water cycle in order to achieve optimal water management outcomes envisaged under
the NWI. However Frontier Economics did advocate that Governments should ensure
the existence of an integrated water planning and management framework that
considered all water sources at a local, catchment and regional level.44
The current legislative framework does not permit the extension of the legislative
intent to such limits. The WMA 2000 definition of ‘water source’ recognises the
excursion to offshore sources. The ‘new’ source of seawater currently being exploited
to secure Sydney’s water future is captured by the WMA 2000 at least within the
confines of the coastal waters of the State.
To integrate all water sources, a Water Sharing Plan would need to adopt an expanded
definition of water to include wastewater in all its forms as a resource (compared with
water sharing rules in the Draft Rivers Order are based on the LTAAEL: see Part 9 of the Draft Rivers Order
particularly cl 39, 40. The LTAAEL are determined on the basis of existing licensed extractions under the WA 1912
(NSW), they are not measured volumes of water use. Similar provisions apply to groundwater usage but the
objectives of the groundwater plan do not include reference to the MWP 2004 provision. Long-term average annual
recharge (LTAAR) forms the basis of the groundwater water sharing rules under the Draft Groundwater Order: see
Pt 10, particularly cl 37. The LTAAR is an estimated volume.
43
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (NSW), ‗Investigation into Water and Wastewater Service Provision
in the Greater Sydney Region‘ (Final Report S9–17, October 2005) (‗IPART Services Final Report‘).on page 280
44
See Frontier Economics, ‗Review of Urban Water Entitlements in Australia‘ (Report prepared for the Joint Steering
Committee for Water Sensitive Cities (JSCWSC), December 2008).
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‘water’ as a natural resource) and take reuse water into account when determining
water allocations, including allocations of water for the environment. A water balance
for the Sydney Region that takes into account all primary and secondary water sources
(fresh/sea/waste/storm) and all water products (desalinated/recycled/drinking water)
would be needed. Unless the system inputs and extractions are known, there can be
no proper allocation of rights pursuant to access licences under the WMA 2000.45
The development of Water Sharing Plans for the Sydney Region offered an opportunity
for NSW to set the pace of reform. If ‘water’ was considered as water, regardless of
the impurities it contained and irrespective of the way in which it was stored and
transported then the Draft Rivers Order could manage all surface water sources
contributing to the water cycle in the Sydney Region.
However, if there is indeed a compelling reason not to include new sources, or some of
them, the right to control all water sources (natural or otherwise) must be clarified in
the WMA 2000 or in new legislation that deals specifically with the State’s water rights.
The issue of control46 is particularly relevant in the Sydney Region where there is
potentially a significant volume of water from other than natural sources available for
treatment (where necessary) and reuse. The process for granting access to, and rights
to extract, ‘new’ water sources by mechanisms outside the WMA 2000 must be
regulated to ensure ecologically sustainable development of the resources. Control
over access to and use of wastewater should not rest with service providers as is now
the case in the Sydney Region.47
8.10

Water for the environment

The MWP 2006 acknowledged that a Water Sharing Plan under the WMA 2000 was
the main mechanism for protecting water for the environment.48
Protection of the environment and waterway health is a critical issue for inclusion in
urban water planning. Section 8(1) of the WMA 2000 as originally enacted defined
45

No such comprehensive water balance has been calculated on a whole-of-water-cycle basis for the Sydney Region
although there is a project underway to develop a water balance for the fresh water sources of the HawkesburyNepean river system: see Office of Water (NSW), (12 November 2010) <http://www.water.nsw.gov.au/Waterlicensing/Metering/Hawkesbury-Nepean/hawkesbury-nepean/default.aspx>.
46
With regard to the issue of control versus ownership Frontier Economics stated that: ‗the fundamental issue for
water in Australia is not who ‗owns‘ a resource but who ‗controls‘ it‘: Frontier Economics, above n 44, iv.
47
Some aspects of regulating water recycling are discussed in Chapter 10.
48
MWP 2006, above n 40, 108.
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environmental health water as ‘water that is committed for fundamental ecosystem
health at all times, and may not be taken or used for other purposes’.
The section has been progressively whittled away to its present condition. Section 8 of
the WMA 2000 now establishes two types of environmental water: planned
environmental water and adaptive environmental water. Planned environmental
water may be committed in at least two of three possible ways: by reference to
physical presence of water in the water source; by reference to long-term average
annual commitment of water as planned environmental water; and/or by reference to
water that is not committed after the commitments to basic landholder rights and for
sharing and extraction under any other rights have been met (that is, as a residue
only).49
Other provisions of an expanded section 8 that cover adaptive environmental water
rely on the compliance of an access licence holder with the terms of a licence to secure
more water for the environment and thus the actual contribution made by such means
is more difficult to measure and monitor than planned environmental water.
Environmental health water as originally defined no longer exists. Now, planned
environmental water offers the highest security for water for the environment. Sadly,
planned environmental water is a shadow of its predecessor. It is ‘water that is
committed by management plans for fundamental ecosystem health or other specified
environmental purposes, either generally or at specified times or in specified
circumstances, and that cannot to the extent committed be taken or used for any
other purpose’.50 Environmental water relies on earmarking for environmental
purposes before its benefits are realised – it is not committed from the outset to meet
fundamental ecosystem needs. As a remainder after extraction it relies on an excess
of water being available before the environment will benefit, a situation most likely to
arise (at least based on recent experience in the Sydney Region) only when and if there
is sufficient water in the system to meet all needs.
In the Draft Rivers Order planned environmental water for each water source is to be
identified and established as the volume of water in excess of long-term average
49
50

WMA 2000 s8(1A).
Ibid s8(1)(a).
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annual extraction limits determined for each water source with additional specific
rules applying for each water source. As a remainder, after allowing for licensed
extractive use, it relies on an excess of water being available before the environment
will benefit, a situation most likely to arise (at least based on recent experience in the
Sydney Region) only when and if there is sufficient water in the system to meet all
needs. In the Draft Groundwater Order water sharing is based on the long-term
annual recharge to each groundwater source. Planned environmental water is
established as the long-term storage component of each groundwater source plus an
amount of the long-term annual recharge. Neither volume is a measured (known)
volume.
Clause 21 of the Draft Rivers Order deals with planned environmental water in the
Upper Nepean and Upstream Warragamba Water Source. A Minister’s note to Clause
21(1)(f) advises that environmental flows for the Warragamba River and Nepean River
below Warragamba Dam are to be determined by the NSW Government ‘in
accordance with the schedule of the Metropolitan Water Plan’. Flows adopted by the
government are to be included in the Draft Rivers Order. A statutory plan, a hard law
instrument, is to take clear direction from a soft law instrument.51 The provisions of
the WMA 2000 that would otherwise have some influence over the process associated
with such determinations will not apply. Unless the Government is inclined to do so,
there need not be any form of public consultation when such decisions are made. The
Minister is not required to consult on amendments to plans.52 The process associated
with the development of the MWP 2006 is discussed in Chapter 9. There is no formally
stated procedure to be followed when the NSW Government decides to amend that
plan.
The latest version of the metropolitan water plan, the 2010 Metropolitan Water Plan,
was released in August 2010 (‘MWP 2010’).53 It does not contain a schedule as
foreshadowed in the Draft Rivers Order. One of the key initiatives and directions of
the MWP 2010 is, however, stated to be:
51

Other provisions of a similar ilk in the Draft Rivers Order include: Clause 9(l): implementation of Government
decisions on environmental flow regimes for the Hawkesbury-Nepean River Water Source and the Shoalhaven River
Water Source are objectives; Clause 9(m): implementation of Government policy of establishing a long-term average
annual extraction limit within the life of the plan is an objective.
52
See discussion above n 21.
53
Office of Water (NSW), 2010 Metropolitan Water Plan (August 2010).
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Environmental flows from Warragamba Dam –further investigation and research
to determine the optimal environmental flow regime and infrastructure
requirements will be undertaken to enable a decision on the long-term flow
regime from Warragamba Dam to be made in 2014. 54

Securing water for the environment is clearly still an issue, with decisions on long term
environmental flows delayed for further investigation and consideration – and
inclusion in the next iteration of the metropolitan water plan that is to emerge in 2014.
How will the water sharing plan for the surface water sources of the Sydney Region
adapt to that policy determination and will the community be involved in the process?
The NSW Government’s performance to date suggests that the community may well
be guided through a consultative process for the review of the soft law plan in 2014.
But perhaps it will be left to the Minister, without recourse to consultation, to put
those policy decisions into practice by amending the hard law plan, if necessary, under
section 45 of the WMA 2000. It is unlikely that the community will have any real say in
the latter process.
In the meantime water releases are to continue from Warragamba Dam but these
flows ‘cannot be variable, or significantly different in volume to the flows that have
been released from Warragamba Dam for a number of years’.55
Water for the environment is far from secure under the Draft Rivers Order. The
government advises in the MWP 2010 that the plan is ‘designed to ensure sufficient
water for people and the environment – with one not more important than the
other’.56 Government policy with regard to environmental water appears to have
moved a long way from the legislative intent originally reflected in section 8 of the
WMA 2000 where water for fundamental ecosystem health took precedence over
competing uses. It remains to be seen how the final version of the Draft Rivers Order
will accommodate the ‘dictates’ of the soft law of the MWP 2010.
8.11

Minister’s (in)discretions ?

Although there is no express statement to the effect in the Draft Orders, there are
several instances where the Minister has exercised choices, some of which are made
54

Ibid 7.
Ibid 50.
56
Ibid 47.
55
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available in the scheme of the WMA 2000 while others are policy decisions.
Immediately obvious are the following:


The Minister has exercised a choice under the WMA 2000 to make a Minister’s
plan.



The NSW Government has decided to use the macro planning approach to develop
the Draft Orders contrary to its previously stated intentions.



The Minister has not declared the Greater Metropolitan Region river water sources
to be regulated rivers.



There is no evidence of the creation and involvement of an advisory committee to
take part in the preparation of the Draft Orders.



There has not been a clear timetable associated with the development of the Draft
Orders and little if any information available publicly throughout the process.



Community consultation has been restricted to ‘targeted consultation’ and the
public exhibition of the Draft Orders.



Lack of community involvement in the development of the Draft Orders until the
final stages of the planning process limits the usefulness of submissions to the
outcome of the planning process.



The extent of the geographical area covered by the Draft Orders, and the variety
and complexity of issues that arise in water management across that area, inhibit –
and probably render impractical – the considered examination by the public of the
detailed provisions of the Draft Orders.

Legislative discretionary powers granted to decision makers give those agencies
freedom to choose from a range of options within any applicable confines imposed by
that legislative framework. However the extent to which the exercise of discretionary
powers available in a hard law instrument has influenced water management planning
for the Sydney Region raises concerns for the direction that water management is
taking in NSW.
The substance of the inclusive water management planning process embodied in
Chapter 2 Part 3 of the WMA 2000 supported assessments of NSW’s compliance with
nationally agreed water planning reforms through the 1990s until recently. That
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assessment of compliance brought with it financial reward in the form of entitlements
to Commonwealth Government financial incentives associated with those reforms.
Although Part 4 was an element of the WMA 2000 planning framework, it was not
foreseen that the opportunity to by-pass the Part 3 process by producing Minister’s
plans would ultimately become the sole process by which water management planning
in NSW would be undertaken. Since the inception of the WMA 2000, its original
provisions supporting environmental protection have been progressively whittled
away.
Neither the process of developing the Draft Orders nor the outcome of that planning
process might be said to comply wholly with the NWC expectation that a fully effective
water planning regime will:


provide a clear and secure basis for water access entitlements and allocations,
thereby providing certainty to water users and the environment.



enjoy the support of the community, by appropriately balancing economic,
social and environmental considerations, drawing on and utilising the best
available science, socioeconomic analysis and community input.



clearly establish how to deal with currently overused and/or overallocated
systems, thereby helping return necessary water to the environment and
ensure environmental and resource sustainability.57

The Draft Orders fail to address the complexity of the whole of the Greater
Metropolitan Region water cycle, omitting the new sources of water from the
regulatory framework so that access to and use of valuable sources of water ‘fit for
purpose’ remain under the control of water service providers.
They fail to take account of contributions made to the total water balance by
alternative water products such as recycled sewage and wastewater, desalinated
seawater, and roof water collection.
They are complicated and difficult to navigate. They attempt to deliver optimised
outcomes to meet too many disparate environmental, social and economic demands;
57

National Water Commission, Australian Water Reform 2009: Second Biennial Assessment of Progress in
Implementation of the National Water Initiative (National Water Commission, Canberra, September 2009) 14.
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and they rely on government policy to determine significant aspects of the water
sharing framework. They run the risk of failing to deliver real and effective positive
outcomes for the environment in the Sydney Region.
The Draft Orders themselves deliver numerous discretionary powers to the Minister –
powers that should be matched with processes to ensure that the community is
included in decision-making, and kept informed so that the government can act in
partnership with it to manage the water of the Greater Metropolitan Region
sustainably. As demonstrated in the Sydney Region, those discretionary powers can
provide powerful tools to respond to drought with ad hoc contingency planning, 58 by
means that lack transparency and affect the security of water access entitlements. The
Draft Orders rest on a non-consultative foundation of very wide Ministerial discretions
that are not amenable to administrative review in many circumstances.
8.12

Discussion

Arguably, the establishment of nationally compatible markets for water trading is the
backbone of the reforms of the NWI, being both the principal driver of reform and an
essential outcome. Through market-based reforms the NWI anticipated that scarce
water resources would be allocated to the most productive uses – an expectation that
has been a major element of the COAG water reform agenda since the 1990s. The
NWI reforms expanded on the inroads made into this area under earlier reforms,
seeking institutional, legislative and administrative arrangements that would further
facilitate interstate and intrastate trade and rural-urban trading.
Implementation of this element of the NWI was intended to ensure that, through
appropriate pricing, water resources would be used efficiently and water services and
water resource management would be adequately funded. It is a reform objective
which clearly impacts on the urban water sector. Water trading is definitely on the
urban water agenda to be considered as part of the full range of options called for
under the NWI. The NWI predicates achievement of its objectives on the existence of,
amongst other things, transparent, statutory-based planning. Water management
planning is an essential prerequisite for water trading in the Sydney Region.
58

Ibid vii: The National Water Commission (‗NWC‘) highlighted the need for improvement in drought contingency
water planning which according to the Commission remained ad hoc and lacked transparency thus affecting the
security of water access entitlements.
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Chapter 2 of the WMA 2000 embodies one of two principal components of the reform
framework called for under the water reform agenda of the NCP through the 1990’s
and reinforced in the NWI. It is under the provisions of Chapter 2 that the water
planning framework is set out. It provides a statutory basis for the creation of a
system of water management planning which addresses the guidelines set out in
Schedule E to the NWI. The planning processes established under Parts 1, 2 and 3 of
Chapter 2 of the WMA 2000 incorporate the elements set out in Clause 6 of the
Schedule E Guidelines of the NWI.
However, the import of the provisions of Part 4 of the Chapter was not apparent at the
time the legislation was introduced to Parliament. The intent evident in the drafting, if
not the application in practice, of the provisions of Part 4 provided scope for a Minister
to make plans by a process which might avoid, if not evade, the intent and objectives
of the national reform agenda to ensure that planning should take place within an
evidence-based, participatory and transparent process.
The consequences for NSW of non-compliance with the NCP water reform agenda
have been examined in Chapter 5. The impact of suspension of competition payments
was clear in that discourse: when ultimate compliance, and consequent release of
withheld payments, was tied to the completion of specific actions, then response was
timely. Although NSW was able eventually to secure the release of its suspended
competition payments, comments on certain aspects of its implementation of the
1994 COAG Water Reform Framework in all assessments of performance under the
NCP were far from complimentary. NSW was repeatedly taken to task on its
performance in relation to water planning, itself a prerequisite to the water trading
objective. It appears not to have learnt from its experience.
There was, in the event, no clearly identifiable consequence where implementation of
the NWI by NSW was ineffective or inadequate, other than perhaps the potential for a
‘name and shame’ amongst peers, at least those of them that could come to the table
with clean hands. With the removal of the incentive payments of the NCP the
imperative for reform in NSW seems to have waned. The failure to complete a Water
Sharing Plan for the Sydney Region nearly 10 years after the WMA 2000 received
assent, 4 years after the end of the NCP, and 6 years after the emergence of the NWI,
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is surely evidence of the complacency the NWC urged governments to avoid. There is
no evidence that Commonwealth funding still tied to completion of the Draft Orders is
dependent upon the outcome of a review of the planning process associated with the
development of the plans.
The establishment of a clear system of ‘title’ to water has been part of the national
water reform agenda since the early 1990s. The progress with this element is notable
in many jurisdictions, at least with the introduction of legislative frameworks, even
though implementation has been slow. However, it remains to be seen how, or indeed
if, the ‘new’ resources such as stormwater, wastewater, reuse water and desalinated
water will be brought into existing legislative frameworks to ensure that, in accordance
with the objectives of the NWI, they are ‘allocated and used to achieve socially and
economically beneficial outcomes in a manner that is environmentally sustainable’. 59
This thesis proposes that water sharing rules for the Sydney Region encompassing all
supply options can be accommodated in one water management framework if the
political will exists to embark upon the difficult task. It is a challenge that can be met.
The question is whether a hard or soft law framework is the preferred option. The
analysis in this chapter does not lend much support for a hard law mechanism. The
statutory framework already in existence has failed to deliver administrative practice
associated with the preparation of the Draft Orders that exhibits robust processes of
community consultation and transparent decision making. Chapter 9 explores policy
and procedure associated with an alternative approach — the development of a soft
law plan of action designed to secure Sydney’s water future.

59

Council of Australian Governments, Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Water Initiative (25 June 2004)
(‗NWI‘) Preamble, para 2.
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Chapter 9: A Soft Law Alternative
The adaptive nature of the [Metropolitan Water] Plan, with regular reviews and updates
against progress, ensures that the community can be confident that the management of
1
Sydney’s water supply is undertaken in a robust and comprehensive way.

9.1

Introduction

At the request of the Prime Minister, the National Water Commission (‘NWC’)
prepared a progress report on the National Water Initiative (‘NWI’) to support an
agenda item for the July 2006 meeting of Council of Australian Governments (‘COAG’).2
The report applauded the way in which water reform initiatives had been embraced
cooperatively in all jurisdictions, but cautioned that growing demand and reduced
security of supply continued to present risks to Australia’s water resources.
The NWC called for even greater commitment by the States and Territories to the
fundamental improvements in water management anticipated by the NWI, at the
same time acknowledging the constraints imposed upon the process by lack of
financial and human resources to implement the reforms. 3
The report listed a number of areas of urban water reform to be addressed including:


transparent regional water supply planning to ensure that ‘all feasible water supply
options are on the table’



rural-urban trade



development of national guidelines for recycled water for potable use, stormwater
reuse, managed aquifer recharge, and to enhance environmental flows

1

New South Wales, Audit Office, ‗Planning for Sydney‘s Water Needs: Department of Infrastructure, Planning and
Natural Resources, Sydney Water Corporation, Sydney Catchment Authority‘: [Department of Infrastructure,
Planning and Natural Resources (NSW), Sydney Water and Sydney Catchment Authority, ‗Joint agency response to
the performance audit report on Sydney‘s Water Supply‘ (27 April 2005)] (Performance Audit, Report No 135,
4 May 2005) 7 (‗Audit Report‘).
2
National Water Commission, ‗Progress on the National Water Initiative‘ (A Report to the Council of Australian
Governments, 1 June 2006) (‗2006 NWC Progress Report‘).
3
Ibid. The report suggested that performance on the collective national agenda items (water accounts, metering
standards, nationally compatible water registers, and consistent water pricing) was outpacing action at the domestic
level in all jurisdictions and called for an increased commitment by governments. In particular, the National Water
Commission (NWC) called for the core items of the National Water Initiative – entitlements, planning, trading (with
strong links between these three), pricing and accounting – to be priorities for governments‘ focus and resources, and
underlined them as the major focus of NWC future assessments of progress on the National Water Initiative.
Recognising the financial constraints on governments to effect change, the NWC alluded to the possibility of
investment in some of these actions through the Raising National Water Standards Programme: at 1-2, 5, 9-10.
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encouragement of private sector participation in the water industry through
facilitation of access to infrastructure and clarification of entitlements to ‘new
sources of water’. 4

Rural-urban water trade, indirect potable re-use of water and private sector
involvement in water provision were three issues specifically addressed by the NWC in
relation to supply options which it considered should be part of regional water
planning.
The NWC referred to initiatives underway in central Victoria, south-east Queensland
and NSW to illustrate innovative policy and infrastructure solutions already being
implemented to secure regional water supplies around mainland capital cities. The
NSW planning initiative referred to by the NWC in that ‘regional’ context was not a
statutory water management plan under the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW)
(‘WMA 2000’) but the 2006 Metropolitan Water Plan (MWP 2006),5 a soft law plan of
action to secure Sydney’s water future.6
This Chapter reviews the development of water management policy in NSW that
preceded the MWP 2006. It then examines the administrative process that delivered
the MWP 2006. The power of soft law policy statements becomes apparent in the
discussion. Soft law was free to roam and embrace new sources of water and new
ways of using them while legislation was constrained by its relevance only to natural
water sources – and the difficult processes that accompany significant legislative
reform. However, that freedom is seen to come at a high price – public participation
and transparent decision-making emerge as the casualties of the process.

4

Ibid. The areas requiring attention in urban water reform are considered in more detail at 3.
Water for Life (NSW), 2006 Metropolitan Water Plan (April 2006) (‗MWP 2006‘).
6
See reference to MWP 2006 in 2006 NWC Progress Report, above n 2, 12. See also Department of Infrastructure,
Planning and Natural Resources (NSW), Meeting the Challenges — Securing Sydney‘s Water Future: The
Metropolitan Water Plan 2004 (October 2004) (‗MWP 2004‘). The MWP 2004, predecessor of the MWP 2006, was a
deliverable under the National Water Initiative for NSW: New South Wales Government, NSW Implementation Plan
for the National Water Initiative 2006 (‗NSW Implementation Plan‘). It was part of the State‘s response to meet the
objectives of paragraph 92 of the National Water Initiative — it was a departure from familiar water planning that
addressed only rain-fed sources. The management strategy involved demand management, supply augmentation and
increased recycling. The MWP 2006 was reviewed in 2010: see discussion in Chapter 9.8 on page 196.
5
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9.2

Policy forerunners

In October 2000 the NSW Government released its NSW Water Conservation Strategy7
(‘Strategy 2000’), acclaimed at the time as an holistic approach to water use efficiency
and conservation in urban and regional environments throughout NSW.
Strategy 2000 presented a vision, identified principles for water conservation and set
out nineteen strategies and fifty-five actions to bring about change, elements not
dissimilar to the structure if not the content of the Draft Water Sharing Plan: Greater
Metropolitan Region unregulated river water sources Order 2010 and the Draft Water
Sharing Plan: Greater Metropolitan Region groundwater sources Order 2010 discussed
in Chapter 8.8
The cornerstone of the initiatives in Strategy 2000 was that ‘water use should be
consistent with the principles of ecologically sustainable development’,9 a factor
clearly reinforced by the aim of Strategy 3 to ‘integrate environmental, economic and
social costs and benefits into decision making on water conservation’. ‘Ecologically
sustainable development’ took its meaning from section 3(1) of the Water
Administration Act 1986 (NSW), a definition which is now found, in a somewhat
expanded form, in section 6(2) of the Protection of the Environment Administration Act
1991 (NSW).

7

Department of Land and Water Conservation (NSW), NSW Water Conservation Strategy (October 2000) (‗Strategy
2000‘). Federal and State water conservation strategies already applying to the Sydney Region in 2000 were
summarised in the new policy. These strategies included:

the National Water Conservation Rating and Labelling Scheme for appliances and plumbing fittings, a voluntary
scheme with limited funding available

WaterWise Australia, encouraging wise use of water by the community through educational and promotional
strategies across water utilities, water industry organisations and state and local governments

the development of a National Water Conservation Strategy

bulk water supply and management, including the development of management plans for river and groundwater
systems; water entitlements and allocations; water licence trading on regulated and unregulated rivers

efficient water use in agriculture, including the WaterWise on the Farm program

major utility initiatives including, for Sydney Water Corporation:
o improvement of system efficiency through reduction of per capita water extraction from storages
o reduction of unaccounted for losses
o expansion of reuse and demand management
These initiatives are a common thread running through water reforms that followed Strategy 2000.
8
Ibid. In the Foreword to Strategy 2000, the then Minister for Agriculture refers to competing demands for water
from various users placing a strain on limited water resources. Strategy 2000 was promoted as having come about
after extensive public consultation and contributions from a Water Conservation Task Force, comprising
representatives from government and non-government organisations including the NSW Irrigators Council, the
Australian Water Association and the Nature Conservation Council. The focus of Strategy 2000 was reported to
reflect the government‘s view that all parties have to work together to achieve the ‗sustainable management of water
resources‘: at 1. The nineteen strategies can be found at 24-34.
9
Ibid 5.
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According to Strategy 2000, water conservation involved ‘using water efficiently so
that the needs of ecosystems, human settlements and production are all met
sustainably on a permanent basis’.10
Strategy 2000 was consistent with the water reform framework set out by COAG in
1994.11 Thus it is no surprise to see that the issues of pricing, development of a
transparent planning process, and water reuse were integral components.
Eight groupings of valleys or catchments, referred to in Strategy 2000 as ‘regions’,
were identified and profiles of the water storages of each region presented.
‘Regulated’ rivers (where downstream users are supplied by a series of dams and weirs
as is the case in the Murray River for example) were distinguished from ‘unregulated’
rivers. Strategy 2000 acknowledged that unregulated rivers could be affected by
infrastructure used to supply water to urban centres, a situation which clearly existed
in the Sydney Region. The Sydney Region is included in the Sydney/South Coast Region
in the document. 12
Strategy 2000 highlighted the importance of community involvement in water
planning. Water management committees were recorded to be in place for
unregulated rivers that were stressed or had high conservation value and for aquifers
at risk from contamination or over-extraction.13 The role of the committees in
preparing plans ‘to advise the Government on options for implementing the river flow,
groundwater extraction and water quality objectives in their area, and assess the
environmental, economic and social impacts of these options’ was also emphasised.14

10

Ibid 7.
See Council of Australian Governments, ‗Communiqué‘, (Hobart, 25 February, 1994) Attachment A – Water
Resource Policy (‗1994 COAG Water Reform Framework‘). The 1994 COAG Water Reform Framework formed the
basis of the water reform agenda of the National Competition Policy: see discussion above in Part II, particularly
Chapter 5.5 on page 96.
12
Strategy 2000, above n 7, 8 and Appendix 2. According to Strategy 2000 most rivers were ‗unregulated‘ and
supply from these rivers was estimated to average 1 000 000 ML per annum. Supply from regulated rivers was much
higher than that.
13
Ibid 9.
14
Ibid. It is these committees that advised the NSW Government as part of the process of developing water sharing
plans for the State after the introduction of the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) (‗WMA 2000‘). See discussion
above in n 21 in Chapter 7.5, on page 141 and related text.
11
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Significant opportunities to conserve water in all regions were recognised in Strategy
2000, and it was stressed that ‘individual small savings can add up to a large total
saving’.15
Strategy 2000 reinforced the urban water initiatives of Sydney Water Corporation
(‘SWC’)’s Waterplan 21 seeking to increase water reuse by including eight actions to
expand the role of reuse across the State.16 Research into potable reuse was part of
the plan.17
As with subsequent iterations of water management policy in NSW, Strategy 2000 did
not present new initiatives, but rather reworked and reinforced actions already in
place under national, cooperative reform packages. They had the advantage of
familiarity. Particular water conservation initiatives to be employed in the urban and
industrial sector included pricing and regulatory reform, financial incentives and
reduction of system losses, all of which had already appeared through the COAG
initiatives of the 1990s. Strategy 2000 was a companion regulation, but a soft one,
guiding water management when the hard law of the WMA 2000 was introduced.18
A Ministerial Statement made in 2004 (‘2004 Ministerial Statement’) 19 ushered in the
next wave of water reform objectives setting out ‘three major phases of NSW’s
continuing journey towards world’s best practice in water management’ only the third
of which was not in place at the time of the announcement. The first two phases
referred to in the 2004 Ministerial Statement related to the introduction and
implementation of the major legislative initiatives embodied in the WMA 2000 in the
period 2000–2004.20
The third phase was to produce ‘tangible signs’ of achievement in the form of:

15

Ibid 10.
Ibid 1, 19. Sydney Water Corporation‘s Water Plan 21 was an initiative in place at the time to increase the amount
of water reuse in Sydney Water Corporation‘s (‗SWC‘) area of operations. The objective of Water Plan 21 was to
increase opportunities for water reused by promoting and building new markets, lowering the cost, and gaining
community acceptance of water reuse.
17
Ibid 30. Potable reuse is covered in Action 12.8 of Strategy 12. The potable recycling strategy of Waterplan 21
envisaged the development of additional greywater recycling or potable recycling in a 10-20 year timeframe (20102020) depending on a number of factors aligning: ‗water demand forecasts, customer preference, market factors,
economic viability, and technology development‘: at Strategy 12, 30.
18
Ibid. Strategy 2000 refers to the proposed new legislation: at 11.
19
Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources (NSW), NSW Water Reforms: A Secure and
Sustainable Future (Ministerial Statement) (DIPNR, August 2004) (‗2004 Ministerial Statement‘) 4.
20
Ibid 4–5.
16
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regional communities using their on-the-ground expertise to take a greater
responsibility in managing natural resource issues that affect their lives;



a wider mix of measures to achieve environmental and water conservation
outcomes, with innovative market oriented schemes to be used wherever
possible in preference to regulatory measures; and



the Government and communities making future decisions about water sharing
from a sound and comprehensive knowledge base on the water resource and the
various activities which affect its volume and quality.21

In the third phase, 13 Catchment Management Authorities (CMA’s) were created
under the Catchment Management Authorities Act 2003 (NSW). The 2004 Ministerial
Statement proposed that the CMA’s would be involved in the development of water
management plans and catchment action plans (‘CAP’s). Notably, the third phase
contemplated that CAPs could be used to properly address some water management
issues, for example water quality and water quality monitoring, rather than having
them addressed in water management plans under the WMA 2000, so anticipating
time and cost saving.22
Perhaps most importantly, the third phase of reforms addressed the need to secure
Sydney’s water supply. The 2004 Ministerial Statement noted that ‘In 2002–2003,
Sydney used 5% more water than the long-term available water supply’.23 The
development of a ‘Metropolitan Water Strategy for the Sydney Basin’ was proposed as
part of the third phase. This metropolitan strategy was to conform to the principles of
demand management in the NWI; to incorporate the government’s response to the
Hawkesbury-Nepean River Management Forum on environmental flows; and to build
on the advice of the Premier’s Expert Water Panel.24 It sounded like a statutory water
management plan as contemplated under the WMA 2000 but it emerged as something
quite different.

21

Ibid 19.
Ibid 19-20. See also discussion of water quality in Chapter 7. There is no reference to CAPs in the Draft Rivers
Order. This would surely have been a positive step in the direction of integrated water management and cooperative
natural resource management.
23
Ibid 22.
24
Ibid. The expert water panel referred to in this context was probably a forerunner of the water advisory group that
resided in the Department of Premier and Cabinet and is now part of the Department of Climate Change and Water.
22
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9.3

The First Metropolitan Water Plan

October 2004 was important for water management in NSW. The release of Meeting
the Challenges: Securing Sydney’s water future: The Metropolitan Water Plan 2004
(‘MWP 2004’) in that month set out, for the first time, a strategic approach to water
management in the ‘greater Sydney area’.25 In his introduction to the MWP 2004, the
Premier proclaimed its arrival as the ‘first comprehensive water conservation plan for
Sydney for 200 years’.26
The objective of the MWP 2004 was set out as follows:
This Plan outlines the course that the Government will follow as a 25 year plan for
water use and supply in Sydney. It is a balancing act between having enough water in
the short term and ensuring we manage our water resources sustainably in the longer
term. This means increasing water supplies as well as reducing demand for water.
Sharing water between the environment and water users is an important outcome of
this Plan, as well as developing a comprehensive water recycling scheme.
Overall, this Plan is the cornerstone to Sydney becoming a sustainable and water
sensitive city.27

The MWP 2004 had been forecast in the 2004 Ministerial Statement, and it
incorporated elements addressed in Strategy 2000. It had sustainable management as
a goal for the longer term, and invoked demand management and supply
augmentation, particularly through water recycling, as tools to secure Sydney’s water
supply. The environment was recognised as a water user and as part of the water
sharing framework. Sydney as a water sensitive city would conform to the ambitions
of the NWI.
However, the MWP 2004 was not a formal planning instrument. It had no basis in
legislation. It was an elaborate restatement of government policy that had been
evolving in NSW for more than a decade, meshed with a considered approach to
implementation of policy to produce tangible results on the ground. It provided the
template for water management in the Sydney Region from 2004.
The MWP 2004 was to meet its objective through measures to:
25

MWP 2004, above n 6.
Ibid Premier‘s foreword.
27
Ibid 26.
26
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increase supply, by accessing deep water at the bottom of dams; increasing
transfers from the Tallowa Dam on the Shoalhaven River; using groundwater
supplies; planning for desalination; and recycling wastewater



reduce demand by encouraging efficient water use through incentive schemes such
as the Every Drop Counts programme, and subsidising installation of water saving
devices in existing homes; the Basix requirements directed towards water use
reduction in new homes; leakage reduction programmes; mandatory labelling of
water efficiency on appliances; development of a ‘Smart Water Mark’ for
household garden plants, equipment and design; community education; pricing
reform for water supplied to Sydney’s urban users; and the introduction of water
use reforms in the agricultural sector of the greater Sydney area (including water
trading)



protect the environment by environmental flow releases from dams or by means of
replacement flows of recycled water; improvement of river and catchment health;
planning regulations to ensure that developments in the catchments do not
adversely impact on water quality; and reduced nutrient discharge through
licensing conditions, pollution offset schemes, recycling and stormwater
management



develop a Water Sharing Plan under the WMA 2000 for the greater Sydney area.

The proposed ‘Sydney Metropolitan Water Sharing Plan’ would
secure the share of the water available for urban and rural consumption as well as
protect the new environmental flow regimes and provide a legal framework for the
implementation of many of the measures approved under [the MWP 2004].28

The soft law plan was to be the dominant mechanism. The statutory plan would
provide framework to implement some of the measures approved in that soft law plan.
The MWP 2004 anticipated that the Water Sharing Plan would provide an effective,
enforceable means to modify the behaviour of the water users of the greater Sydney
area to produce the desired outcomes sought in the soft law plan. The statutory plan
was to be based on the results of community consultations undertaken by the
28

Ibid 25. The MWP 2006, above n 5, refers more generally to ‗a water sharing plan for the Sydney Region‘: at 108
(emphasis added).
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Hawkesbury-Nepean River Management Forum and ‘this work’ was to be completed
by the CMAs through targeted community ‘discussions’.29
Keeping in mind that the MWP 2004 was a policy document and not a statutory plan, it
is important to note the reference here to the involvement of a ‘targeted’ part of the
community in the development of the proposed Water Sharing Plan simply by way of
‘discussions’. Perhaps this was a portent of things to come. The MWP 2004 paid lip
service to the notion of community consultation in a way that contrasted markedly
with the intent of the WMA 2000 to involve the community in planning though water
management committees appointed under the WMA 2000.30
Without the support of a rigorous implementation framework, the MWP 2004 left a lot
to be desired when measured against the water planning objectives of the NWI and
the mechanisms for planning available under the framework of the WMA 2000.
Nevertheless it did set ‘all feasible water supply options … on the table’ for
consideration within a context that at least professed to be striving to make Sydney a
sustainable and water sensitive city. It planned beyond the confines of traditional rainfed water sources that were managed under legislative regimes.
Strategy 2000 had called for progress on the implementation of the Strategy to be
monitored and reported once in three years.31 Similarly, the 2004 Ministerial
Statement indicated that a Water Innovation Council, to be established in delivering
the third phase of the reforms, would report to the NSW Government by 30 June 2005
on progress with the implementation.32 Research endeavours have been unable to find
evidence of any of these reports on the public record. Perhaps events overtook these
review ambitions. Whether or not they were delivered is unclear. However, there was
to be a frantic series of reviews and reports to come, culminating in a reincarnation of
the MWP 2004 as the MWP 2006. It arguably took another step along the way to
integrated urban water cycle management but the signposts leading the way were far
from clear.

29

MWP 2004, above n 6, 25.
The water management planning provisions of the WMA 2000 are discussed in Chapter 7. The way those
provisions have been applied to prepare water sharing plans for the Sydney Region is examined in Chapter 8.
31
Strategy 2000, above n 7, 34.
32
2004 Ministerial Statement, above n 19, 5.
30
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9.4

An unexpected Audit

In May 2005 the NSW Auditor-General released the report Planning for Sydney’s Water
Needs (‘Audit Report’), on progress made by water agencies to ensure a reliable water
supply for Sydney.33 The Foreword to the Audit Report refers to the Government’s
‘major responsibility’ to reliably supply water to Sydney and its ‘vital task’ of planning
for the future in the face of a range of uncertainties. The audit examined the adequacy
of arrangements that SWC, Sydney Catchment Authority (‘SCA’) and the NSW
Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources had in place to ensure a
reliable supply of water to meet metropolitan water requirements.
The audit was undertaken at a time when security of supply was becoming an
increasingly urgent issue as the population of Sydney watched dam levels drop at an
alarming rate.34 However, the Audit Report stressed that it was addressing long-term
requirements for water and not measures designed to bridge the gap between supply
and demand.35
The release of the MWP 2004 while Audit Report investigations were being undertaken
was perhaps fortuitous. The Audit Report became a critical appraisal of the approach
taken by the government under the MWP 2004 – a baptism by fire indeed.36
The ‘efficiency, effectiveness and economy’37 of initiatives in place to secure Sydney’s
water supply were assessed in the Audit Report against several objectives grouped
under three headings: Planning for water security; Identifying and managing the risks;
and Ensuring oversight and accountability. Some of the more general observations
made in the Audit Report in relation to the MWP 2004 are explored in the following
discussion.

33

Audit Report, above n 1. The Audit Report presents the findings of a performance audit conducted under Part 3,
Division 2A of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 (NSW). Topics for performance audits may arise from a
number of sources including research on emerging issues. Performance audits cannot question the merits of policy
objectives of the Government: at 64.
34
For a graphic representation of changing dam storage levels in the Sydney Region from January 1998 to
11 November 2010 see: Sydney Catchment Authority (12 November 2010) <http://www.sca.nsw.gov.au/dams-andwater/weekly-storage-and-supply-reports/2010/11-november-2010> .
35
Audit Report, above n 1, 2.
36
Ibid 20. The Audit Report states that:
In 2004 the Government identified and assessed a set of actions to close the gap [between water supply and
demand] by both reducing demand and increasing supply. The result was summarised in a document
Metropolitan Water Plan 2004: Meeting the challenges – Securing Sydney‘s water future. The document
was released in October 2004, during the course of our audit.
37
Ibid 61.
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When addressing the issue of water planning, the Audit Report acknowledged the
requirement for development in NSW to be ecologically sustainable, an objective that
had been introduced into environmental legislation in 1991 and incorporated into soft
law planning for the Sydney Region from 2000.38 The application of the precautionary
principle, one of the principles of Ecologically Sustainable Development (‘ESD’) to
water resource management adopted in the Audit Report postulated that ‘if there is a
serious risk of environmental damage because of a proposed extraction of water, the
decision should ensure that the environment is protected’.39 However it stressed
perhaps somewhat pragmatically, given the thrust of the rest of the report, that the
principles of ESD ‘also *apply] to a serious risk of failure of public water supply, which
would be unacceptable in terms of its social and economic impacts’.40
ESD was a constant theme through the policies of Strategy 2000 and the 2004
Ministerial Statement. However, the Audit Report did not assess progress with
implementation of the principles of ESD as a specific element in water management
planning for Sydney’s water supply. The principle was recognised in a statement of
‘policy context’41 but only addressed throughout the Audit Report in relation to
sustainable use and sustainability. It is arguable that these are merely references to
‘sustainability of supply’ in the sense of securing continuous supply, by virtue of its
relevance to the social and economic wellbeing of the population, rather than the
more lofty restatement of the principle espousing protection of the environment. The
Audit Report’s extension of the ambit of the principles of ESD to circumstances of
supply failure perhaps provided a foundation for a more pragmatic examination of
processes in place to secure Sydney’s water supply than might otherwise have been
the case.
Having noted the multiplicity of agencies involved in meeting Sydney’s water needs,
the Audit Report listed documents that were to deliver integrated urban water cycle
planning in Sydney.42 The report concluded with the observation that:

38

See previous discussion in this chapter of Strategy 2000 and the 2004 Ministerial Statement.
Audit Report, above n 1, 24.
40
Ibid 24.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid 16, 39. The MWP 2004 was amongst the 13 documents listed in the Audit Report, and the list was expressly
non-exhaustive.
39
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The Metropolitan Water Plan 2004 needs to be interpreted in the context of a range of
other plans and policies, including a number that are still to be developed. Compared
to water plans we have seen developed for other major cities, the Plan is relatively
brief and focused on actions to close a gap in supply and demand.
There is a need to continue to develop and integrate the planning for Sydney’s water
supply, preferably in one readily accessible set of documents.43

In relation to the issues of accountability and transparency the Audit Report
comments:
The Metropolitan Water Plan 2004 contains little planning or implementation detail.
The Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources is to monitor
overall implementation of the actions contained in the Plan.
IPART is looking at the inclusion of various targets for water efficiency, recycling and
leakage-reduction in *Sydney Water’s+ Operating Licence. But we could find no overall
performance-reporting framework to monitor the various components of Sydney’s
water supply and demand, so as to ensure an efficient and effective balance is
maintained.44

The issue of accountability was addressed in the Audit Report in the context of the
1994 COAG Water Reform Framework which had called for specific institutional
reforms including the development of administrative arrangements and decisionmaking processes to ensure an integrated approach to natural resource management.
It had also sought separation of the roles of water resource management, standard
setting and regulatory enforcement and service provision. Metropolitan water service
providers were to be commercially focused whether by contracting out of services, or
corporatisation or privatisation of entities.45
The Audit Report recommended that a review of the legislative and organisational
arrangements relating to Sydney’s water supply/demand balance should be
undertaken to ‘further clarify and formalise’ accountability for the oversight of the

43

Ibid 40.
Ibid 54.
45
See discussion above in Chapter 6.4 on page 119.
44
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balancing arrangements; responsibility for ensuring supply; and arrangements to
facilitate the involvement of the private sector in recycling.46
As to the issue of transparency, the Audit Report was scathing in its remarks:
Public consultation and transparency associated with the preparation of the
Metropolitan Water Plan 2004 have been limited. This can be attributed in part to the
urgent need to develop measures to counter Sydney’s falling water supply in serious
drought.
Material supporting the Metropolitan Water Plan 2004, the assumptions made and the
basis for decisions has not been publicly released. We were advised that the
Metropolitan Water Senior Executives Committee kept an action list but no minutes of
its meetings. The latter would generally be expected, especially to comply with the
State Records Act 1998.47

The Audit Report recommended the implementation of a ‘greater level of engagement’
of the public in the development of demand management strategies; the reliability of
water supply; water pricing and the appropriate balance between demand and supplyside options. The actions called for were to include the release of an information
paper on these issues and the public release of the documents supporting the
Metropolitan Water Plan 2004 and its periodic review. 48
9.5

Further and better reviews?

The Audit Report was the first of several reviews of the MWP 2004.
In February 2006, ACIL Tasman and others presented a Review of the Metropolitan
Water Plan (‘ACIL Tasman Review’)49 to the NSW Cabinet Office as part of an overall
review of the MWP 2004. Also in February 2006, a progress report on the MWP 2004
was released to the public by the Premier of NSW (‘MWP 2004 Progress Report’).50
46

Audit Report, above n 1, 56.
Ibid 57. This statement anticipates the National Water Commission‘s concerns that emerged in the Second
Biennial Assessment: that drought contingency planning was ad hoc and lacked transparency and could affect the
security of water entitlements that in NSW were created under the WMA 2000: see National Water Commission,
Australian Water Reform 2009 Second Biennial Assessment of Progress in Implementation of the National Water
Initiative, (National Water Commission, Canberra, September 2009), vii; and see discussion about the exercise of
Ministerial discretion in water planning in the Sydney Region above in Chapters 7 and 8.
48
Audit Report, above n 1, 58.
49
University of Technology Sydney Institute for Sustainable Futures, ACIL Tasman and SMEC Australia, ‗Review
of the Metropolitan Water Plan‘ (Report Forming Part of a Review of the Metropolitan Water Plan for the NSW
Cabinet Office, February 2006)(‗ACIL Tasman Review‘).
50
Water for Life (NSW), ‗Securing Sydney‘s Water Supply Metropolitan Water Plan‘ (Progress Report, February
2006) (‗MWP 2004 Progress Report‘).
47
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In April 2006 the Review of the Metropolitan Water Plan: Final Report (‘ACIL Tasman
Final Report’) was released.51
The covering letter presenting the ACIL Tasman Review to the NSW Cabinet Office
stated that ‘*the+ report reaches some strong conclusions – with substantial
implications for the strategy’ adopted in the MWP 2004.52 The ACIL Tasman Review
began with an optimistic assessment of the likely impact of ‘changes’ that had taken
place since the introduction of the MWP 2004, referring to progress with the
identification of new groundwater reserves, increased recycling, and investment in
desalination studies and water savings measures. In particular, the ACIL Tasman
Review highlighted the increase in dam levels in the Sydney Region from ‘a low of 38%
in June 2004 to 45% in February 2006 with an 80% likelihood that dam levels will rise in
the next 12 months’, also acknowledging the improvement in supply system
modelling.53
According to the report, the success of those measures meant that the immediate
threat from drought to Sydney’s water supply was manageable. However, the
situation from 2015 was not so secure. In the period from 2015 to 2030 decisions on
environmental flow releases contemplated under the MWP 2004 were to be taken,
with the expected effect of reducing supply availability. The report suggested that
increased supplies from the Shoalhaven, increased recycling and desalination were
supply augmentation options available to meet possible changes in the supply/demand
balance. However, concluding that there was a very low probability that storages in
the Sydney region would reach levels required to trigger the construction of a
desalination plant ‘in the next four years – and even in the next ten to fifteen years’,54
the ACIL Tasman Review recommended that construction of a desalination plant
should be deferred, provided that a plant could be brought on-stream with a 26 month
lead time if necessary. 55

51

University of Technology Sydney Institute for Sustainable Futures, ACIL Tasman and SMEC Australia, ‗Review
of the Metropolitan Water Plan‘ (Final Report to the NSW Cabinet Office, April 2006) (‗ACIL Tasman Final
Report‘).
52
ACIL Tasman Review, above n 49, covering letter, 1.
53
Ibid 8. Note that the prediction with regard to rising dam levels in the ensuing 12 months is attributed to the
Sydney Catchment Authority: at para 1.1a.
54
Ibid 5.
55
Ibid 16-18. The ACIL Tasman Review looked at the role to be played by desalination in the overall scheme of
securing Sydney‘s water supply, including its role in the demand/supply balance. It was essentially treated as a
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The ACIL Tasman Review concluded that:
There is ample time to consider these needs and options in detail and determine the
best long-term strategy which meets the needs of the community at the lowest
economic, environmental and social cost. There is also an opportunity to ensure that
there is an appropriate level of community engagement in the decision making process,
commensurate with the importance of these decisions.56

The Premier’s Message in the MWP 2004 Progress Report acknowledged the authors
of the ‘new, independent analysis’ of the strategy being implemented under the MWP
2004:
Their advice gives me confidence that Sydney is now in a position to secure its water
supplies in the face of severe drought – and even potential climate change impacts –
and has more than enough water to meet its normal growth needs for at least the next
10 years.57

The MWP 2004 Progress Report delivered two popular messages to the voters of the
Sydney Region: firstly, the Government had decided not to proceed with any
immediate and significant modifications to the Shoalhaven Transfers Scheme which
was to include raising the Tallowa Dam wall and secondly, it had decided not to
proceed with construction of the desalination plant, although work would continue so
that construction could commence at short notice if required.58
The Executive Summary included in the ACIL Tasman Final Report outlined the
assumptions behind the analysis in the report:

possible trade-off for the imposition of high level water restrictions in times of extreme drought – events which had
specific trigger points related to the level of supply available in storages. Level IV restrictions would be imposed if
dam levels fell below 35% and Level V restrictions below 25%. The ACIL Tasman Review noted that, based on
simulation modelling, the probability that Level IV restrictions would be invoked in the following 10 years was about
2.5%, and for Level V restrictions, about 1.15%, and in reality the long run probability of these restrictions being put
in place was much lower. The ability to bring desalination on line is a short lead time would provide the buffer
necessary to fill the supply gap if high level restrictions were removed from the suite of management options. The
report also suggested that there might be scope for a trade-off against low level restrictions as well.
56
Ibid 7. Despite this optimistic outlook and the improvements in modelling methods, available supply actually fell
from a high of 44.6% on 2 February 2006 to a low of 33.9% on 8 February 2007, and this was after the increase
attributed to accessing deep water supplies in the dams of the catchment in April 2006. Although Level IV
restrictions were not put in place, the prediction was certainly wide of the mark – and certainly not a basis for
decision-making that would be conducive to sustainable management of the Sydney Region‘s water resources. The
Sydney Catchment Authority reported on the expanded storage level achieved through deep water access in the Bulk
Water Storage and Supply Report dated 20 April 2006: (For historical dam storage levels see diagram referred to
above n 34).
57
MWP 2004 Progress Report, above n 50, 1.
58
Ibid 10, 13-14. See discussion of the Shoalhaven Transfers Scheme: at 10; and Desalination – Securing our Water
Supply: at 13-14.
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We have assumed that the objectives of the Metropolitan Water Plan remain
unchanged – ensuring adequate supply to meet demand through the current drought
and forward at least 25 years, and contributing to improved environmental outcomes.
We have also worked with the assumption that these objectives are to be pursued
with an eye to community acceptability and cost-effectiveness, inclusive of
environment and user, as well as water supplier costs.59

Given those assumptions it appeared that ongoing water supply security would be
achieved in a manner that would keep everybody happy. The ACIL Tasman Final
Report explored the supply and demand initiatives instigated under the MWP 2004,
making recommendations in relation to those initiatives and advocating investigation
of other options including scarcity-based pricing, and indirect potable reuse thus
placing all options on the table. It also advocated an adaptive management strategy
which could respond to changes in a number of variables, such as dam levels and
demand patterns, at the same time taking into account the relative costs of the
different response measures. The report was heavily weighted towards economic
considerations. Adaptive management was defined in terms of the benefits which
would accrue from implementation of a range of supply and demand measures ‘while
minimising the risks associated with unnecessary or unnecessarily early investment in
high cost measures.’60
The notion of adaptive management adopted in the ACIL Tasman Final Report differed
from that in the Audit Report. The Audit Report distinguished ‘adaptive management’
from ‘adaptive capacity’:
‘Adaptive management’ commonly means that the state of the system and the
impacts of changes are monitored and assessed to ensure continual movement toward
desired performance. It does not generally involve risk assessment, which facilitates
pre-emptive action. Therefore ‘adaptive management’ is not a term generally used to
address unexpected or unforeseen changes or shocks to the system. However, a
system that has ‘adaptive capacity’ has the ability to absorb such shocks and stresses
without major disturbance to its functioning. Highly adaptive systems have
redundancy, multiple operational pathways and are not generally operating to full
capacity. This suggests that a method of assessing and quantifying the ‘adaptive
59
60

ACIL Tasman Final Report, above n 51, 5.
Ibid 13.
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capacity’ of the complete system, its function and the controls that act upon it
(physical, procedural, economic, legislative and social) is needed to ensure
sustainability.61

Adaptive management, as the term was used in the ACIL Tasman Report, would be
more concerned with responses to changing circumstances than with the way
decisions were made in response to change, but in that context the report captured
the reader’s attention with a forceful statement:
With explicit recognition of the need to manage high levels of uncertainty, and with
the move toward reduced reliance on dam supplies and the likelihood of increased
private involvement in supply and wastewater management, there is a strong case for
ensuring that the institutional arrangements for formal planning and accountability
can deal with these developments.
Responsibility for adequacy of supply, including overseeing the implementation of the
various components of the Metropolitan Water Plan itself, should be allocated to a
body or bodies with the power to pursue the objective both cost effectively and with a
view to ensuring decisions are optimal for the system as a whole. There is a continuing
need for a high-level coordinating body to tap into the substantial expertise currently
held by key agencies and ensure continuing investment in the information needed to
support adaptive management efficiently.62

Although deficiencies in the MWP 2004 were identified in the Audit Report, successful
progress with implementation was quantified in the ACIL Tasman Review and
embraced in the MWP 2004 Progress Report. Recommendations for changes to the
strategy outlined in the MWP 2004 were set out in the ACIL Tasman Review and
adopted by the Government in the MWP 2004 Progress Report. Notably, there was no
reference in the ACIL Tasman Review or in the MWP 2004 Progress Report to the
findings and recommendations of the Audit Report. The ACIL Tasman Final Report did
address a number of the matters raised in the Audit Report – the need for adaptive
capacity if a system is to be able to respond to external shocks, the need to plan for
worst-case scenarios, and multi unit metering – indicating that initiatives had been, or

61
62

Audit Report, above n 1, 49.
ACIL Tasman Final Report, above n 51, 10.
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were recommended to be, put in place to accommodate the concerns raised in the
audit.63
On one level it could be argued that water management planning for the Sydney
Region was being conducted by review. On another level, the flexibility afforded by
planning through statements of policy rather than under the guidance of a formal
statutory water management plan was abundantly clear.
Although the expectation was that the MWP 2004 would be reviewed every five years,
the MWP 2004 Progress Report of February 2006 foreshadowed the release of the
2006 Metropolitan Water Plan in March 2006 (MWP 2006). The first metropolitan
water plan setting out strategies for water use and supply for the next 25 years had
survived only 16 months.
9.6

The Metropolitan Water Plan 2006

The Metropolitan Water Plan 2006 (‘MWP 2006’)64 built on strategies already
progressed under Strategy 2000, the 2004 Ministerial Statement and the MWP 2004
and formalised many of the announcements made in the MWP 2004 Progress Report.
Authorship of the plan was indeterminate – at best it could be attributed to the ‘NSW
Government’. 65
Like its predecessor, the MWP 2006 was not a formal planning instrument and there
was no delineation of the area to which it applied. It was a statement of NSW
Government policy outlining measures designed to secure Sydney’s water needs over
the next 25 years and its implementation was spread across a number of portfolios and
regulatory authorities.66 It was soft law.
By way of introduction, the publication explained how water is captured, stored,
treated and distributed to users in Sydney. The measured amount of water used in
Sydney and the nature of it use were documented. The factors that were taken into

63

Ibid 40, 44, 59.
MWP 2006, above n 5. The MWP 2006 is available for download from the Water for Life website
<http://www.waterforlife.nsw.gov.au> as a PDF file of 11Mb with numerous coloured graphics. The MWP 2004 was
a more modest production of only 26 pages.
65
Ibid. No authorship is directly attributed in the MWP 2006. The cover of the plan bears the logo of ‗Water for
Life‘ and is annotated as ‗A water plan from the NSW Government‘.
66
Ibid 120. The NSW Government agencies involved in the implementation of the MWP 2006, and their areas of
responsibility are listed in section 10.1 of the MWP 2006. There have been departmental reorganisations since the
plan was produced. Although the names have changed, the overall distribution of responsibilities is mostly the same.
64
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consideration in formulating the MWP 2006 were set out. The initiatives already in
place under the MWP 2004 were reviewed. The approach proposed under the MWP
2006 to adapt to changing circumstances, and to accommodate issues raised in
reviews and reports which preceded its release, was promoted. Not surprisingly,
central to the proposals set out in the MWP 2006 was the emerging notion of
‘adaptive management’- ‘having the capacity to respond to circumstances as they
change, taking advantage of new information and technologies as they emerge, and
avoiding costs by deferring investment until it is needed’.67
The Water for Life website, the principal internet portal for information on the MWP
2006, addressed the initiatives of the MWP 2006 under five headings: dams, recycling,
desalination, water efficiency, and rivers and catchments.68 This simplicity belied the
complexity of the plan itself but reflected the categorisation of the activities adopted
in a progress report completed in 2008 (‘MWP 2008 Progress Report’).69
Traditional rain-fed sources of water supply for the Sydney Region were to be
augmented under the MWP 2006 proposals by accessing previously unused reserves of
deep water in dams and untapped groundwater supplies; recycling wastewater70;
treating seawater for use as drinking water; and, increasing transfers from the
Shoalhaven River into the Sydney supply system.71 Water efficiency measures already
in place under previous initiatives continued under the MWP 2006 and were
67

Ibid 121. The discussion of adaptive management in Chapter 10 of the plan bears a striking resemblance to that in
the ACIL Tasman Final Report, above n 51. The illustration of the features of an adaptive management approach on
page 121 is in fact reproduced from page 7 of the ACIL Tasman Final Report but not accredited to it. The definition
of ‗adaptive management‘ offered in the MWP 2006 reinforces the usage of the term in the ACIL Tasman Report and
almost denies the existence of an alternative meaning. Adaptive management now seems to be all about meeting
demand for water in the Sydney Region, the adaptability indeed being the capability to respond to the unexpected.
68
Water for Life (5 August 2009) <http://www.waterforlife.nsw.gov.au>. It was somewhat disturbing to note that
the motto associated with the MWP 2006 initiatives in December 2009 was ‗Water4Life‘ promoting the four elements
of ‗Dams+Recycling+Desalination+Water Efficiency‘. It seems that the environment and river health did not fit the
motto. The web page has been through many revisions since, and includes a tab for ‗water for life‘ that covers water
for people and the environment. But the motto remains ‗Water4Life‘.
69
Department of Water and Energy (NSW), ‗Metropolitan Water Plan 2008 Progress Report‘ (January 2009) (‗MWP
2008 Progress Report‘), 34-35.
70
MWP 2006, above n 5, IV. The MWP 2006 emphasised the role of recycling in securing Sydney‘s future water
needs, and dealt with it as a separate element of the plan. A goal was set in the MWP 2006 to recycle 70 billion litres
by 2015 (12% of Sydney‘s estimated water needs), a contribution comparable to the total targeted supply
augmentation from groundwater (7 billion litres), desalination (30 billion litres) and deep water resources (40 billion
litres). At the end of the 1907–08 year the contribution was less than half the 2015 target: see MWP 2008 Progress
Report, above n 69, 14. Regulation applying to certain recycling initiatives in the Sydney Region is examined below
in Chapter 10.
71
Work undertaken by the Sydney Catchment Authority at Warragamba, Nepean and Avon Dams has enabled the
pumping of previously inaccessible water supplies at the bottom of these dams. New pumps have also been installed
at Prospect Reservoir so that the water in the reservoir can be used as additional supply if necessary. The effect of
these initiatives has been to increase water availability for the Sydney Region in the long term by 40 GL per year – or
about 7% of Sydney‘s predicted water needs.
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expanded.72 The potential for private sector participation in the delivery of water
services was also an element of the plan to promote competition – an important
element of the water reforms of the 1990s. The Water Industry Competition Act 2006
(NSW) (‘WICA 2006’) was NSW’s response to this objective.73
Importantly, realisation of the environmental objectives of the MWP 2006 relied on
the preparation of statutory Water Sharing Plans to secure environmental water needs
for the Sydney Region.74
The MWP 2006 also provided for the development of regulatory and institutional
arrangements to support its objectives.75 Status reports were to be prepared by the
Government each year, with a major review of the plan to be undertaken every four
years to produce a new Metropolitan Water Plan.76 The following section examines
how implementation of the MWP 2006 is being monitored in view of the criticisms
leveled at the processes associated with the development and implementation of the
MWP 2004 in the Audit Report.
9.7

An Independent Review Panel and more reviews

In December 2006 the NSW Government announced the establishment of an
‘Independent Review Panel to provide expert advice and monitor progress of the
Metropolitan Water Plan’ (‘Independent Review Panel’).77 The original Independent
Review Panel was Chaired by Professor Peter Cullen and consisted of five other
members. No statement has been found on the public record about how the

72

MWP 2006, above n 5, Ch 6. Water efficiency measures included the Water Efficiency Labelling and Standards
Scheme at the domestic level; Water Savings Action Plans with industry, businesses and government; and supporting
pricing reforms to introduce a two-tiered pricing structure with higher prices for higher water usage as a means of
reducing demand.
73
Arguably, the goals for creating a dynamic and competitive water industry set out in the MWP 2006 have been
achieved with the introduction of the Water Industry Competition Act 2006 (NSW) although the impact of this
initiative on providing a secure and sustainable water supply for the Sydney Region is yet to be realised. Uptake of
opportunities to enter the water supply and services sector has been limited since the introduction of the legislation:
see discussion below in Part IV.
74
Environmental water as a component of water sharing plans under the statutory planning framework of the WMA
2000 is discussed below in Chapter 7. The development of water sharing plans for the surface and groundwater
sources of the Sydney region is discussed below in Chapter 8.
75
It may be open to question whether the MWP 2006 would, or could, be a ‗drought management strategy‘ in the
circumstances contemplated by section 60(3)(iii) of the WMA 2000. Other supporting measures are set out in MWP
2006, above n 5 Chs 9, 10.
76
MWP 2006, above n 5, [10.3], 122. Progress Reports were produced for 2007 (Department of Water and Energy
(NSW), ‗Metropolitan Water Plan 2007 Progress Report‘ (September 2007)) (‗MWP 2007 Progress Report‘) and
2008 (MWP 2008 Progress Report, above n 69).
77
Water for Life (NSW) Metropolitan Water Independent Review Panel (12 November 2010)
<http://www.waterforlife.nsw.gov.au/mwp/independent_review_panel> (‗Independent Review Panel‘).
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Independent Review Panel was selected, its terms of reference, its procedures or its
accountability.
The Independent Review Panel reported to the Premier in December 200678 and the
two progress reports since then relating to the MWP 2006 contained ‘comments’ from
the Independent Review Panel.79
The Premier’s introduction to the Metropolitan Water Plan 2007 Progress Report
noted that the MWP 2006 would be reviewed by the Independent Review Panel every
year, and the Premier’s introduction to the Metropolitan Water Plan 2008 Progress
Report (‘MWP 2008 Progress Report’) advised that ‘independent experts have
reviewed this report and agree we’re on track’. Presumably the independent experts
referred to by the Premier were the Independent Review Panel members. The
‘comments’ of the Independent Review Panel in the relevant progress reports are the
only public records that have been found by this author of reviews conducted by the
Independent Review Panel. There have not been regular releases of information from
the Independent Review Panel and indeed it is not obvious how it operates.
The 2007 and 2008 progress reports on the MWP 2006 contained tabulated
summaries of progress with actions under the plan, helpfully indicating against each
action whether it had been completed, or was ‘on track’ or delayed.80 According to
the MWP 2008 Progress Report only three actions remained ‘delayed’: the
implementation of metering and water use monitoring of irrigators, development of
reasonable use guidelines for domestic and stock use of river water and groundwater,
and development of metropolitan Water Sharing Plans. The first two items had been
highlighted as ‘delayed’ in the 2007 Progress Report, but the development of
metropolitan Water Sharing Plans was assessed to be on track at that time.
Two draft Water Sharing Plans for the Greater Metropolitan Region were released for
public exhibition on 7 June 2010: the Draft Water Sharing Plan: Greater Metropolitan
Region unregulated river water sources Order 2010 and the Draft Water Sharing Plan:
Greater Metropolitan Region groundwater sources Order 2010. A system for water use
78

Letter from the Metropolitan Water Independent Review Panel to the Premier of NSW, 8 December 2006
<http://www.waterforlife.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/4844/061208WaterPaneltoPremier.pdf>.
79
MWP 2007 Progress Report, above n 76, and MWP 2008 Progress Report, above n 69, 2.
80
MWP 2007 Progress Report, above n 76, 24-25; MWP 2008 Progress Report, above n 69, 34-35.
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metering and monitoring of all irrigators across the Sydney Region was not complete
when the Draft Orders were published. To accommodate the absence of measured
data the Draft Orders use volumes related to existing licensed extractions under the
Water Act 1912 (NSW) (‘WA 1912’) for unregulated river water sources and estimates
of groundwater recharge for groundwater sources to determine water sharing rules in
the Draft Orders.81 The Draft Orders anticipate reasonable use guidelines for basic
landholder extractions – but there is no indication in the Draft Orders when they will
be released or how they will be prepared.82
9.8

An update for 2010

Again, it was time for a review of the MWP 2006. The NSW Government was to
update the plan ‘to factor in new information such as population growth projections
and potential impacts from climate change’.83 As foreshadowed in the MWP 2006, the
Independent Review Panel would indeed be involved in considering how community
views could be integrated into ongoing planning to secure Sydney’s water future and
overseeing the process for updating the MWP 2006, including community consultation.
84

The Independent Review Panel was involved in two phases of community

consultation ‘to involve the community in updating the long-term plan for Sydney’s
water future’.85
The objective of the Phase 1 community consultation was to identify what the
community considered to be high priorities in water planning. Three key values
emerged:


Having a safe and dependable water supply for homes



Considering the needs of future generations in decision-making and planning
water use



Ensuring human needs for water are balanced with those of the environment.86

81

Office of Water (NSW), Draft Water Sharing Plan Greater Metropolitan Region Groundwater Sources: Order
(May 2010) (‗Draft Groundwater Order‘) cl 19(2); Office of Water (NSW), Draft Water Sharing Plan Greater
Metropolitan Region Unregulated River Water Sources: Order (June 2010) (‗Draft Rivers Order‘) cl 11(1)(e), 27(7).
82
The Reasonable Use Guidelines are discussed below in Chapter 10.3.1 on page 213.
83
Water for Life (NSW), Updating the plan (25 October 2009)
<http://www.waterforlife.nsw.gov.au/about/plan/updatingtheplan>.
84
MWP 2006, above n 5, 122.
85
Ibid.
86
Water for Life, Community input phase 1 (25 October 2009)
<http://www.waterforlife.nsw.gov.au/about/plan/community_input _phase_1>. In the Metropolitan Water Plan 2010
the last of these key values has been amplified by the Government to emphasise the balance: when it comes to people
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The results of the first phase were to be used ‘in conjunction with economic and
environmental analyses of options to develop the most appropriate and balanced mix
of measures for securing Sydney’s water supply for the long term.’87
The objective of Phase 2 of the community input was not clear. The Water for Life
website informed that:
The objective is to reflect on the outcomes of phase 1 and identify the community’s
preferred portfolios of measures to be included in the 2010 Plan. This approach will
seek to establish planning principles for the Plan and then identify preferred portfolios
in light of these agreed principles.88

The full report on the outcomes of phase 1 consultation indicated that 104 valid
responses were received from an online survey; the eight community workshops
conducted attracted a total of 219 people; and representatives of local councils,
catchment management authorities, industry groups, human service groups, water
users and water recreation peak bodies were included in two stakeholder workshops.
Phase 2 consultation would be different:
Due to the technical and complex nature of the water supply portfolios, workshops will
be held with informed community members and stakeholders.89

Phase 2 consultation involved the community in discussion around the proposed
supply and demand management options for the new plan. 90 Perhaps one of the most
significant outcomes from the consultation process was the development of the
following seven community planning principles that are to underpin the way the new
plan is delivered:


Provide water that is affordable and safe to drink.



Ensure enough water to meet both environmental and human needs – one not
more important than the other.



Ensure a dependable long-term water supply for current and future generations.

and the environment, one is not more important than the other: Office of Water (NSW), 2010 Metropolitan Water
Plan (August 2010), 47. See also discussion above in Chapter 8.10 on page 166.
87
Water for Life (NSW), Community input phase 1 (25 October 2009)
<http://www.waterforlife.nsw.gov.au/about/plan/community_input _phase_1>.
88
Water for Life (NSW), Community input phase 2 (25 October 2009)
<http://www.waterforlife.nsw.gov.au/about/plan/community_input _phase_2>.
89
Ibid.
90
Office of Water (NSW), 2010 Metropolitan Water Plan, (August 2010) (‗MWP 2010‘) 21.
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Maximise water efficiency and recycling, especially capturing stormwater and
invest in research and innovation.



Restore clean healthy waterways and ensure health of catchments by reducing
pollution.



Ensure government and community take joint responsibility for water
management.



Share water – taking into consideration all relevant sectors and regions.91

The environment and the community will be vying for water – on an equal footing.
Interestingly, the final principle set out above embodies Fisher’s view of integrated
resource management – that resources should be managed on an inter-sectoral basis
and in relation to location.92 Perhaps soft law will deliver integrated urban water cycle
management more effectively than the hard law water management framework has
been able to do under the constraints imposed on it by that very same soft law.
The 2010 Metropolitan Water Plan (‘MWP 2010’) was released in September 2010.
Unlike its predecessors it was developed in a spirit of engagement with the community
and in association with a formal and impressively orchestrated consultative process.
The community has had its say in the contents of the plan and how it will be
implemented. There will be little comeback now if implementation does not go the
way those who participated in the process intended. However, as were its
predecessors, it is a soft law instrument amenable to change. It has no statutory
backing – it may even be an electoral casualty if (or more likely when) the political
composition of the NSW Government changes at the State election in early 2011.
9.9

Discussion

The MWP 2006 was not statute-based. It was a statement of policy, and potentially
changeable according to perceived electoral contingencies of the day. The process of
its preparation was not transparent, and there was no effective mechanism
incorporated into the plan to make government accountable for its performance under
the plan.

91

Ibid 20. The community planning principles were ‗developed from the findings of Stage 1 consultation and
validated during Phase 2‘.
92
See discussion in Chapter 4.4 on page 69.
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The discussion in this chapter has not focused on the technical details or relative
merits of the initiatives pursued in response to the MWP 2006 and its policy
predecessors, or on the success or failure of each initiative in reaching its predicted
goal. The manner in which those instruments were devised and how they have been
implemented, particularly the MWP 2006, give rise to issues of transparency,
accountability and community engagement. The development of the MWP 2010
incorporated community participation in the process – arguably with more positive
outcomes than the consultation that was associated with the development of draft
Water Sharing Plans for the Sydney Region. Nevertheless, issues of transparent
procedures and effective community engagement continue to be the primary focus of
discussion. The job is far from done although the NSW Government seems to be
moving towards a more inclusive – if somewhat formulaic and orchestrated –
administrative process in relation to soft law at least.
The chapters that follow reveal a pattern of management that shows a negative side of
adaptive management, one which facilitates changes in direction by government with
little if any prior democratic process. The MWP 2006 and now the MWP 2010, both
soft law instruments, set overarching water management policy for the Sydney Region.
Management of the natural water sources of the region is only one aspect of that
overarching policy and one which is arguably subordinate to the objective of securing
water supply for the Sydney Region. Integrated urban water cycle management for
the Sydney Region invoking statutory planning mechanisms languishes, an option
rejected by the Government – at least for the time being.
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Chapter 10: Putting Plans into Practice
Effective consultation is time-consuming and resource hungry…[but it] will always remain
critical to improving water management.1

10.1

Introduction

The Metropolitan Water Plan 2004 (‘MWP 2004’) recognised the importance of
partnering with the community:
The key to meeting Sydney’s water needs in the future is for the Government and the
community to share ownership of the problem and the solution.2

Two years later, among the initiatives in the Metropolitan Water Plan 2006 (‘MWP
2006’)3 designed to secure the Sydney Region’s future water needs there were some
that were more relevant to the residential sector than others – that relied on
community involvement for their implementation. The discussion in this chapter
outlines those initiatives and examines the regulatory responses to ensure public
health and safety when they are put in place – and thus facilitate their effective
implementation.
The development and use of soft law guidelines firstly to assist the community to
accept and implement domestic recycling projects, and secondly to encourage
sustainable use of water, are investigated. The use of language to disguise a statutory
water restriction is discussed as an example of how water savings measures are being
presented to the public in the form of user-friendly hard law.
A review of the decisions to proceed with the Kurnell desalination project and the
documentation associated with that undertaking in the next Chapter will illustrate the
legal complexities associated with this ambitious project.
Throughout the discussion here and in the following chapter, the processes associated
with the projects (including decisions to proceed with a major project, adaptation of

1

National Water Commission, ‗Progress on the National Water Initiative‘ (A Report to the Council of Australian
Governments, 1 June 2006) 10 (‗COAG Report‘) (with some license taken to edit a lengthy quotation).
2
Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources (NSW), Meeting the Challenges — Securing
Sydney‘s Water Future: The Metropolitan Water Plan 2004 (October 2004) (‗MWP 2004‘), 17.
3
Water for Life (NSW), 2006 Metropolitan Water Plan (April 2006) (‗MWP 2006‘).

Chapter 10: Putting Plans into Practice

201

regulations to meet new needs, and the engagement of the community in the
processes) are discussed. By providing an historical context for the various activities it
is possible to discern a pattern of administrative decision-making that is becoming
more and more immune from the traditional realms of administrative review.
10.2

A new source of water for the home: recycling

Although water recycling gained significant public support in Australia in the 2000s the
road to acceptance has not been a smooth one. Recycled water has been used to
water parks and gardens, for industrial purposes and for irrigations ‘for decades’. 4
However, many urban dwellers, including those in the Sydney Region, were surprised
to learn, mainly from media reporting of the ongoing debates of how best to secure
Sydney’s future water supply, that they have been the unwitting recipients of
‘unplanned’ indirect potable reuse water, and that they have been consuming water
containing wastewater discharged by upstream communities for many years.
Consumers’ opinions about using recycled water for drinking vary. In 2006 an Adelaide
survey, the first national survey of perceptions on using recycled water, reported that
42 per cent of the 2500 respondents expressed ‘moderate or great confidence’ about
drinking a mix of recycled and conventional water. Some 96.5% of the respondents
were willing to recycle water for household uses such as flushing toilets, watering
public parks, car washing and home gardens. In the same year, residents in
Toowoomba voted against a plan to top up their dwindling drinking water supplies
with recycled water.5
Bringing better science into augmentation of supply with recycled wastewater is a
major component of current recycling initiatives. Planned indirect potable reuse
involves the addition of highly treated wastewater into an existing drinking water
source such as a reservoir, river or aquifer. The recycled water is mixed with the stored
water to be extracted and treated in the usual processes prior to consumption.6
Guidelines developed under the National Water Initiative (‘NWI’) have incorporated

4

National Water Commission, Re-use & recycling (1 August 2008) <http://www.nwc.gov.au/www/html/196-reuse—recycling.asp?intSiteID-1>.
5
Verity Edwards, ‗Idea of recycled water getting easier to swallow‘, The Weekend Australian (Sydney), 2122 October 2006, The Nation 7.
6
The location of the various recycling initiatives in place in the Sydney Region is shown on Figure 10.1. Futher
information is available at Water for Life (NSW) <http://waterforlife.nsw.gov.au/>.
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the management of risks associated with potable reuse.7 Notably however, and
reflecting NSW Government policy of the day, the MWP 2006 excluded potable reuse
as an appropriate application for recycled water in the Sydney Region. That policy
remains in place. 8
The regulatory framework which provides for the construction, operation and
maintenance of wastewater treatment and distribution facilities in the Sydney Region
is made up of Commonwealth and State guidelines, legislation, codes of practice and
regulations. It covers several areas of law including water management planning, land
use planning, local council regulations, and the entry of the private sector into the
businesses of water supply and delivery. Various regulatory mechanisms in these
areas of law address issues concerning public health and safety and environmental
health, the provision of services, accreditation of new technology, licensing of network
operators and retail suppliers, access to water industry infrastructure, and pricing of
recycled water products. Regulation of water recycling in the Sydney Region as
embodied in this framework is an example of a regulatory response to needs, an
endeavour to meet changing circumstances quickly and appropriately. It is a mix of
hard and soft law regulatory mechanisms.
The following discussion outlines the main components of this framework, and how
they apply to wastewater treatment and reuse in the Sydney Region. It focuses on two
different opportunities for wastewater treatment in the Sydney Region: greywater
recycling at the domestic level, and large scale recycling of wastewater including
sewage and stormwater.
10.2.1 Managing health and environmental risks – the Australian guidelines
Commonwealth Government support for water recycling initiatives has played an
important part in the development of a national framework to ensure public health
and safety in the delivery of recycled water products in all sectors.
7

See Environment Protection and Heritage Council, National Health and Medical Research Council and Natural
Resource Management Ministerial Council, Australian Guidelines for Water Recycling: Managing health and
Environmental Risks: Augmentation of Drinking Water Supplies (National Water Quality Management Strategy,
Document No 22, May 2008) (‗ Augmentation Guidelines‘) .
8
Department of Water and Energy (NSW), ‗Metropolitan Water Plan 2008 Progress Report‘ (January 2009) (‗MWP
2008 Progress Report‘), 14: ‗The NSW Government considers that recycled water is inappropriate for some
purposes, including food processing…[T]he NSW Government‘s policy is to use recycled water for non-drinking
purposes, saving precious drinking water.‘ See also Office of Water NSW), 2010 Metropolitan Water Plan (August
2010) (‗MWP 2010‘), 27.
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Drinking water standards have been established by the application of national
guidelines for a long time. The most recent edition of the Australian Drinking Water
Guidelines (‘ADWG’) was issued in 2004. The ADWG adopted a risk management
approach used in the food industry through the application of the Hazard Analysis and
Critical Control Point System (‘HACCP’).9
In 2005 the Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council (‘NRMMC’) and the
Environment Protection and Heritage Council (‘EPHC’) commissioned an assessment of
the impact of development of national guidelines for managing the health and
environmental risks associated with water recycling. The report, prepared by Marsden
Jacob Associates,10 found that wastewater reuse at the time was governed by
frameworks administered by the States and that there was no uniform approach.
Further, it indicated that existing State regulatory frameworks relied on explicit
guidelines and standards which were generally prescriptive in order to offer a degree
of certainty to operators in the sector.11
Against that background the report summarised the rationale behind the development
of national guidelines as follows:
With increasing recognition of the importance of recycling as a potential option in
water supply strategies, and the recognition that recycling need not remain a
peripheral option, there has been a convergence of thinking towards a national
approach based on current best practice. Following from the Australian Drinking
Water Guidelines 2004, this has involved the development of a ‘risk management
framework’ approach to human health and environmental protection, rather than a
more ‘prescriptive’ *footnote omitted+ approach to regulation. These have become all
the more important as the present and expected expansion of recycled water will
occur in areas in closer proximity to human contact, potentially affecting a larger
proportion of the population.12

9

National Health and Medical Research Council and Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council, National
Water Quality Management Strategy: Australian Drinking Water Guidelines 2004 (‗ADWG 2004‘). The ADWG
undergo a rolling review process to ensure that that represent the latest scientific evidence on good quality drinking
water: National Health and Medical Research Council (12 November 2010) <http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/>.
10
Marsden Jacob Associates, ‗National Guidelines on Water Recycling Managing Health and Environmental Risks
Impact Assessment‘ (Report prepared for the Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council/Environment
Protection and Heritage Council, 30 September 2005) (‗Marsden Jacob Impact Assessment‘).
11
Ibid 4.
12
Ibid.
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The report advised that the term ‘prescriptive’ as used in the discussion related to
‘rule-based’ regulation which, for example, might require the use of a specific quality
of recycled water – for example a ‘grade A’ recycled water – on golf courses. It
distinguished the risk management approach in the same situation as one where risks
to human health and the environment of using recycled water on golf courses should
fall below a defined tolerable level. 13 However, Marsden Jacob Associates stressed
that ‘it is not intended to imply that the guidelines are enshrined and enforceable by
law’.14
Marsden Jacob Associates pointed to improved consumer confidence in effective
management of health and environmental risks as one factor that would lead to an
increase in demand for recycled water:
This analysis has found that protection and fostering of consumer confidence is the
largest indicatively quantifiable economic benefit of the move to National Guidelines
for water recycling. Use of HACCP and best practice arrangements for recycled water is
clearly the best available method of safeguarding human and environmental health
throughout the period of expansion in recycled water supply. This analysis contends
that water recycling is likely to expand at a faster rate under the Guidelines than would
be the case under separate state guidelines with varying standards and methods of
approach.15

As agreed under the NWI, the Commonwealth and the States cooperated to produce
guidelines that would provide an authoritative reference for those engaged in the
supply, use or regulation of recycled water schemes. Work to develop the modules of
the guidelines was undertaken in two phases under the auspices of the EPHC, the
13

The Executive Summary provided in the National Guidelines for Water Recycling: Managing Health and
Environmental Risks offers a succinct statement of the application of a risk management framework in water
recycling projects:
The first step is to look at hazards in the recycled water that could potentially affect human or
environmental health (ie ‗What might happen and how it might occur?‘). The next step is to estimate the
risk from each hazard by assessing the likelihood that the event will happen and the consequences if it did
(ie ‗How likely is it that it will happen, and how serious will it be if it does?‘). After characterising the
risks, preventive measures to control hazards are then identified (ie ‗What can we do about it?‘). The
approach also includes monitoring to ensure that the preventive measures operate effectively, and
verification to ensure that the management system consistently provides recycled water of a quality that is
fit for its intended use: Environment Protection and Heritage Council, Natural Resource Management
Ministerial Council and the Australian Health Ministers‘ Conference, National Guidelines for Water
Recycling: Managing Health and Environmental Risks (National Water Quality Management Strategy,
Document No 21,November 2006) (‗Recycled Water Guidelines‘), 1.
14
Marsden Jacob Impact Assessment, above n 10, 4. The NSW Government has adopted this view quite openly: see
discussion in Chapter 10.2.2 on page 207.
15
Ibid 47.
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National Health and Medical Research Council (‘NHMRC’) and the NRMMC. Four
guidelines for water recycling have now been released (‘Australian Recycling
Guidelines’):
Phase 1:


National Guidelines for Water Recycling: Managing Health and Environmental
Risks (‘Recycled Water Guidelines’)16

Phase 2:


Australian Guidelines for Water Recycling: Managing Health and Environmental
Risks: Augmentation of Drinking Water Supplies (‘Augmentation Guidelines’)



Australian Guidelines for Water Recycling: Stormwater Harvesting and Reuse
(‘Stormwater Guidelines’)



Australian Guidelines for Water Recycling: Managed Aquifer Recharge (‘MAR
Guidelines’).17

The Recycled Water Guidelines provided a generic risk management framework to
manage risks to human health and the environment arising from the use of recycled
treated sewage and greywater. They focused on large-scale treated sewage and
greywater for use in residential garden watering, car washing, toilet flushing and
clothes washing; irrigation for urban recreational and open space, and agriculture and
horticulture; fire protection and fire fighting systems; and industrial uses, including
cooling water. Greywater treated on-site, including in high rise apartments and office
blocks, to be used for garden watering, car washing, toilet flushing and clothes washing,
was also covered by the Recycled Water Guidelines.18
The Augmentation Guidelines manage the health risks associated with ‘potable reuse’,
that is, the use of recycled water in drinking water supplies. The guidelines applied,
16

Recycled Water Guidelines, above n 13.
Phase 2:

Environment Protection and Heritage Council, National Health and Medical Research Council and Natural
Resource Management Ministerial Council, Australian Guidelines for Water Recycling: Managing Health and
Environmental Risks: Augmentation of Drinking Water Supplies (National Water Quality Management Strategy,
Document No 22, May 2008) (‗Augmentation Guidelines‘)

Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council, Environment Protection and Heritage Council and National
Health and Medical Research Council,

Australian Guidelines for Water Recycling: Stormwater Harvesting and Reuse (National Water
Quality Management Strategy, Document No 23, July 2009) (‗Stormwater Guidelines‘)

Australian Guidelines for Water Recycling: Managed Aquifer Recharge (National Water Quality
Management Strategy, Document No 24, July 2009) (‗MAR Guidelines‘).
18
Recycled Water Guidelines, above n 13, 12-13.
17
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and expanded upon, the elements of the risk management framework of the Recycled
Water Guidelines. The guidelines appear to be applicable both to direct and indirect
augmentation of drinking water supplies. However they include the following note of
caution about direct augmentation:
Direct augmentation should not proceed unless sufficient mechanisms are established
to prevent substandard water from being supplied. Implementation of direct
augmentation presents substantial technical and management challenges. The need
for reliability of processes, vigilance of monitoring and highly skilled operators –
already high for indirect use – is magnified for direct augmentation. Knowledge and
understanding of system reliability and control of variability is essential before direct
augmentation can proceed. Further research is required in this area.19

For the time being at least, neither direct nor indirect potable reuse is being
considered in the mix of supply options in the Sydney Region.20
Echoing the view of Marsden Jacob Associates about the legal effects of guidelines, the
NSW Water for Life website noted that:
The Australian guidelines are not mandatory and have no formal legal status in
themselves. The water recycling schemes addressed in the guidelines are regulated by
States/Territories, and application of the framework may vary across jurisdictions
depending on the arrangements for water and wastewater management.21

NSW has mellowed somewhat in its publications, now clearly supporting a consistent
approach to the management of recycled water quality in Australia. At the same time
it has moved to suggest that the Australian Recycling Guidelines may be used to inform
NSW legislation and regulatory processes.22 Water quality planning in manner that is
consistent with the ADWG (for drinking water) and the Australian Recycling Guidelines
(for non-potable water) is included in the licensing scheme of the Water Industry
Competition Act 2006 (NSW) (‘WICA 2006’) by way of conditions attaching to
licences.23 The Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (NSW) (‘IPART’) proposed
19

Augmentation Guidelines, above n 17, 4.
See above n 8.
21
Water for Life (NSW), Australian Guidelines (25 November 2008)
<http://www.waterforlife.nsw.gov.au/recycling/guidelines/national_guidelines>.
22
Ibid at 12 November 2010. See also statement from Marsden Jacob Impact Assessment, above n 10, 4.
23
See particularly Water Industry Competition (General)Regulation 2008 (NSW) Pt 1, s 3; Pt 2 Div 1 s 6; Pt 2 Div 2
s 12; and Sched 1 Pt 2 s 7. The licensing and access provisions of the Water Industry Competition Act 2006 (NSW)
are discussed in Chapter 13.
20
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that a condition should be included in any amended or new operating licence issued to
Sydney Water Corporation (‘SWC’) requiring it to comply with the ADWG and the
Australian Guidelines for Water Recycling.24
NSW has produced two instruments to manage human health and environmental risks
associated with recycled water use in specific situations: NSW Guidelines for Greywater
Reuse in Sewered, Single Household Residential Premises (‘Blue Guidelines’) and Interim
Guidelines for Management of Private Recycled Water Schemes (‘Purple Guidelines’). 25
These guidelines address re-use options for greywater around the home indirectly
augmenting drinking water supply by replacing it for particular uses.
10.2.2 The NSW Guidelines and the role of local councils
In the MWP 2006, water recycling in Sydney’s homes and businesses was encouraged
by the NSW Government. The regulatory response to this initiative was an excellent
example of a ‘mix’ of hard and soft law.
Section 68 of the Local Government Act 1993 (‘LGA 1993’) requires approval to be
obtained to ‘install, construct or alter a waste treatment device or a human waste
storage facility or a drain connected to any such device or facility’; and to ‘operate a
system of sewage management’.26 A general provision of Part F of the table to section
68 of the LGA 1993 prescribes ‘domestic greywater diversion’ as an activity that
requires the prior approval of council. Greywater is defined in regulation 75A(4) of the
Local Government (General) Regulation 2005 as being wastewater from washing
machines, laundry tubs, showers, hand basins and baths but not from a kitchen, toilet,
urinal or bidet.

24

Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (NSW), ‗Review of the Operating Licence for Sydney Water
Corporation‘ (Water — Issues Paper, September 2009), 15. See discussion of the conditions attached to the Sydney
Water Operating Licence 2010–2015 in Chapter 13.4.1 on page 289.
25
Department of Water and Energy (NSW), NSW Guidelines for Greywater Reuse in Sewered, Single Household
Residential Premises (May 2008) (‗Blue Guidelines‘); Department of Water and Energy (NSW), Interim Guidelines
for Management of Private Recycled Water Schemes (May 2008) (‗Purple Guidelines‘).
26
Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) (‗LGA 1993‘), s 68, Table Part C, 5-6. ‗Operate a system of sewage
management‘ means to hold or process, re-use or discharge, sewage or by-products of sewage (whether or not the
sewage is generated on the premises on which the system of sewage management is operated) but it does not include
any action relating to the discharge of sewage directly into a public sewer or to sewage or by-products of sewage after
they have been discharged into a public sewer: LGA 1993 s 68A. A definition of ‗operate a system of sewage
management‘ is also contained in Regulation 42 of the Local Government (General) Regulation 2005 (NSW) (‗LGA
General Regulation‘) in similar but not identical terms. Sewage is defined in section 68A of the LGA 1993 by
reference to part of the definition of ‗waste‘ in the Dictionary in the Act.
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The elaborate supporting framework of soft law in the form of the Blue Guidelines and
the Purple Guidelines is intended to assist the community either to comply with these
requirements for approval under the LGA 1993, or carry on the activities in such a way
that exemption provisions come into play and no approval is necessary.27
Both sets of guidelines recognise that the use of recycled water may present risks to
human health and the environment. They offer a risk assessment framework to
identify and manage the risks associated with the various methods of recycling. They
are in reasonably plain English and they include definitions. They are generally most
impressive user-friendly colourful publications that provide a stark contrast to the
black and white of hard law instruments. NSW has demonstrated how to take a
national initiative into the State arena through the Blue Guidelines and Purple
Guidelines.
10.2.2.1

Domestic greywater recycling – the Blue Guidelines

The Blue Guidelines deal specifically with greywater reuse in sewered, single household
residential premises. The process involves the diversion of greywater for use around
the home before it enters the sewerage system.
Recycling greywater offers an opportunity for households to tap into an additional
source of water to replace drinking water for discretionary use outdoors and, provided
that appropriate treatment facilities are in place, for limited indoor use in toilets and in
washing machines. The three techniques for domestic greywater recycling covered in
the Blue Guidelines involve manual bucketing of greywater28 or the installation of
either Greywater Diversion Devices (‘GDD’)29 or Greywater Treatment Systems
(‘GTS’)30.

27

Prior approval of council is not required to ‗install, construct or alter a waste treatment device‘ or ‗operate a system
of sewage management‘ if certain conditions are satisfied: LGA General Regulation, reg 48. Similarly domestic
greywater diversion may be carried out without the prior approval of council in some circumstances: LGA General
Regulation, 75A.
28
The Blue Guidelines deal briefly with possible issues associated with the bucketing of greywater from showers and
the laundry. The activity is considered low risk, no consents are required and, as the volume and frequency of reuse
by bucketing is likely to be low, the risks to health and the environment are also likely to be low. ‗Dos and Don‘ts‘
for bucketing of greywater offer advice intended to ensure that greywater is used safely in this way: Blue Guidelines,
above n 25, 22-23.
29
A greywater diversion device (‗GDD‘) is a hand-activated switch that diverts untreated greywater by gravity or
pump directly to a sub-surface irrigation system. The exemptions, set out in LGA General Regulation, reg 75A(2),
apply if greywater diversion is carried out in accordance with the Plumbing and Drainage Code of Practice; if a
sewage management facility is not installed on the premises; and if certain performance standards are met. The Blue
Guidelines emphasise that a GDD should only be turned on when water is needed for the purpose for which it is
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Regulation 75A of the Local Government (General) Regulation 2005 does not apply to
manual bucketing of greywater. Thus there are no approvals required to effect reuse
of greywater by this means. Nevertheless the Blue Guidelines do offer some advice on
the safe use of buckets.

31

The use of GDDs around the home, the second method of recycling covered by the
Blue Guidelines, is justified on the basis that, when used properly, direct diversion of
greywater is a low risk activity. The logic is interesting:
By reusing only greywater produced within the household for sub-surface irrigation,
the health risks associated with pathogen exposure are reduced, since those residing
in the house are likely to have been exposed to the majority of the pathogens in the
greywater, through contact with the other residents at the household. The main form
of exposure for pathogens is through personal contact.
The reuse of greywater by a GDD where more than one dwelling is located on a block,
including groups of town houses, villas and multi-unit dwellings, is not permitted. This
is due to the fact that other residences will not have been exposed to the pathogens
through personal contact, therefore increasing the risk of spreading disease through
the community. A town house occupant using only that residence [sic] greywater on
the garden within the premises is permitted. Use on common property gardens is not
permitted.32

The owner of the premises has primary responsibility for the installation, operation
and maintenance of a GDD. Any plumbing work required to be done must be done in
accordance with the relevant regulatory requirements by a licensed plumber who will
be responsible for the work performed. However, the most likely enforcement
mechanism to be invoked where there is a breach of the conditions which exempt the
GDD system from council approval will be under section 626(3) of the LGA 1993 which
creates offences for carrying out activities without any consent required. Fines and
diverted, otherwise the greywater is to be disposed of into the sewer. Incorrect diversion is highlighted as a risk to
plant and soil health and potentially an increased health risk to residents: see Blue Guidelines, above n 25, 10.
30
A greywater treatment system (‗GTS‘) collects, stores, treats, and may disinfect, greywater to the standards
specified in the NSW Health Department Domestic Greywater Treatment Systems Accreditation Guidelines: Part 4,
Clause 43(1), Local Government (Approvals) Regulation, 1999 (February 2005). Recycled water from a GTS may be
used for irrigation (including surface irrigation), toilet flushing and washing machine use: Purple Guidelines, above n
25, 18.
31
The definition of domestic greywater diversion specifically excludes ‗manual collection and re-use of greywater‘
by means of a bucket ‗or similar receptacle‘: LG General Regulation, reg 75A(4). Manual bucketing of greywater is
covered in Section 5 of the Blue Guidelines, above n 25, 22–23.
32
Blue Guidelines, above n 25, 10.
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directions may also be issued under Chapter 7, Part 2 Division 1 of the LGA 1993 if
complaints are lodged in relation to the operation of the system.
The third method of greywater recycling covered by the Blue Guidelines involves the
use of a GTS. A GTS is a waste treatment device for the purposes of the LGA 1993.
There is no special exemption from approval under section 68 of the LGA 1993 for the
operation of a GTS treating only greywater.
The essential differences between the installation, operation and maintenance of a
GDD and a GTS lie in the nature of the technology involved in each system and the
water quality of, and permitted end uses for, the recycled water product. The
responsibility for the wastewater system is similar in each case. A licensed plumber
must be engaged to install the device or system, as the case may be, and it is the
plumber’s responsibility to notify local water utilities of that installation. For a GTS, the
owner is required to have the backflow prevention device tested annually by an
accredited tester.33
The Blue Guidelines are limited in their application. They only apply to single
households thus, for example, they do not apply to greywater use in a town house
development, although they will apply in certain circumstances to reuse in a single
town house in such a development. The Blue Guidelines only apply to residential
premises in sewered areas, and not to unsewered areas where septic systems or
aerated water treatment systems are used. They do not apply to blackwater, only
greywater generated from washing machines, laundry tubs, showers, hand basins and
baths (and, where a greywater treatment system is installed, to wastewater from
kitchens).34 Use of greywater distributed onsite by the processes covered by the Blue
Guidelines is also restricted.
10.2.2.2

Private recycled water schemes – the Purple Guidelines

The Purple Guidelines regulate the installation and operation of private recycled water
schemes that serve more than a single household. These schemes must have approval
under section 68 of the LGA 1993.
In May 2008 the NSW Government released the Purple Guidelines to:
33
34

Ibid 21.
This requirement is reinforced by the NSW Code of Practice: Plumbing and Drainage 3 rd Edition 2006.
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assist in fulfilling the requirements outlined in the Metropolitan Water Plan; that the
Government will take measures to ensure that the regulatory system for water
recycling manages environmental and health risks and encourages recycling.35

The Purple Guidelines incorporate principles set out in the Recycled Water Guidelines
into the approvals process of section 68 of the LGA 1993 to achieve the objectives of
management of environmental and health risks. They apply specifically to projects to
service more than one dwelling which require Part C approval under section 68, and
they are concerned with recycling of sewage, that is greywater and blackwater, but not
stormwater or wastewater from industry. For recycling schemes that will service up to
2,500 person equivalents, the principal mechanism for regulating installation,
maintenance and performance of water recycling plants is the LGA 1993. To service
communities above 2,500 person equivalents, the proponent may be required to seek
approvals under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) (‘EP&A
Act 1979’).36
The Purple Guidelines assist proponents of recycled water schemes to identify
potential hazards associated with the project and so inform project design;37 to
undertake appropriate planning to support the project;38 to apply for the consents
necessary to install and operate the system;39 to conduct system monitoring and
management and undertake and ensure ongoing operator training and qualification;40
and to meet record keeping and audit requirements.41 They adopt a risk management
approach which ‘is seen as the most effective way to assure the appropriate quality of

35

Purple Guidelines, above n 25, 4.
For example, a sewerage system that has an intended processing capacity of more than 2,500 persons equivalent is
declared to be designated development under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) (‗EP&A
Act 1979‘) s 77A and Environmental Planning and Assessment Regulation 2000 (NSW) (‗EP&A Reg 2000‘), reg 29.
37
Purple Guidelines, above n 25, Parts 3, 6. The identification of all sources of recycled water precedes the
identification of actual and potential hazards in that water to the environment and/or people that come into contact
with the water. Risk assessment will consider hazards which may arise from the presence of contaminants in a water
source (of a biological, chemical, physical or radiological nature); requirements to meet residual flows to water
source (eg sewer); impacts of rain events or drought on the process; maintenance of water quality to suit end use; and
human exposure to hazards through authorised or inadvertent or unauthorised ingestion, inhalation or contact with the
skin.
38
Ibid Part 4. The Purple Guidelines encourage the proponent of a water recycling scheme to develop a recycled
water policy as advocated in the Australian Guidelines; to engage in ‗early and inclusive‘ consultation with the
appropriate stakeholders and, where necessary, with the public; to complete a financial assessment to determine the
long-term viability and sustainability of the scheme; and to enter into agreements with proposed users of the recycled
water product and, where the water is sourced from a third party, with the supplier of the water for treatment.
39
Ibid Parts 5, 10.
40
Ibid Parts 7, 8, 9.
41
Ibid Part 11.
36

Chapter 10: Putting Plans into Practice

212

recycled water for the proposed end use’42 by managing risks proactively. Application
of HACCP principles is designed to ensure that ‘as far as possible, any nonconformance with the system requirements is detected before supply, discharge or
application of recycled water, to minimise the risk to public health and the
environment’.43 However, it must be recognised that the application of HACCP
principles relies on the necessarily subjective scoring or ranking of risks associated with
any particular undertaking.44
10.2.3 Still room for improvement
The scheme of the LGA 1993 applying to recycled water projects is disjointed, being set
out variously in the Act itself, more particularly expounded in the General Regulation,
and explained to potential users in guidelines. The LGA 1993 has been amended to
adapt an existing approvals system to respond to new technology and new hazards
with the increased emphasis on water reuse at the domestic level and beyond. The
terminology in the legislative instruments is often difficult, and often poorly and
inconsistently defined. To the extent that the provisions of the LGA 1993 and the Blue
and Purple Guidelines are encouraging and supporting recycling endeavours in the
Sydney Region, then that outcome is a tribute to the government agencies
administering their implementation.
The LGA 1993 regulatory framework attempts to ensure public health and safety
through imposing conditions on installation and operation of wastewater treatment
facilities. In practice, enforcement of the requirements for proper use and
management of wastewater treatment systems authorised under the processes of the
LGA 1993 may often depend on the watchful neighbour rather than on any external
monitoring and measurement of the impacts of the processes.
10.3

Encouraging responsible use of water

The actions set out in the MWP 2006 were all directed at water availability and use in
the Sydney Region. They relied in part on the replacement of drinking water for
specific uses around the home and in commerce and industry by alternative water
42

Ibid 24. The quality of the product produced from the recycling process is determined by the intended uses for that
product.
43
Ibid.
44
Ibid 26: three methods for ranking risks (qualitative, semi-quantitative and quantitative) addressed in AS/NZS
4360:1999 Risk Management are discussed.
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supplies, ‘water fit for purpose’. In various combinations the measures were put
forward as a solution to Sydney’s water woes for the next 25 years. However, the
success of the planning measures also relied on water users exercising some restraint
in their use of valuable water resources. This is a difficult message for regulators to
deliver when they are trying to encourage the uptake of initiatives that will make more
water available for discretionary use around the house (extra water for gardens) and in
some applications replace the use of drinking water indoors (toilet flushing and clothes
washing).45 The NSW Government has exhibited creativity in its efforts to address
these problems. The following sections investigate reasonable use guidelines
contemplated under the MWP 2006 and the perpetuation of a scheme of water
restrictions in the Sydney Region under another name.
10.3.1 Reasonable use guidelines for domestic and stock rights46
The importance of agriculture in the Sydney Region was discussed in Chapter 2. The
MWP 2006 encouraged and assisted smart use of water in agriculture in the Sydney
Region as part of the demand measures to be implemented under that plan. It also
addressed the management of water accessed under ‘domestic and stock rights’
preserved in the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) (‘WMA 2000’), an important
source of water for the agricultural industry in the Sydney Region. The water needs
of that industry are addressed in the Draft Water Sharing Plan: Greater Metropolitan
Region Unregulated River Water Sources Order 2010 (June 2010) (‘Draft Rivers Order’)
and the Draft Water Sharing Plan: Greater Metropolitan Region Groundwater Sources
Order 2010 (May 2010) (‘Draft Groundwater Order’) (together called ‘Draft Orders’).47
Programs promoting and assisting with smart water use in agriculture are changing
attitudes to water use on farms to encourage sustainable water use.

45

The dilemma faced by Sydney Water Corporation as a business with objectives to sell water and licensing
constraints on how much it can sell shows parallels.
46
Water Management Act 2000(NSW) (‗WMA 2000‘) s 52. The common law rights of landholders to access and use
water from a river, lake or estuary to which they have frontage and to extract groundwater underlying their land are
preserved: WMA 2000 Ch 3, Pt 1, Div 1. Landholders do not require authority to exercise this right. However the
purposes for which the water can be used are restricted to domestic consumption and stock watering: WMA 2000
s 52. Landholders are entitled to capture and use surface water running across their land in accordance with certain
conditions (including harvestable rights orders): WMA 2000 Ch 3, Pt 1, Div 1, ss 53, 54. Native title rights to water
are recognised in the WMA 2000 Ch 3, Pt 1, Div 3. Native title rights may be subject to a volumetric restriction:
WMA 2000 s 55. Discussion in the text refers to the Ch 3 Pt 1 Div 1 domestic and stock rights only.
47
The draft water sharing plans for the Greater Metropolitan Region are discussed in Chapter 8 of this thesis.
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But it is not only the farmers of Sydney’s hinterland that can avail themselves of water
under the domestic and stock rights pertaining to their land for use around the home.
The Draft Groundwater Plan and its explanatory documents recognise demands from
residential users extracting water from aquifers in the Sydney Region in the
metropolitan area and in rural residential areas. Rural subdivisions are increasing the
numbers of landholdings with river frontage and hence the potential for increased
surface water extraction. The NSW Government has proposed regulations to address
possible impacts of such an increase but has not indicated what they will do.
For the purposes of the legislation domestic consumption means consumption for
normal household purposes in domestic premises situated on the land.48 Stock
watering does not extend to watering stock kept in feedlots or buildings on an
intensive commercial basis.49
In the MWP 2006 the description of these rights contemplated the taking of water ‘for
use around *the+ house, growing food and watering …animals’.50 It also suggested that
where extraction for stock and domestic purposes did not place undue stresses on the
water sources involved, exercise of these rights by ‘Sydney’s householders’51 could
make a positive contribution to conserving drinking water supplies. However, the
uptake of the domestic and stock rights by residents of the Sydney Region anticipated
by the MWP 2006 may have been beyond the contemplation of the legislators. The
MWP 2006 recognised this dilemma, noting that in areas with high population density,
large increases in extraction volumes could place ‘additional and unacceptable
pressure on local water sources, particularly during drought.’52 It responded to these
concerns in two ways.
Firstly, it announced that the likely volumes of extraction under domestic and stock
rights were to be taken into account in the total plan extraction limits under Water
Sharing Plans to be developed for surface water and groundwater in the greater
Sydney region. But this of course would require measurement of those volumes, and
existing works associated with extractions under domestic and stock rights are not
48

WMA 2000 s 52(3) (emphasis added).
Ibid.
50
Water for Life (NSW), 2006 Metropolitan Water Plan 2006 (April 2006) (‗MWP2006‘) [6.5.2], 68.
51
Ibid.
52
Ibid.
49
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metered. Secondly, the NSW Government foreshadowed the development of
‘Reasonable Use Guidelines’ which would define reasonable use under the domestic
and stock rights, and impose limits on the total volume of water that could be used for
household purposes under the domestic component, and on the garden area
maintained by water extracted under these rights. The MWP 2006 announced that
Reasonable Use Guidelines would be released but it did not set out the process to be
followed in their preparation. However, it forecast public exhibition of the Reasonable
Use Guidelines by the end of 2006.53
The 2007 Progress Report on the MWP 2006 noted that development of the
Reasonable Use Guidelines was ‘delayed’. A footnote explained that the delay was:
due to drought management and water sharing priorities. The Government is
currently considering whether the Guidelines should be released as firm rules rather
than as guidelines.54

The Progress Report on the MWP 2006 completed in 2008 (‘2008 Progress Report’)
indicated that the matter was still delayed and advised that, following targeted
consultation of key stakeholder groups in 2008, draft guidelines would be released in
‘early 2009’. The 2008 Progress Report also indicated that the final policy and
guidelines were to be submitted for consideration by the government by June 2009.55
This did not happen.
In accordance with the requirements of sections 5(3) and 20(1)(b) of the WMA 2000
the Draft Orders included estimates of the requirements for surface and groundwater
usage under basic landholder rights in the Sydney Region. The estimates were to be
revised in the course of public exhibition of the plans. The Draft Orders also
recognised that the exercise of such rights by existing and new landholders may
increase over the life of the plans and that basic landholder rights were to be exercised
in accordance with any Ministerial guidelines with respect to reasonable use of water

53

Ibid 52, 68.
Department of Water and Energy (NSW), ‗Metropolitan Water Plan 2007 Progress Report‘ (September 2007), 17,
25.
55
MWP 2008 Progress Report, above n 8, 27, 28, 35.
54
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for domestic consumption and stock watering.56 Reasonable Use Guidelines had still
not emerged when the Draft Orders were released for public exhibition in June 2010.
As the guidelines will clearly regulate use by households of river and groundwater
accessed through stock and domestic rights under the WMA 2000, the proper place to
deal with any restriction on the exercise of those rights would be through water
sharing rules for the Sydney Region developed in accordance with the planning
principles of the WMA 2000. The WMA 200057 includes specific provisions for the
Minister to establish ‘mandatory guidelines’58 with respect to the taking and use of
water for domestic consumption and stock watering’ whether the water is accessed by
right or under an access licence. The WMA 2000 sets out a procedure for the
preparation of the guidelines so that draft guidelines are made available for public
comment. Despite indications to the contrary in the MWP 2006, there is no
information available to the public regarding the preparation, form and content of the
guidelines. It seems that another planning process set out in the WMA 2000 is being
bypassed. The Government could of course take the matter further and legislate to
restrict the rights – it has been done before in relation to basic landholder rights.59 But
there is currently an election around the corner.
10.3.2 Water restrictions by any other name
Restrictions on water use can be either temporary restrictions or permanent in their
application. Temporary restrictions are usually a drought response measure imposed
in times of water shortages. They are generally modified and eventually removed as
water availability improves. Permanent restrictions or ‘permanent water conservation
measures’ are intended to promote water conservation and efficient water use in the
longer term and are generally less severe than temporary restrictions.
The merits or otherwise of the imposition of water restrictions (and other demand
management options) have been hotly debated since the NWI was signed. These

56

See Part 5 in each of the Draft Orders. The reasonable use guidelines are referred to only in notes to cl 27(7) in the
Draft Rivers Order and to cl 19(2) of the Draft Groundwater Order.
57
WMA 2000 Ch 7, Div 7, Pt 1.
58
Ibid s 336B. An oxymoron — soft or hard law? Arising as it does under statute, the provision itself is hard law.
However, guidelines are generally considered to be soft law, neither mandating behaviour nor giving rise to
consequences for non-performance.
59
See for example WMA 2000 s 393 which abolishes common law riparian rights.
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debates have provided fertile grounds for the creative mind. One side of the argument
was encapsulated by Paul Kelly:
City water problems are largely decoupled from weather and reside totally within the
political system. The solution is to expand supply rather than limit demand, the false
choice long preferred by state politicians…
Governments have exploited shamelessly the public’s idealism and naivety. Water
restrictions are mainly used to avoid confronting the supply-side solution. The
politicians have won every way. They duck the solution, penalise the consumers and
are applauded for taking action courtesy of the pervasive green culture that applauds
restraint and opposes market solutions.60

Speaking to the National Press Club in January 2007, the then Prime Minister Howard
made the statement that:
While the case for Commonwealth involvement in interstate water systems is a
compelling, indeed overwhelming one, it is less obvious that the Commonwealth
should be directly engaged in the provision of urban water. The truth is that all of our
cities are able to afford as much water as they need.61

Despite the rhetoric, water restrictions are still the subject of inquiries. Paragraph 91
iv) of the NWI called specifically for a review of the effectiveness of temporary water
restrictions and associated public education strategies, and an assessment of the scope
for extending low level restrictions as standard practice.
The Productivity Commission released a discussion paper in March 2008 as part of a
broader program on environmental and resource issues. The aim of the paper was to
identify challenges to be faced in urban water management and to explore possible
areas for reform.62 The Chairman of the Commission set the tone of the report in the
first paragraph of the Foreword:

60

Paul Kelly, ‗A Watershed Moment‘, The Weekend Australian (Sydney), 11-12 November 2006, Inquirer, 20.
Prime Minister of Australia John Howard, ‗Address to the National Press Club‘ (Speech delivered at the Great
Hall, Parliament House, 25 January 2007).
62
Productivity Commission, ‗Towards Urban Water Reform‘ (Discussion Paper, Melbourne, March 2008) (‗Towards
Urban Water Reform‘).
61
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Water rationing has become pervasive in Australian cities in recent years. This is only
partly due to low rainfall. An important contributor has been inadequate institutional
arrangements for the management of our urban water resources.63

The report expanded on this perspective noting that ‘While institutions cannot make it
rain, they are responsible for aligning long-term supply and demand, and managing
periodic scarcity’.64 The costs associated with the imposition of restrictions were
addressed in the preliminary statements in the report, providing a tangible view of the
downside of the measures:
The costs of water restrictions are many and varied. They include: structural damage
to buildings; deterioration of lawns and gardens; purchasing new watering systems;
time spent on labour-intensive methods of watering; injuries from carrying ‘greywater’
in buckets and the emergence of ‘water rage’ with neighbours checking the water use
of others in ways they would not contemplate for other services, such as phone use.65

This was an analysis the community could relate to – and it might foreshadow the
demise of water restrictions in their familiar forms. The Productivity Commission’s
analysis of the direction that it thought institutional and structural reforms should take
was equally consumable. The language and the content were palatable – and they
delivered a credible platform for debate, albeit perhaps underlined more with
concerns for economic efficiency than for environmental and social outcomes as the
direct drivers for change.
Frontier Economics was commissioned by the National Water Commission (‘NWC’) to
assess alternative approaches to urban water pricing to further the initiatives for
metropolitan water pricing reform. The report, Approaches to Urban Water Pricing,
was released in July 2008.66 As part of the existing management arrangements, water
restrictions were assessed against several criteria: economic efficiency, revenue
adequacy, flexibility, ease of operation and administrative simplicity, transparency, and
equity.67 Frontier Economics found that68:
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Ibid iii.
Ibid xv.
65
Ibid xix.
66
Frontier Economics, ‗Approaches to Urban Water Pricing‘ (Waterlines Occasional Paper No 7, prepared for the
National Water Commission, July 2008).
67
Ibid 4.
68
Ibid 28-29. The summary in the text is taken largely from Table 2 of the report.
64
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quantity-based water restrictions are an inefficient measure to balance supply and
demand



uncertainty surrounding the need for restrictions over a regulatory period and the
impact of various restrictions rules on demand creates a significant revenue risk for
water authorities



restrictions can be applied flexibly in accordance with the degree of scarcity and
could be a ‘wait and see response’ to avoid the potential for over-investment in
excess capacity69



restrictions require administration and compliance and impose associated costs70



the community is generally satisfied with the information available about
restriction rules71



water restrictions apply to, and impact upon, different households and industries
in very different ways.

There was little support for the imposition of water restrictions in the Frontier
Economics analysis which was strongly skewed to the economic impact of the
measures which were addressed.
The result of those reviews will reinforce the NWI call for pricing review and
implementation of specific pricing policies. Pricing is a key element of the NWI,
especially for urban water. According to the NWC, ‘Through best practice pricing,
economically efficient and sustainable use of water resources will be promoted, in turn
reducing the demand on water supplies’.72 It seems to be almost a panacea.
As to water use restrictions, the NSW National Water Initiative Implementation Plan
(‘Implementation Plan’) noted that the timing of the completion of the NSW review
was ‘contingent on environmental circumstances and the end of the drought’.73
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Ibid 26.
Ibid. Frontier Economics notes that one reason restrictions focus on outdoor use is that monitoring and enforcement
are easier.
71
See also Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (NSW), ‗Residential Water Use in Sydney, the Blue
Mountains and Illawarra – Results from the 2003 Household Survey‘ (Research Paper RP 26, April 2004).
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National Water Commission, Demand management (1 August 2008) <http://www.nwc.gov.au/www/html/211demand- management.asp>.
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New South Wales Government, NSW Implementation Plan for the National Water Initiative 2006, Implementation
Timetable, 85.
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The NWC coordinated a review of temporary water restrictions in larger urban centres
(those with over 50 000 connections) to pursue the action agreed under paragraph 91
iii) of the NWI. Sydney was used as one of the case studies. The report concluded:
In Sydney, restrictions have deferred the need for potentially costly investment in
supply infrastructure by allowing the supply-demand balance to be met during
droughts. This value of restrictions is particularly evident in Sydney, because of its very
large existing storage capacity and because long-term climate change predictions for
the area indicate that severe droughts are not necessarily part of a continuing
downward trend in water supply availability.
Nevertheless, there is a need an opportunity [sic] for reviewing and optimising the
current restrictions regime, ahead of any future droughts. In consideration of existing
household support for restrictions but mixed responses from industry, forward
planning for restrictions should review the reliability criteria, trigger points, and
restriction rules and levels.74

Although the report claimed to reflect information available to August 2007, its
conclusions indicate that, for Sydney at least, it preferred to reflect what might have
been rather than what was happening at the time. The NSW Government had made a
decision to proceed with construction of a desalination plant at Kurnell in July 2007.75
The Government had also made its own decision on future water restrictions for
Sydney before the report was released.
In June 2009, NSW introduced ‘Water Wise Rules for Greater Sydney, ending more
than five years of tough drought restrictions’.76 The new rules were notified under
section 15(1) of Part 3 of the Sydney Water Regulation 2006 (NSW) as being ‘in the

74

Institute for Sustainable Futures and ACIL Tasman Pty Ltd, ‗Review of Water Restrictions: Volume 1 — Review
and Analysis‘ (Final Report for the National Water Commission, UTS, September 2009), ix. The project involved
three stages: a review and analysis of water restriction policies and related public education strategies across
Australia; a quantitative analysis of the economic, environmental and social costs and benefits of different water
restriction policies; and reporting conclusions on the effective and efficient application of water restrictions. The
report cautions that the research in it is only current to August 2007. Changes that have occurred since that date are
not reflected in the report: at ii. The pace of change in water management in the Sydney Region since 2000 suggests
that the report has passed its use-by-date for the region.
75
The Institute for Sustainable Futures and ACIL Tasman Pty Ltd had completed a review of the MWP 2004
in February 2006 recommending in that report that construction of a desalination plant could be deferred provided
that a plant could be brought on-stream with a 26-month lead time if necessary: see University of Technology Sydney
Institute for Sustainable Futures, ACIL Tasman and SMEC Australia, ‗Review of the Metropolitan Water Plan‘
(Report Forming Part of a Review of the Metropolitan Water Plan for the NSW Cabinet Office, February
2006)(‗ACIL Tasman Review‘). See discussion in Chapter 9.5 on page 187. See also the discussion of the Kurnell
desalination project in Chapter 11.5 on page 235.
76
See Minister for Water, Phillip Costa ‗Sydney moves to water wise rules‘ (Media Release, 21 June 2009).
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public interest, for the purpose of maintaining the water supply’. 77 The measure was a
water restriction with a user-friendly name. There was a penalty attached to noncompliance and the ‘rules’ were statute-based. Despite the Minister’s comments that
they were a ’simple set of water saving measures which replace drought restrictions’,
they were still water use restrictions. Creative use of nomenclature does not make for
clarity of intent or purpose, nor does it always engender community confidence. The
rules may be changed in the future – strengthened or weakened as the need arises.
But they are created under legislation, they are hard law. They rely entirely on
community compliance, if not acceptance, to achieve their purposes.
10.4

Discussion

The Blue Guidelines can be categorised as soft law both in terms of source (they have
no legislative backing) and function (they guide behaviour but in themselves they do
not mandate it). They encourage re-use of greywater (not sewage) in single sewered
residential properties where the landowner is able to control wastewater produced by
the household. They help landowners comply with the hard law of the LGA 1993
either by meeting the requirements where consent is needed, or by carrying out their
activities so that exemptions will apply and consent will not be necessary. The Blue
Guidelines operate in low risk situations where any adverse consequences that might
arise from using greywater are contained – re-use will only impact the residents of the
property around which it is used. There is little monitoring or enforcement associated
with the ongoing conduct of greywater re-use methods covered by the Blue Guidelines
and no formal monitoring of their impacts on environment and public health beyond
the confines of the relevant back yard. They attempt to regulate an area of re-use that
has been going on unregulated in many backyards in the Sydney Region for a long time.
The Purple Guidelines are also soft law. They relate to activities on a larger scale than
those covered by the Blue Guidelines and they contemplate the treatment and re-use
of sewage. They are designed to assist applicants to obtain consents and approvals
that are necessary to conduct their operations and to carry out those operations in
accordance with applicable regulations. They are intended to complement the hard
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New South Wales, New South Wales Government Gazette, No 92, 22 June 2009, 3577.
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law of the LGA 1993. They are guidelines in the strict sense of the word. They are not
a law unto themselves.
Reasonable use guidelines could emerge as statutory or hard law ‘mandatory
guidelines’ or as something else. Hard law water restrictions are in place in the Sydney
Region with a name that will supposedly encourage compliance but with language that
does not disguise their statutory origin.
The approach adopted by the NSW Government to water management in the Sydney
Region that is described above raises a series of questions of interest for different
community sectors. For example, it might well be thought that the NSW Government
has under-played its responsibility in relation to the health of the community by
determining that low risk re-use water can be subject to minimal regulation. Some
may think that the environment will be the silent victim of unmonitored discharge of
greywater into the backyards of the Sydney Region. The Purple Guidelines can be seen
as an attempt to disguise a patchwork approach to hard law regulation providing
assistance for those who want to find a way through a maze of hard law instruments.
Political imperatives seem to be determining that a soft law mechanism will be invoked
to curb water usage under a common law right – for domestic and stock use – that is
now formally embodied in legislation. There is no obvious evidence that the
community will be any more inclined to save water by following water wise rules than
it was under a regimen of clearly-labelled water use restrictions. Plain talk may not
always be palatable, but it surely must be desirable in the management of one of the
fundamentals of life for the whole population.
By way of contrast to the regulatory approach examined in this chapter, Chapter 11
explores how the hard law framework of land use planning and development in NSW
has facilitated the introduction of some of the more ambitious, large-scale projects
proposed in the MWP 2006.
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Figure 10.1

Area covered by the Metropolitan Water Plan 2010

Source: Adapted from Office of Water (NSW) 2010 Metropolitan Water Plan (August 2010) 10
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Chapter 11: Accommodating Major Change
*The NSW Government+ claimed that Part 3A would increase public participation, whereas it’s
only reduced it. To some extent, it’s vitiated community participation altogether by giving the
minister power to ignore plans and controls that have been developed in cooperation with the
community. So it has, I think quite deliberately – and the Government’s known what they’re
doing – quite deliberately taken these steps to avoid community scrutiny of controversial
1
development.

11.1

Introduction

In the 2006 Metropolitan Water Plan (‘MWP 2006’) 2 contributions from ‘new sources’
were crucial components of the mix of measures relied upon to secure a reliable water
supply for the Sydney Region. Chapter 10 explored how the community has been able
to contribute to the delivery of some MWP 2006 initiatives by adopting demand
management measures and water reuse opportunities in residential areas. It set out
how potential issues of public health and safety associated with the use of recycled
wastewater for non-potable reuse in residential, industrial and commercial
applications have been addressed through the development of national guidelines for
recycled water.
This chapter reviews the major infrastructure provisions of the land use planning and
development assessment and control system in NSW and observes how that regulation
has smoothed the way for the introduction of some of the more ambitious projects
proposed in the MWP 2006. The discussion then focuses on the political and
regulatory processes associated with the decision to proceed with perhaps one of the
most controversial initiatives put forward in the MWP 2006: construction of the
desalination plant at Kurnell.
Ensuring proper process through open and transparent actions in the implementation
of innovative demand management and supply augmentation initiatives under the
existing regulatory framework emerges from the discussion in this chapter as an
ongoing challenge for regulators.

1

ABC Television NSW, ‗The Land Bribe‘, Stateline, 11 September 2009 (Tim Robertson, Barrister) (‗The Land
Bribe‘).
2
Water for Life (NSW), 2006 Metropolitan Water Plan (April 2006).
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Figure 11.1 Planning framework
Source:Department of Planning (NSW) State Environmental Planning Policy (Infrastructure) 2007
(Planning Circular No PS 08–001, 31 January 2008) 3
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11.2

Land use planning adapting to need

The New South Wales land use planning and development assessment and control
system embodied in the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW)
(‘EP&A Act 1979’) is the principal means by which the State manages proposals that
affect the environment and the use of its resources. Detailed provisions relating to
applications for development approval are further set out in the Environmental
Planning and Assessment Regulation 2000 and environmental planning instruments
(State environmental planning policies and local environmental plans) made under the
EP&A Act 1979.
The planning framework is far from simple but it is explained simply in a summary flow
chart produced by the NSW Department of Planning and reproduced here in Figure
11.1. The basic planning and development control mechanisms of the system are set
out in three parts of the legislation: Part 3A, Part 4 and Part 5.
Part 4 of the EP&A Act 1979 sets out the general procedures applying to development
that requires consent usually from local councils. Part 5 of the EP&A Act 1979 controls
activities that do not require development consent under Part 3A or Part 4 but which
have a significant impact on the environment – with the exception of such activities to
be carried out by State authorities. The latter are not dealt with under Part 5 but are
referred to another part of the Act: Part 3A. It is the relatively new provisions of Part
3A that are of particular interest for water-related projects in the Sydney Region.
The Part 3A consent provisions of the EP&A Act 1979 were presented to the public by
the NSW Government as a mechanism to facilitate major project and infrastructure
delivery and encourage economic development in the State while continuing to ensure
‘the appropriate level of community consultation and environmental assessment is
undertaken, based on the level of risk or community concern’.3 The statement begs
the question as to what constitutes an appropriate level of community consultation
when major water infrastructure projects are in question. The discussion in this
chapter demonstrates that, at least in relation to the desalination project, there was a
high level of community concern. Some conclusions are drawn as to whether that
3

Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources (NSW), Commencement of Part 3A (Major Projects)
of the EP&A Act 1979 (DIPNR Circular PS 05-006, 29 July 2005) 1/2.
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concern was properly addressed in an appropriate level of community consultation
associated with the project.
The Minister was somewhat more effusive in his Second Reading Speech introducing
the new provisions to the Parliament for consideration saying that ‘There is no doubt
that this bill dramatically improves the climate in which to do business in this State.’4
For the Sydney Region two further statements made in the Second Reading Speech
became highly significant with hindsight.
Firstly, the new Part 3A provisions were to ‘re-establish the duality’ of the planning
legislation by ensuring delineation of matters that could be properly dealt with by local
councils and those that should be dealt with by the State. The new assessment
process of Part 3A was intended to strengthen ‘the rigour, transparency and
independence of the process of assessment’.5 In October 2009 Prime Minister Kevin
Rudd forecast that the Commonwealth Government might well weigh into the urban
planning arena suggesting that in future Commonwealth funding for urban
infrastructure could come with conditions attached to influence city planning.6 The
State’s wresting of control over planning from local councils with the introduction of
Part 3A may well evolve into a tug-o-war with the Commonwealth Government
justified on similar grounds – that Commonwealth control would ensure rigour,
transparency and independence of assessment processes.
A second comment worthy of note in the context of water management in the Sydney
Region not only stressed the importance of the Part 3A reforms to the delivery of
major infrastructure projects and to the economy of the State but highlighted the role
of the reforms to ‘underpin the Government’s ability to implement strategic initiatives
such as the Metropolitan Strategy’.7 The Metropolitan Water Plan 2004 (‘MWP 2004’)
was such a strategic initiative. The discussion that follows shows how the hard law
Part 3A provisions have been used by the Government to implement the soft law
water management and planning strategies embodied in the MWP 2006 by facilitating

4

New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 27 May 2005, 16332 (Craig Knowles).

5

ibid.

6

The Prime Minister‘s comments were reported at: Brendan Trembath, ‗PM Proposes Taking Over City Planning‘,
ABC News AM, 28 October 2009.
7
New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 27 May 2005, 16332 (Craig Knowles).
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developments to deliver specific elements of the strategy, such as the Sydney
desalination plant and major water recycling projects. 8
11.3

Getting into Part 3A – the SEPPs

Two State Environmental Planning Policies (‘SEPPs’) relate to infrastructure projects
and influence the approvals process relating to such projects: State Environmental
Planning Policy (Major Projects) 2005 (NSW) (‘Major Projects SEPP’), and State
Environmental Planning Policy (Infrastructure) 2007 (NSW) (‘Infrastructure SEPP’).
They are shown in Figure 11.1 to be the first step to take to determine the appropriate
planning process for an infrastructure project in NSW.
The Infrastructure SEPP
The Infrastructure SEPP, which commenced on 1 January 2008, was intended to
provide a consistent planning regime for infrastructure and the delivery of services by
providing greater flexibility in the location of such facilities and, most importantly, by
identifying the environmental assessment category into which different types of
infrastructure and services development fall.9 Certain classes of exempt development
were also identified.10 However, to be exempt the development had to be of minimal
environmental impact.11 The Infrastructure SEPP prevails over other environmental
planning instruments excluding the Major Projects SEPP.12 Section 68 of the Local
Government Act 1993 (NSW) (‘LGA 1993’) does not apply to development to which the
Infrastructure SEPP applies.13
The Infrastructure SEPP includes planning provisions and development controls for
sewerage systems (Pt 3 Div 18), stormwater management systems (Pt 3 Div 20), waste
management facilities (Pt 3 Div 23) and water supply systems (Pt 3 Div 24). Water
recycling facilities fall into the category of sewerage systems under the policy14 and a
water supply system includes a water treatment facility such as a desalination plant or
8

It would also be necessary to determine if the project fell within the ambit of other hard law regulatory requirements
such as Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth), Protection of the Environment
Operations Act 1997 (NSW), Public Health Act 1991 (NSW), Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 (NSW),
Water Management Act 2000 (NSW).
9
State Environmental Planning Policy (Infrastructure) 2007 (NSW) (‗Infrastructure SEPP‘), Pt 1, cl 2.
10
Ibid Pt 2, Div 1, cl 20.
11
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (‗EP&A Act 1979‘) s 76(2).
12
Infrastructure SEPP, Pt 1, cl 8, especially cl 8(2)(c) for the exceptions.
13
Ibid Pt 1, cl 9(e)(ii). The application of section 68 of the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) (‗LGA 1993‘) to
water recycling projects in the Sydney Region is discussed in Chapter 10.2.2 on page 207.
14
Ibid Pt 3, Div 18, cl 105 (Definitions).
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a recycled or reclaimed water treatment plant whether the water produced is potable
or not, but does not include a water recycling facility under Pt 3 Div 18.15 The
Infrastructure SEPP states whether or not consent is required for development for the
relevant purposes and, if relevant, specifies the zoning to which such determination
applies. Under the Infrastructure SEPP, development of
o a sewage treatment plant (which treats and disposes of sewage and may or
may not supply recycled water for use as an alternative water supply) and
o a water recycling facility which treats sewage effluent, stormwater or waste
water (whatever that might be in the context, possibly industrial wastewater)
for ‘use as an alternative supply to mains water, groundwater or river water
(including sewer mining works)’
can be carried out by or on behalf of a public authority without consent on land in a
‘prescribed zone’, or by the holder of a licence under the Water Industry Competition
Act 2006 (NSW) (‘WICA 2006’). Development by any other person, or development on
land other than in a prescribed zone, requires consent under Part 4 of the EP&A Act
1979 to carry out such a project.16
Under the Infrastructure SEPP development for the following purposes by or on behalf
of SCA may be carried out without consent on any land:


investigations into the availability of groundwater (including mine water),
extraction of groundwater or mine water, and associated water reticulation
systems,



development to enable access to deep water extraction in dams within the
SCA’s area of operations, including investigations, associated works or
equipment and construction works and other water supply infrastructure.17

Development for the purpose of a desalination plant or a pilot plant, including
development for any of the following purposes may be carried out without consent on
any land by or on behalf of SWC:

15

Ibid Pt 3, Div 24, cl 124 (Definitions).
Ibid Pt 3, Div 18, cl 106.
17
Ibid Pt 3, Div 24, cl 125.
16
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the Kurnell Desalination Plant (as declared to be a critical infrastructure project
by Schedule 5 to the Major Projects SEPP,



a pilot desalination plant on the Kurnell Peninsula.18

All of the actions set out above were part of the strategy set out in the MWP 2006.
Although they could be carried out by the relevant State authorities without consent
under Part 4 they were nevertheless required to run the gauntlet of referral to Part 3A
as projects which would have significant impacts.
The Major Projects SEPP
The Major Projects SEPP, which commenced on 1 August 2005, is a State
environmental planning policy that identifies development to which Part 3A of the
EP&A Act 1979 applies. The Major Projects SEPP prevails over other environmental
planning instruments.19 A project can be declared under clause 6 of the Major Projects
SEPP to be a project to which Part 3A applies by inclusion in Schedules 1–3 and 5 of
that planning policy.
Schedule 1 provides a list of the types of projects that can be Part 3A projects
(including for example transport, energy and water infrastructure) often setting
thresholds (for example total capital investment value or infrastructure capacity)
before a development will be considered to be a major development to be considered
under Part 3A.
Schedules 2 and 3 specify locations (such as the coastal zone or within State significant
sites) where certain developments will be Part 3A projects.
Projects described in Schedule 5 of the Major Projects SEPP are projects to which Part
3A applies (to the extent that they are not already covered in Schedules 1–3). By
inclusion in Schedule 5 they are also declared to be critical infrastructure projects for
the purposes of section 75C of the EP&A Act 1979.20

18

Ibid Pt 3, Div 24, cl 126. The general exemption provisions of Schedule 1 to the Infrastructure SEPP include
rainwater and bore water tanks that meet certain specifications.
19
State Environmental Planning Policy (Major Projects) 2005 (NSW) (‗Major Projects SEPP‘), cl 5.
20
Ibid cl 6A. A Fact Sheet issued by the NSW Government Department of Planning in 2007 stated that the critical
infrastructure provisions were rarely used: NSW Government, Department of Planning, ‗Critical Infrastructure‘
(Major Projects Assessment System, Fact Sheet 7, 2007), 1.
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The development of water supply works and sewage and related wastewater
treatment plants that have a capital investment value of more than $30 million are
major projects to be assessed under Part 3A.21 Development of desalination plants to
produce drinking water that have a capital investment of more than $10 million are
also to be assessed under Part 3A.22 Thus some water projects that are significant
components of the initiatives under the MWP have been declared under the Major
Projects SEPP to be major projects to which Part 3A of the EP& A Act 1979 applies.
Some of those projects have also been declared to be critical infrastructure projects.
Water supply works declared to be Part 3A projects under Schedule 1, Group 8, Clause
25 of the Major Projects SEPP are:


Kangaloon Groundwater Borefields: proponent – Sydney Catchment Authority
(‘SCA’)



Kurnell Desalination Plant: proponent – Sydney Water Corporation (‘SWC’)



Nepean River Pump and Pipeline: proponent – SCA

Sewage and related wastewater treatment plants declared to be Part 3A projects
under Schedule 1, Group 8, Clause 26 of the Major Projects SEPP are:


Western Sydney Recycled Water Initiative: proponent SWC



Camellia (formerly known as Rosehill) Recycled Water Scheme: proponent
Alinta Asset Management Pty Ltd

Four initiatives in the MWP 2006 have been declared to be critical infrastructure
projects. The Kurnell desalination plant was declared to be critical infrastructure
under Schedule 5, clause 1 of the Major Projects SEPP. Three initiatives under the
MWP 2006 have been declared to be critical infrastructure pursuant to section 75C of
the EP&A Act 1979:


Kangaloon borefields project within the Upper Nepean Catchment



Leonay–Emu Plains borefields project within the Lapstone Monocline Area



Wallacia borefields project within the Lapstone Monocline Area.

21

Major Projects SEPP Sch 1, Gp 8, cl 25(1), 26(1)(b). Clause 26 provides that sewage and wastewater treatment
plants of a certain capacity also qualify for treatment under Pt 3A. Note that the clause does not apply to
developments by a public authority.
22
Ibid Sch 1, Gp 8, cl 25(2).
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11.4

Part 3A in practice

Part 3A of the EP&A Act 1979 established an assessment and approval regime for
major infrastructure development that included sewerage treatment facilities, dams or
water reticulation works and desalination plants whether or not they were carried out
by a public authority.23 Part 3A applied to development that was declared to be a Part
3A project under section 75B(1) by either a State Environmental Planning Policy (s
75B(1)(a)) or Ministerial Order (s75B(1)(b)). Under section 75B(2) of the EP&A Act
1979, Part 3A applied to major infrastructure development that in the opinion of the
Minister was of State or regional environmental planning significance. A Part 3A
project might also qualify for consideration under the Part as a ‘critical infrastructure
project’ if it was declared to be essential for the State for economic, environmental or
social reasons.24 The Minister for Planning is the approval authority for all Part 3A
projects.25
Applications for approval under Part 3A are to be made to the Minister and are
processed in accordance with the Part. An application is to include a description of the
project and ‘contain any other matter required by the Director-General’.26 Section 75F
of the EP&A Act 1979 requires the Director-General to prepare environmental
assessment requirements in respect of applications for approval under Part 3A having
regard to any relevant guidelines published by the Minister under section 75F(1). Once
accepted by the Director-General under the provisions of the Part, an environmental
assessment is to be made available to the public for at least 30 days during which
period any person including a public authority may make written submissions to the
Director-General on the matter.27 Any person who has made a submission under
section 75H, and who is dissatisfied with the Minister’s determination to give approval
to a Part 3A project, can appeal to the Land and Environment Court – provided that the
project is not, amongst other things, a critical infrastructure project.28

23

E P& A Act 1979 s 75A.
Ibid s 75C.
25
Ibid s 75D(1).
26
Ibid s 75E(2)(b).
27
Ibid s 75H.
28
Ibid s 75L. The right to appeal determinations in respect of certain types of projects is qualified as set out in
s 75L(1). The qualification of an ‗objector‘ is set out in s 75L(2).
24
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Division 3 of Part 3A sets out the approval provisions applying to project ‘concept plans’
The Minister may authorise or require a proponent to apply for the approval of a
concept plan for a project.29 The approvals process is similar to that which applies to
project approval under Division 2 of the part. However, there is no right of appeal for
third parties in relation to concept plan approvals.
Division 4 of Part 3A excludes the application of Parts 4 and 5 of the EP&A Act 1979 to
projects approved under Part 3A. It also excludes Part 3A projects from consideration
under local environmental plans. The operation of a number of approvals provisions of
– and the making of orders or notices under – specific legislation as set out in section
75U are excluded or restricted for projects dealt with under Part 3A. The requirements
relating to water use, management and activity approvals under the Water
Management Act 2000 (NSW) (‘WMA 2000’) are excluded under section 75U(h)
although there is no mention of similar provisions that relate to water management
under the Water Act 1912 (NSW) (‘WA 1912’). This is an interesting omission for water
infrastructure projects in the Sydney Region but arguably of no practical consequence
when the scheme of Part 3A comes into play.
Section 75T prohibits the taking of proceedings in the Land and Environment Court and
making of orders by a Court under Division 3 of Part 6 of the EP&A Act 1979; under
sections 252 or 253 of the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (NSW)
(‘POEOA 1997’); and under section 20(2) of the Land and Environment Court Act 1979
(NSW) in respect of critical infrastructure projects except on application made or
approved by the Minister.
For a simplified and streamlined process it all seems a little bewildering. An alarming
collection of documentation associated with the assessment processes for major water
infrastructure projects in the Sydney Region has been made available on the
Department of Planning website and will not be reviewed here. The EP&A Act 1979
dates from 1979. Part 3A and the two SEPP’s are from a new century trying to adapt
the old to suit the new. Nevertheless they have in practice whisked major projects out
of the general approvals processes to cloak them with a degree of immunity from open
and transparent scrutiny.
29

Ibid s 75M.
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Sydney Barrister Tim Robertson summed up the practical effects of the Part 3A
provisions in colourful terms that a disenfranchised public could appreciate:
[The Government has] taken a huge area of development decision-making … where
power had been previously diffused amongst the community and in community
leadership nodes such as local government and … concentrated that power in the
hands of one person. And that person’s decision-making is essentially ungovernable.
The court can only police the boundaries of it, it can only police legality. But there is
really no merits review of that decision any longer, because the Government has cut
out merits review by appointing panels or by requiring concept plans to be prepared,
both of which are steps taken for the purpose of preventing judicial review of
Government’s decisions. And in the case of major infrastructure projects, which the
Government decides are important enough to classify as such, there is no right of
appeal by anybody for any reason and the implementation of those projects even in
breach of conditions applied by the minister … is uncontrollable by the courts.30

When introducing the Part 3A amendments to the NSW Parliament Craig Knowles had
prefaced his comments by saying that the wellbeing of the State’s economy depended
on ‘business being able to work with certainty, a minimum of risk, low transaction
costs, and appropriate levels of regulation’.31 The appropriateness of a level of
regulation obviously depends on the perspective from which it is being assessed. Later
in the interview quoted above Tim Robertson was asked why, having spoken in such
damning terms of the Part 3A planning process, he would advise property developers
to invoke those provisions. His response was simple – no planning lawyer in the State
would do otherwise.32
The following discussion reviews the processes surrounding the development of the
desalination project at Kurnell demonstrating that the Part 3A provisions were an
important factor in the timely delivery of one of the Government’s most unpopular
water policy initiatives.

30

‗The Land Bribe‘, above n 1. Perhaps Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission of NSW [2010] HCA 1 might offer
some hope to open up the Part 3A provisions to judicial scrutiny. But that is an academic excursion beyond the scope
of this study.
31
New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 27 May 2005, 16332 (Craig Knowles).
32
‗The Land Bribe‘, above n 1.
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11.5

Desalination

The Kurnell desalination project provides a major new source of potable water to
augment the Sydney Region’s drinking water supply. The project involves the
extraction of seawater from the ocean near Kurnell; transfer of that salt water to a
desalination plant on adjacent land for treatment; and transfer of the drinking water
produced by the process to SWC’s reticulation network for distribution to consumers.
Initially the plant will have the capacity to provide 250ML/day of water, approximately
15% of Sydney’s water needs. The desalination plant commenced production on
28 January 2010.
The three main elements of construction associated with the project were:


the design, construction, operation and maintenance of the desalination plant and
seawater intake and outlet structures and associated infrastructure at Kurnell;



construction of a pipeline to deliver drinking water from the desalination plant at
Kurnell to SWC’s reticulation network at Erskineville; and



construction of Capital Wind Farm near Bungendore in NSW to supply renewable
energy for the desalination plant.

Planning for the possible construction of the project generated vigorous public debate,
and an ‘on-again-off-again’ political see-saw, until work commenced in 2007. This
section traces the history of the project, highlighting the core issues which arose along
the way. The discussion that follows examines the authority under which the project
has proceeded, including the mechanisms made available by the land use planning and
assessment provisions outlined in the preceding discussion. Finally, the commercial
framework governing the relationships between the parties involved in delivering the
project is outlined.
Desalination of seawater was presented as a possible additional supply of water for
the Sydney Region in the Metropolitan Water Plan 2004 (‘MWP 2004’)33. The MWP
2004 was a deliverable under the NSW National Water Initiative Implementation Plan

33

Departure of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources (NSW), Meeting the Challenges — Securing Sydney‘s
Water Future: The Metropolitan Water Plan 2004 (October 2004) (‗MWP 2004‘).
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(‘Implementation Plan’),34 part of the State’s response to meet the objectives of
paragraph 92 of the National Water Initiative (‘NWI’).35 It was an innovative strategy
that contained elements of demand management, supply augmentation and increased
recycling. Desalination was only one element of the supply augmentation measures
proposed in the MWP 2004.
The process of desalination offered a means of producing a reliable supply of good
quality water from a source that was immune to drought and climate change impacts.
However, the costs and energy usage associated with it were seen as negatives. The
MWP 2004 advised that $4 million would be spent on developing a ‘contingency plan’
to build a desalination plant in the event that the then current drought was ongoing.
Planning was to minimise environmental impacts, particularly greenhouse impacts,
and would consider options such as low-emission or renewable energy sources; using
waste heat from nearby industries; gaining synergies by combining the desalination
plant with a co-generation plant; and using offsets linked to the Greenhouse Gas
Abatement Scheme.36
The MWP 2004 was released in October 2004. By the end of April 2005, the $4 million
investigation into desalination was ‘well advanced’.37 In July 2005, the Premier, Mr
Bob Carr, announced that a plant would be constructed at Kurnell.
It would be an understatement to say that Premier Carr’s July 2005 announcement did
not receive widespread community support. In a radio interview at the time, the
Member for Wentworth, Malcolm Turnbull, offered the following comments on the
process used to reach the decision to proceed with desalination:
This is a very reckless decision…*a+ very, very bad decision. It’s been taken in complete
secrecy…what could be more important to the future of Sydney than a sustainable
water supply?
34

New South Wales Government, NSW Implementation Plan for the National Water Initiative 2006 (‗NSW
Implementation Plan‘).
35
Council of Australian Governments, Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Water Initiative (25 June 2004)
(‗NWI‘).
36
MWP 2004, above n 33. Desalination was dealt with only briefly in the MWP 2004, introducing an option not
previously openly explored for augmenting Sydney‘s water supply: at 12.
37
Progress with the planning for the desalination plant was addressed in the Joint Agencies Response to the 2005
performance audit: see New South Wales, Audit Office, ‗Planning for Sydney‘s Water Needs: Department of
Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources, Sydney Water Corporation, Sydney Catchment Authority‘:
[Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources (NSW), Sydney Water and Sydney Catchment
Authority, ‗Joint agency response to the performance audit report on Sydney‘s Water Supply‘ (27 April 2005)]
(Performance Audit, Report No 135, 4 May 2005) (‗Audit Report‘), 7-12 at 8.
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But have we had a public inquiry, have we had a discussion, have we had the
government providing information about the comparative merits of this technique, or
that technique? No, we haven’t. It’s the same old thing.
High handedness, secrecy, the public ignored, the public kept in the dark…38

Mr Turnbull’s language was emotive, and his comments unsubstantiated in the context
in which they were delivered. Nevertheless, he did reflect the mood of the time – and
raised genuine issues of concern with regard to the degree of ‘transparency’ apparent
in the decision making, and the level of accountability of the decision makers.
Premier Bob Carr resigned in August 2005 and Morris Iemma was installed as Premier.
Mr Iemma confirmed that the desalination project would proceed, and in the same
month SWC made a presentation to the Desalination Working Group of the Sutherland
Shire Council, in whose area the Kurnell section of the project was located, and
addressed questions posed by the public at that meeting.
In October 2005, SWC issued its Community Update 1 on the Sydney Desalination
Project which proudly announced that:
Sydney Water is committed to keeping the community informed about the Sydney
desalination Project.
This is the first of a series of community updates about the project.39

SWC’s Community Update 1 addressed questions posed by the public at and after the
August 2005 meeting with the Sutherland Shire Council. In response to a question
about community involvement in the process, the following answer was published:
Residents will have the opportunity to comment on the Environmental Assessment for
the desalination plant. The Department of Planning will consider the community’s
views in their final assessment and will detail measures that need to be taken to
address any issues of concern.
During the public display period of the Environmental Assessment there will be
opportunity for future meetings between the local Kurnell community and Sydney
Water.40

38

Radio 2UE, Steve Price, Interview with Malcolm Turnbull, Monday 11 July 2005.
Sydney Water Corporation, ‗Sydney Desalination Project Community Update 1‘ (October 2005).
40
Ibid.
39
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In October 2005 the proposal was declared to be a project to which Part 3A of the
EP&A Act 1979 applied.41 The Government closed the doors on effective consultation.
SWC’s Community Update 2, issued in November 200542 referred to the NSW approval
process for critical infrastructure projects, particularly a SEPP made on 31 October
2005.43 The purpose of the new SEPP was ‘to increase certainty and remove the
possibility of delays associated with the need for separate approvals under various
legislation *sic+’.44 With community input into the process expanded to include the
SEPP provisions, SWC’s Community Update 2 informed that:
Consultation with the community will provide the opportunity to comment on the
overall desalination proposal including all aspects of the proposal covered by the
SEPP.45

In November 2005, the plant was declared critical infrastructure under section 75C of
the EP&A Act 1979.46 The Environmental Assessment of the Concept Plan for Sydney’s
Desalination Project47 was placed on public exhibition for the period from
24 November 2005 to 3 February 2006.48 The Government threw away the keys to the
doors for community participation that it had already closed. But there was a surprise
in store for those concerned about proceeding with the desalination plant.
On 8 February 2006, plans to construct the desalination plant were put on hold
indefinitely, although site acquisition and pilot plant construction were to proceed.
The February 2006 Progress Report on the MWP 2004 advised that:
A desalination plant will be built if, in future, critical dam levels of around 30% are
reached. But this has an extremely low probability, because of our considerable

41

Department of Planning (NSW), Project Approval Section 75J of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act
1979 (Sydney Water Corporation, ―The Desalination Plant‖ Project, 16 November 2006), Schedule 1.
42
Sydney Water Corporation, ‗Sydney Desalination Project Community Update 2‘ (November 2005).
43
The SEPP referred to in this statement was not specified but it would have been the Major Projects SEPP.
44
Sydney Water Corporation, ‗Sydney Desalination Project Community Update 2‘ (November 2005), The Approval
Process.
45
Ibid.
46
Department of Planning (NSW), Project Approval Section 75J of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act
1979 (Sydney Water Corporation, ―The Desalination Plant‘ Project‖, 16 November 2006), Schedule 1.
47
Sydney Water Corporation, Environmental Assessment of the Concept Plan for Sydney‘s Desalination
Project, November 2005.
48
Sydney Water Corporation, ‗How can the community have a say about The Environmental Assessment‘, (Seawater
Desalination Fact Sheet 24, undated).

Chapter 11: Accommodating Major Change

239

storage capacity and the mix of other measures that we now know can secure our
water supply, including new recycling capacity and groundwater resources.

49

In its review of water reform progress in 2005 the National Water Commission (‘NWC’)
noted that the level of public consultation on Sydney’s desalination plant project had
been ‘inadequate to engender public confidence that the proposed investment will be
demonstrated to be economically and ecologically sustainable’.50 It was a harsh
verdict, but it had no obvious consequences other than a stated intent by the
Commission to monitor decisions on the project to assess the extent to which the
economic viability and ecological sustainability of the plant were established before
construction commenced.
A week is a long time in politics. The nine months from June 2005 to February 2006
illustrate some of the pitfalls of a flexible approach to implementation of the MWP
2004. In the MWP 2004 the statement of intent to progress the planning and design of
a desalination plant was accompanied by an intention to recommend strategies to
minimise environmental and greenhouse impacts51 – some ‘big ticket’ items were
addressed in passing. The objective of the initiative was to secure a state of readiness
to construct the plant ‘relatively quickly and efficiently’ if the drought continued
beyond two years52 – that is, beyond October 2006. The language of the MWP 2004
was soft, it did not mandate an outcome other than a state of readiness in
circumstances that could not be foreseen. There was no clear undertaking to
construct the plant, and there was no indication of the level of readiness that was
contemplated. 53 Discussion in Chapter 9.3 and 9.4 highlighted the lack of
transparency and accountability in the processes associated with the development of
49

Water for Life (NSW), ‗Securing Sydney‘s Water Supply: Metropolitan Water Plan‘ (Progress Report, February
2006), 13 (‗2006 Progress Report‘). See also discussion at 2-3, 13-15. The key findings of the 2006 Progress
Report supported delaying construction of a desalination plant, provided that the project was capable of
implementation within a 26 month period when needed. The independent consultants‘ advice on which the decision
was based can be found in: University of Technology Sydney Institute for Sustainable Futures, ACIL Tasman and
SMEC Australia, ‗Review of the Metropolitan Water Plan‘ (Report Forming Part of a Review of the Metropolitan
Water Plan for the NSW Cabinet Office, February 2006).
50
National Water Commission, 2005 National Competition Policy Assessment of Water Reform Progress (National
Water Commission, Canberra, April 2006), 2.52.
51
MWP 2004, above n 33, 12.
52
Ibid.
53
In response to the decision to maintain a state of readiness with plans for the desalination plant Sydney Water
Corporation (‗SWC‘) published a long list of activities that it would undertake. These included completion of the
environmental assessment process to obtain approval; engagement of consulting engineers to develop components of
the project blueprints; and establishment of two pilot plants. Other onsite activities to be undertaken included vehicle
access upgrades, surveying, fencing, erosion control and borehole drilling. For a project on hold there was a lot to be
done. See Sydney Water Corporation, ‗The next steps‘, (SW132/06) <www.sydneywater.com.au> held in hard copy.
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the MWP 2004. The public had not been brought along in the process. They had not
had a say in the mix of measures proposed in the plan. There had not been any open
discussion of the merits of otherwise of desalination as an option in the context of the
development of the plan. But that was perhaps understandable when the
Government was merely following the strategic directions it had set in a soft law
document – the MWP 2004. There remained the promise of community consultation
under the hard law of the EP&A Act. However, the major infrastructure provisions of
the EP&A Act 1979 enabled the Government to take the desalination project under the
protective wing of Part 3A and swaddle it in the clothes of a critical infrastructure
project.
On 16 November 2006, the Minister for Planning approved the concept plan for:
Construction and operation of a desalination plant on the Kurnell Peninsula and
associated infrastructure for the supply of an annual daily average production of up to
500 megalitres of drinking water per day, including:
a)

intake and outlet pipelines to draw raw seawater into the plant and return
seawater concentrate to the ocean (including tunnelling under Botany Bay
National Park);

b)

pipelines and/or tunnels from the plant across Botany Bay to the SWC water
supply system for distribution of drinking water;

c)

connection of the plant to the electricity grid; and

d)

temporary laydown areas for construction use.54

On the same day project approval was also given under section 75J of the EP&A Act
1979 for the desalination plant55 and the intake and outlet pipelines.56 Project
approval under section 75J of the EP&A Act 1979 for the ‘desalinated water delivery
system’ project was given almost a year later on 22 October 2007.57

54

Department of Planning (NSW), Concept Approval Section 75O of the Environmental Planning and Assessment
Act 1979 (Sydney Water Corporation, Application No 05_0082, 16 November 2006).
55
Department of Planning (NSW), Project Approval Section 75J of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act
1979 (Sydney Water Corporation, ‗The Desalination Plant‘ Project, 16 November 2006) [a component of the above
approved concept plan for the Kurnell Desalination Plant (05_0082)].
56
Department of Planning (NSW), Project Approval Section 75J of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act
1979, (Sydney Water Corporation, ‗The Seawater Intake and Discharge System‘ Project, 16 November 2006) [a
component of the above approved concept plan for the Kurnell Desalination Plant (05_0082)].
57
Department of Planning (NSW), Project Approval Section 75J of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act
1979, (Sydney Water Corporation, ‗The Desalinated Water Delivery System‘ Project, 22 October 2007).
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In the run-up to the February 2007 State election, with dam levels at around 35 per
cent, Premier Iemma revealed that two consortia had been invited to tender for
construction of the Kurnell desalination plant. The plant was to be capable of
delivering 125ML per day by 2009 and would be able to be upgraded to produce
500ML per day.58 The ‘indefinite’ suspension attributed to Premier Iemma had lasted
only some nine months.
The Iemma government was returned to power and the desalination project
proceeded as planned. In July 2007, with dam levels back up to around 50 per cent, a
contract for the construction of a desalination plant capable of delivering 250 ML per
day (twice the size originally stated) was signed by the government and the successful
tenderers, the BlueWater Joint Venture, and a contract to construct the water pipeline
was awarded to the Water Delivery Alliance.59
When advising of the decision, SWC confirmed that:
Sydney Water has developed a comprehensive community consultation program to
keep the community informed throughout the project and will work to minimise
disruption to residents and businesses during construction.
Extensive environmental planning and monitoring programs are in place to ensure any
potential impacts are identified and managed.60

The community was going to be kept informed about progress on the project!
Finally in July 2007, after the desalination plant project and the intake and outlet
valves had been approved under the EP&A Act 1979, SWC was directed under section
20P of the State Owned Corporations Act 1989 (NSW) to arrange for:
1. The construction of a desalination plant on the Kurnell Peninsula (and associated
infrastructure) for the supply of an annual daily average production of up to 250 megalitres of drinking water per day (scaleable to 500 mega-litres per day)…; and

58

Anne Davies, ‗Water Wars: it‘s the Sea or Underground‘, Sydney Morning Herald, (Sydney), 7 February 2007, 1.
The plant is currently producing 125 ML/day and has the capacity to produce 250ML/day. A second plant of an
equivalent size could be built to boost total production to 500ML/day.
59
Two principal contracts for the desalination plant were executed on 18 July 2007 and others at later dates: Sydney
Water Corporation, An introduction to Sydney‘s desalination plant contracts including October 2008 amendments,
(25 November 2008), <http://www.sydneywater.com.au/EnsuringTheFuture/Desalination> Documents available at
(1 December 2010) <http://www.sydneywater.com.au/Water4Life/Desalination/overalldocumentation.cfm> . Work
was to begin in July 2007 and take 26 months to complete.
60
Sydney Water Corporation, ‗Contract signed for Sydney‘s desalination project‘, (Media Release, 19 July 2007).
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2. The construction of distribution pipelines capable of delivering 500 mega-litres per day
across Botany Bay for connection with Sydney Water’s existing distribution network…61

The relevant activities were to be undertaken in accordance with any approvals issued
under the EP&A Act 1979. The direction was made on the basis that the Minister for
Water Utilities was satisfied that exceptional circumstances rendered it necessary in
the public interest to do so. In giving reasons for making the direction, the Minister
also acknowledged that planning approval for the activities would be conditional on
the purchase of ‘100% accredited renewable energy’.
Construction management plans were approved by the NSW Department of Planning
in August 2007 to allow major construction works to commence.62 In November 2007,
the NSW government announced a shortlist of tenderers for the renewable energy
contract to supply the desalination plant.
In April 2008 SWC was directed to ‘arrange for’ the operation of the desalination plant
at maximum capacity (being 250ML a day) for the initial two-year period and then in
accordance with an operating regime that would be determined by the Government.63
Perhaps the horse had already bolted from the SWC stable by the time that the section
20P directions were given. It is open to debate whether, until the section 20P notice
was published, SWC was operating beyond the functions and powers conferred on it
by the Sydney Water Act 1994 (NSW) (‘SWA 1994’). SWC’s functions are to provide,
construct, operate, manage or maintain systems or services for storing or supplying
water; providing sewerage services; providing stormwater drainage systems; or
disposing of wastewater.64 SWC had historically supplied drinking water to the Sydney
Region from storage dams in the catchment, and its operations had largely been landbased.65 It can be argued that the excursion offshore into ocean waters involved SWC
in a whole new enterprise. Suddenly, SWC became the supplier of bulk water
(seawater not water from a rain-fed source) to a treatment plant (the desalination
plant); a provider of infrastructure to deliver treated water from that plant to a
61

New South Wales Government, New South Wales Government Gazette, No. 94, 27 July 2007, 4913-4914.
Sydney Water Corporation, ‗Construction on Sydney‘s desalination plant‘, (Media Release, 31 August 2007).
63
New South Wales Government, New South Wales Government Gazette, No. 40, 4 April 2008, 2641.
64
See Sydney Water Act 1994 (NSW) (‗SWA 1994‘) s 12(1). See also Chapter 13.3 on page 278 and Chapter 13.4.1
on page 289.
65
Note that Sydney Water Corporation uses ocean outfalls to discharge stormwater and treated sewage to the ocean
in the Sydney Region.
62
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distribution network (a pipeline owner); and finally a purchaser of drinking water from
a non-traditional source for supply in the Sydney Region. Some of these activities were
not contemplated by the SWA 1994.
However the State Owned Corporations Act 1989 (NSW) (SOCA) does provide a means
to further expand SWC’s functions in certain circumstances. The Minister may, with
the approval of the Treasurer, notify the board of SWC of a public sector policy that is
to apply to it and to its subsidiaries if the Minister is satisfied that it is necessary to give
such notification in the public interest.66 Another provision of the SOCA enables the
Minister to give directions to the board of SWC if satisfied that, because of exceptional
circumstances, it is necessary to give such a direction in the public interest.67 The
relevant order with respect to the desalination plant was made under the latter
provision.
The wording of the direction issued under section 20P of the State Owned
Corporations Act 1989 (NSW) was significant. SWC was to ‘arrange for’ certain
activities to take place and that is specifically what it did. SWC was not going to carry
out the activities. ‘Arrangements’ made for the construction, operation and
development of the desalination plant included engagement of the Blue Water Joint
Venture to design, build, operate and maintain the plant for 20 years; establishment of
a wholly-owned subsidiary of SWC, Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd,68 to own the
plant; entry into an Alliance Agreement for the design and construction of a pipeline to
deliver desalinated water to SWC’s water supply network; and contractual
arrangements with the wind power generator69 to meet the green energy obligations
attaching to the development consent.

66

State Owned Corporations Act 1989 (NSW) (‗SOCA‘) s 20O sets out the procedure to be followed by the portfolio
Minister in relation to such notifications.
67
Ibid. The procedure to be followed by the Minister when issuing directions is set out in s 20O. The SOCA
provisions relating to the giving of directions are reinforced by SWA 1994 s 93A when action is warranted on grounds
of urgency, public health or public safety. In particular, a direction given in such circumstances will override
inconsistent terms and conditions in SWC‘s operating licence: SWA 1994 s 93A(5). SOCA s 33AA provides that a
director of the board of a State-owned Corporation does not incur any personal liability for compliance with public
sector policy notifications or directions.
68
See discussion of Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd in Chapter 13.4.3 on page 296.
69
In May 2008, Babcock & Brown Wind Partners and Babcock & Brown Power were revealed as the successful
tenderers for the renewable energy project. See: Sydney Water Corporation, ‗Preferred tenderer announced for
desalination plant renewable energy contract‘, (Media Release, 13 May 2008).
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11.6

Discussion

In this chapter ‘hard law’ instruments appeared in the formal approvals processes
embodied in the environmental planning and assessment legislation in NSW, and the
legislation that enables SWC, a statutory State-owned Corporation, to expand its
activities into new arenas. Contractual obligations between SWC and its specific
purpose subsidiary and the private sector operators are examples of contractual hard
law. Hard law contracts also influence the relationship between SWC and SDP.
The activities regulated by this hard law are promoted under the ‘soft law’ instruments.
Soft law plans (the MWP 2004 and the MWP 2006) that embodied responses to
nationally agreed water reforms (the soft law of the 1994 COAG Water Reform
Framework and the NWI) are now being implemented in the Sydney Region. These
plans have been powerful tools to drive development in difficult directions and often
against a tide of public outrage. Planning legislation – that is the hard law process –
has been adapted to smooth the path for major projects, simplifying formal approval
processes and tailoring public consultation processes to desired and perhaps
manageable levels, at least from the Government’s perspective.
The speed and apparent ease with which decisions on the scale of the desalination
plant could be taken, and retracted, and resurrected when considered ‘appropriate’,
raise questions of credibility and sound science. Perhaps most importantly, a new
source of water to provide potentially up to 30 per cent of the Sydney Region’s
drinking water needs might reasonably be expected to be an integral part of formal
water planning for the region. By the time the decision to proceed with construction
of the plant and associated infrastructure had been taken, the community of the
Sydney Region might reasonably have expected that the concept would have
constituted an identifiable and significant element of an integrated water
management plan for the Sydney Region under the WMA 2000. But it was not. The
community of the Sydney Region might also have thought that the contribution to be
made by the project to the urban water cycle would have been a factor in the water
sharing rules for the region under the umbrella of a regional water management plan
developed under the WMA 2000. But, again, it was not.
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Chapter 12: The Services Sydney Experience
It can be concluded that Services Sydney’s proposed entry plan is extremely ambitious, but we
1
cannot be satisfied that it is not either technically or financially viable.

12.1

Introduction

Sydney Water Corporation (‘SWC’) and Sydney Catchment Authority (‘SCA’) are the
principal public water utilities presently operating in the Sydney Region. They were
established for specific purposes: SWC to supply drinking water and provide
wastewater treatment and disposal services and SCA to supply bulk water and to
manage its catchment area. The services provided by SWC and SCA are described in
Chapter 2 and the infrastructure associated with their activities is illustrated in Figures
2.2–2.5.
Ambitious policy initiatives enunciated by Commonwealth and State Governments in
the 1990s called for competition in the water sector.2 These reform initiatives meant
that the incumbents could be challenged for opportunities to participate in the
provision of water services in the Sydney Region if operators in the private sector were
so inclined.
However, in order to be in the business of supplying water or dealing with wastewater,
a new operator needed to be able to move water or wastewater around the Sydney
Region. The creation of additional infrastructure capacity to do this might not be
possible or economical from a new operator’s viewpoint. The alternative was to seek
approval to access and use appropriate existing infrastructure operated by SWC and
SCA for these purposes, but incumbent operators might not be enthusiastic about
sharing their infrastructure. A new operator could attempt to negotiate terms to use
existing facilities to conduct its business. If negotiations failed, then it was in the
interests of an efficient economy to provide a regulatory solution.

1

Application by Services Sydney Pty Ltd [2005] ACompT 7 [151].
The role of the National Competition Policy in the development and implementation of water management policy in
the Sydney Region is discussed in Chapter 5. In the National Water Initiative all Australian Governments agreed to
implement urban water reforms to encourage the re-use and recycling of wastewater and innovation in water supply
sourcing, treatment, storage and discharge: Council of Australian Governments, Intergovernmental Agreement on a
National Water Initiative (25 June 2004) (‗NWI‘) paras 90 iii) and v).
2
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The Competition Principles Agreement was one component of the framework of
intergovernmental agreements that underpinned the sweeping reforms of the
National Competition Policy (‘NCP’) agreed to by all Australian governments in April
1995.3 Clause 6 of the Competition Principles Agreement anticipated the introduction
by the Commonwealth of a legislative regime to provide for third party access to
significant infrastructure services. That regime was established in Part IIIA of the Trade
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (‘TPA 1974’).
In 1998 a company was formed with the ambition of entering the water industry in the
Sydney Region. It professed to bring with it a visionary approach to future water and
wastewater management, or at least an interesting alternative to the long-term plans
of the incumbent operator. Ten years later the company still existed, but its market
potential had been greatly impacted by developments along the way. The company
struggled to gain access to the relevant infrastructure of SWC over an extended and
tortuous legal course but, in the end, policies and events had moved so significantly
that it withdrew from active interest and now it is no longer a player in the water
market of the Sydney Region. This chapter follows the progress of the company down
the long road to access. It was the first private operator to seek access to water and
wastewater infrastructure under the Commonwealth legislative regime. Its
endeavours paved the way for the introduction in NSW of a legislative regime to
facilitate third party access to water and wastewater infrastructure in the form of the
Water Industry Competition Act 2006 (NSW) (‘WICA 2006’).4
12.2

The Services Sydney Pty Ltd Story5

Services Sydney Pty Ltd (‘Services Sydney’), an Australian-owned infrastructure
development company, was established in 1998 to implement solutions for sewage
and water management in New South Wales.6 It professed to have access to

3

The National Competition Policy and the water reforms incorporated in it are discussed in Chapter 5 of Part II of
this study.
4
The access provisions of the Water Industry Competition Act 2006 (‗WICA 2006‘) are examined in Chapter 13.
5
The summary of events surrounding the Services Sydney Pty Ltd (‗Services Sydney‘) project is based on
information taken from National Competition Council, ‗Application by Services Sydney for Declaration of Sewage
Transmission and Interconnection Services Provided by Sydney Water‘ (Final Recommendation, 1 December 2004)
(‗NCC Final Recommendation‘) and from submissions made by the parties in the course of the proceedings.
6
Services Sydney Pty Ltd, ‗Applications under Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 Requesting
Recommendation that Sewage Transmission and Interconnection Services Provided by Sydney Water Corporation
Ltd be Declared‘ (1 March 2004), 2 (‗Services Sydney Applications‘).
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experience in a range of industries and could draw on solid financial, legal, engineering,
development, construction and business expertise.7
In October 1997 SWC had published its Water Plan 218, a long-term strategic plan for
providing water and wastewater services in the Sydney Region. In response, Services
Sydney conducted a review of SWC’s sewerage system and operations and developed a
proposal, known as Sustaining the City, for wastewater treatment and management as
an alternative to Water Plan 21.
The four key areas of Water Plan 21 set out specific actions to protect the rivers;
protect the beaches and oceans; to recycle water and biosolids; and to reduce wet
weather sewage overflows. Services Sydney’s proposal envisaged the establishment of
a new ‘state-of-the-art’ water reclamation plant, new trunk main sewers for the
transmission of sewage to interconnection points with specific parts of the SWC
system and, in phase two of the proposal (the Water to Rivers Project), the
construction of water conduits to return tertiary treated water to the base of the
catchment dams to supply environmental flows.9 The success of its enterprise was
premised on obtaining access to some of SWC’s infrastructure services. According to
Services Sydney the benefits of its proposal included


the introduction of lower cost sewage treatment facilities



immediate reduction in the disposal of contaminated sewage through ocean
outfalls



utilisation of renewable energy generated by the sewage treatment process



use of tertiary treated water as environmental flows



enhancement of sustainable water management by freeing up potable supply



long term potential for high quality reclaimed water for use in drinking water
supply



potential closure of ocean outfalls.10

In May 1999 Services Sydney began discussions with SWC in relation to six major
projects which were key components of Sustaining the City. The parties entered into a
7

Services Sydney, About us (March 2008) <http://www.waterworks.net.au/About-Us.asp>.
Sydney Water Corporation, Water Plan 21 (October 1997).
9
Services Sydney Applications, above n 6, 12.
10
Ibid 2.
8
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Heads of Agreement in October 1999 which, according to Services Sydney, set out the
basis of further development of the projects, the ownership of development rights and
a common objective to proceed with implementation if studies were positive.11 The
two parties commissioned a prefeasibility study which, according to Services Sydney,
recommended detailed feasibility studies be undertaken on the basis that:
No significant impediments or flaws have been identified. There are significant
potential benefits for Sydney Water from each of the system elements across all of the
technical, environmental, social, regulatory and project financing aspects.12

However, according to Services Sydney, SWC subsequently terminated the agreement
it had with Services Sydney and confirmed its intention to proceed with Water Plan 21.
Sustaining the City, with some modifications, was again presented by Services Sydney
to the New South Wales Government in September 2002 with a view to implementing
the plan as a public-private partnership. Although government investigations
recommended further consideration of the plan, it was not taken any further by
SWC.13 According to SWC, since 1998 there had been ‘extensive engagement’ with
Services Sydney. SWC’s ultimate view of events as presented to the NCC was
somewhat different from that of Services Sydney: it was adamant that although it did
not pursue the Sustaining the City Proposal, there had been no request by Services
Sydney for, and subsequent denial by SWC of, access to its water infrastructure
services. 14
Nevertheless on 3 March 2004 Services Sydney lodged an application under Part IIIA of
the TPA 1974 with the National Competition Council (‘NCC’). If its application were
successful, Services Sydney intended not only to implement the various elements of
Sustaining the City, but to compete with SWC to provide sewage collection services to

11

Ibid 13.
Ibid. The quote from Connell Wagner Report of 2000 appears at 13.
13
Ibid 14.
14
See Sydney Water Corporation, ‗National Competition Council‘s Draft Recommendations on the Application by
Services Sydney for Declaration of Sewage Transmission and Interconnection Services Provided by Sydney Water
Corporation‘ (Submission to National Competition Council in response to Draft Recommendation, November 2004),
29 (‗SWC Submission on Services Sydney Draft Recommendation‘). It is not a precondition for an application for
declaration under the national regime that access must have been sought – see NCC Final Recommendation, above n
5, [6.66], 43. The provisions of the NSW water infrastructure access regime established by the WICA 2006 do
include such a requirement: see discussion below in Chapter 13.
12
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residential, commercial and industrial customers in parts of Sydney. Access to the
services was a prerequisite to the introduction of competition.15
The following sections outline the procedures invoked by Services Sydney in an
attempt to gain access under the TPA 1974 to services necessary for the
implementation of its plan. The discussion focuses on those issues which are pertinent
to the current examination of urban water regulation and so it does not examine the
interpretation of the TPA 1974 declaration criteria in depth, nor the detailed economic
analyses contained in the decisions.
12.3

Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) –Access to services

The stated objective of the TPA 1974 was to enhance the welfare of Australians
through the promotion of competition and fair trading and the protection of
consumers.16
Part IIIA of the TPA 1974 established a national legislative regime to facilitate third
party access to services provided by major infrastructure facilities that were
uneconomic to duplicate where access was needed to promote competition. The
regime established a legal right to share the use of such services on reasonable terms
and conditions.17 It was to operate in the absence of an effective access regime in the
jurisdiction in which access was sought, and in respect of services which were not the
subject of an access undertaking.18 At the time of Services Sydney’s application, New
South Wales did not have an effective access regime in place nor had an access
undertaking been given in relation to those services.19
The outline of the provisions of Part IIIA of the TPA 1974 set out in the following
paragraphs covers those sections that are relevant to the Services Sydney matter.

15

Services Sydney Applications, above n 6, 3.
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (‗TPA 1974‘), s 2.
17
See National Competition Council ‗Third party access‘ <http://www.ncc.gov.au/articleZone.asp?article
ZoneID=64> (‗Third Party Access‘) in para 1 where the National Competition Council (‗NCC‘) states that Part IIIA
establishes a ‗legal right for third parties to share the use of …infrastructure services‘.
18
TPA 1974 s 44G.
19
National Competition Council, ‗Application by Services Sydney for Declaration of Sewage Transmission and
Interconnection Services Provided by Sydney Water‘ (Issues Paper, April 2004), 27(‗Services Sydney Issues Paper‘);
Application by Services Sydney Pty Ltd [2005] ACompT 7 [191]. Declaration of NSW‘s access regime (established
in the WICA 2006) as an ‗effective regime‘ under the national framework is discussed in Chapter 13. See also
submissions relating to the application for declaration in Appendix: Related Papers A and B.
16
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One way access to infrastructure services can be achieved under Part IIIA is through
the declaration procedure,20 although the declaration itself does not grant access. The
initial step under Part IIIA is to seek a declaration which provides a right for Services
Sydney, or any other party requiring access, to negotiate terms and conditions of
access with the service provider, in this case SWC, for access to the declared services.
If negotiations fail, the second stage of the process provides the opportunity for the
access seeker to go to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (‘ACCC’)
to arbitrate the dispute. 21
Under Division 2 of Part IIIA a party seeking access to a service may apply to the NCC to
recommend that a service be ‘declared’:
Declaration helps to ‘open a door’ to increased competition. Whether or not potential
competitors choose to avail themselves of that opportunity is not a matter directly
relevant to the application of the declaration criteria.22

A recommendation under this part is to be made by the NCC to the ‘designated
Minister’. The designated Minister is the Premier where the service provider is a State
body and the State is a party to the Competition Principles Agreement, as is the case
with SWC and the State of NSW.23
The NCC cannot recommend the declaration of a service unless it is satisfied that all of
the following declaration criteria set out in TPA 1974 section 44G(2) are met:
(a)

that access (or increased access) to the service would promote a material increase
in24 competition in at least one market…other than the market for the service;

(b)

that it would be uneconomical for anyone to develop another facility to provide
the service;25

20

Access may also be achieved through an existing access regime (see TPA 1974 Div 2A) in the jurisdiction in which
access is sought or under the terms of voluntary undertakings (see TPA 1974 Div 6) given by service providers.
21
See Third Party Access, above n 17. The NCC refers to declaration establishing ‗a right for any party to negotiate
terms and conditions of access‘ and giving ‗an access seeker the right to seek binding arbitration‘. However, there is
no clear statement in the legislation of the effect of declaration of services, or of any rights in relation to the services
which may arise from declaration.
22
Services Sydney Issues Paper, above n 19, 16.
23
See TPA 1974 s 44D.
24
Note that this provision was amended in 2006 by the Trade Practices Amendment (National Access Regime) Act
2006 (Cth). At the time of the Services Sydney application the words ‗a material increase in‘ were not included in
this declaration criterion. The effect of the amendment was to ensure that a declaration would only be made where
the competition flowing from it was non-trivial, an approach which according to the NCC formalised its historical
practice (National Competition Council, Annual Report 2005-2006, (Commonwealth of Australia, Melbourne, 2006),
5.
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(c)

that the facility is of national significance, having regard to :
(i) the size of the facility; or
(ii) the importance of the facility to constitutional trade or commerce; or
(iii) the importance of the facility to the national economy;

(d)

that access to the service can be provided without undue risk to human health or
safety;

(e)

that access to the service is not already the subject of an effective access regime;

(f)

that access (or increased access) to the service would not be contrary to the public
interest.

The TPA 1974 sets out target time limits for the NCC to make a recommendation under
the part and procedures to be followed in determining whether or not to make a
recommendation.26 Upon receipt of a recommendation for declaration, the
designated Minister must either declare the service, or not declare it, in accordance
with the provisions of the TPA 197427 and within the time limits set out in s 44JA.
Section 44HA(1) requires the designated Minister to publish decisions and reasons for
decisions. However, if there is no publication of a decision within the prescribed time,
the designated Minister is taken to have decided not to declare, and to have published
that decision not to declare, the service.28
If the designated Minister decides not to declare a service, or is deemed to have so
decided, the applicant for declaration may apply to the Australian Competition
Tribunal (‘Competition Tribunal’) for a review of the decision. A review by the
Competition Tribunal is a re-consideration of the matter – it is a merits review.29 The
Competition Tribunal has the same powers as the designated Minister for the purposes
of the review.30 All of the declaration criteria set out in s 44H(4) of the TPA 1974,
which are identical to those in s 44G(2) as set out above, must be satisfied before the
Competition Tribunal can declare the services. The Competition Tribunal expands upon
its powers with regard to reconsideration saying that it ‘is not an appeal and the

25

This criterion is referred to as the ‗natural monopoly‘ criterion. ―The facility is a natural monopoly if the facility
exhibits economies of scale over the entire range of reasonably foreseeable demand for the service‖: Services Sydney
Issues Paper, above n 19, 12.
26
TPA 1974 ss 44GA, 44GB, 44GC.
27
Ibid ss 44H, 44HA.
28
Ibid s 44H(9).
29
See the discussion of merits review in Chapter 3.4.3 on page 46.
30
TPA 1974 sub-ss 44K(2), (4), (5).
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tribunal can consider new information and evidence that was not available to the NCC
or the minister’31. Further the Competition Tribunal states that:
The tribunal is an administrative body, not bound by the rules of evidence. It can
receive such material from such sources and in such manner as it sees fit.32

The Competition Tribunal may either affirm the designated Minister’s decision not to
declare the service, or set aside the decision and declare the service.33
When a service has been declared, the access seeker has the right to negotiate the
specific terms of access with the service provider. If negotiations fail, s 44S(1) of the
TPA 1974 provides that:
If a third party is unable to agree with the provider on one or more aspects of access to
a declared service, either the provider or the third party may notify the Commission in
writing that an access dispute exists…

The consequence of such notification, unless it is withdrawn, is an arbitrated
determination of terms by the ACCC. A determination of a dispute by the ACCC may
deal with:
any matter relating to access by the third party to the service, including matters that
were not the basis for notification of the dispute. By way of example, the
determination may:
(a)

require the provider to provide access to the service by the third party;

(b)

require the third party to accept, and pay for, access to the service;

(c)

specify the terms and conditions of the third party’s access to the service;

(d)

require the provider to extend the facility;

(da)

require the provider to permit interconnection to the facility by the third

party;
(e)

specify the extent to which the determination overrides an earlier
determination relating to access to the service by the third party.34

The TPA 1974 sets out circumstances in which the ACCC must not make a
determination35 and specifies ten matters which must be taken into account in making
31

Application by Services Sydney Pty Ltd [2005] ACompT 7 [9].
Ibid 159.
33
TPA 1974 s 44K(8)
34
Ibid 44V(2).
35
Ibid s 44W.
32
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a final determination36 although the ACCC has considerable discretion to consider
other matters that it may consider relevant37. There is provision to apply for review of
a determination to the Competition Tribunal38 and a right to appeal on a question of
law to the Federal Court from a decision of the Competition Tribunal39 .
The Part IIIA provisions are designed to ‘provide a framework and guiding principles to
encourage a consistent approach to access regulation’40. There is no doubt that they
provide an expansive framework for access regulation. The interpretation of these
provisions, by the NCC, the Competition Tribunal and ACCC, provides comprehensive
guidance for their application. Whether or not a consistent approach has been
fostered in the development of an access regime in relation to water infrastructure in
NSW is considered in Chapter 13.
The Services Sydney application for a declaration of services provided by SWC
sewerage infrastructure, and the subsequent application for a review of the deemed
decision of the designated Minister, will now be explored. The proceedings illustrate
the importance of adjudicated interpretation in giving meaning and effect to the
legislative provisions of Part IIIA in specific circumstances.
12.4

The Services Sydney Application to the National Competition Council

Services Sydney was seeking a recommendation for the declaration under the TPA
1974 of services provided by SWC. In the Services Sydney Applications41 the services
were described as:
(1)

a service for the transmission of sewage via Sydney Water’s Sewage
Reticulation Network from the Customer Collection Points to the
Interconnection Points (Transmission Service); and

(2)

a service for connection of new trunk main sewers owned and operated by
Services Sydney to the existing Sydney Sewage Reticulation Network at the
Interconnection Points (Interconnection Service).42

36

Ibid s 44X.
Ibid. See TPA 1974 s 44X(2) in relation to Final determinations and s 44X(3) in relation to Interim determinations.
38
Ibid s 44ZP.
39
Ibid s 44ZR.
40
Ibid s 44AA(b). This objects clause was inserted in 2006 by the Trade Practices Amendment (National Access
Regime) Act 2006 (Cth).
41
Services Sydney Applications, above n 6, 17 [6.1].
37
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While the NCC’s examination of each of the declaration criteria is not explored in detail
here, those issues which arose in relation to matters of policy and regulatory reform
will be considered to assess the impact of the proceedings on the emergence of a
state-based access regime in the water sector in NSW.
After Services Sydney’s application was lodged in March 2004, and before the Final
determination of the NCC was handed down, the NSW Government released The
Metropolitan Water Plan 2004 (‘MWP 2004’)43. The MWP 2004 hinted at the part to
be played by the private sector in relation to recycling, saying that regulations to
protect public health should ‘not raise unnecessary barriers to innovation by private
developers and service providers’44. However the plan did not set out any detailed
framework for the production and use of recycled water, or for private sector
participation in that part of the water industry.
In its original submission to the NCC, SWC was adamant that policy was the prerogative
of government and not the industry incumbent. It was at pains to distance itself from
any potential involvement in making policy decisions stating:
The NSW Government is responsible for policy development and regulatory standards
in the area of water management … Sydney Water does not seek to articulate a
particular policy outcome. In addition, the NSW Government has a process for
evaluating private sector involvement in Government projects … The underlying merit
of the Services Sydney proposal is a matter of policy for the NSW Government to
determine and is not an issue on which Sydney Water expresses any view.45

The NCC released a draft recommendation in November 2004 (Draft Recommendation)
in favour of the declaration sought by Services Sydney.46 In its submission in response
to the Draft Recommendation, SWC referred to the ‘NSW Government’s program for …
facilitating further private sector participation in the provision of Sydney’s water and

42

NCC Final Recommendation, above n 5, 3.
Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources (NSW), Meeting the challenges – Securing Sydney‘s
water future: The Metropolitan Water Plan 2004 (October 2004) (‗MWP 2004‘).
44
Ibid 15.
45
Sydney Water Corporation, ‗Application by Services Sydney for Declaration of Sewage Transmission and
Interconnection Services Provided by Sydney Water‘ (Submission to the National Competition Council, June 2004)
(‗SWC Initial Submission‘), 1.
46
National Competition Council, ‗Application by Services Sydney for Declaration of Sewage Transmission and
Interconnection Services Provided by Sydney Water‘ (Draft Recommendation, 12 August 2004) (‗Services Sydney
Draft Recommendation‘).
43
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sewerage services’.47 SWC relied on the framework for providing water and
wastewater services in Sydney set out in the MWP 2004 to argue that access should
not be driven by specific access proposals such as that put forward by Services Sydney.
SWC went further to say that a broad approach access was ‘important to ensure that
the market structure and access arrangements reflect Government policy for these
services and facilitate efficient production and consumption decisions’.48
The SWC submission on the Draft Recommendation devoted an entire section to water
policy, setting out SWC’s position on the development of competitive models in its
industry and what it saw as the key components of reform necessary to achieve
efficiency.49 From the outset, SWC stated that it ‘supports the introduction of
appropriate market structures and competition reforms’, at least when they were part
of an overarching framework and not in response to a specific proposal.
Frontier Economics was engaged by SWC to prepare a report in response to the Draft
Recommendation.50 SWC noted its support for the report and presented it to the NCC
to assist it in its deliberations. In its Final Recommendation the NCC commented:
much of Frontier Economics’ analysis appears relevant to the broader policy question
of what is the most efficient manner in which to structure a water and wastewater
industry. This is largely a matter for governments and is beyond the scope of criterion
(a). The issue under criterion (a) is not whether declaration will lead to the
implementation of the most efficient structure. Rather, it is whether access through
declaration will promote competition; that is, lead to an improvement in the
opportunities and environment for competition.51

The NCC accepted that it is not appropriate to limit declaration of a service such that it
meets only a single business model. Accordingly, the NCC determined that the
application was in respect of a sewage transportation service and an interconnection
service as applying to any part of the relevant facility, a result which would potentially

47

SWC Submission on Services Sydney Draft Recommendation, above n 14 , 4 [1.3].
Ibid 3 [1.2].
49
Ibid 6 [2.1].
50
Ibid 4, [1.3]: SWC refers to a report prepared by Frontier Economics.
51
NCC Final Recommendation, above n 5, 37, [6.45]. This sentiment was echoed in the NCC‘s consideration of the
NSW application for certification of the access regime established in the WICA 2006: see discussion in Chapter 13.
48
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open up the opportunity for access seekers, other than Services Sydney alone, to enter
the industry.52
The NCC also determined that Services Sydney’s application in fact sought six
declarations in respect of two services (a transportation service53 and an
interconnection service)54 provided by three facilities (the North Head, Bondi and
Malabar Reticulation Networks).55
In its issues paper the NCC noted that it was
unaware of any examples internationally where competing treatment facilities are
serviced by a common reticulation system. There are however examples, in the United
Kingdom in particular, of different infrastructure operators operating geographically
distinct reticulation systems and treatment facilities. There are also examples of inset
appointments whereby sewage is treated, typically on-site, using facilities provided by
entities other than the provider of the reticulation system.56

Not only was the Services Sydney application the first to seek access to water industry
infrastructure under the national regime, the proposed development was one which
was without precedent internationally.
SWC’s submissions on the Draft Recommendation also focused on its concerns about
the likely costs associated with the implementation of reforms necessary to permit the
development contemplated by Services Sydney. SWC submitted that the costs likely to
be incurred included:
(a)

the policy making and regulatory costs associated with setting up the
necessary regime, including redrafting legislation, establishing and redrafting
licences, designing regulatory arrangements, advising consumers of any new
rights and responsibilities; and

52

Ibid 12, [4.8].
Ibid. The term ‗transportation service‘ was used by the NCC in preference to the term ‗transmission service‘ in
response to SWC‘s submission concerning the appropriate industry terminology: at [4.7].
54
Ibid 13, [4.11].
55
Ibid. The document sets out the full text of the declarations: at 19, [4.30]. The NCC noted that the TPA 1974 does
not define a facility but referred to the Sydney Airports decision where the Competition Tribunal said that ‗a facility
for the purposes of the Act is a physical asset (or set of assets) essential for service provision‘: at 14, [4.12]. Further
the NCC noted that despite a degree of economic linkage between the three facilities, there was only a marginal
physical and operational connection between the three, hence access to any one of the three in isolation would be
meaningful: at 18, [4.25].
56
Services Sydney Issues Paper, above n 19, 20.
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(b)

administrative costs such as those involved in establishing and monitoring
complex contracts and metering and payment costs.57

SWC advised that it was pursuing a number of recycled water initiatives contained in
the MWP 2004. However, there was little if any support for private sector involvement,
or indication that the private sector would have significant participation in these
initiatives, other than in smaller endeavours.58
It is interesting to contemplate what SWC’s position would have been if the current
version of the Metropolitan Water Plan (‘MWP 2006’)59 had been in place at the time.
Chapter 9 of the MWP 2006 addressed the challenge of ‘Creating a dynamic and
competitive water industry’, including the question of access to infrastructure. In its
introduction, the NSW Government stated that the MWP 2006 included:
details [of] a range of existing and proposed reforms designed to encourage the
participation of the private sector in water and wastewater services in Sydney. Private
sector involvement is expected to lead to significant innovation in metropolitan water
service provision .…
These reforms are key elements of a comprehensive package to facilitate innovative
water recycling by the private sector.60

SWC would have had trouble suggesting that Services Sydney’s proposal did not fit
within the expected outcomes envisaged by the policy embodied in that introductory
statement. Indeed, the Services Sydney proposal would have certainly fallen within the
bounds of the overarching policy framework of the MWP 2006.
The concept of sewer mining was also a focus of SWC’s submissions to the NCC.61 SWC
noted that no declaration was necessary for sewer mining. SWC explained the Services
Sydney proposal in an attempt to distinguish it from the practice of sewer mining:
in addition to taking the average waste load sewerage (sic) from the main trunk
network, [Services Sydney] wants to negotiate with waste producers (ie: customers) to
acquire their waste at the boundary trap and then use the transport services of Sydney
57

SWC Submission on Services Sydney Draft Recommendation, above n 14, 7, [2.1].
Ibid. See also MWP 2004, above n 43, 13-15.
59
Water for Life (NSW), 2006 Metropolitan Water Plan (April 2006) (‗MWP 2006‘).
60
Ibid 109.
61
Services Sydney Issues Paper, above n 19, 8: Sewer mining relies on the right to connect into a transportation
network, not to use the transportation service. The NCC noted that there had been no instances of sewer mining
likening the system operated by the Sydney Olympic Authority to an inset arrangement rather than sewer mining.
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Water to take it from the customer’s boundary trap to a point along the main trunk
sewer where an average load of waste, equal to the relevant customer’s volumes,
would be taken. Services Sydney then proposes to treat it as it would if it had sought
simply to pursue sewer mining.62

It is the proposed acquisition of sewage directly from customers and then the use of
SWC’s infrastructure to transport the sewage to an extraction point that distinguishes
the Services Sydney proposal from the process of sewer mining – which simply involves
physically accessing and extracting the sewage from the infrastructure. There is no use
of the transport service involved in sewer mining and hence, at least on the NCC’s
analysis, no issue of access. On the basis of SWC’s description of the process of sewer
mining in the course of the proceedings, the NCC took the view that:
There is no right of access. The terms and conditions of access (other than as to price)
are entirely a matter of negotiation between Sydney Water and the prospective sewer
miner. Failure to reach agreement would result in no access being given. In contrast,
declaration of the interconnection service would confer a right of access such that
failure to reach agreement would entitle the parties to seek arbitration by the ACCC of
the terms and conditions of access under Part IIIA of the TPA 1974.63

The NCC also highlighted the fact that the effect of declaration would be to give the
new entrant an opportunity to seek direct access to the customer relationship by
offering to provide retail services (wastewater services) in competition with the
incumbent service provider. The existing sewer mining regime limited the sewer miner
to taking sewage for treatment from the service provider, not the customer. This
extension would only become possible where access to the transportation service was
granted.64
Regarding the public interest criterion in section 44G(2)(f) of the TPA 1974, the NCC
commented on the lack of definitional guidance in the legislation as to what
constitutes the ‘public interest’. The NCC suggested that the flexibility afforded by a
deliberate lack of definition accommodates a changing perception of public interest
over time, to reflect changing community attitudes. The NCC had recourse to clause
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SWC Initial Submission, above n 45, 2, [10].
NCC Final Recommendation, above n 5, 52, [6.96].
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Ibid 52, [6.97].
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1(3) of the Competition Principles Agreement for guidance.65 The relevant
consideration was whether the introduction of access, or increased access, rather than
the specific development itself, would or would not be contrary to the public interest.
The NCC’s conclusion was that access to the transportation and interconnection
services would not be contrary to the public interest.66
Finally, in considering the impact of declaration on market structure the NCC stated
that:
The [MWP 2004] amounts to a statement of policy and provides little, if any guidance
as to the type of reform structure that may ultimately be adopted to implement policy.
The reform program that may be adopted absent declaration may or may not be more
efficient than that which is adopted following declaration. Declaration may or may not
impact on the design and resultant efficiency of the eventual reform program. To the
extent it does, it is possible that declaration may enhance rather than impede the
development of efficient reform measures by providing an impetus for government to
develop an appropriate reform framework in a timely manner. In particular,
declaration may enhance the quality of the implementation program by providing
industry participants with market alternatives to government designed initiatives. 67

The NCC determined that all of the declaration criteria were satisfied in respect of each
of the services and handed down its Final Recommendation on 1 December 2004. The
NCC recommended declaration of the services for a period of 50 years.68
The Premier of New South Wales did not declare the services within the time specified
in s 44HA(1) of the TPA 1974. Under s 44H(9) the Premier was deemed not to have
declared the services and in early March 2005 Services Sydney applied under s 44K(2)
for a review by the Competition Tribunal of the deemed refusal.
12.5

The Application for Review to the Australian Competition Tribunal

After due deliberation, the Competition Tribunal made the declarations sought by
Services Sydney for a period of 50 years. In the course of the review, two events of
particular note occurred. In 2005, the NSW Government released a statement of its

65

NCC Final Recommendation, above n 5, 68, [10.1].
Ibid 77, [10.35].
67
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intention to develop an access regime for the Sydney Region, and the NSW
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (‘IPART’) released its Draft Report on its
Investigation into Water and Wastewater Service Provision in the Greater Sydney
Region (‘Services Draft Report’) on the provision of water and wastewater services in
the Sydney Region.69 The impact of these two events on the proceedings is explored
below.
The Premier of New South Wales sought permission to intervene in the proceedings
before the Competition Tribunal. 70 It was put to the Competition Tribunal that by
taking part in the proceedings, the Premier could explain why no decision was taken
on the NCC recommendation and make submissions on issues of public interest and
human health. Participation would also afford an opportunity to put before the
Competition Tribunal the Services Draft Report and possibly even the NSW
Government’s response to the recommendations in that report.
Given the flexibility of the Competition Tribunal as an administrative body, the
Competition Tribunal could receive the IPART report and the policy views of the
government without the Premier’s intervention. For that reason among others, the
Premier’s application to intervene was refused.
The issues between the parties that were central to the review by the Competition
Tribunal related to declaration criteria (a) and (f) of TPA 1974, section 44G(2).71 In
relation to criterion (a), SWC accepted Services Sydney’s definitions of markets but
argued strongly that competition in those markets would not be promoted by
declaration of the services. In relation to criterion (f), SWC’s submissions supported an
integrated approach to providing access in line with government policy which had
evolved externally to, but over the course of, the actions before the NCC and the
Competition Tribunal.
As to the review itself, SWC submitted that the Competition Tribunal did not have
jurisdiction to make the declaration sought by Services Sydney, or any other
69

Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (NSW), ‗Investigation into Water and Wastewater Service Provision
in the Greater Sydney Region‘ (Draft Report S9–14, September 2005) (‗Services Draft Report‘). The Final Report
was released in October 2005.
70
Application by Services Sydney [2005] ACompT 7 [75]–[76].
71
Criterion (a) required that ‗access (or increased access) to the service would promote a material increase in
competition in at least one market…other than the market for the service‘. Criterion (f) required that ‗access (or
increased access) to the service would not be contrary to the public interest‘.
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declaration. The basis for the submission was that the services defined in the
application for review were different from those the subject of the Services Sydney
Final Recommendation, and that the declaration sought pursuant to the review was
different from that recommended by the NCC. The Services Sydney application for
review was made in respect of the six services identified by the NCC but the facilities
were to be identified as either a single network, or a combination of three individual
networks or each of the three separately.72 The Competition Tribunal adopted the
NCC’s definition of the services accepting that there were three relevant facilities and
in noting that the Tribunal did not determine its own jurisdiction it commented:
It is clear enough that the NCC is limited to dealing with the application made to it,
pursuant to s 44F(1) of the Act. It is also clear enough that a recommendation to
declare must be limited to the particular service identified in the application. However,
that does not require a literal or pedantic adherence to the nature of the application
or to the particular description of the service when deciding whether the same
application and the same service is being dealt with. 73

In finding that the SWC submission in respect of jurisdiction was not correct the
Competition Tribunal summarised its reasoning as follows:
the splitting of the facility (and so the services) into three does not affect the substance of
the service to be declared in any respect material to this case. It is the kind of precise and
detailed formality that does not affect substantial compliance with the statutory
regime…The added flexibility…provided by the NCC recommendation does not change the
essential nature of the application or the service. A literal and pedantic construction of the
provision would not accord with the wider purpose of Part 3A of the Act and would create
anomalous and capricious results – as this case would illustrate if Sydney Water’s
submission were to be accepted.74

The release of the Services Draft Report, which in its final form75 recommended the
introduction of competitive reform to Sydney’s water industry, had a significant impact
72

See Application by Services Sydney Pty Ltd [2005] ACompT 7 [11].
Ibid 146 [23].
74
Ibid 140, 147 [23]. The notion of anomalous and capricious results in a decision was taken further in the Water
Industry Competition Act 2006 (NSW) resonates with terminology used in the Independent Pricing and Regulatory
Tribunal Act 1992 (NSW) (s 24E) and the WICA 2006 (s 25(5)), for example in relation to coverage declarations.
See discussion in Chapter 13.2 on page 268.
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Competition Tribunal notes that the final report was published on 29 November, 2005.
73

Chapter 12: The Services Sydney Experience

263

on the outcome of the Competition Tribunal review. In discussing declaration criterion
(f) – that access should not be contrary to the public interest – the Competition
Tribunal noted that:
The dispute under (f) also changed, with Sydney Water no longer arguing that the costs of
providing access would exceed the potential benefits, but arguing that the provision of
access would require various other regulatory reforms and that a state-based access
regime, which would deal with these issues in an integrated package, would be preferable
to declaration under Part 3A of the Act.76

SWC stayed on message. The submission here was consistent with that made to the
NCC. The costs associated with reforms to establish a state-based regime were
palatable to SWC. The costs associated with accommodating access under a
declaration were not.
The IPART recommendations for the establishment of a state-based access regime
were enthusiastically adopted by the NSW Government in a statement provided by the
Government to the Competition Tribunal. In that statement the NSW Government
indicated that, among other things, coverage would not be limited to large customers
but would cover business and residential customers; the regime would be drafted to
permit application beyond the greater Sydney metropolitan area; a negotiate-arbitrate
model would be followed; the drafting would ensure that the regime would qualify as
an ‘effective access regime’; and the regime would be administered by IPART. The
statement indicated that the government expected the regime to be implemented
toward the end of 2006. 77
With regard to regulatory reform which might accompany the development and
implementation of the new regime, the NSW Government stated that it would review,
and where necessary modify, the current regulatory and legal framework to give effect
to IPART’s recommendation 17 that ‘appropriate regulatory obligations are placed on
incumbents and new entrants… to protect customers and the public interest’78. Any
regulatory impediments to competition would be identified, and where warranted
removed, and above all the ‘first guiding principle’ for the development of the access
76
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regime and its regulatory framework would be that ‘no service provider or activity
should have an adverse impact on public health, safety or the environment’. 79
The WICA 2006 was the embodiment of these undertakings. The Bill for the WICA
2006 was introduced into the NSW Parliament on 24 October 2006 and received
assent on 27 November 2006. However, the Act did not commence until 8 August
2008 – when the regulations relating to licensing of private sector operators under the
WICA 2006 were proclaimed (regulations relating to access already had been
introduced on 7 December 2007). Notably, the WICA 2006 did not include any
provisions for merits review of decisions made under the access regime it established.
The WICA 2006 licensing and access regimes are discussed in Chapter 13.
12.6

The Services Sydney Applications to the ACCC

Declaration of the services by the Competition Tribunal pursuant to the TPA 1974
‘opened the door’ for Services Sydney to negotiate access with SWC. According to
Services Sydney80, the company spent most of 2006 in negotiations with SWC regarding
the terms of access. However, on 6 November 2006 Services Sydney notified the ACCC
of a dispute with SWC concerning the pricing for access to the three sewage
transportation services. The issue related specifically to the methodology to be used
to calculate a price for access. An arbitration report was released by the ACCC on 19
July 2007 that included the ACCC’s Final Determination and Statement of Reasons.81
Services Sydney had proposed a bottom-up building block approach for price
determination; SWC had proposed a retail-minus method.82 The ACCC determined
that the price payable by Services Sydney to SWC for supply of the declared transport
services should be determined as a charge per customer supplied by Services Sydney
calculated as SWC’s regulated retail price (set by IPART) minus avoidable costs. The
ACCC commented in its report that the implication of the price determination for
access seekers was that it provided:

79

Application by Services Sydney Pty Ltd [2005] ACompT 7 [92], (11). These undertakings by the government give
effect to IPART Recommendation 9 and adopt the basic principles set out by IPART which are said to be features of a
‗robust and flexible regulatory framework‘: IPART Services Final Report, above n 75, [8.2.1].
80
Services Sydney Pty Ltd, Letter to Department of Water and Energy, (26 July 2007) Water for Life
<http://www.waterforlife.nsw.gov.au>.
81
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (Cth), ‗Access dispute between Services Sydney Pty Ltd and
Sydney Water Corporation‘ (Arbitration Report, 19 July 1007) (‗ACCC Determination‘).
82
Ibid. The different methodologies are explained at: Arbitration Report,1–2.
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scope for entry so long as the access seeker is more productively efficient than Sydney
Water in undertaking the sewerage services.83

The ‘scope’ provided by the determination was apparently beyond Services Sydney.
On 3 July 2007 Services Sydney lodged an application with the Competition Tribunal for
a review of the ACCC’s Final Determination. That appeal was subsequently
withdrawn.84
In July 2007 a decision was made by the NSW Government to proceed with the
construction of a desalination plant for Sydney. For the water services industry in the
Sydney Region the playing field had changed significantly. SWC would need to recoup
the costs of delivering desalinated seawater into its existing distribution network. The
dynamics for entry into the sector had altered in the decade since Services Sydney first
entered the fray. Enough was apparently enough for Services Sydney.
12.7

Discussion

The NCC suggested that the access regime created by Part IIIA of the TPA 1974 led the
world in regulatory practice, but tempered its pride with acknowledgement that as
industries and businesses change, so too must the scope and nature of the regulation.
The national regime provided an avenue for access to services provided by publiclyowned and privately-owned infrastructure.
Regulation of access involves compromise – firstly between the interests of consumers,
users, and those of infrastructure owners; secondly between the benefits derived from
a competitive marketplace and the impacts of regulated access on infrastructure
owners and their investment decisions. The imposition of regulation was not taken
lightly by regulators. It was subjected to rigorous consideration to ensure that
regulation was invoked only where it was necessary and desirable to do so.85
Despite the success of Services Sydney in achieving the declaration of the services to
which it sought access, the company did not actually gain access. The processes of the
83

Ibid Arbitration Report, 2.
Pers comm. Mr J van der Merwe (Telephone conversation, 21 April 2008).
85
See National Competition Council, Annual Report 2004-2005, (Commonwealth of Australia, Melbourne, 2005). In
the period since 1995 (when Part IIIA of the TPA 1974 came into effect) to 30 June 2007, there had been 20
applications for declaration covering 38 services, 13 of which have been declared, only one of which has been in the
water and wastewater industry. Two disputes were notified to the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission, one of which was in the airline industry and was withdrawn, the other was in the water and wastewater
industry.
84
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legislation were duly invoked and followed. The Competition Tribunal in fact
acknowledged that whilst Services Sydney’s plan was ambitious
it has been pursued tenaciously over many years and at considerable expense by Mr
van der Merwe. He has had both supporters and detractors along the way, and
Sydney Water has been both. Ambitious projects may bring significant economic
progress if they succeed, or they may bring financial disaster for those involved if they
fail.86

It cannot necessarily be concluded that the tenacity of Services Sydney was
instrumental in bringing forward the development of the NSW state-based access
regime of the WICA 2006, but it certainly seems plausible. The coincidence of the
Services Sydney Applications in the Commonwealth arena with the emergence of the
MWP 2004, the IPART Report and the NSW Government’s statement of intent to
implement the IPART recommendations gives a strong impression of the State wanting
to take control of State matters.
SWC’s support for the establishment of a State access regime was couched in terms
that advocated an integrated approach to market reform that would achieve efficiency
in the delivery of water services. One cannot help feeling that SWC wanted to
maintain control of its assets and have some say in who could access the services they
provided. It is hard not to detect rather more of the detractor than the supporter for
Services Sydney in SWC’s submissions. However, time and tide wait for no-one. The
decision to proceed with a desalination plant for Sydney may well have impacted on
the uptake of competitive opportunities under the new regime well beyond the
confines of the Services Sydney ambitions.
The access and licensing provisions of the WICA 2006 are examined in Chapter 13. The
discussion demonstrates that there has been little uptake of the opportunities offered
by the declaration of the services for which Services Sydney fought so hard. Ambitious
projects such as that proposed by Services Sydney have not been forthcoming. The
private sector has chosen sewer mining ventures and opportunities to provide contract
services to SWC, rather than to compete with the incumbent at its own game on a
grand scale.
86

Application by Services Sydney Pty Ltd [2005] ACompT 7 [151].
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Chapter 13: Hard Law for Competition in the Sydney Region
Services Sydney or any other entrant may find it difficult to compete with Sydney Water, but
1
that is not a basis for denying them an opportunity to do so.

13.1

Introduction

Ambitious policy initiatives enunciated by Commonwealth and State Governments and
embodied in agreements including the National Competition Policy (‘NCP’) called for
competition in the water sector.2 Sydney Water Corporation (‘SWC’) and Sydney
Catchment Authority (‘SCA’), the incumbent public sector service providers in the
Sydney Region, were to be challenged for opportunities to participate in the provision
of water services in that area. Every new industry needs a champion and the private
sector was seen as an innovative champion that could provide finance and technical
expertise to develop new water products, especially in the Sydney Region.
Competition would be enhanced if the incumbents and the new players were all
playing by the same rules.
The Water Industry Competition Act 2006 (NSW) (‘WICA 2006’) was developed by the
NSW Government ‘to encourage competition in relation to the supply of water and the
provision of sewerage services and to facilitate the development of infrastructure for
the production and reticulation of recycled water’.3 The WICA 2006 established a
legislative scheme to accommodate the entry of the private sector into an urban water
industry that was traditionally the province of large, public utilities.
The Act established the State’s hard law framework to facilitate private sector access
to infrastructure services provided by water infrastructure in New South Wales 4 and it
created a dispute resolution mechanism for sewer miners. On 13 August 2009 that

1

National Competition Council, ‗Application by Services Sydney for Declaration of Sewage Transmission and
Interconnection Services Provided by Sydney Water‘ (Final Recommendation, 1 December 2004) (‗NCC Final
Recommendation‘) 72, [10.19].
2
The role of the National Competition Policy in the development and implementation of water management policy in
the Sydney Region is discussed in Chapter 5.
3
Water Industry Competition Act 2006 (NSW) (‗WICA 2006‘), Long Title.
4
The Water Industry Competition (Access to Infrastructure Services) Regulation 2007 (NSW) (‗WICA Access
Regulation‘) was the second essential element of the access regime. Access to infrastructure services is about
accessing a service such as a transportation service for sewage provided by infrastructure facilities, in this example
sewerage infrastructure. The access provisions discussed here are not concerned with access to the contents of the
facility (the sewage in the pipes).

Chapter 13: Hard Law for Competition in the Sydney Region

268

access regime was declared by the NCC to constitute an ‘effective access regime’ under
section 44N of the TPA 1974. The WICA 2006 also introduced a licensing regime for
private sector operators to participate in provision of water services and supply. The
NSW Government expressed its intention from the outset that incumbent water
service providers in the public sector would be brought into the new regime
established in the WICA 2006.5
This chapter examines the access regime created under Part 3 of the WICA 2006 and
compares it with that established under the TPA 1974. The sewer mining arbitration
provisions of Part 4 are also discussed. Finally the third element of the WICA 2006
regulatory framework is reviewed – the creation of a scheme to licence water service
providers.
The development and introduction of the WICA 2006 and its certification as an
effective access regime under the TPA 1974 occurred in the course of this study. As an
adjunct to the task of completing this thesis, two submissions were made to the
National Competition Council in relation to the NSW application for certification of the
WICA 2006 access regime. Those submissions are attached in Appendix A.6
13.2

Access to infrastructure services

As noted in Chapter 12, clause 6 of the Competition Principles Agreement anticipated
the introduction by the Commonwealth of a legislative regime to provide for third
party access to significant infrastructure services. That regime was established in Part
IIIA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (‘TPA 1974’). The TPA 1974 provided
mechanisms for declaration of services and for approval of voluntary undertakings.
Infrastructure services which were already subject to an effective access regime7 were
excluded from the operation of the TPA 1974 access provisions.

5

Water for Life (NSW), ‗Consultation Paper: Creating a Dynamic and Competitive Metropolitan Water Industry‘
(May 2006), 5(‗WICA Consultation Paper‘).
6
Wendy L Ambler, ‗Submission on the Application for Certification of the WICA 2006 Access Regime‘
(3 March 2009) (Appendix Related Papers: Paper A); and Wendy L Ambler, ‗Application for Certification of the
NSW Water Industry Infrastructure Access Regime, Response to Draft Recommendation 2 April 2009‘ (1 May 2009)
(Appendix: Related Paper B).
7
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (‗TPA 1974‘) s 44M permits a State or Territory that is a party to the Competition
Principles Agreement [Council of Australian Governments Competition Principles Agreement – 11 April 1995 (As
amended to 13 April 2007) (Competition Principles Agreement)] to apply to have an access regime created by it
certified as an ‗effective access regime‘. If a State regime is certified then the provisions of that State regime
exclusively regulate access to the services to which it applies displacing the national access regime.
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When Services Sydney Pty Ltd (‘Services Sydney’) initially sought access to services
provided by infrastructure owned by Sydney Water Corporation (‘SWC’), the only way
to gain access without recourse to the TPA 1974 regime was by commercial
negotiation. New South Wales did not have a regulatory mechanism to resolve any
negotiating deadlock between access seekers and infrastructure owners. Services
Sydney pursued the matter under the federal legislation from March 2004 until July
2007.8
The finalisation of the National Water Initiative (‘NWI’) in 2004, the introduction of the
Metropolitan Water Plan in 2004, the completion and release of the Independent
Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (NSW) (‘IPART’) Investigation into Water and
Wastewater Service Provision in the Greater Sydney Region in 2005, and the Services
Sydney saga provided the impetus needed for the NSW Government to create its own
regulatory framework to oust the Commonwealth provisions. 9 The Government
acknowledged that the new regulation would be venturing into unknown territory and
it could only speculate on the kinds of projects and arrangements that might emerge
with the introduction of the regulatory framework. Private sector involvement in
desalination and stormwater harvesting, on-site recycling for industrial and domestic
customers, sewer mining and retail sewerage services were possibilities.10 Flexibility
8

Chapter 12 traced the history of attempts by Services Sydney Pty Ltd (‗Services Sydney‘) to obtain access to water
industry infrastructure in the Sydney Region. The chapter examined the applications made by Services Sydney under
the TPA 1974 Part IIIA access provisions to resolve an impasse between Services Sydney and the incumbent services
provider Sydney Water Corporation (‗SWC‘) relating to access to sewerage infrastructure services.
9
The encouragement of re-use and recycling of wastewater and of innovation in water supply sourcing, treatment,
storage and discharge were agreed actions for urban water reform in the National Water Initiative: Council of
Australian Governments, Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Water Initiative (25 June 2004) (‗NWI‘) paras
90 iii), v)). The Metropolitan Water Plan 2004 incorporated these objectives: Department of Infrastructure, Planning
and Natural Resources (NSW), Meeting the Challenges — Securing Sydney‘s Water Future: The Metropolitan Water
Plan 2004 (October 2004) (‗MWP 2004‘).
As part of an investigation conducted in 2005 the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (NSW) (‗IPART‘)
reviewed arrangements for delivery of water and wastewater services in the Sydney Region. As an alternative to the
existing arrangements IPART recommended the introduction of a State-based access regime. The access regime
would permit new entrants to the water industry to seek access to water infrastructure to enable them to transport
potable water products across the water network and compete in retail water services. Throughout the report the
discussion of access relates primarily to access to the water supply network and thus is necessarily concerned with
opportunities for private sector operators to develop and contribute new sources of potable water for the Sydney
Region. The right to seek access to wastewater infrastructure would open up opportunities for new entrants to
compete to collect wastewater, transport it across the network and withdraw it for treatment: Independent Pricing and
Regulatory Tribunal (NSW), ‗Investigation into Water and Wastewater Service Provision in the Greater Sydney
Region‘, (Final Report s9–17, October 2005), 29 (‗IPART Services Final Report‘). Sewer mining was something else
altogether: see discussion below at Chapter 13.3 on page 278.
10
Department of Water and Energy (NSW), ‗Water Industry Competition Act 2006 Regulations Consultation Paper‘
(11 June 2007), 13 (‗WICA Regulations Consultation Paper‘). When the WICA 2006 emerged the private sector was
already participating in the delivery of water services in the Sydney Region through various contractual arrangements
with the NSW Government such as alliance contracts, build-own-operate arrangements and outsourcing: see WICA
Consultation Paper‘, above n 5, 3.
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was needed in any new regulatory regime ‘to cater for – and not unintentionally
preclude or create impediments to – a wide range of possibilities’.11
13.2.1 Part 3 of the WICA 2006
Part 3 of the WICA 2006 provides a mechanism for third parties to gain access to
services provided by significant water industry infrastructure, whether in private or
public ownership.12 The object of the provisions was set out in section 21 of the WICA
2006 as:
to establish a scheme to promote the economically efficient use and operation of, and
investment in, significant water industry infrastructure, thereby promoting effective
competition in upstream and downstream markets.

Part 3 provisions only apply to infrastructure located within the area of operations of
SWC and Hunter Water Corporation although the legislation permits the extension of
these scheduled areas.13
The rights available to access-seekers under Part 3 by means of coverage declarations
or access undertakings relate to access to the service(s) provided by infrastructure, not
to the product held or conveyed by the infrastructure.
As a result of the Services Sydney application under the TPA 1974, SWC’s sewerage
networks at Bondi, Malabar and North Head were declared by the Australian
Competition Tribunal (‘Competition Tribunal’) in 2005.14 Part 2 of Schedule 4 of the
WICA 2006 acknowledged and accepted that declaration by deeming connection to,
and conveyance of sewage through those services to be subject to a coverage
declaration under the WICA 2006 for a period of 50 years, unless the declarations were

11

WICA Regulations Consultation Paper, above n 10, 13.
The objects clause of Part 3 of the WICA 2006 is almost identical to that of the TPA 1974 access regime (clause
44AA) and adopts the principle set out in clause 6(5)(a) of the Competition Principles Agreement, above n 7. Refer
also to Table 13.1 above.
13
WICA 2006 s 22. Scheduled areas are referred to in Schedule 1. The WICA Consultation Paper, above n 5, refers
to the potential for the future extension of the geographic extent of the licensing and the access regimes as an
‗adaptive area‘ of the scheme: at 1. The Metropolitan Water Plan 2006 contemplated that the licensing provisions of
the legislative reform would also be restricted in application at the outset: Water for Life (NSW), 2006 Metropolitan
Water Plan (April 2006) (‗MWP 2006‘), 112. The restriction of the application of the access provisions to areas
specified in Schedule 1 of the WICA 2006 means that there may be scope for operators requiring access to
infrastructure outside those areas to invoke the provisions of the Commonwealth legislation rather than pursue the
expansion of the area to which the State regime applies if they cannot negotiate access with the owners of existing
infrastructure in their area of interest. The services declared were SWC‘s Bondi Sewerage Reticulation Network,
Malabar Sewerage Reticulation Network and North Head Sewerage Reticulation Network.
14
Application by Services Sydney Pty Ltd [2005] ACompT 7.
12
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subsequently revoked under the provisions of that Act.15 Thus, access was assured
under the WICA 2006, with the result that interested parties had an enforceable right
to negotiate with SWC to use the services so covered.
However, if commercial negotiations to gain access to services that are not covered by
the deeming provisions fail, then Part 3 procedures of the WICA 2006 can be invoked.
The provisions of this Part enable access-seekers to secure access by two means:
voluntary undertakings from existing service providers to provide access; or, by means
of a coverage declaration relating to the service to which access is required. An access
undertaking and a coverage declaration each provide the right for access seekers to
gain access to services to pursue their own activities.
Once access becomes possible, the actual terms and conditions of access, for example
the specific location of interconnection points16, remain to be settled between the
service provider and the access seeker either by negotiation or, if that fails, then by
resorting to arbitration under the WICA 2006.
In contrast to the abovementioned provisions which open the door for access, a
binding non-coverage declaration may be obtained under Part 3 by a service provider
to ensure that a new infrastructure service will not be accessed by third parties (other
than by agreement with the service provider) for a period of up to 10 years.
The ways in which access to significant infrastructure can be achieved under Part 3 of
the WICA 2006 are examined in the following sections in the context of similar
provisions of the access regime of the TPA 1974.
13.2.1.1

Access by way of coverage declarations

Division 2 of Part 3 of the WICA 2006 deals with applications for coverage declarations.
Applications may only be made by the service provider for the service, or an access
seeker who has tried but failed to obtain access or a change in access previously
obtained, or the Minister in the case of a service provided by a public water utility.17

15

WICA 2006 Sched 4, Pt 2, cl 2. The effect of certification meant that the services were the subject of an effective
access regime. The National Competition Council recommended that the declarations be revoked. The NSW
Premier acting on that advice revoked the declarations on 1 October 2009: National Competition Council, Annual
report 2009–2010, (Commonwealth of Australia, Melbourne, 2010)
16
See discussion in Application by Services Sydney Pty Ltd [2005] ACompT 7 [17].
17
WICA 2006 s 24(1).
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Applications for coverage declarations are to be in a form approved by the Minister18
and as long as they are not determined by IPART (with the Minister’s consent) to be
‘frivolous or vexatious’ they will be considered under section 25.19
The WICA 2006 requirement that an applicant for a coverage declaration must have
‘tried, but failed’ to achieve access departs from the TPA 1974 provisions where there
is no such prerequisite to an application for a recommendation that a service be
declared. The issue of the success or otherwise of Services Sydney’s attempts to
negotiate access to SWC’s infrastructure under the TPA 1974 was the subject of some
discussion by the National Competition Council (‘NCC’) in the Services Sydney
application for declaration. SWC suggested that Services Sydney had neither requested
access, nor been denied it.20 However, in view of the language of the TPA 1974
provisions, the issue was not relevant to the consideration of the declaration criteria.21
Under the WICA 2006, the attempt to gain access by negotiation is pertinent to
determining whether an application has been properly lodged. What will constitute
trying but failing is not subject to review or appeal. IPART is required to notify an
applicant if an application for a coverage declaration ‘has not been duly completed’.22
However that would apparently be the end of the matter.
Section 24(1) of the WICA 2006 may well be a source of some disquiet if and when an
application for a coverage declaration is made. If Services Sydney had attempted to
apply for a coverage declaration under the WICA 2006 its application may have been
rejected at the outset. SWC was adamant in its submission on the NCC Draft
Recommendation relating to Services Sydney that there had been no request for, or
denial of, access. Offering its account of events against that of SWC, Services Sydney
may have struggled to satisfy the qualification imposed on the applicant – that it had
18

Ibid s 24(3). In addition the application is to be accompanied by a fee and lodged at the office of IPART.
Ibid s 25(5)(b). The section excludes consideration of frivolous or vexatious applications but does not set any rules
or guidelines to establish the characteristics of such an application. It is difficult not to see shadows of the Services
Sydney experience, and the State‘s unstated but obvious disinclination to support the company‘s proposed project,
reflected in this provision. The Services Sydney attempts to gain access to SWC‘s services is discussed in Chapter 12.
20
Sydney Water Corporation, ‗National Competition Council‘s Draft Recommendations on the application by
Services Sydney for Declaration of Sewage Transmission and Interconnection Services Provided by Sydney Water
Corporation‘ (Submission to the National Competition Council in response to Draft Recommendation, November
2004), 29 (‗SWC Submission on Draft Recommendation‘).
21
It was not a precondition for an application for declaration that access must have been sought: National
Competition Council, ‗Application by Services Sydney for Declaration of Sewage Transmission and Interconnection
Services Provided by Sydney Water‘ (Final Recommendation, 1 December 2004), 43 [6.66] (‗NCC Final
Recommendation‘).
22
WICA Access Regulation, reg 4.
19
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tried and failed to negotiate access. However, the section must be recognised as an
attempt to address the specific reform objectives that, wherever possible, the terms
and conditions of access should be settled through negotiation. 23 Services Sydney did
not have the benefit of negotiation protocols at the time. They may or may not have
helped.
Table 13.1 compares the criteria set out in the TPA 1974 and the WICA 2006 with those
relating to conforming State regimes set out in the Competition Principles Agreement.
Table 13.1: Comparison of the Clause 6(3)(a) criteria of the Competition Principles
Agreement, and the declaration criteria of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and the Water
Industry Competition Act 2006 (NSW)24
Competition Principles Agreement
Clause 6(3)(a)

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)
s 44G(2)

Water Industry Competition Act
2006 (NSW) s 23

(a) significant infrastructure facility

(c) the facility is of national
significance, having regard to :
(i) the size of the facility;
or

(a) the infrastructure is of State
significance, having regard to its
nature and extent and its
importance to the State economy,

(ii) the importance of the
facility to constitutional
trade or commerce; or
(iii) the importance of the
facility to the national
economy
(i) it would not be economically
feasible to duplicate the facility

(ii) access to the service is
necessary in order to permit
effective competition in a
downstream or upstream
market
(iii) the safe use of the facility by the
person seeking access can be
ensured at an economically feasible
cost and, if there is a safety
requirement, appropriate regulatory
arrangements exist

(b) it would be uneconomical for
anyone to develop another facility to
provide the service

(b) it would not be economically
feasible to duplicate the
infrastructure

(a) access (or increased access) to
the service would promote
competition in at least one
market…other than the market for
the service

(c) access (or an increase in
access) to the service by third
parties is necessary to promote a
material increase in competition in
an upstream or downstream
market

(d) access to the service can be
provided without undue risk to
human health or safety

(d) the safe use of the
infrastructure by access seekers
can be ensured at an economically
feasible cost and, if there is a
safety requirement, that
appropriate regulatory
arrangements exist

(f) access (or increased access) to
the service would not be contrary to
the public interest

(e) access (or an increase in
access) to the service would not be
contrary to the public interest

23

See Competition Principles Agreement, above n 7, cl 6(4)(a).
Table adapted from National Competition Council, The National Access Regime: A Guide to Part IIIA of the Trade
Practices Act (Cth) Part C Certification of Access Regimes, (National Competition Council, 1st Ed, February 2003),
22-23 (‗Certification Guide‘).
24
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The declaration criteria
Clause 6 of the Competition Principles Agreement25 set out the framework upon which
Commonwealth and State third party access regimes were to be established if they
were to meet the criteria for effective access regimes. To meet the criteria of the
Competition Principles Agreement, the infrastructure services must be ‘significant’;
they must be provided by a facility that ‘would not be economically feasible to
duplicate’; and, where there is a safety requirement, ‘appropriate regulatory
arrangements’ must be in place. The Competition Principles Agreement does not
require the consideration of the public interest. The criteria to be satisfied before a
coverage declaration can be made under Part 3 of the WICA 2006 are set out in section
23 of the Act.
A comparison of the language used in the three documents shows that the WICA 2006
was more closely aligned with the language of the Competition Principles Agreement
than with the TPA 1974 as it appeared in March 2008.26 The concept of economic
feasibility27 could be a contentious issue, yet the notion of what is ‘uneconomical’28
has been well debated in proceedings under the TPA 1974. To require that access or
an increase in access must be ‘necessary’29 to promote a material increase in
competition did not reflect the scheme of the national regime. It is a test that must be
distinguished from the position acknowledged by the Competition Tribunal in Re
Services Sydney that ‘the promotion of competition test does not require it to be
satisfied that there would necessarily or immediately be a measurable increase in
competition.’30 The attitude adopted by SWC to Services Sydney’s ambitions suggests
that application of section 23 (c) of the WICA 2006 would not have aided Services
Sydney’s cause.
The requirements that safe use can be achieved at an ‘economically feasible cost’, and
that ‘appropriate regulatory arrangements exist’ if there is a safety requirement,
25

Ibid.
The discussion in the text refers to the provisions of the TPA 1974 in force at 27 March 2008. The compilation of
the Act at that date included amendments up to Act No 7of 2008. Since then section 44G of the TPA 1974 has been
amended to include in s 44G(2)(a) a requirement that the access would promote a material increase in competition
and to delete s 44G(2)(d). These amendments to the TPA 1974 bring the statutory intent of the TPA 1974 and the
WICA 2006 into closer alignment.
27
Competition Principles Agreement, above n 7, cl 6(3)(a)(i); WICA 2006 s 23(b).
28
TPA 1974 s 44G(2)(b).
29
Competition Principles Agreement, above n 7, cl 6(3)(a)(ii); WICA 2006 s 23(c).
30
Application by Services Sydney Pty Ltd [2005] ACompT 7 [131].
26
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address submissions made by SWC in the Services Sydney matter. SWC’s arguments
were directed at the complexity and extent of the regulatory environment in which the
provision of the relevant services occurred, and the scale and cost of reforms which
would be associated with accommodating new, private sector entrants. 31 It will be a
brave and imaginative regulator that can put a credible price on appropriate regulatory
arrangements to ensure safe use of water infrastructure services.
Despite the obvious difference between the access provisions of the TPA 1974 and the
WICA 2006, substantive resemblance between the criteria of the different instruments
has ensured that the Part 3 WICA 2006 provisions constitute an ‘effective regime’
bringing access to water industry infrastructure of State significance into the State
regulatory arena.
However there remains an opportunity for an access seeker that has tried but failed to
negotiate access to services that are not covered by Part 3 of the WICA 2006 (that is
they are located outside the geographic area referred to in Schedule 1 of the Act) to
resort to the TPA 1974 provisions.32
13.2.1.2

How a coverage declaration is made

After considering an application for a coverage declaration and any submissions, IPART
is to furnish a report to the Minister.33 The report is to include a statement as to
whether, in IPART’s opinion, the declaration criteria are met and if they are all met,
then a recommendation as to the terms in which a coverage declaration should be
made and the period for which it should have effect.34 IPART is to use its best
endeavours to report on an application within four months of receiving it.35
The Minister must determine a coverage application either by making a coverage
declaration if satisfied that the declaration criteria are met or by refusing to make a
declaration if not so satisfied. 36 In making such determination the Minister must
consider, but is not bound to accept, any advice or recommendation in IPART’s

31

Competition Principles Agreement, above n 7, cl 6(3)(iii); WICA 2006 s 23(d).
See discussion above n 13 and Appendix Related Papers: Papers A and B.
33
WICA 2006 s 25(2).
34
Ibid s 25(3).
35
Ibid s 29(4).
36
Ibid s 26(1). For a declaration to be made the service must not be the subject of a binding non-coverage declaration
or an access undertaking.
32
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report.37 Section 26(4) of the WICA 2006 requires a Minister to use best endeavours to
make a decision on an application for a coverage declaration within 6 months of the
date the application was lodged with IPART.
Under the TPA 1974 provisions, the designated Minister must either declare the
service or decide not to declare it. However, the national regime includes a deeming
provision so that a failure to publish a decision within the prescribed time limit is taken
to be a decision not to declare the service.38 The review provisions of section 44I of
the TPA 1974 then become available to the applicant to take the matter out of the
hands of the designated Minister. No parallel deeming provision is provided in the
WICA 2006. There is no provision for appeal against the Minister’s determination in
the WICA 2006.39
13.2.1.3

Binding non-coverage declarations to exclude access

According to the WICA 2006 Consultation Paper, the purpose of a binding noncoverage declaration is to provide increased certainty to the owners of new
infrastructure by protecting their services from declaration.40
Binding non-coverage declarations, effective for a period of up to 10 years, may be
sought in relation to infrastructure services provided by:
(a)

proposed water industry infrastructure, being infrastructure … that is not
currently constructed, or

(b)

existing infrastructure that is not currently used, or

(c)

existing infrastructure that is currently used otherwise than for the production,
treatment, filtration, storage, conveyance or reticulation of water or sewage,

but does not apply to infrastructure services provided by existing water industry
infrastructure.41

37

Ibid s 26(2).
The prescribed period within which a decision is to be made is 60 days after receiving a recommendation in respect
of a declaration: TPA 1974 s 44H(9).
39
TPA 1974 s 44H(9). According to the NCC, a review of the deeming provision indicated that there was merit in
requiring the deemed decision to reflect the NCC‘s recommendation in relation to the relevant declaration application
rather than a deemed decision to refuse the application. The NCC considered that this approach would avoid
decisions, and reviews of decisions, for which no reasons were given: National Competition Council, Annual Report
2006-2007 (Commonwealth of Australia, Melbourne, 2007), 13. There has not been any change to s 44H9(9).
40
WICA Consultation Paper, above n 5, 8.
41
WICA 2006 s 31(1).
38
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There was no parallel provision in the TPA 1974 access provisions when the WICA 2006
was introduced. Once a non-coverage declaration is made, as long as the
infrastructure to which the declaration relates is substantially the same capacity and
supplies substantially the same geographic location as specified in the application,
there is no avenue, except that of negotiation, by which access to the service can be
achieved and there is no recourse to the arbitration provisions of the WICA 2006. An
access seeker has no right to apply for revocation of the declaration.42 Services
provided by new infrastructure will not be open to access by competitors for up to a
decade following declaration.
13.2.1.4

Access undertakings

The declaration provisions of the WICA 2006 can be avoided where service providers
are amenable to granting access. Under the provisions of Division 5 of Part 3, a service
provider may give IPART a document which sets out the arrangements under which
the service provider will grant access to its infrastructure services, whether or not
those services are subject to coverage declarations. An access undertaking must
provide for disputes to be referred to IPART in accordance with the WICA 2006
provisions. Access undertakings do not take effect until they are approved by IPART.
When considering whether to approve an access undertaking, IPART must have regard
to the legitimate business interests of the service provider, the public interest, the
interests of prospective access seekers and any other matters it considers relevant.
IPART is also to invite public submissions on applications for approval of access
undertakings.
Access undertakings are to have effect for a specified period and can only be varied
with the consent of IPART. A service provider must make its access undertakings
available to the public, and it is sufficient compliance with this requirement if the
undertaking is made available on the service provider’s website.
13.2.2 Terms of access: access agreements and access determinations
Once an infrastructure service is the subject of a coverage declaration or an access
undertaking, the terms on which access to the service is actually achieved must be set

42

Ibid ss 35-37.
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out in an access agreement entered into by the service provider and the access seeker,
or where agreement cannot be reached, in an access determination.43
Disputes between access providers and access seekers may be referred by either party
to IPART for determination under s 40. As noted above, IPART may refuse to accept an
application to resolve a dispute if it is not satisfied that the applicant has ‘in good faith,
attempted to resolve the dispute by negotiation’.44 Regulation 8 of the Water Industry
Competition (Access to Infrastructure Services) Regulation 2007 (NSW) (‘WICA Access
Regulation’) provides a detailed framework for the conduct of the negotiations
between the access seeker and the service provider, and IPART must have regard to
the provisions of the regulation in making its determination as to the propriety of the
application. Guidance for the conduct of the arbitration is also set out in the WICA
Access Regulation. 45
The ‘tried, but failed’ WICA 2006 qualification of an applicant for a coverage
declaration under section 24 is in stark contrast to the requirement set out in section
40(2) of the WICA 2006 which provides that IPART may refuse to accept an application
for an access determination if it is not satisfied that the applicant has ‘in good faith,
attempted to resolve the dispute by negotiation’. Regulation 8 of the WICA Access
Regulation sets out an elaborate procedure to provide access seekers with information
to assist them in their good faith negotiations. IPART has produced a protocol to guide
applicants through appropriate negotiations.46 There is no such guide for those simply
trying to negotiate access.
13.3

Sewer mining and Part 4 of the WICA 2006

In the Sydney Region the activity of sewer mining is one way that private sector
operators can enter the recycled water industry and it is an activity that was taking
place in the Sydney Region before the WICA 2006 was enacted. All that was needed
for prospective sewer miners to realise their objectives was to negotiate with the
43

Ibid s 39(1).
Ibid s 40(2).
45
WICA Access Regulation regs 8-11. The WICA Access Regulation also sets out timelines for arbitration; the basis
on which a dispute may be determined by the arbitrator; and the application of certain regulations under the IPART
Act 1992 (NSW). For the extent to which the Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 (NSW), the IPART Act 1992 (NSW)
and the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal Regulation 2007 (NSW) apply to arbitrations under the WICA
2006 see: WICA 2006 ss 40(4), (5) and WICA Access Regulation, reg 11 respectively.
46
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (NSW), Negotiation Protocols: Water Industry Competition (Access
to Infrastructure Services) Regulation 2007 (2008).
44
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relevant infrastructure owner (that is, SWC in the Sydney Region) to settle terms and
conditions on which they would be able to extract the contents of sewerage
infrastructure. Although the process of sewer mining was referred to in a list of
possible activities that would be fostered by the introduction of the WICA 2006 regime,
it was one activity that was singled out for special treatment. Part 4 of the WICA 2006
was intended to facilitate recycling opportunities that used the contents of sewerage
infrastructure by providing a mechanism to resolve disputes between infrastructure
owners and sewer miners. Part 4 is not about access to an infrastructure service or
even access to the infrastructure itself. It only applies if the service provider has
agreed to permit connection to its infrastructure and extraction of the contents of that
infrastructure.
Part 4 of the WICA 2006 was introduced to the Parliament as promoting new recycling
businesses by providing a mechanism to have the terms on which the sewer miner
could extract sewage from the service provider’s infrastructure settled by arbitration
where the parties could not reach agreement.47 It accommodated IPART’s minimum
recommendation for change in relation to sewer mining. 48 To trigger the application
of the provisions of Part 4 a service provider must lodge a notice with IPART setting out
its policy as to whether and on what terms it will permit sewer miners to draw from
the contents of its infrastructure, and indicate its willingness to refer disputes
regarding its grant or refusal of such permission to IPART for determination.49
The term ‘sewer mining’ is not defined in the WICA 2006 but it was defined quite
comprehensively by the Competition Tribunal in relation to the Services Sydney
applications as:
A term used to describe the extraction of sewage from trunk sewers and its treatment
by physical, chemical and/or biological processes to produce reclaimed water suitable
for specific end uses. It generally involves the connection of a pipe owned by the
sewer miner to the trunk sewer to extract and transport the sewage to the sewer
47

New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 24 October 2006, 3277 (David Campbell).
In 2005 IPART expressed the view that sewer mining was likely to feature prominently in recycled water projects.
IPART recommended the establishment of an appropriate regulatory framework for sewer mining — or at least the
establishment of formal dispute resolution procedures relating to sewer mining that would include a right to seek
arbitration. The WICA 2006 has delivered the latter. The discussion that follows in the text examines the process that
enables sewer mining to be conducted in the Sydney Region. See IPART Services Final Report, above n 9, 16–17,
29.
49
WICA 2006 s 45.
48
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miner’s treatment plant. After processing, sludge, grit and screenings may be returned
to the trunk sewer by another pipe, while the recycled water is transported to end
users by a pipe or network of pipes.50

IPART usefully distinguished sewer mining from the arrangements that are now
covered by the access provisions of the WICA 2006:
Access to the wastewater network involves the transportation of raw effluent across
the system, supported by a contract for the collection of effluent between the third
party access seeker and customers, who now pay wastewater charges to the third
party access seeker. Sewer miners extract effluent for the purpose of using recycled
water on-site or for re-selling recycled water to other users. Sewer miners do not
receive wastewater charges from customers.51

Part 4 of the WICA 2006 deals with sewer mining activities and is specifically concerned
with access to the contents of the infrastructure, that is, the sewage in the sewerage
network. It gives legislative recognition to an existing practice accommodated through
negotiation and agreement between sewer miners and incumbent sewerage network
operators in the Sydney Region and beyond.
The operation of Part 4 is not confined to a scheduled area, but its application is
limited to infrastructure services in respect of which the service provider has indicated
its willingness to permit sewer miners to ‘draw from the contents of the
infrastructure’.52 When considering Part 4, these significant distinctions between the
objectives and effects of the Part 3 and Part 4 provisions of the WICA 2006 are
important.

50

Application by Services Sydney Pty Ltd [2005] ACompT 7 [45].
IPART Services Final Report, above n 9, 17. IPART recognised that there was only limited experience of
competition in water and wastewater services in Australia and overseas. Accordingly it took the view when making
its recommendations that an adaptive approach to reform should be taken. Given the way that water recycling is
taking place in the Sydney Region in 2010 it may be open to revisit IPART‘s concept of access in relation to
wastewater versus sewer mining, and its recommendations in the same report relating to the need for property rights
for all water resources. The sewer miner relies on delivery of sewage by the transportation network. It relies on the
transportation network to take away some waste from the process. The sewer miner receives payment from a
customer for recycled water produced from the sewage extracted. The essence of the process is the ability to obtain
wastewater for treatment and re-use. In the Sydney Region the principal source of wastewater is SWC‘s sewerage
and stormwater infrastructure. Perhaps the more appropriate way to provide opportunities for private sector
participation in the non-potable water industry is to provide a regulatory framework to licence access to and use of
wastewater sources. The elements of the process that then require regulation between water service providers and
licensed wastewater users relate to physical connection to infrastructure that provides services. It is access in the
physical sense, to the infrastructure itself — but that is not what is regulated under the TPA 1974 or the WICA 2006
access regimes at the moment.
52
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In the Sydney Region SWC remains the principal provider of sewerage services and
connection to its sewerage infrastructure offers the main opportunity for sewer mining
activities. The framework put in place by SWC to permit sewer mining to occur within
its area of operations is examined in the following paragraphs. The role played by the
Part 4 provisions of WICA 2006 to assist sewer miners working within that framework
is then discussed. SWC has not lodged its Sewer Mining Policy with IPART and so the
arbitration provisions of the WICA 2006 are not yet available to prospective sewer
miners.53
13.3.1 ‘Access’ to sewage
SWC has published a suite of documents to support sewer mining initiatives in the
Sydney Region: a Sewer Mining Agreement54; a Sewer Mining Brochure55; a pro-forma
Sewer Mining Proposal56; and Sydney Water’s Sewer Mining Policy October 2008
(‘Sewer Mining Policy’).57 The Sewer Mining Brochure advises that in addition to the
input that SWC will have in the development of a sewer mining project several other
Government agencies have a role in regulating or assessing sewer mining operations
including:- the NSW Government through the MWP 2006 ; local councils under section
68 of the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW); the Department of Water and Energy
(now the NSW Office of Water) by advising councils and customers about the
provisions of the Interim NSW Guidelines for Management of Private Recycled Water
Schemes (‘Purple Guidelines’) and, where the development is to be carried out by a
local council, as determining authority under section 60 of the LGA 1993; the
Department of Environment and Climate Change about environment protection
licences that may be needed under the Protection of the Environment Operations Act
1997 (NSW) (‘POEOA 1997’); NSW Health regarding water quality related to public
health; and IPART in relation to licensing and dispute resolution under the WICA 2006.
53

Four sewer mining schemes were in operation in the Sydney Region in August 2010 and eight more were
anticipated. Those in operation were: Sydney Olympic Park (Australia‘s first large scale urban recycling to scheme.
Recycled water is used for irrigation and non-potable domestic use); Pennant Hills Golf Club (recycled water is used
for golf course irrigation); Kogarah Council (recycled water is used for irrigating parks and playing fields and the
Beverley Park Golf Course); and Workplace6 in the central business district of Sydney (recycled water is used for
toilet flushing and irrigation).
54
Sydney Water Corporation, Standard Sewer Mining Agreement (Pro-forma Draft, May 2006) (‗Sewer Mining
Agreement‘).
55
Sydney Water Corporation, ‗Sewer Mining: How to Establish a Sewer Mining Operation‘ (October 2008) (‗Sewer
Mining Brochure‘).
56
Sydney Water Corporation, Request for Preliminary Advice on Sewer Mining Proposal (July 2007) (‗Sewer Mining
Proposal‘).
57
Sydney Water Corporation, Policy: Sewer Mining (28 October 2008) (‗Sewer Mining Policy‘).
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The following discussion explores some interesting issues relating to the conduct of
sewer mining in the Sydney Region with particular reference to SWC’s Sewer Mining
Policy.
Who has the right to control the use and flow of sewage?
The common law sought to regulate competition for access to, and the use of, water
resources. The source of the water was relevant to the rights so accorded:
The common law established fundamentally different regimes applicable to surface
water and underground and diffused surface water. The difference was grounded in
the knowledge of the source and path of water flowing in a known and defined
channel.58

Two principles were applied at common law to distinguish particular rights to water.
One related to surface water flowing in confined channels, another to diffused surface
water and underground water. The essence of the first principle was the flow in a
‘known and defined channel’. Necessity was the mother of invention and rights with
respect to flow in an artificial channel had to be dealt with differently:
The position of an artificial watercourse, that is a water channel constructed by man as
distinct from a natural stream, is entirely different. Generally speaking the owner of
land through which an artificial watercourse runs may block or divert it at his will,
unless some easement over it has been acquired by grant or prescription.59

Rights with respect to water flowing in an artificial channel arise from the acquisition
of property rights under the general law:
It may be the result of an easement created by grant, or by implication of law, or by
prescription where the law allows easements to be acquired by prescription; it may
depend upon statute; it may be the result of contract.60

Sewage, the water source for sewer mining, flows through sewerage infrastructure,
artificial channels, and is provided to sewer miners under the terms of a contract.
However, there is no statement, no contractual representation, by SWC that it has the
right to manage and use the sewage in the way proposed by the Sewer Mining
58

Alex Gardner, Richard Bartlett and Janice Gray, Water Resources Law, (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2009) (‗Water
Resources Law‘), [8.53], 175.
59
Gartner v Kidman, (1962) 108 CLR 12, 24.
60
Ibid 27. See also discussion in Water Resources Law, above n 58, Chapter 8, especially 156–157, [8.12].
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Agreement, that is, to permit a third party to take and use the sewage. Yet clause
4.3(a) of the Sewer Mining Agreement provides that:
Title to and all risk in the Sewage taken through the Extraction Point passes to SEWER
MINER at the Sewer Miner Extraction Point.

Arguably SWC only has the right to authorise access to its infrastructure and not to the
sewage itself. The Sewer Mining Agreement does not go so far as to suggest that SWC
does have such a right. It states in its recitals that ‘ Sydney Water is willing to grant
access to the Sewage’ (Recital C) and ‘Sydney Water will adopt a first come, first served
approach in allocating access to sewage flows’ (Recital F). There is no indication that
SWC will allocate the flow itself, but it will allocate access to sewage flows.
In the Sewer Mining Agreement SWC does not warrant title to the sewage. Under the
terms of its Customer Contract, SWC provides a water supply service and a sewerage
service to dispose of wastewater. Under its Operating Agreement SWC is obliged to
provide services. It provides services not products. For SWC to rely on the common
law principles applying to water in artificial channels to create a right to deal with the
contents of its sewerage infrastructure would require that sewage and recycled water
are ‘water’ to which those principles would apply.
Gardner et al identified a solution for contemporary water management where
Australian situations struggled under laws that were tailor-made for different
circumstances:
The problems presented by the common law regimes for a modern Australian society
were and are fundamental, and surmountable only by legislation.61

For the Sydney Region, that legislation exists in the form of the Water Management
Act 2000 (NSW) (‘WMA 2000’), a statute that vests water rights in the Crown.
However, it would be necessary to redefine ‘water sources’ to include artificial
channels and storages and ‘water’ to include all water sources, fresh or otherwise,
61

Water Resources Law, above n 58, 177 [8.56]. Gardner et al emphasise aspects that impact on the transferability of
water rights when discussing the real and potential problems that might arise when trying to apply the common law of
water rights to the modern Australian situation. However, the treatment of environmental issues is significant and the
comment offered on the failure of the common law to treat water as a unified resource is perhaps more of an outline
for a solution than an expression of a problem:
The failure to provide an integrated regime for all surface and underground water is a fundamental barrier
to planning and regulation of water. Management of the water resource in all its forms must necessarily be
integrated. The common law regimes, providing for distinct and inconsistent regulation of surface and
underground water, render integrated planning and management impossible: at 177 [8.57].
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before the WMA 2000 could regulate access to and use of sewage and other
wastewater. Such a move could eliminate the potential for conflicts of interest where
a service provider (who is also a water retailer) controls the allocation of a resource to
potential competitors to treat and sell. Sewage could be managed under the authority
of section 392 of the WMA 2000 as part of the State’s water rights. Access to the
water source could be controlled through licensing and sewage allocation could be
managed as part of Water Sharing Plans for the Sydney Region.
The sewerage system is a complex water system that is an integral part of the water
cycle of the Sydney Region. That water cycle must take into account contributions
from rainfall-dependent water sources in its catchment as well as new sources of
water such as sewage, and it must be able to account for all extractions from that
system. Only in this way can water managers aspire to integrated urban water cycle
management.
Meeting competing needs
The Sewer Mining Policy of SWC states that allocation of sewage will be on a first come
first served basis, and that when advising future applicants of the availability of sewage
in a particular sewerage system, Sydney Water will acknowledge and honour its
existing commitments.62 This provision is incorporated in the recitals to the Sewer
Mining Agreement but is not reaffirmed in the body of the document. 63
SWC stresses in the Sewer Mining Policy that:
The amount of sewage flowing through a sewerage system is a critical aspect of
effective sewerage system operation and varies over time. In order to maintain
adequate flows, Sydney Water determines the quantity of sewage available for
extraction by sewer mining with regard to:
a) the minimum operational flow requirements of Sydney Water’s sewerage system
b) the current diurnal flow pattern of the sewerage system

62

Sewer Mining Policy, above n 57, cl 2.3.
Sewer Mining Agreement, above n 54, Recital F. The undertaking is reflected in practical terms on the SWC
website where sewer mining exclusion zones are identified. They cover areas where sewage flows are committed to
proposed water recycling schemes or where other sewer mining or recycling schemes are already in place. The Sewer
Mining Agreement also includes a ‗Sewer Mining Volume Charge‘, a price per kilolitre for sewage extracted under
the arrangement. Clause 3.2 prohibits the Sewer Miner from taking sewage ‗unless and until it has first‘ obtained all
necessary or desirable approvals for the taking of sewage. The terms and conditions under which extraction may take
place are set out in the agreement and in the schedules. The rate of extraction is determined by SWC.
63
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c) existing commitments involving the extraction of sewage, either upstream or
downstream of the proposed connection.
However, as Sydney Water cannot fully control the volume of sewage in the system,
Sydney Water will make no guarantee or give any warranty regarding the quantity of
sewage available to a sewer miner.64

This description of sewage flowing through sewerage infrastructure and the problems
associated with its management eerily mimics those of water flow in rivers. Sewage is
not a water source to which the WMA 2000 applies. Yet, the manner in which sewer
mining is controlled by SWC exhibits some characteristics of water management of
water sources under the WMA 2000. SWC attempts to provide some degree of
security to the sewer miner in the form of a sewer mining agreement; to meet its own
operational flow requirements to maintain an effective sewerage system; to determine
sewage available for allocation from time to time; and to accommodate uncertainty of
supply.65
The difficulties encountered by SWC in meeting the competing needs of its
infrastructure (the sewerage system), its business objectives, the sewer miner’s
business objectives and the water management objectives of the NSW Government
are reminiscent of the challenges that will be faced by the NSW Office of Water
(‘NOW’) in administering the Water Sharing Plans for the Sydney Region.66 A secure
entitlement to a share of sewage is an issue that could be addressed in a Water
Sharing Plan that included sewage as a water source and that recognised that special
rules should apply to allocation of the resource. Water sharing plans made under the
WMA 2000 already try to do this in respect of the State’s surface and groundwater
sources.
13.3.2 Resolving sewer mining disputes
A dispute resolution mechanism is included in SWC’s Sewer Mining Agreement. Clause
11.1 of the document records the agreement between the parties to co-operate as far
as is reasonably possible to avoid a dispute, but in the event one does arise they will
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Sewer Mining Policy, above n 57, cl 2.2.
Ibid. Issues that will determine the quantity of sewage available for sewer mining are addressed in para 2.2.
66
See discussion of the draft water sharing plans for the Sydney Region released for public exhibition on 7 June 2010
in Chapter 8 on page 154.
65
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negotiate to resolve it. If negotiation fails then the dispute is to be referred to the
chief executive officers of the parties. If it remains unresolved after referral and one of
the chief executive officers is of the opinion that the dispute cannot be resolved, a
mediator can be appointed to assist resolution. If mediation fails then the officer who
formed the opinion that the dispute could not be resolved can refer the matter to
IPART for arbitration.
Part 4 of the WICA 2006 is solely concerned with resolving disputes between sewer
miners and service providers, whether those disputes arise during negotiations or after
a contract is finalised – provided of course that the service provider has lodged the
appropriate notice under section 45(a) and not subsequently changed its mind about
arbitration.67 Disputes that can be determined in accordance with Part 4 include those
relating to the terms of any agreement under which the sewer miner is to be
permitted to draw from the contents of the relevant infrastructure; matters arising
under such an agreement that are permitted by the agreement to be referred to
arbitration under the WICA 2006; and, any matter arising under a determination made
under the WICA 2006 provisions.68 Disputes can be determined by arbitration upon
application by either party. The arbitrator is required to ‘give effect to the service
provider’s policy with respect to the granting of permission to draw from the contents
of its sewerage infrastructure’.69
The Sewer Mining Policy of SWC mirrors the provisions in the Sewer Mining Agreement
and includes provisions for dispute resolution during the negotiation phase.70 The
Sewer Mining Brochure includes a final paragraph about resolving disputes but does
not make it clear that disputes arising in the course of negotiations can be dealt with
by a formal corporate procedure with final resort to arbitration.

67

WICA 2006 s 45(b): Part 4 does not apply if a service provider lodges notice with IPART indicating that it is no
longer willing to allow disputes to be referred.
68
Ibid s 46.
69
Ibid s 46(5).
70
Sewer Mining Policy, above n 57, cl 2: the clause states that:
Where Sydney Water is involved, its processes will be fair and transparent in providing …

Sydney Water General Managers to resolve a dispute should a matter not be able to be resolved between
the (potential) sewer miner and Sydney Water staff, (either during the application process or once an
agreement has been entered into)

independent arbitration on disputes regarding sewer mining by [IPART] in cases where the two parties have
been unable to resolve the dispute, (either during the application process or once an agreement has been
entered into).
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SWC’s policy with regard to dispute resolution once agreement has been reached is
made clear in the Sewer Mining Agreement. SWC’s standard Sewer Mining
Agreement does not leave much room for negotiation. Clause 1.3 of the Sewer Mining
Agreement emphasises SWC’s special position as a State Owned Corporation by
providing as follows:
SEWER MINER acknowledges and agrees that:
(a) Sydney Water has an unfettered discretion to exercise any of its functions and
powers pursuant to its operating licence or any legislation;
(b) Nothing in this Agreement will an any way unlawfully restrict or otherwise
unlawfully affect the unfettered discretion of Sydney Water to exercise any of its
functions and powers pursuant to the Sydney Water Act 1994, its operating licence
or any other legislation; and
(c) Without limiting clause 1.3(a), anything which Sydney Water does, fails to do or
purports to do pursuant to its functions and powers under its operating licence or
any legislation will be deemed not to be, or to have caused or contributed to, an
act or omission by Sydney Water under this Agreement and SEWER MINER will
have no Claim against Sydney Water arising out of the subject matter of this
Agreement.

Comments made by the NCC when considering issues to do with access to
infrastructure services are relevant here in the context of sewer mining. The intention
of clause 6(4)(a) of the Competition Principles Agreement was that wherever possible
access to an infrastructure service should be on the basis of terms and conditions
agreed between the owner of the infrastructure and the access seeker. An important
element of the access provisions of the TPA 1974 was to ensure that the degree of
regulation imposed on conduct of commercial transactions would not hinder effective
negotiations – that arbitration to resolve disputes did not negate the legislative intent
that negotiated access was the preferred outcome. The NCC provided guidance
saying:
efficient outcomes are achieved by ensuring regulatory responses are proportionate to
the problem. This requires consideration of the difference in the bargaining power of
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the service provider and users (including potential users) and the extent of information
asymmetries.71

The NCC was of the view that in the absence of regulatory measures an access regime
may establish a theoretical right to negotiate, yet leave third parties in a position of
negotiating blindly with a monopoly provider. SWC flexed its muscle in the Sewer
Mining Agreement provisions. The presentation of a standard form of agreement that
is strongly aligned with policy statements supporting the intent of that agreement can
be construed as a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ stance vis-á-vis negotiation. Whether the terms
of the current sewer mining agreement are truly negotiable remains to be seen. There
are no operative sewer mining agreements in the public domain. The impact of the
WICA 2006 sewer mining arbitration provisions is yet to be tested.
13.4

Creating a level playing field – licensing

The following discussion is about licensing water service providers – how it has been
done in the past and where it is heading. SWC and SCA are the principal public water
utilities presently operating in the Sydney Region. They were established for specific
purposes: SWC to supply drinking water and provide wastewater treatment and
disposal services and SCA to supply bulk water and to manage its catchment area. They
are required to be licensed under the legislation that creates them in order to carry
out their functions.
The approach to license SWC and the SCA was specific and prescriptive. It tried to
provide comprehensive statements of the responsibilities of the corporations in the
licences, but the range and content of the licence conditions was largely set for SWC by
the SWA 1974 and for SCA by the SWCMA 1998. Consequently the form and substance
of the current licences have not strayed far from the original licences granted to them.
IPART set out convincing reasons to move away from such an approach in its review of
the SWC licence in 200972 and set out its view of the characteristics that could deliver
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National Competition Council, Certification of State and Territory Access Regimes: A Guide to Certification under
Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) Version 3.0, (Melbourne, January 2009) 32, [3.18].
72
See Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (NSW), ‗Review of the Operating Licence for Sydney Water
Corporation‘ (Water — Issues Paper, September 2009) (‗SWCOL Issues Paper‘).
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licence conditions for SWC embracing the principles of regulatory best practice.73 In
IPART’s view such an approach to regulation for SWC required licence terms that
would promote the flexibility, efficiency and effectiveness of best practice regulation
while still addressing specific obligations required under the SWA 1994.74 IPART set
out adaptive management forms that could be adopted for SWC that included risk
assessment processes to identify risks and determine priorities for risk management;
preventative measures to reduce the identified risks to an acceptable level; audits to
evaluate the success of the preventative measures; and reviews of the audit outcomes
to adapt strategies to better meet defined objectives.75
The following discussion gives some insight into the licensing environment in which the
incumbent water service providers operate in the Sydney Region. The focus is then
turned to the new licensing regime of Part 2 of the WICA 2006. Finally specific licenses
granted to one new operator are examined. The ultimate irony – that new operator,
Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd, is a purpose-built public utility and it has been
granted the first retail supplier’s licence for drinking water under the WICA 2006.
13.4.1 Licensing the incumbents
Sydney Water Corporation is a statutory State-owned corporation constituted under
the Sydney Water Act 1994 (NSW) (‘SWA 1994’). SWC’s functions as set out in the
SWA 1994 are:
to provide, construct, operate, manage or maintain systems or services for:
(a) storing or supplying water, or
(b) providing sewerage services, or
(c) providing stormwater drainage systems, or
(d) disposing of waste water.76
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Ibid Chs 2, 3: IPART recognised that some provisions of the current licence delivered best practice regulation by
incorporating an adaptive, outcomes-oriented approach citing as examples current provisions relating to water
quality, environment and asset management. Regulatory best practice is discussed below in Chapter 3.3.3 on page 40.
74
A review of the SWA 1994 would provide a much needed opportunity to bring the Act, and consequently licensing
conditions under it, into line with SWC‘s new rights and responsibilities relating to seawater and wastewater sources.
75
SWCOL Issues Paper, above n 72, 9. IPART cites the Metropolitan Water Plan 2006 (‗MWP 2006‘) as an example
of an instrument employing such a risk-based, outcome oriented approach. IPART suggests that one of the benefits of
the approach is that the regulatory provisions are enforceable since they incorporate an audit process. The analysis of
the MWP 2006 in this study in Chapter 9 does not support this conclusion although the MWP 2006 does deliver some
of the other benefits outlined by IPART.
76
Sydney Water Act 1994 (NSW) (‗SWA 1994‘), s 12(1): Note that the definition of ‗services‘ adopted in the Sydney
Water Corporation Operating Licence 2005–2010 (‗SWC Operating Licence‘) extends this definition to include
‗recycled water‘: SWC Operating Licence, cl 14. The authority by which the definition included in the Act is so
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Sydney Catchment Authority (‘SCA’) is a State-owned statutory authority constituted
under the Sydney Water Catchment Management Act 1998 (NSW) (‘SWCMA 1998’).
SCA’s role is to manage and protect its catchments and to be a supplier of raw water.
Its primary function is to protect the quality and quantity of the water in the inner and
outer catchment areas that is to be provided to SWC and other water supply
authorities, and to holders of Network Operator’s Licences (‘NOL’s) and Retail
Supplier’s Licences (‘RSL’s) issued under the WICA 2006.77 Unlike SWC, SCA is given
statutory control over all water in its water storages and pipelines and is able to supply
that water to others or permit others to draw or take that water. 78
Operating licences may be issued to SWC and SCA by the Governor79 to enable them to
carry out their functions. Only one licence, the Sydney Water Corporation Operating
Licence (‘SWCOL’), has been granted under the SWA 1994. The SWCOL has been
renewed and amended from time to time in accordance with the provisions of the
SWA 1994.80 The Sydney Catchment Authority Operating Licence (‘SCAOL’), was first
granted to the SCA under SWCMA 1998 s 25 on 2 July 1999.81 Its current term expired
on 30 June 2010. The SWCOL applies to all of SWC’s network operations and retail
supply activities in the Sydney Region. It is not confined to activities conducted in a
specific geographical location. Similarly the SCAOL regulates SCA’s activities as a
supplier of bulk water and infrastructure operation and management across an
extensive area of operations.
The form and content of the SWCOL and the SCAOL are similar. The licences are
granted for 5 years and are renewable.82 They are non-exclusive licences.83 Conditions
in each of the licences cover standards for water quality, requirements to report on
extended is not apparent. The SWC Operating Licence does not offer a definition of ‗recycled water‘ nor does it
indicate the nature of the ‗recycled water‘ services contemplated in the context.
77
Sydney Water Catchment Management Act 1998 (NSW) (‗SWCMA 1998‘) ss 13, 15(2) and s 16. The inner and
outer catchment areas are areas declared to be such under the Act.
78
Ibid s 21A. SWC‘s rights to deal with water in its infrastructure; and the control, use and flow of wastewater
sources generally are discussed in Chapter 13.3.1 on page 281.
79
SWA 1994 s 12. SWCMA 1998 s 25(1).
80
The current term of the SWCOL ends on 30 June 2015.
81
Sydney Catchment Authority Operating Licence issued under Part 9 of the Water Act 1912 (NSW) (‗SCA
Operating Licence‘). The licence was renewed on 22 December 1999 for the period 1 January 2000 to
31 December 2004, with amendments incorporated on 19 April 2000. The term was then extended to
31 December 2005. On 8 February 2006 the Governor renewed the amended operating licence of the SCA under
s 28(2) of the SWCMA 1998 until 30 June 2010. Research has not revealed how SCA was licensed in the period
between 31 December 2005 and 8 February 2006. Enquiries were made of the SCA but no response was received.
82
SWA 1994 s 17: more than one licence can be granted to SWC; SWCMA 1998 ss 27, 28.
83
Sydney Water Corporation Operating Licence 2005–2010 (‗SWC Operating Licence‘) cl 10.5.
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water quality and monitoring, asset management obligations, environmental
management planning and water conservation measures. Each of the entities is
required to comply with the terms of its licence and all other applicable laws. 84
A Customer Contract in Schedule 6 to the SWCOL sets out customer and consumer
rights in relation to water services supplied by SWC. It is a legally enforceable
document and is a requirement of the SWA 1994. It may only be varied by SWC with
the approval of the Governor. From the customer’s point of view it is non-negotiable:
an owner of land that is connected to a SWC water main or sewer main is ‘taken’ to
have entered into a Customer Contract for the provision of one or both services to the
land on the terms and conditions set out in the SWCOL.85 Furthermore, a Customer
Contract ‘is not unjust, unconscionable, harsh or oppressive for the purposes of any
law’.86
SCA’s commercial relationship with SWC is highly regulated. SCA is required to enter
into arrangements with SWC dealing with the standard of water quality supplied to
SWC; the continuity of water supply; the maintenance of adequate reserves of water
by the SCA; and, subject to IPART’s role in determinations, pricing.87 In the process,
the Treasurer is consulted, and the final terms and conditions of the arrangement are
subject to approval by the Minister. If SWC and SCA cannot settle on terms, the
Premier can determine either how negotiations will be concluded or what the terms of
the arrangement will be.88 There is provision for public exhibition of the
arrangement.89 Before SCA and SWC can enter into the arrangement, IPART must be
consulted and must provide a report (to be laid before both Houses of Parliament in

84

SWCOL cl 2.1. A note to the clause states that the SWC has obligations under a number of laws including
Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (NSW) (‗POEOA 1997‘), Public Health Act 1991 (NSW),
Fluoridation of Public Water Supplies Act 1957 (NSW), Water Act 1912 (NSW) (‗WA 1912‘), Water Management
Act 2000 (NSW) (‗WMA 2000‘), Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal Act 1992 (NSW) (‗IPART Act 1992‘),
State Owned Corporations Act 1989 (NSW), Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) (‗EP&A Act
1979‘). The POEOA 1997 regulates SWC‘s operation of its sewerage systems – ‗sewerage treatment systems‘ are
‗scheduled activities‘ for the purposes of the POEOA 1997. The Heritage Act 1977 (NSW) requires some older SWC
assets to be maintained at higher cost and preserved rather than abandoned at the end of their useful life.
SCA Operating Licence, above n 81, cl 2.1. A note to the clause states that the SCA has obligations under a number
of laws including POEOA 199), Public Health Act 1991 (NSW), WMA 2000, WA 1912, EP&A Act 1979, IPART Act
1992, Dams Safety Act 1987 (NSW), Fisheries Management Act 1994 (NSW), Public Finance and Audit Act 1985
(NSW).
85
SWA 1994 s 55.
86
SWA 1994 s 55(3).
87
SWCMA 1998 Pt 3 Div 4. The SCA Operating Licence, above n 81, cl 8.1 merely recites that this has been done.
88
Ibid s 23(2).
89
Ibid s 22(8).
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accordance with section 33 of the SWCMA 1998) to the Minister, the SCA and SWC.90
The arrangement is also subject to the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal
Act 1992 (NSW) (‘IPART Act 1992’). SCA’s relationships with customers other than SWC
are not so strictly regulated. Agreements for supply contemplated under clause 8.2 of
the SCAOL must cover water quality and continuity of supply, pricing, and dispute
resolution and complaint handling. Customers do have the right to request to
negotiate specific terms of supply but SCA is not obliged to comply with the request.91
The Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (NSW) (‘IPART’) conducts regular
reviews and annual audits of the performance of SWC and SCA.92 IPART published an
issues paper in September 2009 in relation to the end-of-term review of the SWCOL
(‘SWCOL Issues Paper’).93 The SWCOL licence review and renewal offered an
opportunity to align SWC’s licence with the licensing scheme developed in the WICA
2006 to create a level playing field. A submission prepared in response to an invitation
to the public to comment on the SWCOL Issues Paper addressed a number of issues
relating to the alignment of the two types of licences. It also addressed the proposal
to include references to objectives being pursued under the MWP 2006 in the
conditions applying to SWC under the renewed SWCOL. 94 That submission supported
the adoption of a form of licence for SWC resembling the licences issued under the
WICA 2006. However it also raised a number of concerns about the need for the
review to be comprehensive – to include relevant considerations, recommendations
and outcomes from concurrent processes for the review of the MWP 2006 and for the
finalisation of a Water Sharing Plan for the Sydney Region. 95 A new licence was issued
to SWC in June 2010. The current term of the SWCOL runs from 1 July 2010 to
30 June 2015. The MWP 2010 was released in August 2010 and the water sharing
plans for the Sydney Region remain in draft form.

90

Ibid s 24.
SCA Operating Licence, above n 81, Pt 8.
92
SWA 1994 Pt 6 Divs 1, 2. SWCMA 1998 Pt 4 Divs 1A, 2.
93
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal, ‗Review of the Operating Licence for Sydney Water Corporation‘
(Water — Issues Paper, September 2009) (‗SWCOL Issues Paper‘).
94
Wendy L Ambler, ‗Review of the Operating Licence for Sydney Water Corporation — Issues Paper‘ (Response to
Invitation for Comments, S09/11981, 20 November 2009), Appendix: Related Paper D.
95
For a discussion of the MWP 2006 see Chapter 9, especially Chapter 9.6. The development of water sharing plans
for the Sydney Region is discussed in Chapter 8.
91
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The SCAOL also expired on 30 June 2010. An end of term review of the SCAOL was to
commence around 1 July 200996. To avoid confusion with the review of the SWCOL
that was being undertaken at the time, and to allow the review to take account of
important developments in the water industry that were occurring at the time (the
desalination plant coming on-line; the review of the MWP 2006; and the release of
draft water sharing plans for the Sydney Region) the review was deferred and the
SCAOL was renewed to 6 April 2011.97 IPART has proposed that a short-term licence
should be granted in April 2011 to expire in June 2012. During that time a
comprehensive review of the SCAOL will be undertaken.98
13.4.2

A new licensing regime

The licensing provisions set out in Part 2 of the WICA 2006 introduced a contemporary
licensing regime that embraced these elements of effective regulation. Simpler
language in the WICA 2006 was designed to secure similar outcomes to those intended
from the complex language of the licences of the incumbents. The new approach was
to reflect the experience gained with the implementation of the SWA 1994 and the
SWCMA 1998 and the subordinate instruments created under those Acts, the different
objectives of the two regimes,99 and, in the case of the SWA 1994, the encumbrance of
inheriting previous statutory provisions.
The form adopted for WICA 2006 licences was a combination of prescriptive licence
conditions and outcome-oriented obligations, the latter being delivered in the form of
management plans to cover areas such as water quality, infrastructure operation,
environmental objectives, sewage, and retail supply. IPART stressed that such an
approach did not lead to a reduction of standards or safeguards since the content of

96

SCA Operating Licence, above n 81, cl 6.
SCA advises that IPART ‗recently amended the SCA‘s Operating Licence giving the expiry date to 6 April 2011‘:
Sydney Catchment Authority <http://www.sca.nsw.gov.au/publications/publications/5>. The licence can only be
amended by the Governor. Enquiries of IPART officers confirmed that the appropriate action was taken in July 2010
by the Minister and the Governor. Searches have not discovered the relevant Government Gazette notice. The
manner in which the term of the SCAOL is varied seems to be an ongoing issue: see discussion above n 81 .
98
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (NSW), ‗Sydney Catchment Authority Operating Licence Review‘
(Water Compliance — Issues Paper, July 2010) 2–3.
99
The WICA 2006 is designed to promote competition in the water industry. Regulation of the incumbent service
providers is directed primarily at public health and safety outcomes. Nevertheless, both licensing schemes are hard
law, they are founded in statute. Performance of licensees is monitored and failure to deliver outcomes, however they
are expressed, has consequences for the licensee.
97
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the plans was prescribed, the adequacy of the plans was audited, the plans had to be
fully implemented and compliance with the plans was audited.100
The WICA 2006 creates the offence of constructing, maintaining or operating water
industry infrastructure or supplying water or sewerage services without a licence. 101
The licensing scheme contained in Part 2 of the WICA 2006 created two types of
licences: a Network Operator’s Licence (‘NOL’) that authorised the construction,
maintenance and operation of specific water industry infrastructure,102 and a Retail
Supplier’s Licence (‘RSL’) that authorised the supply of water or provision of sewerage
services to specific customers.103 Currently six NOLs (five for water infrastructure and
one for sewerage infrastructure) and five RSLs (one for drinking water, three for nonpotable water supply and one for sewerage services) have been issued. Of those
licences, two are held by Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd (‘SDPPL’), a wholly-owned
subsidiary of SWC and the first public authority to hold licences under the WICA
2006.104
Licences issued under the WICA 2006 do not replace the need for consents and
approvals required under other instruments.105 The WICA 2006 licences do not provide
any right to control, access or use water or wastewater for the purposes for which the
licence is granted. Unlike the SWCOL and the SCAOL which attempt to regulate the
behaviour of SWC and SCA across the full spectrum of their respective functions and
over vast geographic areas, WICA 2006 licences are limited in scope, applying only to
specific activities to be undertaken at specific locations. The terms of a WICA 2006
100

Ibid Ch 3.
Ibid s 5. Certain categories of operations are exempted: s 5(2)–(4).
102
WICA 2006 s 6(1)(a).
103
Ibid s 6(1)(b).
104
The Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd licences are discussed below in Chapter 13.4.3 on page 296.
105
Ibid s 6(1)(2). Consents and approvals under the WMA 2000 and Protection of the Environment Operations Act
1997 are specifically mentioned. Connection to sewerage and stormwater systems, and taking of sewage and
stormwater from those systems, is conditional upon ‗all Approvals‘ being obtained prior to connection to the systems.
Specific ‗Approvals‘ must be obtained prior to taking either the sewage or stormwater. In each case the term
‗Approvals‘ means any authorisation, permit, consent, licence or approval required by any Authority under any Law.
An ‗Authority‘ is also defined. Importantly ‗Law‘ means any legislation, regulation, rule, by-law, policy, guideline
or standard of any Authority or rule of common law or equity: see cl 3.1(c) and cl 1.1 (Definitions) in each of
Sydney Water Corporation, Standard Sewer Mining Agreement, (Pro-forma Draft, May 2006) (‗Sewer Mining
Agreement‘); Sydney Water Corporation, Stormwater Harvesting and Re-use Agreement (Pro-forma Draft, undated)
(‗Stormwater Harvesting Agreement‘).
The Stormwater Harvesting Agreement requires the harvester to obtain Approvals ‗for extraction and use of the
Stormwater‘ prior to connection to the stormwater system (cl 3.1(c)). The Sewer Mining Agreement does not include
Approvals for extraction and use of sewage as a condition precedent to connection. Both agreements require all
Approvals for taking sewage or stormwater (as the case may be) and use of the water product prior to taking the
same: see cl 3.2(c) in each of the Sewer Mining Agreement and the Stormwater Harvesting Agreement.
101
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licence must specify the authorised activity and the permitted area of operation
(neither of which is exclusive to the licensee).106
Unlike the SWCOL and the SCAOL each of which is granted for a specified term, a WICA
licence remains in force until it is cancelled.107 Licences are subject to any conditions
imposed by the WICA 2006 or WICA 2006 regulations or by the Minister.108 WICA 2006
licences are non-exclusive: licences relating to the same or different activities may be
issued to more than one licensee over the same land.109
The WICA 2006 sets out application procedures:110 submissions can be made in
relation to applications;111 IPART is to recommend to the Minister whether (and on
what conditions) to grant a licence;112 the Minister is the ultimate determining
authority for licence applications; and, when making a decision must consider, but is
not bound to accept, IPART’s advice or recommendation. The decision made and the
reasons for that decision are to be made available to the public on the IPART
website.113 IPART is to monitor and report annually on compliance with licence
conditions and to review licences at least every 5 years. IPART’s report on the review
may include recommendations to vary or revoke existing licence conditions or to
impose new licence conditions.114

106

Ibid s 11. See discussion above in relation to the applicability of such conditions to the licences of SWC and SCA.
Note that the ‗first come first served‘ approach to allocation of access to sewage under contractual arrangements with
the infrastructure provider may limit the opportunity for private sector licensees to access a primary resource
(sewage) and consequently not promote competition in certain sectors of the recycling industry: see Sydney Water
Corporation, ‗Policy: Sewer Mining‘ (28 October 2008) cl 2.3.
107
Ibid s 12. The licences of SWC and SCA are currently issued for a specific term.
108
Ibid s 13(1).
109
WICA 2006 s 11. Title to sewage and stormwater and clear allocation of the right to the control, use and flow of
those water sources requires attention by the regulators in the Sydney Region. See discussion in Chapter 13.3.1 on
page 281.
110
WICA 2006 s 8(2). The specific matters to be addressed in, or to accompany, an application for an NOL are set out
in Div 1 of Part 2 of the WICA General Regulation. Provisions in almost identical terms are set out in reg 6(1) for an
NOL for water industry infrastructure and in reg 6(2) for an NOL for sewerage infrastructure. Division 2 of Part 2
sets out the information to be included in, or to accompany, an application for an RSL. Provisions in almost identical
terms are set out in reg 10(1) for an RSL for water supply and in reg 10(2) for an RSL for provisions of sewerage
services. The WICA General Regulation provides for combined applications to be lodged for an NOL and an RSL,
and for combined plans dealing with matters such as infrastructure operation, water quality, sewage management and
retail supply, to be contained in a single document: WICA General Regulation regs 15, 16. A number of guidelines
and fact sheets have been prepared by IPART to assist applicants and licensees are required to adopt the format of a
reporting manual prepared by IPART. A list of documents is available at: IPART, (12 November 2010)
<http://www.ipart.nsw.gov.au>.
111
WICA 2006 s 9(1) requires that the Ministers responsible for the Public Health Act 1991 (NSW) and the WMA
2000 are to receive copies of applications and are to be invited to make a submission. WICA General Regulation, reg
17 extends the requirement to include the Ministers responsible for the EP&A Act 1979 and the POEOA 1997. Public
submissions are to be invited: WICA 2006 s 9(1)(c).
112
WICA 2006 s 9(2), (3).
113
Ibid s 10 (5), (6).
114
Ibid s 16(7) and Pt 8. IPART‘s other functions under the WICA 2006 are set out in Part 8.
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When considering whether or not to grant a licence ‘regard is to be had to’ the
protection of public health, the environment, public safety and consumers; the
encouragement of competition in the supply of water and the provision of sewerage
services; ensuring the sustainability of water resources; and the promotion of
production and use of recycled water.115
Licences under the WICA 2006 may only be granted to corporations.116 Before
granting a licence the Minister must be satisfied that, among other things, the
applicant has, and will continue to have, the capacity (including technical, financial and
organisational capacity) to carry out the licensed activities in a manner that does not
present a risk to public health and, in the case of an application for a licence to supply
water, that ‘sufficient quantities’ of the water supplied will be obtained other than
from a public water utility.117
It is not immediately clear how the Minister can be satisfied as to the financial or any
other type of capacity, at some future time, of an applicant/licensee as required under
section 10(4)(a) of the WICA 2006. After the grant of a licence, conditions can require
that it should be so, and may impose penalties for failure to comply – but this in itself
is not fulfilling the Minister’s obligation to be satisfied prior to grant.
The requirements relating to the ongoing financial, technical and operational capacity
of applicants and licensees under the WICA 2006 may impose substantial constraints
on the private sector’s ability to assess and accept risk in the normal course of business
in the water services sector. In practice the provisions may have the effect of
providing a barrier to competition that will defeat the objective of the WICA 2006 itself.
They have prompted an interesting response in licensing.
13.4.3

A new player on the scene

Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd was incorporated under the Corporations Act 2001
(Cth) on 13 June 2007 with the principal objective (as stated in its Constitution) of
investigating and developing alternative sources for water supply, including recycling,
desalination and harvesting of stormwater.118 It is a wholly-owned subsidiary of SWC
115

WICA 2006 s 7(1).
Ibid s 8(1).
117
Ibid s 10(4).
118
Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Limited (‗SDPPL‘), Constitution, cl 1.1.
116
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and as such is constrained by Schedule 7 of the State Owned Corporations Act 1989
(NSW) that sets out provisions to be included in the constitutions of subsidiaries of
statutory State-owned corporations.119 SWC provides administrative, corporate
governance, management and oversight services to SDPPL on a commercial basis.120
SDPPL owns the infrastructure located at the Kurnell desalination plant site. It has a
drinking water supply agreement with SWC who will be SDPPL’s only customer initially,
and a contract with Veolia Water Australia Pty Ltd to operate and maintain the
plant.121 SDPPL applied for a network operator’s licence (‘NOL’) and a retail seller’s
licence (‘RSL’) under the WICA 2006 in March 2010. The licences were granted on 9
August 2010.
Conditions included in the licences are set out as required in the WICA 2006. The NOL
authorises SDPPL to carry out the licensed activities at the Kurnell desalination plant
site and at the offshore discharge and inlet structure located in the Tasman Sea and
associated inlet and outlet tunnels.122 Condition A2 of the NOL relates to the manner
in which SDPPL is to maintain and operate its infrastructure:
When the Available Storage falls below 70 per cent, the Licence Holder must, until the
Available Storage rises to 80 per cent operate and maintain the Water Industry
Infrastructure with the objective of maximising the production of drinking water.123

In a letter to IPART the Minister for Water made the following comments in relation to
SDPPL’s application for a NOL:
It is important that the network operator’s licence (if issued) is consistent with the
Government’s objectives under the MWP, in particular the operating rules for the
desalination plant.

119

State Owned Corporations Act 1989 (NSW), Schedule 7, cls 1–4: The clauses include provisions to the effect that
the Constitution of SDPPL cannot be altered without the approval of both Houses of Parliament; Provisions of the
Act prevail over SDPPL‘s Constitution; responsibility of certain shareholders; and restriction on formation of
subsidiaries of SDPPL.
120
Licence applications and supporting documentation for Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd and other licence
holders are available at: (12 November 2010) <http://www.ipart.nsw.gov.au/water/private-sector-licensing/licenceapplicants-holders.asp?view=holders>. Documents cited in the text and referenced below were obtained from this
site.
121
See SDPPL, ‗Combined Application Form: Network Operator and Retail Supplier‘, March 2010.
122
SDPPL, Network Operator‘s Licence No 10–010 (‗NOL 10–010‘), condition A1 Table 4.
123
Available storage refers to storage in SCA‘s water supply system. Available storage is published weekly on the
SCA‘s website. SCA‘s water supply system is described in Chapter 2.7.2 on page 19.
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The MWP is in the final stages of drafting and will be considered by Cabinet in the near
future. Without pre-empting the Cabinet process, I believe inclusion of the following
condition in the draft Network Operator’s licence would reflect the broad principles of
the draft MWP.124

The letter included a proposed condition generally in the terms of Condition A2(b) set
out above. Government policy, well almost policy, had been conveyed to IPART and
the regulator reacted accordingly.125 Notably, there is no requirement for SDPPL to
cease operation of the desalination plant when dam levels reach 80 per cent!
Desalination is here to stay – that is, unless the licence condition is changed. There is
certainly no obligation imposed on SDPPL to cease producing desalinated water at any
time.
The RSL authorises SDPPL to supply water in SWC’s area of operations.126 Interestingly
condition B8 of the RSL requires SDPPL to ‘ensure that sufficient quantities of the
water supplied by the Licence Holder to its customers have been obtained otherwise
than from a public water utility’. This condition is imposed under WICA 2006 section
10(4)(d) and its intention is far from clear. In its general application the condition
could ensure that capital and technical expertise would be invested by operators to
develop ‘new’ sources of water to augment existing supplies under the control of the
incumbent service providers. In this case, where the licensee is a public entity and its
sole customer is an incumbent water supplier and the source water is water under the
control of the State, the inclusion of such a condition is puzzling.
SDPPL also stated in support of its application for an RSL that ‘no agreements or
authorisations’ were required for it to extract source water from the Tasman Sea.127
Discussion in Chapter 4.2.2 concluded that the Water Act 1912 (NSW) could not
control seawater extraction and at the time the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW),
although it could, did not. The establishment of a Water Sharing Plan for the coastal
waters of the State should be a priority to regulate the extraction of seawater sources
and their inclusion in the water balance for the Sydney Region. Seawater is a
124

Letter from Minister for Water, Phillip Costa to Mr Rod Sims, Chairman, Independent Pricing and Regulatory
Tribunal, (Date of facsimile transmission 12 June 2010).
125
SDPPL, Retail Seller‘s Licence No 10–011R (‗RSL 10–011R‘), condition A1 Table 5.
126
Ibid condition A1 Table 5.
127
SDPPL, ‗Application to IPART for Network Operator and Retail Supplier Licence‘ Appendix 1: (Part 1 —
Appendix 1C, Q1(m)ii Quantity of Water)
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component of the urban water cycle of the Sydney Region and its management should
be integrated with that of other sources if integrated urban water cycle management
is to be achieved.
13.5

Discussion

In December 2008 the NSW Government applied for certification of the Water Industry
Competition Act 2006 (NSW) (‘WICA 2006’) access regime. The WICA 2006 was
declared by the NCC to constitute an ‘effective access regime’ under section 44N of the
TPA 1974 in August 2009. In the course of the application process the NCC noted that:
[T]he process of certification does not involve assessment that the particular regime
provides the most effective means of achieving efficient access outcomes. Rather it
requires assessment only that the particular regime satisfactorily addresses the
[Competition Principles Agreement] clause 6 principles. These principles do not
impose a high threshold for an access regime to be certified as effective.128

The declaration sought and obtained by Services Sydney under the TPA 1974 has been
incorporated into the WICA 2006 provisions. The original declarations under the TPA
1974 have been revoked. The WICA 2006 stands on its own two feet, the only State
water infrastructure access regime established in Australia.
However, no applications for coverage declarations have been made under the WICA
2006 in relation to areas outside those of SWC and Hunter Water Corporation that are
deemed declared by the WICA 2006. No access undertakings are recorded on the
IPART website. Only six licences for network operators and five licences for retail
sellers have been issued. Four operators hold two each (one of each type). One of
those operators is Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd, a wholly-owned subsidiary of
SWC, a public utility. Only four sewer mining projects are in operation and they have
been for some time.129 The WICA 2006 seems to have created a regulatory framework
waiting for action. But why is this so?

128

National Competition Council, ‗Water Industry Competition Act 2006 (NSW): Application for Certification of the
NSW Water Industry Infrastructure Services Access Regime‘ (Draft Recommendation, 2 April 2009), 14–15 [4.7].
129
Information on licences granted under the WICA 2006 is available on the IPART website:
<http://www.ipart.nsw.gov.au>. The SWC website provides some information on the number of sewer mining
activities being carried out in the Sydney Region:
<http://www.sydneywater.com.au/Water4Life/RecyclingandReuse/RecyclingAndReuseInAction/SewerMining.cfm>.
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It was a long road from contemplation to execution of the WICA 2006 regulatory
framework.130 Significant developments in the water industry in that time have
impacted on the active pursuit by private sector operators of opportunities to
participate in water service provision in the Sydney Region. In the time it has taken to
introduce and implement the WICA 2006, water management in the Sydney Region
has become increasingly complex as initiatives under the Metropolitan Water Plan
2006 (‘MWP 2006’) progress. SWC has released guidelines on how to harvest
stormwater from its stormwater system for re-use. It has also produced a Stormwater
Harvesting and Re-use Agreement that bears a striking resemblance in its approach to
that of the Sewer Mining Agreement.131 Although access to the services provided by
stormwater infrastructure could be achieved through the WICA 2006, extraction of the
contents of stormwater infrastructure is no more a matter for the WICA 2006 than is
the extraction of sewage.132 The draft surface Water Sharing Plan for the Sydney
Region contemplates the inclusion of rules relating to stormwater.133 The draft
groundwater sources plan refers to possible amendments to accommodate managed
aquifer recharge activities.134 The major recycling initiatives being carried out in the
Sydney Region are SWC projects with private sector participation by way of contract.
SWC has proceeded with the construction of the Sydney desalination plant to supply
drinking water in the Sydney Region. The plant will initially be capable of supplying 15
per cent of Sydney’s current drinking water needs and can be upgraded to supply up to
130

The Water Industry Competition Bill was introduced into the NSW Parliament on 24th October 2006 and received
assent on 27 November 2006. The Act was to commence once regulations concerning the licensing regime and other
matters relevant to the operation of the WICA 2006 (other than Part 3) had been gazetted. A consultation paper on the
proposals for a General Regulation was released in June 2007 (Department of Water and Energy (NSW), ‗Water
Industry Competition Act 2006 Regulations Consultation Paper‘ (June 2007) (‗Regulations Consultation Paper‘)).
The draft Water Industry Competition (General) Regulation 2008 (‗the General Regulation‘) and associated
Regulatory Impact Statement (Department of Water and Energy (NSW), ‗Water Industry Competition (General)
Regulation 2008‘ (Regulatory Impact Statement, April 2008) were released for public consultation in April 2008.
The Act commenced on 8 August 2008.
131
Sydney Water Corporation, ‗Stormwater Harvesting: How to Harvest Stormwater for Re-use from Sydney
Water‘s Stormwater System‘ (October 2009); Sydney Water Corporation, Stormwater Harvesting and Re-use
Agreement (Pro-forma Draft, undated). Stormwater harvesting operations can be pursued by agreement with SWC in
respect of stormwater infrastructure within its control. It is reasonable to expect that amendments to the arbitration
provisions of Part 4of the WICA 2006 will extend the operation of those provisions to disputes arising during
negotiation of a stormwater harvesting agreement or after a contract is finalised.
132
See WICA2006 Dictionary definitions of ‗water industry infrastructure‘, ‗water infrastructure‘ and ‗water‘.
133
Office of Water (NSW), Draft Water Sharing Plan Greater Metropolitan Region Unregulated River Water
Sources: Order (June 2010), cl 90 (‗Draft Rivers Order‘). There is no definition of stormwater harvesting in the draft
plan.
134
Office of Water (NSW), Draft Water Sharing Plan Greater Metropolitan Region Groundwater Sources: Order
(May 2010), cl 53 (‗Draft Groundwater Order‘). Managed aquifer recharge schemes involve taking poor quality
water such as recycled water or urban stormwater, treating it and then storing it in aquifers under controlled
conditions for extraction at a later time: at cl 53 Note.
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30 per cent of those needs. Desalination technology lends itself to adapting to future
needs. Sydney’s desalination plant at Kurnell can and no doubt will be expanded, or
additional plants will be constructed at other locations, if the need arises.
Metropolitan Sydney’s proximity to the coast provides it with an enormous potential
water source to meet Sydney’s future needs – provided that a compromise can be
reached to address environmental, economic and social concerns that further
expansion of desalination capacity would inevitably engender.
There may be little incentive now to lure the private sector into the industry to provide
technical and financial services to bolster the uptake of recycling opportunities when a
new non-rainfall dependent source of potable water is on tap. Recycled water may fill
some demand for discretionary use on parks and gardens and for limited indoor
residential application. But given the apparent strength of SWC’s negotiating position
to provide access to the flow of sewage and the elaborate framework of
documentation that has been constructed to support sewer mining and to influence
arbitration proceedings under the WICA 2006 if negotiations fail, sewer mining may
continue to be an activity that is pursued only at the smaller end of recycling
opportunities. Nevertheless, the WICA 2006 was brave new legislation leading the way
for private sector participation in a traditionally monopolistic market dominated by
government agencies.
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Chapter 14: Reflections
The most fundamental right of all is the right to challenge the State, under a legal system
1
which allows the possibility, occasionally, of winning.

14.1

Introduction

Chapter 1 enunciated the objective of this research: to identify and critically examine
the regulatory mechanisms that authorise, and those that restrict, what is done with
water in the Sydney Region and how it is done.
Four principal areas of investigation were identified:


The range of uses for water in the Sydney Region;



How water is sourced in the Sydney Region;



How water sources in the Sydney Region are managed; and



How water is supplied in the Sydney Region.

Early research indicated that the concepts of ‘hard law’ and ‘soft law’ were important
to understand the mechanisms and the mechanics of water regulation in the Sydney
Region. For the purposes of this study, ‘hard law’ was not to be restricted to
instruments of a legislative nature but could extend to include instruments that
created contractual relationships. Instruments with no legally binding force created by
governments seeking to influence behaviour would be characterised as ‘soft law’ water
regulation in the Sydney Region.2
Those early investigations also pointed to two particular themes to pursue in the
study: the model of integrated urban water cycle management that applied to new as
well as traditional water sources and water products; and the need for transparency in
political and administrative decision-making associated with water management in the

1

Geoffrey Robertson, The Justice Game, (Vintage, 1999), quoted in Justice Keith Mason, ‗Sunrise or Sunset?
Reinventing Administrative Law for the New Millennium‘ (Keynote Address delivered at the 2000 Administrative
Law Forum, Adelaide, 15 June 2000). Also quoted at John McMillan, ‗The role of administrative review bodies — a
commentary‘ (1999) 58(1) Australian Journal of Public Administration 76, 76. Neither source pinpoints the quote in
Robertson‘s book.
2
The nature of regulation was explored in Chapter 3. The concepts of hard and soft law were discussed in Chapters
3.2.1 and 3.2.2 respectively.
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Sydney Region. The working definition of integrated urban water cycle management
(‘IUWCM’) offered by the National Water Commission provided a contemporary
context for examination of water regulation in the Sydney Region.3 Community
participation and transparency were accepted as two essential components of an
administrative process to deliver IUWCM.4 Government attitudes to community
participation in the development of water regulation in the Sydney Region were
observed in the course of the study. Administrative law mechanisms available to
ensure transparent political and administrative processes were examined in Chapter
3.4. Figure 3.1 illustrated the applicability of those administrative review processes to
the spectrum of regulation that would be encountered in water law in the Sydney
Region. Decisions made under hard law regulation were susceptible to a range of
opportunities for review. However, soft law regulation did not fall under the umbrella
of the formal mechanisms of administrative scrutiny, particularly judicial review and
merits review.
The study took shape within this context, to identify the regulations that were relevant
to water in the Sydney Region and to explore the way they were developed and how
they were being implemented.
In this chapter, the essential components of the complex framework of water
regulation identified in the Sydney Region are summarised. Discussion then brings
together some important issues that emerged regarding community participation and
transparency in particular situations examined in earlier chapters. To conclude, these
observations are synthesised into some guiding principles for urban water
management in the Sydney Region, and a possible framework for IUWCM in the
Sydney Region is boldly proposed. The task is undertaken in full recognition, finally, of
the enormous scope of this research project.5

3

The objectives of integrated urban water cycle management are discussed in Chapter 4.4 on page 69.
Community participation and transparency in administrative process are two elements of ‗good regulatory practice‘
according to the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (NSW): see discussion in Chapter 3.3.3 on page 40.
They are goals of administrative law: see discussion in Chapter 3.4.1 on page 43.
5
Despite frequent suggestions from supervisors to consider reducing the scope of the research, the original course of
action was steadfastly pursued. As understanding of the subject grew, areas of particular interest were followed that
led to participation in a number of public consultation processes. The results of those side journeys of academic
discovery are attached to this thesis as: Appendix: Related Papers.
4
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This study was commenced in a spirit of curiosity about how water was regulated in
the Sydney Region, but in blissful ignorance of the complexity that would emerge in
this new and dynamic field of study. The project objectives at the outset did not
envisage – and could not have foretold – the changes that would take place in the
water services sector in the Sydney Region in the course of the investigation. Those
original objectives anticipated a luxury of time for contemplation, not participation in a
frantic race to comprehend changes before they – in turn – were changed. The thesis
has attempted to convey the thrill of the rather extended journey.
14.2

A framework for water regulation in the Sydney Region

Since the mid-1990s, government policies for water management reform in Australia
have emerged at a fast and furious pace. Significant national agreements relating to a
broad reform program appeared in the shape of the National Competition Policy
(‘NCP’) in 1995. The NCP consisted of inter-governmental agreements between the
Commonwealth and the States and Territories (‘NCP Agreements’). Hard law
instruments emerged from those agreements in the form of the Trade Practices Act
1994 (Cth) (‘TPA 1974’) and associated application laws in participating jurisdictions.
Water reform was incorporated into the NCP Agreements by adoption of the 1994
Council of Australian Governments Water Reform Framework (‘1994 COAG Water
Reform Framework’).
The NCP Agreements, and the 1994 COAG Water Reform Framework they included,
were able to play a most significant part in water management in the Sydney Region.
Although they were soft law instruments they were given impetus by linking
performance with their terms directly, and irresistibly (in practice) to financial
payments to be made by the Commonwealth to participating States and Territories.
The NCP Agreements spawned volumes of guidelines, reviews, reports and discussion
papers to aid implementation of, and compliance with, their non-mandatory objectives.
In NSW the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) (‘WMA 2000’) was a legislative
response to implement NCP water management reform objectives. It provided a
framework for water management planning across NSW that was considered to meet
the agreed reform objectives in form and substance, but arguably not in effect. The
WMA 2000 had very little impact in the Sydney Region for almost a decade after it was
Chapter 14: Reflections

307

introduced into Parliament, other than engendering an air of anticipation of things to
come for those tracking its progress.
The water reforms of the 1990s were principally designed to achieve better
management of the water resources of the rivers and groundwater basins of
Australia’s vast interior. Their impact on urban water management was limited but
targeted; often intended to regulate water service provision, for example through
pricing and institutional reforms, and relying on the broader reforms to manage
healthy catchments.
The National Water Initiative (‘NWI’) of June 2004 was to pick up where the NCP left
off. Significantly, it included a specific (if brief) component for urban water reform.
The NWI relied on States to produce implementation plans to set out how, and in what
timeframe, they would put the NWI initiatives into practice. The NSW National Water
Initiative Implementation Plan (‘Implementation Plan’) included urban water actions to
give effect to the aims of the NWI. The NWI was a soft law instrument, an intergovernmental agreement that renewed and expanded on the ambitions of the 1994
COAG Water Reform Framework. The implementation plans put in place by the States
and Territories were also soft law. Although the NWI emerged before the end of the
NCP program of reforms, there were no ongoing financial incentives flowing from the
Commonwealth to directly encourage timely implementation of actions set out in it.
That may have been unfortunate.
It has only been since the NWI set out specific reform objectives for urban water in
2004 that the Sydney Region has really been caught up in a whirl of water reform. The
State of NSW took on the challenge to secure Sydney’s future water supply in the 2004
Metropolitan Water Plan (‘MWP 2004’) in October 2004. The Implementation Plan
adopted the objectives set out in the MWP 2004 for the Sydney Region. 6 The MWP
2004 has had far greater impact on water management in the Sydney Region than was
expected, given its form and substance. It was a soft law instrument. There was no
obligation on NSW to implement it, although periodic reviews of progress with

6

The New South Wales Government NSW Implementation Plan for the National Water Initiative 2006
(‗Implementation Plan‘) had appeared in the public domain in draft form prior to its accreditation by the National
Water Commission in August 2006. The draft included reference to the 2004 Metropolitan Water Plan (‗MWP
2004‘) presumably in anticipation of the release of the latter.
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implementation were to be undertaken. The MWP 2004 demonstrated its flexibility,
responding quickly to changing circumstances that ultimately led to the development
of Sydney’s first desalination plant at Kurnell.
The 2006 Metropolitan Water Plan (‘MWP 2006’) replaced its predecessor in April
2006. It has been the predominant driver of change in the water industry in and
around Sydney over the period of this study. It has taken on a status that belies its
non-binding character. Its ambitions have been adopted as imperatives by service
providers, and regulators have responded with a staggering array of supporting hard
and soft law instruments to assist water service providers and water management
planners to implement its water supply and demand management objectives.
The MWP 2004 set out actions to be taken to reduce Sydney’s dependence on rain-fed
sources of water supply with ambitious targets for recycled water use, demand
reduction, and supply augmentation from existing and new water sources. The MWP
2006 pursued the directions provided by its predecessor. The Government of the day
recognised the opportunity to spread its risks in the water sector by encouraging
private operators to invest their financial and technical resources in innovation in the
urban water sector, even if there was some reluctance on the part of the incumbent
service provider to share the patch.
Hard law mechanisms were available to approve and monitor recycling initiatives, the
Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) at the smaller end of the spectrum, the
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) at the top end. Soft law
regulation in the form of explanatory guidelines assisted those willing to take up the
recycling cause in and around the home. Major projects undertaken by the
Government through incumbent service providers were ushered through approvals
processes with the help of extensive modifications to the planning legislation –
changes that would limit, if not deny, community involvement in decision-making
processes. Those changes would also close up avenues for challenge of decisions once
made.
The Water Industry Competition Act 2006 (NSW) (‘WICA 2006’) provided another hard
law framework to facilitate private sector entry into an area of services previously
dominated by government utilities. The WICA 2006 created an access regime to ensure
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that new entrants could gain access to significant government-owned water
infrastructure if necessary to increase competition in the sector. The WICA 2006
access regime meant that prospective new operators did not need to resort to the
Commonwealth access regime in Part IIIA of the TPA 1974. It set up a mechanism to
settle disputes between infrastructure owners and access seekers on the terms of that
access. But, unlike the TPA 1974, the WICA 2006 did not include an opportunity for
either party to seek review of decisions made under the NSW regime. It did not
incorporate a framework for merits review. Settlement of access issues was to be kept
confined, not only within the State but to the decision-makers working within the
legislative regime.
The WICA 2006 also created a system of licensing for water service providers to
protect public health and safety. The new licensing provisions were designed to
modernise the prescriptive hard law (statutory) licensing approach adopted for the
incumbent service providers. Safe and reliable water supplies would be ensured by
conditions in the statutory licences for new entrants to the water service industry, that
obliged them to take notice of a soft law risk management approach to water quality. 7
The latest, but not necessarily final, element of the framework of water regulation for
the Sydney Region has emerged in 2010. It comprises the draft surface and
groundwater management plans prepared in accordance with the provisions of the
WMA 20008 and the third iteration of the soft law water plan for the region, the
Metropolitan Water Plan 2010.
For the time being at least, dam levels in the Sydney Region are not dropping at an
alarming rate. Water supplied from the Kurnell desalination plant seems to be
compensating in part for the temporary cessation of transfers from the Shoalhaven
system. Recycling opportunities are being taken up by businesses and industry, and
sewer mining provides water for golf courses and sporting fields. There has not been a
rush of applications to license network operators or retail suppliers. A regulatory
7

So far the imposition of conditions in licences authorising non-potable water retail supply health and safety have
preserved the role of NSW Health in this area. See discussion of the new Sydney Water Corporation operating
licence and the Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd licence issued under the WICA 2006 in Chapter 13.4 on page 288.
8
See discussion in Chapter 8. The Draft Orders comprise the Office of Water (NSW) Draft Water Sharing Plan:
Greater Metropolitan Region Unregulated River Water Sources: Order 2010 (June 2010) and the Draft Water
Sharing Plan: Greater Metropolitan Region Groundwater Sources: Order 2010 (May 2010) (together called the
‗Draft Orders‘.

Chapter 14: Reflections

310

framework has been put in place to accommodate water management and water
services provision in the Sydney Region.
There seems to be time, at last, to pause and reflect. The following discussion does
just that.
14.3

Transparent administrative process

Chapters 5 to 11 of this thesis examined the reform elements of the water
management framework set out above, how they were made, and how they were put
into practice. Soft law comprises a major component of that regulatory framework.
Chapter 12 examined the legal processes pursued by Services Sydney when it failed to
gain access to sewage transmission services supplied by SWC through negotiations
with SWC. The actions were initiated under the access provisions of Part IIIA of the
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). In Chapter 13 the NSW water industry infrastructure
services access regime created in Part 3 of the WICA 2006 was examined. It made no
provision for merits review. There would not be any Services Sydney challenges arising
from the new legislation.9
The discussion in these earlier chapters highlighted shortcomings of monitoring and
review processes associated with the implementation of the reforms, and revealed an
inclination on the NSW Government’s part to exclude the community from many, if
not all, aspects of regulation (whether hard or soft law), and to distance itself from
review of its actions. That in turn sowed seeds of disquiet about the extent to which a
government might stray from traditional hard law mechanisms without utterly
compromising the core values of administrative law.
Recourse to the principal formal mechanisms of administrative review – judicial review
and merits review – to question regulatory decisions made under soft law in the
Sydney Region is beyond contemplation at the time of writing. However, the guiding
principles of the Administrative Review Council (‘ARC’) set out in Chapter 3.4.4 did
suggest ways regulators could embrace the values of administrative law in developing
and implementing regulation. The guiding principles applied equally to hard and soft
law and are pertinent to the processes of monitoring and review of that regulation.
9

The omission of merits review from the WICA 2006 was addressed in some detail by the writer in Related Papers
attached: see Appendix: Related Papers A and B.
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Creyke and Groves set out what they saw as the challenges to be faced by
administrative law with the proliferation of soft law instruments (challenges that bore
a striking resemblance to the ARC’s guiding principles): how to develop standards for
drafting soft law; how to make decisions that rely on soft law reviewable; and how to
achieve a greater level of consultation in the development and implementation of soft
laws. They saw consultation as a way for soft law ‘to better represent the interests
and encourage the cooperation of those they are designed to influence’.10 Creyke
separately suggested that thought should be given to more extensive procedures to
require consultation, publicity and professional drafting; extension of the range of
instruments to be tabled in Parliament; and extension of administrative law review
mechanisms, remedies and grounds of review to soft law.11
The issue was addressed by Justice Paul Stein in 1997, when considering difficulties
encountered by courts and tribunals with putting the principles of ecologically
sustainable development into practice. Justice Stein adverted to what he perceived to
be ‘the discomfort of members of the judiciary with “soft law”, especially by “black
letter lawyers”’.12 The difficulty identified by Justice Stein was ‘the translation of the
often “high sounding” statements into the practical reality of decision making.’ 13
Justice Stein concluded by saying that judges would be better equipped to apply the
principles of ecologically sustainable development if they were set out explicitly in
legislation in a way that clarified the role of the principles in decision making.14 He was
indeed suggesting that soft law should be made into hard, at least in that instance.
The ARC’s guiding principles (in part) and the proposals put forward by Creyke and
Groves – and separately by Creyke – to increase the accountability of soft law seem to
be attempting to do the same thing, to change soft law into hard, but these proposals
are expressed perhaps more softly than those of Justice Stein. They all seem to be
going in the same direction. Community consultation, clarity of meaning and
appropriate checks and balances for regulatory process are key common foundations.
10

Robin Creyke and Matthew Groves, ‗Administrative Law Evolution: An Academic Perspective‘ (2010) 59 Admin
Review 20, 26.
11
Robin Creyke, ‗―Soft Law‖ and Administrative Law: A New Challenge‘ (2010) 61 Australian Institute of
Administrative Law Forum 15, 21.
12
Justice Paul Stein, ‗Turning Soft Law into Hard — An Australian Experience with ESD Principles in Practice‘
(1997) 3 The Judicial Review 91, 95.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
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14.3.1 Including the community
The ARC relied on effective and timely consultation processes to deliver open and
transparent development of regulation.15
Chapter 6 reviewed National Competition Council (‘NCC’) and National Water
Commission (‘NWC’) assessments of progress with implementation of nationally
agreed soft law water reforms. Progress with the reforms was tied to payments to be
made by the Commonwealth to States and Territories until 2005–2006, thus although
the reforms were not mandatory, there were persuasive reasons for their
implementation.16 NSW’s hard law water planning reforms were subjected to close
scrutiny in the course of the NCC and NWC assessments. NSW was persistently called
to task in relation to its approach to public consultation, the type and quality of
information provided to stakeholders and the transparency of the process by which
consultation took place.17
The proposed development of a statutory Water Sharing Plan for the Sydney Region
lurked in the background of these assessments, an action that was on the agenda but
one that was constantly delayed. Chapter 8 discussed the draft water sharing plans for
the Sydney Region released by the NSW Government for public exhibition in June 2010
(‘Draft Orders’).18 The regulatory path chosen for the development of the Draft Orders
(as Minister’s plans under Chapter 2 Part 4 of the WMA 2000 and as macro plans) did
not require community consultation. Nevertheless consultation did take place towards
the end of the planning process. It adopted a format that had been followed when
other Water Sharing Plans were developed for the State – a format that had been
criticised in the course of the NCP reviews.
Two phases of consultation were undertaken: one with targeted participants, and the
other as broad public consultation at the end of the development process. There was
no shortage of printed material available to explain the planning process and to set out
specific rules developed for different water sources. The public exhibition period was

15

See generally Administrative Review Council, ‗Administrative Accountability in Business Areas Subject to
Complex and Specific Regulation‘ (Report to the Attorney-General of Australia, Report No 49, November 2008), xii,
28–30 (‗Business Rules Report‘).
16
See generally Chapter 6.
17
See Chapter 6.5 on page 121.
18
Draft Orders, above n 8.
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xtended upon request from concerned individuals. Information evenings were held
across the Sydney Region with previously forgotten areas being included, again upon
request from concerned individuals. But there was no clear indication in any of the
printed material, or in presentations at public meetings, that the plans were more
soundly based on good science than those that had been criticised in the course of the
NCP reviews. Further, the NSW Government had broken faith with the community by
following a course of plan development that it had said on more than one occasion
was not relevant for the Sydney Region.
The consultation process was grand in scale and apparent substance but its impact is
yet to be determined. At the date of writing there is no information available to
indicate the level of public response to the process. In the two meetings attended in
the course of this research, there was an overwhelming feeling of ‘too little too late’ –
regulators would be unlikely to adopt changes to draft instruments that, in the eyes of
their creators, must be almost ready to run the final leg of the race to the finish. The
consultation process was neither effective as a real effort in communication and
discussion about a matter of fundamental importance, nor was it timely, when viewed
from a community perspective. The real dilemma is that the WMA 2000 offered a
framework for plan development that was open and transparent, that offered an
opportunity for community participation from the outset through water management
committees. But the Minister could – and did – choose to follow another path.
Examination of the processes associated with the development of the MWP 2004 in
Chapter 9 illustrated the ‘how-not-to-do’ for development of regulation, particularly
soft law. The plan emerged at a time when there had been a long-standing
expectation that a statutory Water Sharing Plan would be forthcoming for the Sydney
Region. When the MWP 2004 emerged, it only became clear in the document itself
that it was not intended to replace the statutory plan (its language was obviously that
of a policy strategy), and that the statutory plan was still to come.19 It has taken five
years for the community to be given the opportunity to participate in the development
of a revised soft law metropolitan water plan. Perhaps, the NSW Government learnt
from community responses to initiatives such as the desalination project set out in the
19

MWP 2004, above n 6, 25.
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MWP 200. It embraced two phases of community consultation (one targeted and one
broadly consultative) to engage the community in the review of the MWP 2006.
Consultation was undertaken early in the process, but the nature of that consultation
must have provided reasonable comfort for the Government that the outcomes would
follow its preferred directions.
14.3.2 Speaking plainly
In the ARC’s view, plain language delivered under the supervision of legally trained
experts in drafting will go a long way towards ensuring effective and efficient
government and non-government regulation. Importantly, the ARC suggested that
regulation should be available not only on well-publicised internet sites but also in
print to make it accessible.20
Chapter 5 examined the soft law instruments of intergovernmental water reform
agreements: the 1994 COAG Water Reform Framework and the NWI. Those
instruments embodied agreements reached between the Commonwealth and all
States and Territories and, importantly, they were written in the language of
consensus. This study did not investigate the process behind their development, but it
is sufficient to note that the discussion in Chapter 5 records the time spent by
regulatory bodies in assisting parties to implement their terms. The NCC and NWC
assessments of performance pass judgment from time to time on the extent of the
reforms embodied in the documents (for example indicating it was often beyond the
financial and technical capabilities of the parties to implement the intended reforms,
and that the timetables envisaged for completion could not be met).
The MWP 2006 is also a soft law instrument, a non-statutory ‘plan,’ that sets out
strategies to secure water supply for the Sydney Region. It does not mandate action.
Its language is both descriptive and coercive but does not convey the portent of the
plan itself. Projects foreshadowed from 2004, at least as possible components of a
diversified water supply strategy for Sydney, continue to take the community by
surprise when they are put into practice – as evidenced by community responses to
the proposal for a desalination plant at Kurnell that were discussed in Chapter 11.
Groundwater investigations in the Sydney region, particularly at Kangaloon, have
20

Business Rules Report, above n 15, xii.
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elicited angry responses from the local community. Public opinion swayed the
Government so that proposals to raise the wall of Tallawa Dam were shelved.
The MWP 2006 has been extraordinarily influential in modifying behaviour, and it is
having a significant effect on individuals. It is a flexible regulatory mechanism that
affords decision makers unfettered discretion to proceed, or not, along the directions
that it suggests will be followed. It is difficult to imagine how a challenge to decisions
made under the MWP 2006 could enjoy any success beyond the powers of the ballot
box. It is perhaps worth questioning the value of challenge, if indeed the instrument is
delivering appropriate outcomes to secure Sydney’s water future in line with reform
objectives that have persisted since the 1990s.
Websites can offer ready access to information but that access is not always
straightforward. Increased use of soft law instruments has been a shift from ‘black
letter’ law in more than one way. The newer forms of regulation, such as the MWP
2006 and the Blue and Purple Guidelines21 have lent themselves to presentation as
highly colourful publications with embedded graphics. Often these publications are
not available in print form other than from the website, and they are very rarely
available in a ‘printer-friendly’ version that eliminates graphics. Computers have
facilitated the ‘cut-and-paste’ approach to document creation, with the result that as
well as being elaborately illustrated, publications may also be inordinately lengthy and
repetitious. Quantity is not necessarily quality – and there seems to be only one way
that the urge to report, review, re-state and clothe advice in different garments can go.
The result may well be an increase in quantity with an attendant decrease in quality of
output.
14.3.3 Checks and balances for soft law
Monitoring and review of regulation are distinct procedures. They were discussed in
Chapter 3 where the essential differences between them were identified: monitoring
of regulatory schemes is undertaken on an ongoing basis to assess if the objectives of a
scheme are being met, and to change behaviour if necessary to achieve those
objectives; regulatory review determines how a scheme has performed to a particular
point in time in relation to its objectives, and addresses the ongoing relevance of the
21

See Chapter 10.
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strategy and its objectives to assess the need for modification, abandonment or
replacement of that scheme.22
The NCC reviews of performance relating to implementation of the NCP were referred
to in the preceding section. Discussion in Chapter 6 demonstrated that the promise of
financial gain for performance definitely encouraged implementation of reforms.
However, NSW’s repeatedly poor delivery of water planning reform demonstrated a
failure in the review mechanism. The discussion in Chapter 6 suggested that this was
due to the review method – a ‘no-surprise’ approach – that relied on close
collaboration between the reviewer and the subject of the review. The review was
concerned that regulatory objectives were being met (the reforms agreed in the NCP
and the NWI) and that regulations were being put in place in all jurisdictions (such as
the WMA 2000) that were capable of delivering the required changes to water
planning behaviour (to deliver water management that would optimise economic,
social and environmental outcomes)23. The reviews did not address whether or not
those changes were delivered, that is, whether the regulation was implemented in
such a way that the objectives would be met. They failed to offer a mechanism of
enforcement that would deliver tangible on-ground reform.24
The ARC conclusions about the applicability of different administrative review
mechanisms to decisions made under complex and specific regulations were neatly
summarised in the diagram reproduced in Figure 3.1. Disappointingly, the ARC did not
produce a silver bullet. In fact it did not propose any far-reaching changes to the
system on the basis that the existing mechanisms applied to a large number of
decisions made under hard and soft laws. The ARC was also of the view that existing
22

See generally Chapters 3.3.1, 3.3.2.
See Chapter 5, especially Chapter 5.6 on page 100.
24
Requirements for monitoring and review of water regulation in the Sydney Region appear in hard and soft law
instruments: See for example: Section 404 of the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) (‗WMA 2000‘): Minister is to
review the Act as soon as possible after 5 years from date of assent to determine if the policy objectives remain valid
and if the terms of the Act remain appropriate for securing those objectives. A report of the outcome of the review is
to be tabled in parliament within 12 months of end of 5 years. The National Water Commission Act 2004 (Cth)
requires a review of the National Water Commission to be conducted by the end of 2011 and the National Water
Commission Act 2004 (Cth) ceases to be in force on 30 June 2012. The Council of Australian Governments is to
review the objectives and operation of the National Water Initiative in 2011 based on the third biennial assessment in
2010-11: National Water Initiative cl 108 and Monitoring and Review in cl 104-108 generally. The National
Competition Policy had a sunset clause. The Metropolitan Water Plan 2006 provides for preparation by the
Government of a status report each year, ‗to confirm that analysis underpinning the projected supply and demand
balance remains valid, and that no developments have occurred that fundamentally alter the general approach of the
[MWP] in force at the time.‘ A major review is to be undertaken every 4 years: MWP 2006 122 [10.3]. The State
Water Management Outcomes Plan took effect on 20 December 2002 for a period of 5 years. It ceased to have effect
pursuant to sec 6(6) of the WMA 2000 and has not been revised or replaced at the date of writing.
23
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merits review processes were sufficiently adaptable within the confines of their
regulatory creation and made no recommendations for change. They would remain
confined to their statutory homes. Checks and balances for soft law are works in
progress.
14.4

Delivering IUWCM

The sustainable control, management and use of a precious resource should not
depend upon the vagaries of politics. It should transcend political and constitutional
boundaries. A mechanism that is an amalgam of soft and hard law is emerging, and is
being tried and tested, in the Sydney Region. It is demonstrably one that can adapt to
meet new challenges in a changing world. The urban water framework of the Sydney
Region that has evolved from nationally agreed strategies stands as a monument to
cooperative federalism, and at present it sits happily with the State’s rights to manage
its own water resources. But there are other challenges still to be met that have been
identified in this thesis. One of them is the goal of integrated urban water cycle
management.
Chapter 4.4 explored the notion of IUWCM noting that it was not an easy concept to
define. For the purposes of this study a key element of the concept was identified –
the objective of integrated management of all water sources (surface water,
groundwater, recycled wastewater, stormwater and desalinated seawater). The
following discussion draws some final conclusions on options to deliver IUWCM and
proposes guiding principles for water management planning in the Sydney Region,
offering a skeleton around which an appropriate framework might be constructed.
The emerging pattern of water regulation in the Sydney Region reflects the
complexities of a natural system heavily impacted by human habitation. It exhibits
elements of soft law and hard law. Constraints are imposed by Commonwealth, State
and local council instruments. Regulation in the Sydney Region is administered by a
plethora of authorities with little or no imperative to act in the interests of the water
resources themselves.
The ‘water’ that is regulated by this complex mix of regulatory mechanisms is rain
water, wastewater, recycled water, greywater, blackwater, desalinated water,
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stormwater, and groundwater. It is water (H2O) with substances in solution and in
suspension, some of which are desirable while others are definitely not. Nevertheless
water is water.
The State has the right to control the use and flow of water (the term water being used
in a limited sense as defined in the statute and relating only to fresh water sources)
under section 392 of the WMA 2000; its legislatives powers extend to the coastal
water of the State by virtue of the Coastal Water (State Powers) Act 1980 (Cth); and
the Commonwealth has demonstrated its willingness to work with States to improve
water management across all jurisdictions. However, these State powers have not
been extended by statute to the new sources of water, those with impurities, those
known as wastewater but identified by various tags.
Control, use and flow of wastewater in the Sydney Region rests with the owner of the
infrastructure in which the wastewater is contained – the public utility providing
wastewater services, or the landowner for pipes on private land. In Chapter 13 an
analogy was drawn between the difficulties faced by Sydney Water Corporation when
it is allocating sewage for recycling and the regulation of surface water and
groundwater sources in the Sydney Region. There it was suggested that the water
management planning provisions, more specifically Chapter 2, Part 3, of the WMA
2000 could be applied to plan for and regulate access to and use of the wastewater
stream.
The WMA 2000 offered the NSW Government an opportunity to take the lead (albeit
with considerable amendment to the existing legislation) and clearly establish a right
to control the use and flow of new wastewater sources in the Sydney Region in a
manner that was consistent with that existing for fresh water resources.
However, another important component of the water management framework is that
embodied in the soft law of the metropolitan water plans. The WMA 2000 delivered a
State water management outcomes plan (‘SWMOP’)25 that is now languishing on the
shelves, being past its use-by date. The SWMOP set clear objectives for water
management in the State. It set out targets to achieve those objectives. It had the
force of law – in so far as its provisions mandated behaviour. The MWP 2006 and its
25

See discussion in Chapter 7.4 on page 140.
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new successor arguably perform the same function in the Sydney Region, addressing
not only the fresh water sources of the region but new sources that now play an
important part in securing Sydney’s water for the future. The MWP 2006 is in fact a
water management outcomes plan for the Sydney Region embodied in soft law, not
mandating action but persuasively guiding it.
Perhaps the goals of IUWCM are not so elusive, at least in the Sydney Region. If the
two planning mechanisms mentioned above are taken together, as is intended by the
State Government, they can deliver integrated management of all water sources of the
Sydney Region across the whole of the water cycle. However, there are two main
obstacles to the success of this approach: identifying who controls and allocates water,
and winning the community’s confidence and support.
As the ARC provided its list of guideline principles, now this study offers its own guiding
principles for integrated urban water cycle management in the Sydney Region based
on the principal issues that have emerged in previous chapters:
(a) water should be defined to include all forms of water (fresh, saline and waste),
(b) the right to the control use and flow of water should be vested in a single entity
– a water manager – in a way that will ensure water management transcends
political discord, and
(c) water management planning should address all sources of water and all water
uses in a manner that will incorporate the whole of the urban water cycle and
incorporate administrative law values.
Such a water management planning framework might:
a. be based on a complete water balance for the Sydney Region;
b. comprise a broad strategic plan for the whole of the Sydney Region (a
Sydney Region water management outcomes plan) that is implemented
through detailed water management plans for water management
areas identified in the Sydney Region (sub-catchment water sharing
plans);
c. incorporate integrated urban water cycle management principles;
d. adopt, and commit to meeting, the objectives of nationally agreed
water reforms;
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e. evolve from open and transparent development processes including a
process of community consultation that will establish community
ownership of the problems associated with water management in an
urban area and will allow community ownership of solutions to those
problems;
f. provide appropriate mechanisms for review of administrative actions
and decisions;
g. be submitted to regular monitoring and review to ensure efficient and
effective regulation, and to adapt to changing needs and changing
technologies; and
h. adhere to the principles of ecologically sustainable development.
It seems a big wish list but some important elements are almost in place. The MWP
2006, for all of its early problems with lack of consultation and transparency in its
delivery, is now associated with a consultative process at times of review. That
process undeniably leaves room for improvement but it must be seen as a positive
step forward in the six years since the MWP 2004 appeared. The Draft Orders have
attempted to provide detailed water sharing rules for the Sydney Region. The process
of their development has been long and fraught with a lack of openness and
transparency. The Draft Orders, if that is what they can be seen as (draft and not
nearly finalised), provide the foundation for further consultation to arrive at a
compromise that might be more representative of the ‘needs’ of those who will be
governed by their terms. The Draft Orders could also deliver water sharing planning at
a more appropriate scale if they related to smaller areas rather than the Sydney Region
as a whole.26 The groundwork has been done to produce the Draft Orders a decade
after the introduction of the legislation under which they were prepared. It would be
time well spent to produce Water Sharing Plans for the Sydney Region that truly met
the objectives of national water reforms. Chapter 6 demonstrated that NSW’s record
on this front was not good.

26

Draft Orders, above n 8. Chapter 8.2 on page 154 identified the water sources covered by the two plans. The
surface water plan covered six water sources divided into 78 management zones. The groundwater plan relates to 13
groundwater sources. When the WMA 2000 was first introduced it may have been reasonable to expect individual
plans for each water source developed in conjunction with water management committees established in each area.
The vision was too grand.
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14.5

Concluding remarks

This study reveals that the water management framework for the Sydney Region in the
21st century is a complex mix of policy initiatives and legislative prescriptions. That
combination is not a new phenomenon in water resource management in Australia, at
least in the past two decades. However, it is perhaps not as attractive and familiar as a
traditional hard law paradigm might be, with its attendant perceptions of certainty.
Administrative lawyers are already grappling with the challenges soft law poses to the
existing systems of administrative review. Hopefully, soft law accountability can be
tailored to need, and it can adapt as necessary. The real dilemma is the extent to
which the ultimate flexibility afforded by soft law mechanisms should be fettered.
Heavy-handed containment of administrative discretion might best be directed at
those matters that are at least nominally immutable namely environmental needs and
public health and safety. That containment might also be best achieved through
prescriptive hard law mechanisms that do not provide choices for decision-makers.
Urban water pricing is an issue that is obviously being addressed, but price regulators
in NSW seem to be reticent to take on the thorny issue of assessing and including
environmental externalities in price determination. Pricing urban water to reflect the
real cost of supply is a task that is feasible if the political will exists to take on the
consumers in the city. It is perhaps a matter of ‘wait and see’: how will higher water
prices be ‘spun’ to the electorate?
Informed and useful community involvement in regulatory process seems to be the
main challenge to be met in urban water regulation, particularly in the Sydney Region.
Political spin is making many Australians question the sincerity of political
pronouncements. They do not trust reassurances that the chosen course of action is
the right one to take; they query the ‘science’ that is offered in support of water
management planning methods. Perhaps the real issue is communication –
conversation rather than consultation.
It is time consuming and not always easy to bring the community along with policy
development. However, if the community does not take ownership of a problem it
cannot be expected to take an interest in, let alone support, solutions that are foisted
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on it by those in power. The transition that has been witnessed in the evolution of
urban water regulation in the Sydney Region in the first decade of the 21st century is a
move from familiar territory of command and control hard law (where the community
expected consequences from certain actions), to a soft approach that appears to cajole
but that, in fact, compels.
Recent developments in urban water management in the Sydney Region provide an
impressive example of a shift in the relative persuasiveness of the two mechanisms,
soft law and hard law, in the delivery of agreed national urban water management
policies. Rather than hindering progress, the absence of formal sanctions for failure to
deliver urban water reforms under the MWP 2006 and under the Implementation Plan
has provided scope for the NSW Government to respond to change early and often.
But it is this very ease with which change can be brought about that must be
scrutinised.
Professor Farrier once made the observation that:
so far at least as government Ministers are concerned, … they exercise significant
control over the parliament and the governing political party to which they belong
when it comes to allocating discretionary decision-making power to themselves
through legislation in the first place.27

As uncomfortably accurate as the statement may be, it is one that should drive
reforms to strengthen opportunities for recourse to, and outcomes from,
accountability mechanisms that are responsive to the environment in which they are
to be applied, that is for hard and soft law alike. A single water management planning
regime would offer a regulatory environment in which soft and hard law could flourish.
It would remove some of the barriers to management by way of a partnership
between the government and the community that now exist. However, Justice
Mason’s words resonate as a cautionary note: ‘the control of public power is not an
end in itself, even though much of administrative law proceeds as if it is’.28

27

David Farrier, ‗The limits of judicial review: Anvil Hill in the Land and Environment Court‘ in Tim Bonyhardy
and Peter Christoff (eds), Climate Law in Australia (Federation Press, 2007) 189, 196-7.
28
Justice Keith Mason, ‗Sunrise or Sunset? Reinventing Administrative Law for the New Millennium‘ (Keynote
Address delivered at the 2000 Administrative Law Forum, Adelaide, 15 June 2000).
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1. Preamble
1.1.

This paper compares the regulatory instruments relating to the application by
the NSW Government for certification of the access regime established by Part
3 of the Water Industry Competition Act 2006 (NSW). The discussion is based
on a paper which is part of a broader study of urban water regulation as it
applies in the Greater Sydney Region which is being undertaken by the author.
The discussion compares provisions of the relevant instruments to ascertain
consistencies and divergences among them. For ease of reading, and as readers
involved in the present public consultation will probably already be familiar
with the regulatory instruments, the matters of interest that have become
apparent in the study are highlighted in the text, so that they may be easily
identified. The paper is now presented as a contribution to the public
consultation process.

2. Introduction
2.1.

NSW is a party to the Competition Principles Agreement – 11 April 1995 (As
amended to 13 April 2007) (CPA). It has established a regime for access to
water industry infrastructure in Part 3 of the Water Industry Competition Act
2006 (NSW) (WICA) and the Water Industry Competition (Access to
Infrastructure Services) Regulation 2007 (NSW) (Access Regulation). The
WICA is the first water industry infrastructure access regime to be established
in Australia. The WICA regime is largely self-contained. It does not adopt any
provisions of an existing national regime regulating access to water industry
infrastructure – there is no such national scheme.

2.2.

The NSW Government (NSW) is seeking certification of the access regime
established by Part 3 of the WICA under section 44M of the Trade Practices
Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA). The correspondence relating to the request consists of:


Covering letter dated 17 December 2008 from the Premier of NSW to the
National Competition Council



Schedule to covering letter: information required by Regulation 6B of the
Trade Practices Regulations 1974 (Cth) (Schedule to the Application)



Attachment to covering letter: ‗Assessment of the NSW Water Industry
Access Regime against the Competition Principles Agreement principles‘
(Attachment to the Application)



Water Industry Competition Act 2006 (NSW) and Water Industry
Competition (Access to Infrastructure Services) Regulation 2007 (NSW)



National Competition Council request for additional information from NSW
in relation to the application, 13 January 2009 (Council Request)



NSW response to Council Request: covering letter dated 17 February 2009



NSW response to Council Request: Attachment to covering letter (NSW
Response)
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2.3.

The National Competition Council (Council) has published a guide1
(Certification Guide) to assist applicants for certification to assess the merits
of such an application and if appropriate to prepare an application. The
Certification Guide is also to assist those interested in the application or parties
wishing to make submissions.

2.4.

Extensive further information expanding upon the WICA access regime is
accessible from the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of NSW
(IPART) website. A guide to declaration of infrastructure under the WICA
(WICA Guide)2 is included in the IPART publications.

3. The Certification procedures: matters to be taken into account
3.1.

Section 44M(4) of the TPA sets out the matters which must be taken into
account by the Council when making a recommendation to the Minister in
relation to the certification of a State or Territory access regime. The Council
must:


assess whether the regime is an effective access regime by applying the
relevant principles set out in the CPA (s 44M(4)(a));



have regard to the objects of Part IIIA set out in section 44AA of the TPA (s
44M(4)(aa)); and



not consider any other matters (s 44M(4)(b)).

3.2.

The Council is also required, when recommending certification, to recommend
the period for which it should be in force (TPA, s 44M(5)).

3.3.

Clauses 6(2)-(5) of the CPA (the Clause 6 Principles) set out the relevant
principles referred to in TPA section 44M(4)(a). Referring to the national
access regime contemplated under the CPA, and now embodied in Part IIIA of
the TPA, the CPA states in clause 6(2) that:
The regime…is not intended to cover a service provided by means of a facility
where [a] State or Territory…has in place an access regime which covers the
facility and conforms to the principles set out in this clause unless:
(a)

the Council determines that the regime is ineffective having regard to
the influence of the facility beyond the jurisdictional boundary of the
State or Territory; or

(b)

substantial difficulties arise from the facility being situated in more
than one jurisdiction.

3.4.

According to clause 6(3) of the CPA, if an access regime is to conform to the
Clause 6 Principles, it should apply to services provided by means of significant
infrastructure facilities and reasonably incorporate each of the principles of
clause 6(4) of the CPA.

3.5.

Section 44DA of the TPA clarifies these requirements to the extent that each
individual relevant principle of the CPA is to be treated as having the status of a
guideline rather than a binding rule.

1

National Competition Council 2009, Certification of State and Territory Access Regimes: A guide to
Certification under Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act, Melbourne.
2
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of New South Wales, The NSW Water Industry Access
Regime: A guide to declaration of infrastructure under the Water Industry Competition Act 2006
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4. Structure of this discussion
4.1.

This paper addresses the matters to be taken into account by the Council as set
out above. As noted in paragraphs 2.10-2.14 of the Certification Guide, when
assessing an application for certification, the Council generally organises its
consideration of the Clause 6 Principles into five categories. This analysis
follows the Council‘s practice and addresses the Clause 6 Principles under the
following headings:


Scope of an access regime – 6(3), 6(4)(d)



Treatment of interstate issues – 6(2), 6(4)(p)



Negotiation framework – 6(4)(a)-(c), (e), (f), (g)-(i), (m), (n), (o)



Dispute resolution – 6(4)(a)-(c), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k), (l), (o), 6(5)(c)



Efficiency promoting terms and conditions of access – 6(4)(a)-(c), (e), (f),
(i), (k), (n), 6(5), s44AA of the TPA.

5. Preliminary comments
5.1.

Certain minor omissions have been noted from the text of the Clause 6
Principles as set out in the Attachment to the Application.3

5.2.

There is no reference in either the Schedule to the Application or in the
Attachment to the Application to clause 6(2) or to clause 6(4)(i)(v) of the
Clause 6 Principles. There is no explanation or demonstration of how these
clauses are satisfied in relation to the services specified as is required in an
application (Certification Guide [1.10]).

6. Scope of an access regime: Competition principles 6(3), 6(4)(d)
Conformity with the clause 6 principles – 6(3)
6.1.

Clause 6(3)(a) provides that, for an access regime to conform to the Clause 6
Principles, it should apply to services provided by significant infrastructure
facilities which are uneconomical to duplicate, where access is necessary to
permit effective competition, and where the safe use of the facility can be
ensured.

6.2.

To assess conformity with the principle embodied in clause 6(3)(a) the
Certification Guide states that it is necessary to:


define the service(s) covered by the access regime, and



demonstrate that the access regime applies only to the services of a
significant infrastructure facility in the circumstances described in clause
6(3)(a). (Certification Guide [3.2])

Defining the services:
6.3. According to the Certification Guide:
[A]n effective access regime should:
3

See clause 6(4)(d): ‗automatically‘ omitted before ‗revoked‘ at the end of the clause; clause 6(4)(e):
reference to ‗a person‘ should be to ‗persons‘; clause 6(4)(j): the final phrase of the preamble to the clause
should read ‗provide a service if necessary but this would be subject to:‘; clause 6(4)(p): after ‗scheme‘ in
line 4 the words ‗single process for persons to seek access to the service,‘ have been omitted; and clause
6(5)(c): the clause does not reproduce the language of the CPA
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6.4.

describe the type of service(s) and/or proposed service(s) that it covers – for
example, the transportation of gas within a gas pipeline, and
nominate the particular service(s) that it covers (or excludes) – for example, the gas
transportation services of a nominated gas pipeline (or several nominated pipelines).
(Certification Guide, [3.3])

The access provisions contained in Part 3 of the WICA apply to infrastructure
services provided by ‗water industry infrastructure that is situated in, on or over
land referred to in Schedule 1‘. (WICA s22(1)) Schedule 1 is restricted to the
areas of operation of Sydney Water Corporation (SWC) and the Hunter Water
Corporation (HWC) but the schedule may be amended. (WICA s22(2))

6.5. The generic definition of infrastructure service contained in the WICA is:
the storage, conveyance or reticulation of water or sewage by means of water
industry infrastructure, and includes the provision of connections between any
such infrastructure and the infrastructure of the person for whom the water or
sewage is stored, conveyed or reticulated, but:
(a)

does not include the storage of water behind a dam wall, and

(b)

does not include:
(i) the filtering, treating or processing of water or sewage, or
(ii) the use of a production process, or
(iii) the use of intellectual property, or
(iv) the supply of goods (including the supply of water or sewage),
except to the extent to which it is a subsidiary but inseparable aspect of
the storage, conveyance or reticulation of water or sewage. (WICA
Dictionary)

6.6.

Water industry infrastructure includes water infrastructure (used or to be used
for the production, treatment, filtration, storage, conveyance or reticulation of
water), and sewerage infrastructure (used or to be used for the treatment,
storage, conveyance or reticulation of sewage).4

6.7.

When considering the application of clause 6(3)(a), the Certification Guide also
addresses the question of services which may be covered in the future noting
that access regimes can be designed to accommodate change through additions
or deletions to the services nominated to be covered. To be consistent with the
Clause 6 Principles, the Certification Guide [3.4] proposes that the access
regime should include

6.8.



criteria for determining the service(s) or proposed service(s) that can be
covered or excluded from the regime…,and



rigorous and independent processes, at the appropriate time, for assessing
proposals for changes to the coverage status of service(s).

Any future declaration of services under the WICA will be subject to the
definitions set out above and hence constrained in their ambit, unless there is
substantial amendment of the WICA itself. The Minister can add more

4

WICA Dictionary. Note that the definitions exclude in respect of water infrastructure: certain
infrastructure downstream of a customer‘s connection point to a water main, or upstream of a customer‘s
connection to a stormwater drain; and in respect of sewerage infrastructure: certain infrastructure
upstream of a customer‘s connection point to a sewer main.
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scheduled areas, presumably by including the areas of operation of other major
facilities, for example Sydney Catchment Authority, or by including more land
in an existing scheduled area, for example by extending SWC‘s area of
operation under the Sydney Water Act 1994. However, whether or not the
additions or inclusions contemplated by section 22(2) of the WICA will be
subject to any degree of independent assessment is open to question.
6.9.

When introducing the WICA for public consultation the NSW government
stated:
New South Wales is leading Australia in the introduction of competition to the
metropolitan water industry. It is important to ensure that the reforms being
introduced are adaptive, so that progress can be monitored and further reforms
introduced, where necessary, to ensure that the objectives of a sustainable water
supply and protection of public health, the environment, and consumers
continue to be met.5

6.10.

There is no indication in the WICA, or in subsequent discussion documents
on WICA regulations, that the implementation of these objectives
contemplates an independent assessment of the consistency or otherwise of
proposed adaptive measures.

Significant infrastructure facility
6.11.

To determine the consistency of the provisions of an access regime with clause
6(3)(a) of the CPA, the Council advises that it ‗considers it appropriate to
interpret the clause 6(3)(a) principles as far as possible in a manner consistent
with the declaration criteria [of the TPA] (despite slight differences in
terminology)‘.

6.12.

Table 1 provides a comparison of CPA clause 6(3)(a) with the declaration
criteria of section 44G(2) of the TPA and the definition of declaration criteria in
section 23 of the WICA.

5

New South Wales Government (2007), Consultation paper: Creating a dynamic and competitive
metropolitan water industry
<http://www.waterforlife.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0013/1444/smwp_consult_paper_1.pdf> at
28 June 2007, 1.
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Table 1: Comparison of the Clause 6(3)(a) criteria of the Competition Principles Agreement, and the
declaration criteria of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and the Water Industry Competition Act 2006
(NSW)6
Clause 6(3)

Trade Practices Act 1974 s44G(2)

(a) apply to services provided
by means of significant
infrastructure facilities

(c) …the facility is of national
significance, having regard to:
(i) the size of the facility;
or
(ii) the importance of the
facility to constitutional
trade or commerce; or
(iii) the importance of the
facility to the national
economy
(b) it would be uneconomical for
anyone to develop another facility to
provide the service
(a) access (or increased access) to
the service would promote a
material increase in competition in
at least one market…other than the
market for the service

(i) it would not be
economically feasible to
duplicate the facility
(ii) access to the service is
necessary in order to permit
effective competition in a
downstream or upstream
market
(iii) the safe use of the facility
by the person seeking access
can be ensured at an
economically feasible cost and,
if there is a safety requirement,
appropriate regulatory
arrangements exist

(d) access to the service can be
provided without undue risk to
human health or safety

(e) access (or increased access) to
the service would not be contrary to
the public interest

Water Industry Competition
Act 2006 s 23
(a) …the infrastructure is of
State significance, having
regard to its nature and extent
and its importance to the State
economy,

(b) it would not be
economically feasible to
duplicate the infrastructure
(c) access (or an increase in
access) to the service by third
parties is necessary to promote
a material increase in
competition in an upstream or
downstream market
(d) the safe use of the
infrastructure by access seekers
can be ensured at an
economically feasible cost and,
if there is a safety requirement,
that appropriate regulatory
arrangements exist
(e) access (or an increase in
access) to the service would
not be contrary to the public
interest

6.13.

Whilst Table 1 compares the language used in the declaration criteria, any
discussion of the construction of the criteria themselves should be prefaced by
consideration of the way that the declaration criteria are to be applied.

6.14.

IPART‘s obligation to have regard to the declaration criteria of the WICA
arises in section 25(2) – IPART is required to furnish a report on an application
to the Minister after considering the application and any submissions made on
it. Section 25(3) provides that the report must include a statement of IPART‘s
opinion as to whether or not the declaration criteria are met and if they are all
met then IPART must recommend the terms on which, and the period for
which, a declaration should be made.

6.15.

Perhaps the intent of the regime could be better served by a clearer
statement of IPART’s obligations when considering applications under the
WICA. Section 44G(2) of the TPA is unequivocal in its requirements. The
declaration criteria are set out as specific matters. The Council must turn
its mind to each of them before it can come to a conclusion on an

6

Table adapted from Certification Guide, Table 3-1, [3.12].
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application for declaration of a service. The TPA also provides specific
rights of review for decisions made under Part IIIA. These opportunities
for review are not available in the WICA.
6.16.

It is open to question whether the intent of the WICA is properly served by
the soft language which it employs in this regard and whether the tenets of
transparency openness and accountability are enshrined in the process.
Whilst subtleties in language may not be significant, if their effect is to
increase barriers to entry then they must be addressed.

6.17.

As illustrated by the comparison in Table 1, the criteria which are to be satisfied
before a coverage declaration can be made under Part 3 of the WICA are a
hybrid of those set out in Part IIIA of the TPA and clause 6(3) of the CPA. In
general, the language of the WICA is more closely aligned with that of the CPA
than with that of the TPA. A table similar to Table 1 is provided in Attachment
B of the WICA Guide, comparing the provisions of the TPA, the WICA and the
National Gas Acts (the legislation enacted by the States and Territories in
Australia to codify and replace the Gas Code). The language of the National
Gas Acts essentially mirrors that of the TPA.

6.18.

Significant differences between the WICA criteria, reflecting the language
of the CPA, and those of the TPA, arise in sections 23(b), (c) and (d). The
possibilities afforded by different approaches which might be taken to the
application of section 23(e) also warrant consideration. The following
consideration makes reference to IPART‘s views as to the operation of each
criterion as set out in the WICA Guide.

WICA Section 23 (b):
6.19.

The concept of what is economically feasible will no doubt be the subject of
much discussion, yet the notion of what is ‗uneconomical‘ has been well
debated in proceedings under the TPA.

6.20.

IPART advises that this criterion ‗is essentially intended to limit declaration to
services provided by infrastructure that exhibits natural monopoly
characteristics‘. (WICA Guide, [7.1]. However, IPART notes that in assessing
whether the criterion is satisfied it may have regard to ‗the broad social
construction of the term ‗not economically feasible‘.‘ (WICA Guide, [7.2]).

6.21.

IPART‘s explanation of its approach to the social construct of the term ‗not
economically feasible‘ is imprecise. Significantly, however, IPART comments
that:
if alternative infrastructure is developed but is inefficient from a broader social
perspective, the mere fact that an alternative is available may not impact on a
finding that criterion (b) is satisfied. However, the availability of alternative
infrastructure may affect whether criterion (c) is satisfied. (WICA Guide [7.6])

6.22.

The manner in which social costs are to be assessed by IPART, and the
circumstances in which it may choose to do so, can lead to uncertainty
which could be counterproductive to the objectives of the WICA access
regime.

WICA Section 23 (c):
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6.23.

What will be the consequences of requiring that access, or an increase in access,
is ‗necessary‘7 to promote a material increase in competition? The element of
necessity is not directly addressed in the WICA Guide although perhaps some
guidance can be taken from the position acknowledged by the Australian
Competition Tribunal (Tribunal) in re Services Sydney that
the promotion of competition test does not require it to be satisfied that there
would necessarily or immediately be a measurable increase in competition.
Rather, consistent with the purposes of Pt IIIA being to unlock bottlenecks in
the supply chain, declaration is concerned with improving or reducing a
significant barrier to entry.8

6.24.

It would be of assistance if NSW offered some indication of the legislative
intent of insertion of the element of ‘necessity’ into section 23(c).

WICA Section 23 (d):
6.25.

Section 23(d) of the WICA essentially reproduces clause 6(3)(iii) of the CPA.
In contrast to the TPA, the WICA introduces the requirement that ‗safe use‘ of
the infrastructure can be ensured at an ‗economically feasible cost‘ and safety
can be addressed by ‗appropriate regulatory arrangements‘.

6.26.

The Council states that:
It is appropriate for a state or territory government to determine whether and
how to regulate the safe provision of services, but not to regulate safety in a
manner that poses unnecessary barriers to access and competition.
(Certification Guide, [3.40])

6.27.

Human health is not specifically mentioned, although IPART
acknowledges that it is part of the rationale behind section 23(d). (WICA
Guide, [9.1]) In relation to the supply of water services, it is arguable that
health considerations must be paramount. Great progress has been made
to prepare national guidelines to direct the States and Territories in water
quality regulation (for example, the Australian Drinking Water Guidelines
and the Australian Guidelines for Water Recycling). However, in NSW it
is only through the application of the licensing provisions of the WICA and
conditions imposed on licensees that operators in the water sector become
bound to comply with these guidelines. (See for example section 7 of the
WICA, and the mandatory conditions set out in the Water Industry
Competition (General) Regulation 2008 (General Regulation). Guidelines,
by definition, are not mandatory.

6.28.

IPART suggests that safety standards may be imposed by regulatory and
licensing obligations, such as the WICA licensing regime, or through terms and
conditions of access. (WICA Guide [9.1])

6.29.

IPART explores the licensing provisions of the WICA noting that an
application for declaration may involve services that are subject to the WICA
licensing provisions. (WICA Guide, [9.3]) IPART also notes that the Services
Sydney matter recognised that the incumbent, Sydney Water Corporation
(SWC), was subject to ‗extensive health and safety regulation under the law‘.
(WICA Guide, [9.3]) The view expressed by the Australian Competition

7
8

Competition principles Agreement cl 6(3)(a)(ii); WICA s 23(c).
re Services Sydney 227ALR140, 171 [131].

Appendix: Related Papers

xi

Tribunal (ACT) on this issue, as reported in the WICA Guide, was that
declaration would not cause health and safety risks as all access would be
provided subject to this regulation. (WICA Guide [9.3])
6.30.

The IPART treatment outlined in paragraph 6.29 covers both licensing
conditions and access conditions. The principle which can be extracted from
the analysis relates to the declaration of specific services, circumstances
which should be distinguished from the consideration of an application for
certification of an access regime. The relevant licence conditions of the
access provider were in place, and SWC was the specific access provider.
It is implicit in the conclusion drawn by IPART here that the conditions of
access would apply – that they would be non-negotiable.

6.31.

After specific consideration of the imposition of terms and conditions on which
access is provided, IPART concludes that:
Criterion (d) may be satisfied where the terms and conditions on which access
is provided could address any safety concerns raised by access to the service.…
Accordingly, safety requirements and their enforcement may be left to the
negotiation stage after infrastructure is declared. (WICA Guide, [9.4])

6.32.

The Council Request sought additional information from NSW in relation to the
licensing provisions of WICA, particularly section 10(4)(d), noting that they
‗appear to be integral to the effective operation of NSW‘s water access
arrangements‘. (Council Request, [2])

6.33.

The NSW Response states that the licensing provisions do not form part of the
WICA access regime, and apply irrespective of whether access is sought under
it.

6.34.

Section 40(9) of the WICA provides:
If the access seeker seeks access in relation to any activity for which it would
require, but does not yet hold, a licence under Part 2:
(a)

the arbitrator may adjourn proceedings for such time as the arbitrator
considers reasonable for the purposes of enabling the access seeker to
obtain such a licence, and

(b)

if the access seeker fails to obtain such a licence within that time, may
make a determination refusing the access sought.

6.35.

For the license conditions to provide adequate conformance with this
declaration criterion, it is essential that there is some connection between the
access regime (who may apply) and the licensing regime. If the access seeker
intends to ‗construct, maintain or operate any water industry infrastructure‘ the
access seeker will need to hold either a network operator‘s or retail supplier‘s
license. (WICA s5) The terms and conditions applying to the license would
then be known and a proper assessment of whether or not the declaration
criterion in section 23(d) is met could be made.

6.36.

The problem inherent in this overly simplistic approach is that a license
under the WICA provisions is project specific. It is not the operator that is
licensed under the WICA, in contrast for example to the licensing of a
plumber or an electrician under the relevant regulation. Section 11 of the
WICA requires that a license must specify the activities that it authorises
and the area within which those activities can be carried out. The section
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also confirms that the same land (and presumably facilities providing
services on or under that land) may be within the area of operation of more
than one licensee. Thus more than one set of conditions may apply to the
safe use of infrastructure by access seekers.
6.37.

The complexity of the licensing scheme is not reflected in the NSW
Response. IPART seems to sidestep the issue in its conclusion that safety
requirements may be settled as license conditions or left to the negotiation
stage.

6.38.

The Council’s contention that the licensing provisions of WICA appear to
be integral to the effective operation of NSW’s water access arrangements
is reasonable. Indeed, the impact of those provisions is surely a matter
which may properly be considered by the Council in assessing the WICA
regime for certification. Whilst no suggestion is offered here to clarify the
legislative scheme, it is suggested that the shortcomings evident in the
provisions may not provide a reasonable incorporation of the principle
enunciated in clause 6(3)(iii) of the CPA. Certainty in such matter is
needed before a service is declared; afterwards may be too late to deal with
issues that could have been foreseen and managed.

WICA Section 23 (e):
6.39.

The WICA access regime incorporates a public interest criterion. IPART
indicates that to assess this criterion it may have regard to a number of factors,
one of which includes the broad notion of ‗other public interest considerations‘.
(WICA Guide, [10.2]) In turn, IPART lists the items in clause 1(3) of the CPA
as matters which may be taken into account in considering this issue as well as
the desirability of consistency across access regimes. (WICA Guide, [10.6])

6.40.

The departures from the language of the TPA criteria in the WICA could
be seen as a barrier to competition, if their effect is to raise the bar to
access. Perhaps NSW could clarify its drafting intent?

6.41.

Whilst the consideration of the impact of the variations in language
outlined above may be somewhat academic, it is pertinent to consider that
the WICA access regime is setting the pace for the water industry
nationally. The express objective of Part IIIA of the TPA to ‘provide a
framework and guiding principles to encourage a consistent approach to
access regulation’ in the water industry would arguably have been well
served by adoption in the WICA regime of clear and unambiguous terms
to reflect the declaration criteria of the TPA. This argument is supported
by the effect of certification – to displace the opportunity for declaration of
services under Part IIIA of the TPA. The intention of the NSW
government in choosing the language it has is not apparent in the WICA or
in explanatory documents in the public domain.

Regular review – 6(4)(d)
6.42.

The second element in the assessment of the scope of an access regime is
concerned with the ability to review the right to access services, through
coverage, over time. The protection of existing contractual rights where there
may be termination of coverage is paramount. Clause 6(4)(d) of the CPA states
that:
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(d)

6.43.

Any right to negotiate access should include a date after which the right
would lapse unless reviewed and subsequently extended; however,
existing contractual rights and obligations should not be automatically
revoked.

The Tasmanian pipelines regime, by giving effect to the National Gas Code,
adopts the coverage (and revocation of coverage) provisions set out in the
National Code, provisions which have been found by the NCC to conform to
clause 6(4)(d) of the CPA.9 In making the decision on the effectiveness of the
Tasmanian provisions, the NCC notes that:
Under the Code, when a pipeline is covered and an access arrangement is
approved by the relevant regulator, an enforceable right to negotiate access to
its services then arises. Any person can apply to the Council for coverage of a
particular pipeline to be revoked. The Council is then required to undertake an
open and transparent public process and make a recommendation to the relevant
Minister about whether coverage should be revoked. Both the Council‘s
recommendation and the Minister‘s decision must be based strictly on the
coverage provisions in the National Code. A decision to revoke coverage would
effectively mean that there would no longer be an enforceable right to negotiate
access to the services of the pipeline concerned under the Tasmanian Regime.
However, it would not disturb any contractual (or other) rights or obligations in
existence at the time.10

6.44.

Under section 27 of the WICA, a coverage declaration is to apply, subject to
prior revocation, for a specified period after which renewal may be sought by
any person having access to the service. An application for renewal is dealt
with under the same process as an application for a coverage declaration and
thus will be considered against the declaration criteria to qualify for renewal.
Depending on the period for which a coverage declaration is in force, the
opportunity for review will arise ‘regularly’ if renewal is sought. This
would seem to be reasonable incorporation of the clause 6(4)(d) principle.
However, if the period of declaration is lengthy then, unless there is
revocation of the declaration, there is no opportunity to seek a review.

6.45.

WICA section 28(1) provides that an application for the revocation of a
coverage declaration may only be made by or on behalf of the service provider
for that service. Section 44J(1) of the TPA provides that the NCC may
recommend to the Minister that a declaration be revoked. The procedure for
determining an application for revocation set out in Pt 3 Div 3 of the WICA
provides for public submissions to be made on the application. IPART is
required to consider these submissions before furnishing a report to the
Minister. If the Minister is satisfied that any of the declaration criteria are not
met in relation to the service to which the application relates, the coverage
declaration must be revoked.

6.46.

The NCC offers two avenues for an access regime to incorporate the principle
in clause 6(4)(d). The first is for the access regime to mandate appropriate
review requirements, for example by including a schedule for reviews.
(Certification Guide [3.58], [3.59]) There is no provision in the WICA for
reviews, scheduled or otherwise. The alternative offered by the NCC to
provide conformity with this principle contemplates that:

9

Tasmanian Pipelines Final Recommendation 23 [4.47].
Tasmanian Pipelines Final Recommendation 23 [4.48].

10
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clause 6(4)(d) could be satisfied, for example, by incorporating in the regime:
 the clause 6(3)(a) criteria in the making of coverage decisions
 an independent, transparent and effectual means for revoking or reviewing
coverage decisions. (Certification Guide [3.60])

6.47.

The WICA incorporates the clause 6(3)(a) criteria in the making of coverage
decisions under section 26 and includes revocation provisions in sections 28-30.

6.48.

Whichever approach is taken, the NCC is unequivocal that the review process
should be ‗independent, open and transparent‘. (Certification Guide, [3.58])

6.49.

There is no provision in the WICA that preserves the rights under existing
access agreements. However, according to the Certification Guide:
Clause 6(4)(d) makes clear that a review of access regulation should not
override commercially determined outcomes by automatically revoking
any existing contractual rights. This does not mean that they could not be
revoked, but rather that some process (such as a review) would first need
to be undertaken. (Certification Guide, [3.62])

6.50.

The WICA revocation provisions may only be invoked by the service
provider. The opportunity for review is not mandated nor is it open to any
person to invoke. However, IPART indicates that in recommending the
period for which a coverage or binding non-coverage declaration should be
made under the WICA, it may take into account:
the desirability of periodic review of access regulation governing services,
including the need for declaration itself. On the expiry of a declaration,
the need for ongoing regulation can be reviewed. (WICA Guide, [11.1])

6.51.

The detail of the revocation procedure appears to provide for an
independent, open and transparent process. It must be hoped that in the
course of this process the rights of existing users would be protected.

7. Treatment of interstate issues: Competition Principles 6(2), 6(4)(p)
7.1.

The principle embodied in Clause 6(2) of the CPA provides that an access
regime established in a state or territory cannot be effective if the facility has
influence across a jurisdictional boundary or if the facility is located in more
than one jurisdiction. Clause 6(4)(p) calls for cross-jurisdictional consistency
and co-operation where more than one regime can apply to a service so that an
access seeker can follow a single process, a single body will resolve disputes
and there will be a single forum for enforcement.

7.2.

The limited geographical application of the WICA from its commencement
ensures initial conformity with these principles. However, as the WICA
provisions are anticipated to apply to water industry infrastructure
whether in public or private ownership, and in areas beyond the Sydney
metropolitan region and the Hunter Water Corporation area of operation,
cross-jurisdictional issues may well arise in the future. Access to irrigation
infrastructure in parts of the Murray Darling Basin may well be a case in
point.

7.3.

Neither the WICA itself nor the NSW government’s application addresses
the treatment of interstate issues.
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8. Negotiation framework: Competition principles 6(4)(a)-(c), (e), (f), (g)-(i)11, (m),
(n), (o)
Clauses 6(4)(a)-(c), (e), (f)
8.1.

These Clause 6 Principles embody the negotiate/arbitrate framework for access
to services on which Part IIIA of the TPA and the WICA access regime are
based. Clause 6(4)(a) encourages negotiation for all aspects of ‗access‘ –
seeking access to the facility itself and the terms and conditions on which that
access will be granted. Clauses 6(4)(b) and (c) call on governments to assist the
negotiation process by creating enforceable rights to negotiate, and to set the
rules negotiators are to follow. If negotiation still does not achieve the
objectives of the parties then clause 6(4)(c) sets the scene for dispute resolution
through arbitration.

8.2.

According to the NCC, the principles in clauses 6(4)(a)-(c) can be considered
together because they establish a framework for negotiations to proceed.
(Certification Guide [3.14]-[3.17]) They require a balance to be struck between
commercial negotiation (where disparity in the relative strengths of the
negotiating parties may prejudice the outcome) and regulatory intervention
(imposed to redress inequities in bargaining strengths) so that effective
negotiation can take place.12 The NCC points out that:
In the absence of such measures, an access regime may establish a right to
negotiate in theory, but may put third parties in a position of negotiating blindly
with a monopoly provider or of being offered potentially inappropriate
prices…on a ‗take it or leave it‘ basis. The latter may amount to a constructive
denial of access, and cannot be viewed as satisfying 6(4)(a)-(c).13

8.3.

The declaration of services provided by infrastructure facilities under the WICA
creates the right to negotiate access to services with recourse to arbitration if
negotiations fail. However, the legislative process still contemplates that access
may be achieved by negotiation from the start – provided the negotiated terms
are approved by the relevant regulator.14 Indeed the WICA provides that access
seekers are only able to apply for a coverage declaration if they ‗have tried but
failed‘ to obtain access to, or a modification of existing access to, the service,
presumably by negotiation. (WICA s24(1)) Where negotiation of access or
terms of access fails, section 40 of the WICA establishes processes for dispute
resolution through arbitration.

8.4.

Regulation 8 of the Access Regulation embodies the intention that negotiations
should take place in an atmosphere of openness and transparency with
established negotiation procedures. IPART is to have regard to the provisions
of regulation 8 to determine if parties to a dispute have, in good faith, attempted
to resolve an access dispute.

8.5.

Regulation 8(2) of the Access Regulation contemplates that an access seeker
will request information from a service provider prior to seeking access. The
regulation does not prescribe the time, or the manner, in which the access

11

Note: Principles 6(4)(g)-(i) are considered under the category of Dispute resolution.
Tasmanian Access Regime for Natural Gas Pipeline Services Application for Certification under
Section 44M(2) of the Trade Practices Act 1974: Final Recommendation April 2005, 15, [4.13].
13
Tasmanian Access Regime for Natural Gas Pipeline Services Application for Certification under
Section 44M(2) of the Trade Practices Act 1974: Final Recommendation April 2005, 16, [4.15]
14
WICA s 38(4): an access undertaking does not have effect until it has been approved by IPART.
12
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seeker is to request the relevant information. Within 14 days after receiving
such a request, the service provider is to make a package of information
available to the access seeker which is to include information on the procedure
to be followed to obtain access to services and the time it is likely to take to
conduct negotiations. The package from the service provider is also to include
a copy of negotiation protocols to be compiled by IPART. These protocols
have been established by IPART (Negotiation Protocols).15
8.6.

The obligation on the parties to follow the Negotiation Protocols arises under
clause 2(h) of Schedule 1 of the Negotiation Protocols which requires the
service provider to include a statement that the Negotiation Protocols ‗apply
unless and until the Access Seeker and the Service Provider agree otherwise‘.
The Negotiation Protocols set out the procedure to be followed when requesting
and responding to a request for access and the manner in which negotiations are
to proceed.

8.7.

The parties have no right to make submissions to IPART in respect of the
negotiation and its bona fides, nor is there any right to challenge a decision
of IPART not to accept an application to arbitrate.

8.8.

The NCC includes the principle in clause 6(4)(e) in the negotiation framework
category. The principle provides that:
(e)

The owner of a facility that is used to provide a service should use all
reasonable endeavours to accommodate the requirements of persons seeking
access.

8.9.

The WICA does not incorporate this provision directly but through the Access
Regulations.16 Regulation 8(3) of the Access Regulations seeks to place an
obligation on the service provider to use all reasonable endeavours to
accommodate the access seeker‘s requirements. However this obligation only
arises by virtue of inclusion in the Negotiation Protocols, which as
discussed in relation to clause 6(4)(a)-(c) above are only to be made
available to an access seeker upon request under the terms of regulation
8(2).

8.10.

The WICA provision appears to bear strong similarity to that of the Tasmanian
pipelines regime which adopts the provision in the National Gas Code.17 Under
section 5 of the National Gas Code, the service provider of a covered pipeline
must establish an information package containing specific information which
must be provided to an access seeker upon request.18 The WICA provision is in
very general terms adopting the language of cl 6(4)(e). The National Gas Code
is specific in its reference to information which would be appropriate to
negotiations in the natural gas sector. The language of the WICA conforms
to clause 6(4)(e), the intent is clear although it is only perceived by
persistence and relies not so much on compliance by the service provider as
on diligence on the part of the regulator.

15

Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of New South Wales, Negotiation protocols: Water
Industry Competition (Access to Infrastructure Services) Regulation 2007.
16
The NCC accepts this approach: Tasmanian Pipelines Final Recommendation, 24 [4.52].
17
For a discussion of the Tasmanian pipelines provisions see Tasmanian Pipelines Final
Recommendation, 24-25 [4.53 – 4.59].
18
Tasmanian Pipelines Final Recommendation 24-25 [4.54, 4.55]
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8.11.

Perhaps the WICA access determination provision has been written with
the current sewer mining procedures in mind. The information package
which is provided by SWC to prospective sewer miners bears strong
resemblance to the information package contemplated by the Access
Regulation, without the IPART protocols. The Sewer Mining Agreement
provided by SWC may also bear some resemblance to the access
agreement contemplated by section 39(1)(a). Although there is apparently
a lot of information available around the negotiating table, it does seem
that the whole package may well be presented on a ‘take it or leave it’
basis. Does the WICA framework really provide for effective negotiation
to take place? When considering conformity of the Tasmanian natural gas
pipelines access regime with the negotiation principles, the NCC states:
In considering whether an access regime provides appropriate guidance to
market participants, the Council focuses, in the first instance, on whether
regulatory processes are sufficiently robust to make the guidance credible.
In particular, market guidance should be independent, and developed
through open and transparent processes that allow stakeholders to
participate, and provide them with reliable information to inform their
views. Regulatory processes should be derived from appropriate legislative
underpinnings, rather than being applied on an ad hoc basis, and should
be clearly defined and made publicly available, to allay concerns of bias or
perceptions of agreements made ‘behind closed doors’.19

8.12.

Clause 6(4)(f) of the CPA acknowledges that negotiated terms and conditions of
access may vary and seeks to protect this position in its negotiation framework.
The WICA incorporates this principle in section 39(2)(b) in relation to access
agreements which record the outcome of negotiated access. The Attachment to
the Application when assessing clause 6(4)(f) against the WICA provisions
notes:
Nothing in the access regime requires access to a service for different access
seekers to be on the same terms and conditions.

8.13.

The provisions of the WICA and the Access Regulation encourage settlement of
terms of access by negotiation and recognise that not all negotiated outcomes
will be identical. The WICA also clearly provides a right to take a dispute to
arbitration. The possibility that a referral to arbitration can be refused by
IPART may inhibit recourse to a determination. However, once an
application for arbitration is accepted the provisions of the WICA provide
a proper framework for the terms and conditions of access to be
determined.

8.14.

The WICA negotiation framework may well be considered to reasonably
incorporate the principles of clauses 6(4)(a)-(c), (e), and (f). Clearer
conformity to the principles could be achieved with a more open and
transparent process to provide appropriate guidance to access seekers to
facilitate effective negotiations. The provisions as they stand require an
access seeker to trawl through the regulations to find the opportunity to
access such information. Perhaps the intent of the legislators is proper, the
execution leaves scope for improvement.

19

Tasmanian pipelines final recommendation, 16 [4.17].
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Clauses 6(4)(m)-(o)
8.15.

The Council includes the principles in clauses 6(4)(m), (n) and (o) in its
consideration of the negotiation framework. It is sufficient to note that section
43 of the WICA incorporates and expands upon the clause 6(4)(m) principle
requiring that the owner or user of a service is not to hinder access to the
service by others. The WICA restriction applies to related corporations of a
provider or a user. The conduct is ascertainable, inter alia, by inference (WICA
s 43(2)) and a ‗user‘ includes a person who has a right to use the service.
(WICA s 43(4))

8.16.

Provision for separate accounting arrangements contemplated by clause 6(4)(n)
is incorporated in the WICA in section 42. Draft cost allocation manuals have
been prepared by IPART and are available on IPART‘s website.

8.17.

As intended by clause 6(4)(o), in addition to the requirements of section 42 of
the WICA with respect to publication of cost allocation manuals, IPART may
access information under Part 3 Div 7 of the IPART Act when conducting
investigations under the WICA.20 The Attachment also notes the application
under s 42 of the WICA of certain provisions of the Commercial Arbitration
Act 1984 (NSW) to access arbitrations.

9. Dispute resolution: Competition principles 6(4)(a)-(c), (g)-(l), (o), 6(5)(c)
Clauses 6(4)(g)-(l)
9.1.

Section 40(1) embodies the formal dispute resolution mechanism of the WICA.
Either party to a dispute can apply for the dispute to be determined by
arbitration.

9.2.

Regulation 8(3)(f) of the Access Regulation requires the Negotiation Protocols
to include ‗protocols as to the dispute resolution procedures to be attempted
before an application is made to IPART for the dispute to be determined by
arbitration‘. This process would permit the resolution of disputes in the course
of negotiations without recourse to the formal arbitration procedures of the
regime.

9.3.

Schedule 3 of the Negotiation Protocols suggests procedures which may be
followed where access negotiations fail and sets out procedures for referral to,
and conduct, of arbitration.

9.4.

The WICA provisions adopt dispute resolution procedures from a number of
sources, specifically:


the Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 (NSW) (the Arbitration Act), which is
to apply to an arbitration, and any determination arising from an arbitration,
under s 40 of the WICA. 21



sections 24B-24E (other than ss24B (2) and (3)(b) and (c)) of the IPART Act
which also apply to arbitration under the WICA, although s 15of the IPART
Act is not to apply to determinations under the WICA. 22



Part 4B of the IPART Act.23

20

WICA Pt 8 Div 3.
WICA s 40(4).
22
WICA s 40(5).
21

Appendix: Related Papers

xix



the application of the pricing principles set out in s 41(2) of the WICA when
determining a dispute.24



the provisions of the regulations under the IPART Act that modify the
application of the Arbitration Act to arbitration of disputes under the IPART
Act which the Access Regulation also applies to the arbitration of disputes
under the WICA.25

9.5.

A detailed analysis of all of these provisions will not be attempted here.
However, certain significant provisions warrant discussion.

9.6.

Section 24B(3)(a) of the IPART Act requires the arbitrator to take into account
the matters set out in clauses 6(4)(i), (j) and (l) of the CPA thus ensuring that
the WICA conforms to those elements of the CPA.

9.7.

The NCC comments that ‘The arbitrator should be independent of all
stakeholders, including service providers, current users, access seekers and
governments.’26 The discussion continues:
The Council’s previous work in certification has raised an issue – the
arbitrator’s independence may be compromised if that body performs the
dual role of regulator and arbitrator. For example, a dispute may arise
over an access arrangement that the arbitrator has previously approved in
its capacity as the regulator.27

9.8.

Under the WICA, IPART performs a number of functions including the
regulatory functions set out in section 90. The functions conferred on
IPART by Part 3 of the WICA, including its functions as an arbitrator, are
regulatory functions. Section 90(2) of the WICA applies Part 4B of the
IPART Act to IPART’s regulatory functions under the WICA. Section 24
FB of the IPART Act provides that:
(1)

In exercising its regulatory functions …, the Tribunal must give
effect to any current government policy that has been
communicated to the Tribunal, and certified to be government
policy, by the relevant Minister or by the Premier.

…
(3)

9.9.

The Tribunal is to make each such policy communicated to it and
certificate received by it publicly available.

In addition to its functions as an arbitrator under Part 3 of the WICA, IPART
has various administrative and advisory functions in relation to applications for
coverage declarations, revocation of coverage declarations, and binding noncoverage declarations. IPART is not the ultimate decision maker in respect of
such applications. Indeed, its advice to the Minister must be considered but is
not binding. However, with respect to applications for approval of access
undertakings, IPART is the decision maker and an access undertaking, once

23

WICA s 90 (2).
WICA s 41. The pricing principles are also to be taken into account when approving an access
undertaking.
25
Access Regulation 11. Section 24A(2) of the IPART Act, subject to regulations made under it, applies
the Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 (NSW) to arbitration under Part 4A of the IPART Act,. However,
s 24A does not apply to arbitration under the WICA.
26
Tasmanian pipelines final recommendation, 27 [4.66].
27
Tasmanian pipelines final recommendation, 27 [4.67].
24
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approved cannot be varied without the consent of IPART.28 In addition, IPART
plays a significant role under the licensing regime established by the WICA.
9.10.

The NCC, in suggesting that dispute resolution can be approached in a number
of ways to address the issue of independence, includes as an alternative that
either party to a dispute may require the arbitrator to appoint an alternative body
if a question of bias arises.29 Under s 24B(1) of the IPART Act, IPART may
appoint one or more persons from a panel approved by the Minister
(whether or not the persons are members of IPART) to hear and determine
a dispute. The question then arises whether the panel approved by the
Minister is sufficiently independent. According to the Certification Guide,
under the Western Australian rail regime, the independent regulator
appoints the arbitrator from a panel that is pre-selected by the regulator
and the Chairman of the Western Australian Chapter of the Australian
Institute of Arbitrators.

10. Efficiency promoting terms and conditions of access: 6(4)(a)-(c), (e), (f), (i), (k),
(n), 6(5), s44AA of the TPA
10.1.

The following comments offer a brief overview of recent access issues in the
context of the Sydney water industry.

10.2.

The attempts by Services Sydney Pty Ltd (Services Sydney) to enter the
Sydney sewage services market are well documented. The matter will not be
examined in detail here but several points arising from the saga are relevant to
the consideration of these Clause 6 Principles.

10.3.

Services Sydney initiated moves to implement its plans for sewage and water
management in Sydney in 1997-1998. Services Sydney lodged an application
for declaration of certain of SWC‘s services in March 2004. The NCC
recommended declaration of the services in December 2004. The services were
not declared by the then Premier of NSW. Consequently, under the TPA the
services were deemed not to have been declared and in March 2005 Services
Sydney requested a review of the deemed decision by the ACT. The ACT
made the declarations sought by Services Sydney. Declaration of the services
by the ACT opened the door for Services Sydney to negotiate access with SWC
which was not successful. Services Sydney notified the Australian Competition
and Consumer Commission (ACCC) of a dispute with SWC in November 2006
and an arbitration report was released by the ACCC in July 2007. Services
Sydney subsequently lodged, and withdrew, an appeal against the
determination.

10.4.

The introduction of the Metropolitan Water Plan in 2004, the completion and
release of the IPART Investigation into Water and Wastewater Service
Provision in the Greater Sydney Region in 2005, and the Services Sydney saga
provided the impetus needed for the introduction of the WICA access regime.
The WICA was assented to on 27 November 2006 and commenced on 8 August
2008, a decade after Sydney Services first came on the scene.

10.5.

The WICA deems certain SWC services as declared under the access regime.
The declaration of the sewage services declared under the TPA in still in place.
The WICA access regime is not yet certified as an effective access regime

28
29

In particular WICA ss 38 (4)-(7).
Tasmanain pipelines final recommendation, 27 [4.68].
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under the TPA and thus it is open to access seekers to avail themselves of the
opportunity offered in either jurisdiction to seek to negotiate with the service
provider.
10.6.

Despite the success of Services Sydney in achieving the declaration of the
services to which it sought access, the company did not actually gain access and
no other party has availed itself of the opportunity offered by declaration of the
services. There has not been an attempt to negotiate access to, or any new
applications for coverage of, services provided by water industry infrastructure
in the SWC area of operations under the WICA since it commenced.

10.7.

The Council queries the import of section 10(4)(d) of the licensing provisions
of the WICA access regime in relation to the potential to constrain competition
in certain markets.

10.8.

At this stage there seems to be little indication that the objective of promoting
effective competition has been achieved, in practice, either by declaration under
the TPA or deemed declaration under the WICA or by the existence of the
WICA access regime.

11. Conclusion
11.1.

Whilst it is arguable that a number of the certification criteria are
reasonably incorporated into the access regime of the WICA, the foregoing
discussion highlights some of the issues which militate against certification
of the regime at this stage and which would – if clarified – assist in the
design of future access regimes in the water sector. The objective of
promoting effective competition in upstream or downstream markets in
the area currently covered the access regimes does not presently seem
capable of being achieved. The involvement of IPART in the licensing of
operators under the WICA may compromise the independence of IPART
in exercising its functions under the access regime.

11.2.

Sydney’s water supply is now said to be secure, with desalination to come
on line at the end of 2009 (see statements on the Water for Life website).
The private sector is involved in a range of water and wastewater
initiatives under various arrangements. Sewage can be captured for
recycling without requiring any ‘access’ regime of the type involved in this
NSW application for certification – SWC has set up an elaborate
procedure for sewer mining under ‘negotiated’ agreements, a draft of
which is available on the SWC website. Private sector contractors are
engaged by SWC to design/construct/operate new water infrastructure.
IPART price regulation has arguably been so rigorous that it has stifled
actual competition – noone can really compete with the incumbent’s price
regime for sale of the product reticulated through the infrastructure.

11.3.

There seems at present to be little demand for the mechanisms offered by
the WICA access regime, and certainly no urgency is demonstrated in the
time taken so far to implement the framework.

11.4.

The WICA leads the way nationally with a water-specific access regime.
Perhaps the objective of section 44AA(b) of the TPA might be better served
if some time was taken to clarify intent where there is ambiguity. The
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policy decision to omit a merits review process may be well worth
revisiting. Indeed, the NSW application to the NCC presents a useful
opportunity to take on board comments which may arise in the course of
the certification procedure and perhaps create a clearer precedent for
other states to follow and promote consistency across jurisdictions.
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PAPER B: Application for Certification of the NSW Water Industry Infrastructure Access
Regime, Response to Draft Recommendation 2 April 2009 (1 May 2009)
Wendy L Ambler

Contents:
1. Introduction
2. The effectiveness of the safeguards in the regime
3. Addition of geographic areas to Schedule 1
4. Impact on access regime of requirements attached to water licences
5. Conclusions
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1. Introduction:
1.1. I refer to the application by the NSW Government for certification of the access
regime established by Part 3 of the Water Industry Competition Act 2006 (NSW)
(WICA Access Regime) and the Draft Recommendation released by the National
Competition Council (Draft Recommendation) in response to that application.
1.2. In the Draft Recommendation, the National Competition Council (Council) has
indicated its preliminary view that the WICA Access Regime meets the requirements
for certification and that it should recommend that the Minister for Competition
Policy and Consumer Affairs certify the regime. If the Council’s final recommendation
is in accord with this preliminary view then Council has stated it would also
recommend the revocation of the declaration made in Re Services Sydney. (Draft
Recommendation, [1.2])
1.3. Council states that its preliminary view relies significantly on the objectives of the
NSW Government in regulating access to water infrastructure services stated in
correspondence directed to the Council on 17 February 2009. (Draft Recommendation,
[1.3])
1.4. The Council expresses concern that if, following certification, there is evidence that
the stated purpose of the regime is not being given effect to and appropriate access
outcomes are not being achieved then in certain circumstances the exemption from
declaration under Part IIIA of the TPA arising from certification may cease to operate.
(Draft Recommendation, [1.4])
1.5. To assist in making its final recommendation, the Council seeks additional information
and opinions in relation to three aspects of the WICA Access Regime:


the effectiveness of the safeguards in the regime (such as the processes for
decision making and arrangements for reviewing decisions) regarding coverage,
revocation of coverage and binding non-coverage declarations, given the broad
discretions given to IPART and decision makers and the involvement of the NSW
Government in the NSW water sector through ownership of Sydney Water
Corporation and Hunter Water Corporation,



the implications of the ability of the Premier to add geographic areas to Schedule 1,
so having the effect of expanding the services that are subject to the WICA Access
Regime, and



the impact of requirements for water licences, and in particular whether the
requirement that parties seeking a licence for retail water supply obtain sufficient
quantities of water from non-public-utility sources would have the effect of unduly
limiting the use that might be made of the WICA Access Regime. (Draft
Recommendation, [1.5], [5.27])

1.6. This submission will address the above three matters recognising that, as Council has
pointed out in the Draft Recommendation,
[T]he process of certification does not involve assessment that the particular regime
provides the most effective means of achieving efficient access outcomes. Rather it
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requires assessment only that the particular regime satisfactorily addresses the CPA
clause 6 principles. These principles do not impose a high threshold for an access
regime to be certified as effective. (Draft Recommendation, [4.7])

2. The effectiveness of the safeguards in the regime:
2.1. The Council’s comparison of the provisions of Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act 1974
(Cth) (TPA) and the WICA Access Regime highlights the retention of the role of the
NSW Premier as the decision maker in relation to coverage declarations under the
WICA Access Regime. The comparison also points to the distinction between the two
regimes with the introduction in the WICA Access Regime of provisions for IPART
recommendations and the removal of the merits review provisions. (Draft
Recommendation, [1.8]) This submission addresses the issue of merits review.
2.2. The NSW Government Submission on the Draft Recommendation (NSW Submission 2)
emphasises that the Competition Principles Agreement does not mandate the
inclusion of provision for merits review in an access regime and notes that the
Government’s decision not to include such provisions was taken after extensive public
consultation.
2.3. The NSW Government explained its policy decision in the NSW Response dated
17 February 2009 to Council’s Request for further information (NSW Response)
offering support for this decision by reference to specific provisions of the WICA.
(NSW Response, 6-7). The WICA provisions referred to do not add to the outcomes
achieved by those contained in the TPA Part IIIA regime. Importantly, they are
offered in the absence of the merits review procedures of the Part IIIA regime.
2.4. The safeguards in the access regime established under the TPA are comprehensive
and cohesive. Merits review is an integral part of that scheme. In the absence of a
requirement to include merits review procedures in an access regime to satisfy the
requirements for certification under the TPA there is little that can be offered to
further assist the Council in making its final recommendation. Perhaps it is the
threshold for an access regime to be effective which should be addressed with respect
to the role of merits review in infrastructure service access regimes.
2.5. The NSW Response refers to the distinction between judicial review and merits
review. (NSW Response, 6) This submission will not explore the view taken in the
NSW Response. There is an abundance of literature available on the subject.
1.1. More importantly, the ‘merits’ of merits review should be noted. Mitchell Landrigan
explored the merits review provisions of access in the telecommunications industry.1
Landrigan argued in favour of merits review:


when broad discretion is conferred on a decision-maker,



when significant personal or commercial rights are at stake, and



where decisions are potentially politically contentious.

1

See Mitchell Landrigan, The Merits of Merits Review (2002) Telecommunications Journal of Australia,
Vol 52, No 2, 55- 61.
Appendix: Related Papers

xxvi

In those circumstances merits review provides a mechanism to:


guard against regulatory error,



enhance public confidence in administrative decision-making by promoting
accountability, and



enable access by all parties to merits review of a decision.

1.2. The legal framework governing the water industry in Australia is an emerging
paradigm. It is a mixture of acts, regulations and rules made by parliaments and soft
law made by governments and non-government bodies (policies, guidelines, industry
codes of practice, plans and other non-statutory instruments). The primary driver of
water reform in Australia is the National Water Initiative – an ‘agreement’ between
governments. In NSW, urban water initiatives in the Sydney Region are embodied in
the Metropolitan Water Plan 2006 (MWP). The MWP is not a statutory plan but
rather a statement of policy. Guidelines are playing a significant part in fleshing out
the details of the WICA Access Regime. This paradigm provides an adaptable,
responsive form of regulation to meet the challenges of new knowledge in the water
industry. However, that flexibility must be balanced by an appropriate level of
openness, transparency and accountability at all levels of decision making and
enforcement. It is to be hoped that the policy decision to omit a merits review
mechanism from the WICA Access Regime will not tip that balance in the wrong
direction.

2. Addition of geographic areas to Schedule 1:
2.1. The WICA Access Regime is to apply only to water industry infrastructure that is
“situated in, on or over land referred to in Schedule 1”. (WICA s 22(1)) Schedule 1 can
be amended by order of the Minister under section 22(2).
2.2. Additions to Schedule 1 will expand the geographic application of Part 3 of the WICA
but will not result in any new water infrastructure services being covered by the
regime unless the procedures of Part 3 are invoked for example to seek a coverage or
non-coverage declaration.
2.3. The NSW Government Submission on the Draft Recommendation (NSW Submission 2)
notes that if the WICA had been silent as to geographical coverage, it would
automatically have applied throughout NSW and further:
The jurisdictional coverage of the Act, either now or in the future, has no bearing on
whether or not the access regime is an effective access regime in respect of whatever
areas it has effect over. (NSW Submission 2, 3)

2.4. Schedule 1 is concerned with the geographic application of Part 3 of the WICA which
embodies the WICA Access Regime. By virtue of Schedule 1, the WICA Access Regime
is currently only available to access seekers in relation to water industry infrastructure
situated in, on or over land within the areas of operation of Sydney Water
Corporation (SWC) and Hunter Water Corporation (HWC). Consequently, two
avenues are open to operators seeking access to infrastructure in other areas of NSW:
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2.4.1.to seek expansion of the Schedule 1 areas to extend the application of the
legislation to the relevant geographical location and then seek access under the
WICA Access Regime, or
2.4.2.to seek access under the provisions of Part IIIA of the TPA.
2.5. Amendment of Schedule 1 is at the discretion of the Minister and there is no
procedure set out in the WICA to be followed in the exercise of this discretion. There
is no provision in the WICA for public consultation on, or independent review of,
section 22(2) decisions.2 In this legislative context it is not clear how an access seeker
could secure the expansion of Schedule 1.
2.6. If an access seeker chose to pursue access under the Part IIIA provisions it would
remain open to the Minister to expand Schedule 1 of the WICA to include the relevant
geographical location subject to the Part IIIA application.
2.7. Although the scenario explored in the previous paragraphs is hypothetical, it is not
unrealistic. The issues raised highlight an unnecessary uncertainty for the industry in
the WICA Access Regime. Further, in failing to provide a rigorous and independent
process for assessing proposals for changes to Schedule 1, the WICA Access Regime
may not satisfactorily address the requirements of the Clause 6(3)(a) of the Clause 6
Principles.3
2.8. The objectives of the NSW Government in introducing the WICA Access Regime as set
out in section 21 of the WICA, and further amplified in the NSW Response dated
17 February 2009 to Council’s Request for further information (NSW Response), do
not reflect any intention to restrict the application of the regime. However, the
emphasis on “the development of new water sources, particularly recycling” in the
explanation of the objectives offered in the NSW Response may have the practical
effect of limiting the geographic impact of the WICA Access Regime to those areas
which provide sufficient sources of wastewater for development.
3. Impact on access regime of requirements attached to water licences
3.1. In its Final Report relating to the Investigation into Water and Wastewater Service
Provision in the Greater Sydney Region (IPART Report), IPART considered ‘who’
should be entitled to seek access and ‘when’ rights to access should be considered.
3.2. In relation to ‘who’, IPART suggested that “the regulatory mechanism enabling access
should be flexible enough to allow any person to seek access, so long as such
applications are not spurious”. (IPART Report, 33). However, the final
recommendation was that the regulatory mechanism should enable ‘designated
people’ to seek access. (IPART Report, Recommendation 6) The WICA Access Regime
adopted the ‘designated people’ approach, as for example in section 24 in relation to
coverage declarations.
3.3. With regard to the ‘when’, IPART suggested that a logical sequence of decisions would
be:
2
3

See discussion in Ambler sub 1 at [6.3]-[6.10].
See Certification Guide [3.4].
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to first secure an ‘in principle’ decision on access



then undertake detailed engineering, feasibility, design studies



then do detailed planning and environmental analysis, seek approvals, etc. (IPART
Report, 33).

3.4. The licensing provisions of the WICA apply specifically to corporations. (WICA section
8). To ensure that applications for access are not ‘spurious’ it would have been logical
to include licensing considerations in the decision sequence suggested by IPART to
ensure that the designated access seeker, if successful, would qualify to apply for, and
perhaps be capable of obtaining, any licence necessary to carry out the activities
requiring access.
4. Conclusions:
4.1. Council notes in the Draft Recommendation that:
[A] state or territory access regime that merely replicates the negotiate/arbitrate
approach already available under the general provisions of Part IIIA would appear to
4
offer little benefit while arguably adding to cost and uncertainty.

4.2. Where a state or territory access regime essentially replicates the general provisions
of Part IIIA and, in its attempts to adapt to specific industry circumstances, introduces
new elements of uncertainty and cost, there is a strong case to delay certification of
that regime.

4

Draft Recommendation [1.9].
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PAPER C: Response to Invitation for Comments: Essential Services Commission of Victoria
Inquiry into an Access Regime for Water and Sewerage Infrastructure Services – Draft
Report, June 2009 (27 July 2009).
Wendy L Ambler

1. Introduction:
I refer to the Inquiry into an Access Regime for Water Infrastructure Services – Draft Report
(Draft Report) prepared by the Essential Services Commission of Victoria in June 2009. Several
comments in the Draft Report indicate that the Commission has taken account of the New
South Wales Government’s approach to, and experience with, developing an access regime for
water industry infrastructure under the Water Industry Competition Act 2006 (NSW) (WICA)
and its application for certification of that regime under Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act
1974 (Cth) (TPA). I refer the Commission to my submissions in respect of the application for
certification of the WICA access regime as background to the comments I make in relation to
the Draft Report. [See <http://www.ncc.gov.au/images/uploads/WICASu-002.pdf> and
<http://www.ncc.gov.au/images/uploads/WICASu-008.pdf> ].
The following paragraphs offer comments on some of the recommendations of the
Commission by way of support rather than advocating a change of direction. The comments
are of a general nature, but the primary focus of my review of the Draft Report has been to
consider the impact of the proposals in the urban context.
2. Staged Implementation
The Draft Report does not convey an urgency to conclude a legislative regime to provide
access to water industry infrastructure in Victoria. This is reflected in the Commission’s
recommendation to follow a staged process of implementation, and thus use the opportunities
offered by that approach to produce a regime that will meet the Government’s objectives.
The Commission notes that:
In designing a Victorian access regime, the Commission and the Victorian Government
have an opportunity to address the concerns expressed by the NCC in relation to New
South Wales’ regime. Staged implementation of the regime will allow the development of
a more comprehensive and well-defined regime that provides greater clarity, certainty and
transparency. It will also allow the Victorian Government to fine-tune the access regime in
response to industry developments and a better understanding of the nature and extent of
demand for access, prior to an application for certification. [Draft Report, p 37]

Staged implementation provides an opportunity for the use of flexible and adaptive
mechanisms to develop the framework for a legislative access regime. Changes can be made
to the evolving paradigm to accommodate experience gained without the constraints that
apply to amendment of formal legislative provisions. Draft Recommendation 3.1 is strongly
supported.
3. Coverage
The scope of the regime’s influence is clear from the outset. The Draft Report recommends
that the entire State of Victoria be covered by the access regime. [Draft Recommendation 4.1]
However, the treatment of interstate issues was of some concern in the consideration of the
application for certification of the WICA regime. The principle embodied in Clause 6(2) of the
Competition Principles Agreement (CPA) provides that an access regime established in a state
Appendix: Related Papers

xxx

or territory cannot be effective if the facility has influence across a jurisdictional boundary or if
the facility is located in more than one jurisdiction. The CPA calls for cross-jurisdictional
consistency and co-operation where more than one regime can apply to a service so that an
access seeker can follow a single process, a single body will resolve disputes and there will be a
single forum for enforcement. The Commission comments in the Draft Report that:
In Victoria, interstate issues could arise in respect of services located in the Murray Darling
Basin, where trading has created a single market that crosses state borders. The relevant
state governments, including the Victorian Government, have agreed that consistent
regulatory arrangements should be put in place through a national scheme. [Draft Report,
p 51]

A staged approach would facilitate consideration of the issues in the Murray Darling Basin and
perhaps lead to an integrated inter-jurisdictional approach in the area but the Commission’s
final comments in relation to the consummation of an inter-governmental agreement to deal
with the matter do not bode well for resolution of a difficult issue:
At present, the Murray-Darling Basin is not included within the scheduled geographic area
covered by New South Wales’ access regime. No other state currently has a state-based
access regime for its water industry. Therefore, including the Murray-Darling Basin within a
Victorian access regime would not result in infrastructure facilities located in this area
becoming subject to more than one state-based access regime. If the Basin were to
subsequently become subject to another state-based access regime, an intergovernmental agreement could be made to ensure that a single process applied for
seeking access.
The Commission has concluded that the entire state should be covered by a Victorian
access regime. In respect of the Murray-Darling Basin, it seeks further information on
whether any barriers to gaining access to infrastructure facilities arise as a result of
differing state arrangements. It also seeks further information in relation to existing
arrangements for sharing the use of rural infrastructure facilities [Draft Report, p 51]

It is open to debate whether the mechanism of an inter-governmental agreement will offer a
‘comprehensive, clear and transparent’ extension of the regime to the sensitive water industry
environment of the Murray Darling Basin.
4. Dispute Resolution
Draft Recommendation 5.3 provides for the inclusion of limited merits review of arbitration
decisions. The Draft Report explores the relevance of merits review in a number of
circumstances. While I support the draft recommendation, I would encourage further
consideration of full merits review.
5. Access seekers and licensing
The Commission canvasses elements to be included in a licensing system for new water and
sewerage service providers. The Draft Report suggests that:
In order to obtain a licence, access seekers would be required to demonstrate that they
have sufficient capacity to carry out the activity and comply with the licence obligations.
[Draft Report p 98]

The Draft Report then records that:
The Commission recommends that financial capacity be a consideration in granting
licences to ensure the long term financial viability of the water industry in Victoria.
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This statement is not included in the body of a formal recommendation of the Draft Report.
The fact that ‘financial capacity’ is to be a ‘consideration’ is a positive development of the
requirement of section 10(4)(a) of the WICA that:
A licence may not be granted unless the Minister is satisfied…
(a) that the applicant has, and will continue to have, the capacity (including technical, financial
and organisational capacity) to carry out the activities that the licence (if granted) would
authorise

The ability of regulators to accurately assess the financial capacity of a potential licensee, and
confidently base a decision on such an assessment at any point in time, raises a number of
issues in the light of experiences of the global financial crisis of the past 18 months.
6. Entitlements to water
The need for a comprehensive system of entitlement to water, regardless of source, to enable
an access regime to be effective is recognised by the Commission and raised in a number of
sections of the Draft Report. [See for example Draft report p 50] Actions under the National
Water Initiative support the development of entitlements for new sources and integration of
water management planning and urban planning. I strongly urge regulators to prioritise the
inclusion of new sources (especially raw water for recycling and salt water for desalination)
into regional water planning in urban contexts so that appropriate water sharing principles,
inclusive of all water resources, can be defined in those regions.
7. Conclusion
The Commission’s comment that work is currently underway to develop sewer mining
guidelines is noted. [Draft Report p 13-14] The notion of sewer mining in the context of an
access regime poses certain challenges. Sewer mining offers the opportunity for smaller
operators to obtain and use the contents of water industry infrastructure without recourse to
access provisions. Does sewer mining defeat the purpose of an access regime with regard to
smaller operators? At the other end of the spectrum, where an access seeker and an
infrastructure owner are able to negotiate terms of access on a commercial basis without the
support of an access regime, is there a real need?
It is to be hoped that there is sufficient uptake by the Victorian water industry of the
opportunities offered by the staged implementation of an access regime to permit proper
assessment of that regime as it develops.
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PAPER D: Response to Invitation for Comments: Independent Pricing and Regulatory
Tribunal of New South Wales: Review of Operating Licence for Sydney Water Corporation –
Issues Paper September 2009 (20 November 2009).
Wendy L Ambler

1. Introduction
1.1.

This submission is made in response to the Review of the Operating Licence for
Sydney Water Corporation: Issues Paper (Issues Paper) published by the
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of New South Wales (IPART) in
September 2009. General comments are offered and some of the specific
matters highlighted in the Issues Paper are addressed.

2. General Issues
2.1.

The roles and responsibilities of SWC arise from a number of statutory, policy
and contractual instruments only some of which are discussed in this
submission. The SWC is constituted under the Sydney Water Act 1994 (NSW)
(the Act). It has been issued an Operating Licence (the Operating Licence)
under Part 5 of the Act and it holds a water management licence under Part 9
of the Water Act 1912 (NSW). SWC provides services to its customers under
the Customer Contract set out in the Operating Licence. SWC is responsible for
implementing a number of actions to secure Sydney’s water supply under the
Metropolitan Water Plan 2006 (MWP).1 SWC enters into sewer mining
agreements in accordance with its sewer mining policy2 and has recently
released its stormwater harvesting policy.3

2.2.

The Issues Paper is concerned with IPART’s review of the Operating Licence.
However, the outcome of the current review of the MWP and the preparation
of a Draft Water Sharing Plan for the Greater Metropolitan Region (GMRWSP)
under the water management planning framework of the Water Management
Act 2000 (NSW) (WMA) will impact on IPART’s review of the Operating Licence.

2.3.

The MWP is currently being updated. The Independent Review Panel
appointed under the MWP to ‘provide expert input on metropolitan water
planning matters’4 is overseeing the process, including community consultation.
Community consultation on the MWP is being undertaken in 2 phases. The first
phase, which is now completed, involved an online survey, eight public
workshops and two stakeholder workshops. Phase 2 consultation will be
different:

1

The Metropolitan Water Plan 2006 is available at:< http://www.waterforlife.nsw.gov.au/about/plan
accessed 18 November 2009>.
2
Information on Sydney Water Corporation‘s sewer mining policy is available at:
<http://www.sydneywater.com.au/Water4Life/RecyclingandReuse/RecyclingAndReuseInAction/SewerM
ining.cfm accessed 18 November 2009>.
3
Information on Sydney Water Corporation‘s stormwater harvesting policy is available at:
<http://www.sydneywater.com.au/OurSystemsandOperations/StormwaterManagement/> accessed
18 November 2009.
4
Metropolitan Water Plan 2006, 122.
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Due to the technical and complex nature of the water supply portfolios,
workshops will be held with informed community members and stakeholders.5

2.4.

In the Issues Paper IPART comments that:
This review is scheduled for completion in early 2010. IPART is therefore of the
view that it will not be able to identify which demand management/water
efficiency measures should be recommended for inclusion in the Operating
Licence until the MWP review is completed. In particular, IPART will be interested
to see how clearly Sydney Water’s role is defined within the revised MWP. If the
revised MWP does not clearly specify Sydney Water’s role in demand
management and water efficiency, it may be necessary to continue with a more
prescriptive approach to these outputs of Sydney Water’s Operating Licence.6

2.5.

SWC comments in its Submission to the Review of Sydney Water’s Operating
Licence that the MWP is specifically designed to adapt to changing
circumstances and that the projects that SWC will undertake as part of the
MWP may change with time and government policy. SWC states that the
Operating Licence should not include specific actions of the MWP. 7 There is in
fact no enforcement mechanism in the MWP. It is a statement of intent, a
statement of government policy, and not a formal statutory planning
instrument.

2.6.

The New South Wales Government is also currently preparing a Draft Water
Sharing Plan for the Greater Metropolitan Region (GMRWSP) under the water
management planning framework of the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW)
(WMA). Targeted community consultation on the plan is being undertaken at
the same time as the review of SWC’s operating licence. Public exhibition of a
draft plan is anticipated in early 2010. 8

2.7.

When the GMRWSP is finalised SWC’s current water management licence
issued under the Water Act 1912 (NSW) will presumably be replaced by a
licence and approval issued under the WMA. There appears to be no
opportunity under the WMA for community consultation in the relevant
processes.

2.8.

IPART expresses the view in the Issues Paper that:

5

Water for Life, Community input phase 2, <http://www.waterforlife.nsw.gov.au/about/plan/community_input _phase_2> at 25 October 2009.
6
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal, Review of the Operating Licence for Sydney Water
Corporation: Issues Paper, September 2009, 30.
7
Sydney Water Corporation, Submission to the Review Sydney Water‘s Operating Licence,
26 October 2009, 28. The policy changes evident in the history of the desalination project and in recent
decisions regarding Shoalhaven Transfers in fact support SWC‘s position but are not referred to by SWC
in its submission.
8
The proposed ‗water sharing plans‘ were discussed in: NSW Government Water for Life, How will
Sydney‘s water consumption be managed under the water sharing plans?
<http://www.waterforlife.nsw.gov.au/about/2007-progress.report/faq_executive_summary> at
10 March 2008. Current information is available at:
<http://www.waterforlife.nsw.gov.au/about/plan/a_plan_for_sharing_water> accessed
18 November 2009.
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the MWP process provides a mechanism to require Sydney Water to contribute to
supply/demand issues in a manner that is more consistent with good regulatory
practice than that used in the current Operating Licence.9

The mechanism referred to by IPART is adaptive management: ‘the ability to
assess changing needs and the flexibility to implement demand and supply
options that address these needs while minimising risks and costs’.10 The
Issues Paper outlines the benefits of a risk-based, outcomes oriented adaptive
management approach over more prescriptive licence provisions and notes
that this approach underlies the licensing regime of the WICA.
2.9.

Included in the demand and supply measures under the MWP are contributions
to be made by the desalination plant, by recycling projects, through Shoalhaven
transfers, from groundwater sources, and from resources obtained from deep
water access in dams – not all of which fall under the umbrella of SWC’s
operations. IPART suggests in the Issues Paper that plans required to be
prepared by SWC under its operating licence could mandate SWC to meet
specific obligations in the MWP with regard to demand management and water
conservation.11

2.10. The updated MWP, the GMRWSP, new water management licence(s) and the
new Operating Licence will each affect SWC’s operations. Opportunities for
community participation in the processes associated with the development of
each of these instruments vary. The degree of integration of the outcomes
from each process is not apparent.

9

Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal, Review of the Operating Licence for Sydney Water
Corporation: Issues Paper, September 2009, 30.
10
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal, Review of the Operating Licence for Sydney Water
Corporation: Issues Paper, September 2009, 29.
11
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal, Review of the Operating Licence for Sydney Water
Corporation: Issues Paper, September 2009, 31.
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Submission 1: IPART’s recommendations for the operating licence should not only
depend upon the review of the MWP but also on the identification of any rights and
obligations imposed on SWC under the statutory water planning framework of the
WMA in the GMRWSP and other licences issued under the WMA.
Submission 2: SWC’s sewer mining and stormwater harvesting activities should be
addressed in the review of the Operating Licence. The activities arguably go beyond
the functions contemplated under the SWA as indeed does extraction of seawater for
desalination.
Submission 3: SWC’s right to control the use of sewage and stormwater accessed from
its water infrastructure should be addressed in the course of the review. Should the
right to control the use of these water sources rest with SWC or should it be
incorporated into the water management framework of the GMRWSP? What are the
impacts of SWC’s control of these water sources on competitive opportunities for the
private sector in water recycling projects?
Submission 4: The manner in which the MWP is used to inform the regulation of SWC
under the Operating Licence must be consistent with SWC’s objectives and functions
under the SWA (particularly its principal objectives which include protection of the
environment through compliance with the principles of ecologically sustainable
development) and with the principles of regulatory best practice adopted by IPART.
SWC’s submission that the Operating Licence should not include specific actions in the
MWP is strongly supported. Nor should the Operating Licence be used as a method of
enforcing the MWP.
3. Issues highlighted in the Issues Paper (paragraph numbering refers to
corresponding items in the Issues Paper)
1. Does the form of the current Operating Licence reflect regulatory best
practice?
SWC’s Operating Licence is of a general nature, regulating SWC’s behaviour across
the spectrum of its functions and over a vast geographic area. By way of contrast,
private sector operators licensed under the WICA are licensed in respect of specific
water projects at specific locations and thus the requirements imposed on
operators under each licence are tailored to the specific requirements of the
project.
Submission 5: The adoption of a form of licence resembling the licences granted
under the Water Industry Competition Act 2006 (NSW) (WICA) is supported. The
review of the Operating Licence presents an excellent opportunity to create a level
playing field in the water services sector in the Sydney Region.
The SWA provides that more than one licence can be granted to SWC to enable it
to carry out its functions. This may be a possibility for future SWC operating
licences so that, for example, the desalination plant operations could be specifically
licensed under the SWA.
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Submission 6: Possible regulatory overlaps between conditions imposed under
other legislation on individual SWC projects (for example the desalination plant
approvals granted under the environmental planning and assessment legislation)
should be identified in the course of the current review and addressed to ensure
‘co-ordination of regulatory effort, streamlining of regulatory processes and the
identification and removal of unnecessary reporting requirements’ as advocated by
IPART in its 2006 report on regulation.
2. Apart from ADWG 2004 and AGWR 2006 or their updated equivalents, should
further water quality standards be introduced into the Operating Licence?
Development of the Australian Guidelines (ADWG 2004 and AGWR 2006) has been
supported by the States and embraced by NSW in the development of its own
guidelines for certain recycling applications.12
Submission 7: Drafting should ensure that variants of the Australian Guidelines
approved by NSW Health govern the supply by SWC of water fit for purpose.
3. Are there any issues with water quality which would necessitate further
consideration in IPART’s review?
Submission 8: The adoption of ‘Aquality’ and ‘Requality’ as quantitative audit
assessment tools is supported.
6. What sustainability and environmental management requirements should be
imposed through the Operating Licence and how should they be expressed?
See discussion above for comments relating to the proposed imposition of
conditions requiring SWC to meet specific obligations in the MWP.
Submission 9: Inclusion of a requirement in the Operating Licence to adhere to the
objectives of the GMRWSP is supported.
7. Are the retail management and customer service requirements in the current
Operating Licence adequate?
Submission 10: Efforts to simplify the language of the Customer Contract are
supported.
12. Are any amendments required to the MoU obligation in the Operating Licence?
SWC currently has four Memorandums of Understanding in place, one with each
of: the Water Administration Ministerial Corporation (represented by the
Department of Natural Resources – February 2007); the Department of
Environment and Conservation (June 2006); NSW Health (February 2006); and NSW
Fire Brigades & NSW Rural Fire Service (July 2008).
12

See NSW Guidelines for Greywater Reuse in Sewered, Single Household Residential Premises 12 (the
Blue Guidelines) and Interim NSW Guidelines for Management of Private Recycled Water Schemes (the
Purple Guidelines).
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Some of the names have changed many times since these instruments were
executed. Although the requirement to enter into such arrangements arises in the
SWA, it is open to question that they really achieve anything that would otherwise
not be reasonably expected of public authorities. Indeed, if IPART’s view of the
significance of the MWP is adopted then there is an overarching imperative for all
government bodies to cooperate to achieve the policy goals set out in that
document.
4. Concluding remarks
4.1.

The Operating Licence is only one instrument in a complex framework that
governs the operations of SWC. The National Water Initiative (NWI)13 and the
NSW Implementation Plan for the National Water Initiative provide the policy
framework for water management in the Sydney Region. The MWP sets out
actions to secure Sydney’s water supply for the future. SWC is charged with
implementing a number of the initiatives in the MWP which progress the
agenda of the NWI to meet NSW’s commitments in the NSWNWIIP. SWC does
so as part of its functions under the SWA and otherwise as directed by the
Minister under the State Owned Corporations Act 1998 (NSW) from time to
time. IPART’s current review presents an excellent opportunity to ensure that
the terms of the Operating Licence appropriately address SWC’s dynamic
operating environment.

13

Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Water Initiative signed by the Commonwealth
Government and all State and Territory Governments on 25 June 2004.
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PAPER E(a): Submission prepared as a member of the Water Advisory Group of the NSW
Nature Conservation Council for the Council: Comments on Update of the Sydney
Metropolitan Water Plan: Response to Phase 2 Community Consultation: Stakeholder
Workshop 2 December 2009 (14 December 2009).

Introduction:
Thank you for inviting the NSW Nature Conservation Council (NCC) to participate in the second
phase of consultation concerning the update of the Metropolitan Water Plan (MWP). Whilst
the NCC was not included in the first phase of consultation and hence cannot comment on the
procedure followed there, we are concerned that the guided workshop approach of Phase 2
did impose limits on contributions that could be made on the day and hence on the outcomes
of the exercise. Specific questions addressed in the course of the presentations throughout
the day limited the possible responses and guided input to largely predetermined outcomes.
Although it is a strategy document and not a statutory-based plan, the MWP is a powerful tool
to drive water management reform in the Sydney Region. As a consequence it has also
encouraged legislative responses to accommodate new needs as new water sources and new
water products emerge. It is a document which demands open and transparent process.
However, as the opportunity to participate in the review process has been quite limited, the
NCC requests that the following written submission be accepted for consideration instead of a
completed Handbook. We appreciate the opportunity afforded to our representative, Wendy
Ambler, to take the workbook for completion after the day and do not wish to abuse that
accommodation.
Comments:
1. The Workshop discussion was focused on seven Community Planning Principles that
emerged from the Phase 1 Consultation. Water management principles that regulate
water management and use in the Sydney Region are already clearly espoused in the
National Water Initiative (NWI), the NSW National Water Initiative Implementation Plan
(Implementation Plan), and the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW). The NSW
Government is currently preparing a water sharing plan in accordance with the provisions
of the Water Management Act 2000 for the Greater Metropolitan Region. The water
sharing plan will provide the basis on which Sydney’s surface water and groundwater
resources will be shared amongst a diverse range of users – including the environment.

Any restatement of planning principles in the MWP must not derogate from the
intent and objectives of the nationally agreed policy and the State legislative
framework pertaining to water. The formal principles of the NWI, the
Implementation Plan and the Water Management Act 2000 offer the appropriate
tools for assessing strengths and weaknesses of the MWP.
2. The Water4Life motto, as explained at the Workshop and as represented on the website,
is a shorthand reference to four water supply measures: dams, recycling, desalination and
water efficiency. Elements of these measures were used to guide discussion and elicit
responses from the participants at the Workshop.
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The important fifth element of the measures addressed in the MWP, ‘Rivers and
Catchments’, that seeks to protect catchment and river health and provide water
for the environment should appear as a principle objective of the MWP. As
currently presented in publications, the emphasis of the measures in the MWP is on
water supply. The importance of water for the environment, of catchment and river
health, must not be subjugated to demand imperatives either in fact or by
implication through graphic design creativity.
3. At present NSW Government agencies are involved in: the conduct of a review of Sydney
Water Corporation’s Operating Licence; an update of the MWP; preparation of a water
sharing plan for the Greater Metropolitan Region; and in due course, a review of Sydney
Catchment Authority’s Operating Licence. All of these reviews are concerned with water
management in the Sydney Region. They are inter-related and the implementation each
one will impact on the others.







The issues relating to the MWP discussed at the Workshop could not be
properly considered as discrete options but needed to be considered as part of
the whole – as elements of integrated urban water cycle management.
The options also needed to be considered in conjunction with, or at least in the
context of, underlying robust scientific, environmental, economic and social
analyses that would support them or require their rejection.
The MWP should in turn be considered in the full context of the complex
framework of water management in the Sydney Region and not in isolation.

4. The NCC is not aware of any complete water balance for the Hawkesbury-Nepean that
takes into account all water sources (fresh/sea/ waste/storm) and water products
(desalinated/recycled/drinking water) although we understand one is being worked on cooperatively across Government agencies. There is certainly no such balance for the whole
system to be managed under the MWP.





If the aim of the MWP is to ensure that the ‘bucket of water’ available is
sufficient to meet diverse needs in the Sydney region then the volume contained
in that bucket must be known, and the extractions from that volume must be
known. If the water available in, and extracted from, the system as a whole
cannot be or it is not being measured then it cannot be managed.
If there is no complete water balance, then policy planning for water security
for the short, medium and long terms in the Sydney Region is largely a matter
of best guessing. The inclusion of a non-rainfall dependent water supply
(desalination) in the mix provides certainty and security that was not previously
available to policy makers and must be properly factored into the water account
for the region.
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5. The general consensus of the group at the Workshop supported environmental flows
mimicking nature. Reduction of those flows in times of severe drought was not supported.
As mentioned above, environmental aspects of the MWP have been visually marginalised.
They must not be diminished in the overall planning framework that is to be embodied in
the next iteration of the MWP.





The security afforded to environmental flows under the original provisions of
the Water Management Act 2000 should be reinstated as part of the water
management policy of the MWP.
The obligations imposed on public utilities and private sector operators
involved in delivering the measures set out in the MWP should recognise and
enforce the needs of the environment and catchment and river health.

6. The 2004 version of the MWP stressed the importance of ‘partnering with the community’:
The key to meeting Sydney’s water needs in the future is for the Government and the
community to share ownership of the problem and the solution.1
There appeared to be little support at the Workshop for increased domestic demand
management measures.





The NCC strongly supports the inclusion of, and Government support for,
continuing demand management measures in the MWP that are capable of
implementation in homes. It is only through hands-on measures such as
rainwater collection, greywater reuse and household water use targets that
the community can own and understand the problems associated with water
management and use. Through such measures the community can also
participate in a ‘solution’.
Effective communication between water managers, the water industry and
the community is essential to nurture partnership with the community. The
web now makes ‘communication’ easier for most. However, the MWP
review process should critically evaluate the ‘effectiveness’ of web-based
communication. If the web is to remain the principal medium for passing
information to the public in a form that can be converted to print, then the
documentation may have to sacrifice form in favour of substance and
eliminate complex graphic design elements that do not add to content.
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PAPER E(b): Submission prepared as a member of the Water Advisory Group of the NSW
Nature Conservation Council for the Council: Comments on the Independent Pricing and
Regulatory Tribunal of New South Wales Review of the Prices for the Water Administration
Ministerial Corporation (16 June 2010).

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on IPART’s Issues Paper (Issues Paper), the
Office of Water’s Submissions (NOW Submissions) and the PriceWaterhouse
Coopers/Halcrow Draft Report (Draft Report) that relate to IPART’s current Review of
the Water Administration Ministerial Corporation’s Water Management Charges
(Review).
Unfortunately it is beyond the resources available to the Nature Conservation Council
(NCC) to make detailed comments on many of the economic matters highlighted in the
Issues Paper and in the Draft Report but the NCC notes that a number of comments
made in the Draft Report are critical of the level of clarity and transparency in several
elements of the NOW Submissions.
However, the NCC welcomes the opportunity provided by the Review to raise an issue
that it believes is relevant to the Review. Section 15 of the IPART Act reproduced in
Appendix A of the Issues Paper requires IPART to have regard to:
e)

the need for greater efficiency in the supply of services so as to reduce
costs for the benefit of consumers and taxpayers

f)

the need to maintain ecologically sustainable development…by
appropriate pricing policies that take account of all the feasible options
available to protect the environment.

The NCC submits that there is a pressing need to clearly identify the NSW
Government agency or agencies in which the State’s water rights are vested and the
roles and responsibilities of that agency or those agencies. Clarification of the roles
and responsibilities of these agencies will enable efficient service delivery to support
ecologically sustainable development.
The Review is a ‘review of prices for the Water Administration Ministerial Corporation’
(WAMC). The Issues Paper advises that WAMC is the legal entity responsible for water
management in NSW but that the NSW Department of Water and Energy (DWE)
undertakes water management activities on behalf of WAMC.1
The Draft Report postdates the July 2009 reorganisation of NSW Government agencies
and records that although WAMC is the legal entity responsible for water management
in New South Wales, NOW is responsible for undertaking these activities on its behalf.
Both the Issues Paper and the Draft Report are adamant that WAMC is legally
responsible for water management in NSW, but neither of these documents provides a

1

IPART Review of prices for Water Administration Ministerial Corporation from July 2010: Water
Issues Paper July 2009, 1. The NCC notes that although IPART was apparently aware of the
reorganisation of NSW Government agencies in July 2009 the Issues Paper continues to refer to DWE
‗for the sake of simplicity‘: see comments in footnote 14 on page 13 of the Issues Paper.
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clear basis for this statement, nor for the assumption by the various agencies of
responsibility for the conduct of WAMC’s operations.
The WAMC was established under the Water Administration Act 1986 (1986 Act).
Section 12 of the 1986 Act vested the right to the use and flow, and to the control, of
water in the WAMC. The WAMC was responsible for the administration of the Water
Act 1912 (WA 1912) – responsibility for decision making with regard to water
management in NSW was clear and unambiguous.
Section 392 of the Water Management Act 2000 (WMA 2000) defines the State’s
water rights and vests those rights in the Crown. The Minister is responsible for
implementation of the water management provisions of the WMA 2000 although the
WAMC constituted by Chapter 8, Part 2 of the WMA 2000 has specific functions set out
in section 372 – but they do not extend specifically to the exercise of the State’s water
rights. The WAMC can delegate its functions.
The NCC submits that the clarity afforded from 1986 by the role of the WAMC in the
management scheme of the WA 1912 has been clouded with the introduction of the
WMA 2000, especially with respect to water management in the Greater
Metropolitan Region.
The NOW Submissions clarify that NOW’s services (presumably those delivered on
behalf of WAMC or are they delivered on behalf of the Minister?) relate to water
management within regulated rivers, unregulated rivers and groundwater sources, and
transaction consents for water access, works and for water dealings. NOW also
advises that another entity (the State Water Corporation) provides storage and
delivery services for water in regulated rivers; an environmental water section within
the Department of Environment, Climate Change and Water manages specific
environmental contingency allowances and environmental water licences; and the new
Office of the Hawkesbury-Nepean oversees river management in the HawkesburyNepean.2
What functions does the WAMC actually perform under the WMA 2000?
In the Greater Metropolitan Region water management has not yet been brought
under the provisions of the WMA 2000. The provisions of the WA 1912 regulate
access to and use of water in the region. The WAMC continues to have authority over
water management in the Sydney Region under the WA 1912. Accordingly, the WAMC
has issued water management licences to Sydney Water Corporation and Sydney
Catchment Authority. The Sydney Water Corporation licence clearly states that it is
‘issued by’ the WAMC. The Sydney Catchment Authority licence also indicates that it is
issued by the WAMC but notes in the definition section that at the time the licence
was granted the functions of the WAMC were delegated to DWE under section 377 of
the ‘Act’ – a reference to the WMA 2000 when the authority to grant the licence arises
under the 1912 Act. The Sydney Catchment Authority bore licences were issued to
2

See NSW Office of Water Submission for 2010 Bulk Water Price Review, 2 December 2009, pages 7and
14.
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Sydney Catchment Authority under the WA 1912 by the Department of Natural
Resources.
The NCC notes that draft water sharing plans for the Greater Metropolitan Region are
now on public exhibition and that the activities of Sydney Water Corporation and
Sydney Catchment Authority will be regulated by the plans when implemented.
However, the NCC submits that a transition period of nearly 10 years from the
introduction of the WMA 2000 has resulted in efficiencies in service delivery in the
region. The NCC is concerned that there is a risk of further inefficiencies arising with
the development and exploitation of new water sources, in the Greater Metropolitan
Region and elsewhere in the State, that are not covered by the water management
scheme of the WMA 2000.
In its area of operations Sydney Water Corporation controls wastewater and
stormwater in its infrastructure and has the capacity to enter into agreements to
permit the taking of wastewater and stormwater that it collects and disposes of in the
Sydney Region for treatment and reuse taking the ‘management’ of these ‘water
sources’ outside the legislative regime. Sydney Catchment Authority controls water in
its infrastructure and can supply water to third parties. Local councils can grant access
to wastewater in infrastructure that they control and can authorise water supply works
in certain areas. At the same time, the Minister is responsible for the preparation of
water sharing plans for the Sydney Region under the WMA 2000.
The delivery of water management in NSW is at best awkward and administrative
responsibility for delivery of related services unclear.


Real or apparent difficulties with transitional provisions relating to the
continuation of the WAMC under the WMA 2000 are curable and should be
clarified as a matter of urgency.



If there is not an ongoing role for WAMC under the WMA 2000 then that matter
should be addressed in legislation.



The proper allocation of rights to access and use new water sources –
wastewater (including sewage), stormwater and seawater – in NSW requires
deliberate action to ensure that the functions of asset management and
resource management remain the responsibility of separate entities; to ensure
efficient delivery of management services in relation to those water sources; and
to ensure that ecologically sustainable development is maintained in the State.
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PAPER E(c): Submission prepared as a member of the Water Advisory Group of the NSW
Nature Conservation Council for the Council: Submission: Draft Water Sharing Plan Greater
Metropolitan Region unregulated river water sources 2010 (30 July 2010).

A

Introduction

The NSW Nature Conservation Council (NCC) welcomes the opportunity to comment
on the Draft Water Sharing Plan: Greater Metropolitan Region unregulated river water
sources 2010 (Draft Plan). The NCC acknowledges the magnitude of the task
undertaken by the NSW Office of Water (Office) in preparing the Draft Plan and in
coordinating the public information sessions during the public exhibition period.
In November 2009 the NCC provided comments to the Office (NCC Comments)
following a targeted consultation presentation by Dr Stephen Allen. The NCC invites
the Office to review the NCC Comments and incorporate them as an element of this
submission.
It is beyond the resources of the NCC to undertake a full scientific review of the
elements of the Draft Plan. The NCC notes that the Office has relied on the
methodology of the ‘macro’ approach to water planning and that the reader is
referred to a full discussion of the relevant method provided in a document titled:
Macro water sharing plans: The approach for unregulated rivers. Report to assist
community consultation (Macro Report). Accordingly comments in this submission
address the process rather than the outcomes.
The NCC reiterates its concerns relating to implementation of some of the
recommendations of the Hawkesbury-Nepean River Management Forum. The NCC
looks forward to replies to the questions posed in the NCC Comments and to
assurances that the Forum recommendations raised in the NCC Comments have been
accommodated in the Draft Plan so that environmental water rules will deliver
sustainable positive ecological outcomes.
B

Classification as unregulated river water sources

The water sources to which the Draft Water Sharing Plan: Greater Metropolitan Region
unregulated river water sources 2010 (Draft Plan) applies are categorised as
‘unregulated rivers’. The term ‘unregulated river’ is not defined in the Dictionary to
the Draft Plan. The Dictionary to the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) (WMA2000)
defines an ‘unregulated river’ as ‘a river that is not a regulated river’, a ‘regulated river’
being ‘a river that is declared by the Minister…to be a regulated river’. The definitions
are not only circular but indicate that there is some discretion as to which rivers the
Minister will declare to be regulated rivers for the purposes of the WMA2000.
The Background Document to the Draft Plan is more helpful, expanding on the
definition offered by the WMA 2000 to inform in its definition of ‘regulated river’ that:
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Typically rivers where state owned storages catch water during wetter periods and the
river is used to supply stored water to meet downstream user’s orders during dry
times are declared as regulated rivers.1

The Background Document also notes in its introductory statement that:
The supply of water in unregulated rivers is typically not controlled by releases of
water from dams but is dependent solely on rainfall and natural river flows.
The supply of water from the river water sources of the GMR is controlled by releases from state
owned storages. That supply is augmented by non-rainfall dependent flow from sewage treatment
plants and from stormwater channels that discharge into the rivers of the GMR. Water from the
rivers of the GMR is supplied by a statutory authority to downstream users including Sydney Water
Corporation, a statutory State-owned corporation that supplies drinking water to over 20% of
Australia’s total population that lives and works in the GMR.
The NCC submits that the treatment of the river water sources of the Greater Metropolitan Region
(GMR) as ‘unregulated’ rivers is a fundamental flaw in the construction of the Draft Plan. It does not
provide an appropriate basis for development of water sharing rules in accordance with the objectives
of the WMA 2000 and the National Water Initiative.

C

Macro water planning

The Background Document advises that the classification of the water sources of the
GMR was the first step in the development of the Draft Plan. The classification
method is explained in the Macro Report and in a brochure titled: Overview of macro
water plans (Macro Overview).
The Draft Plan has been prepared as a ‘macro water plan’. The NCC refers to the
comments made in relation to the macro planning process in the NCC Comments. The
WMA 2000 does not define a ‘macro water plan’, nor does the Draft Plan. The Macro
Report advises that the term refers to a broad approach to the development of water
sharing plans adopted to cover ‘much larger areas than…single sub-catchment,
unregulated river water sharing plans’.2 The NCC Comments referred to a peer review
of the NSW macro water sharing planning process that was commissioned by the
National Water Commission (NWC) in the course of the 2005 follow-up assessment of
NSW water reform progress under the National Competition Policy (Peer Review).
As noted in the NCC Comments the Peer Review concluded that ‘the macro planning
process was deemed adequate to prescribe flow rules in unregulated streams under
circumstances in which there is no significant competition for water between
environmental and other uses.’3 However, the NWC also reported, and concurred with,
the Peer Review finding that although the ecological science for the development of
macro plans was acceptable for less competitive systems ‘it is too simplistic for
competitive water allocation systems’.4
According to the Macro Overview:

1

NSW Office of Water, Draft Water Sharing Plan Greater Metropolitan Region unregulated river water
sources: Background Document, May 2010, Glossary, 51.
2
Macro Report, 1.
3
Australian Government National Water Commission, 2005 National Competition Policy follow-up
assessment of water reform progress: Water planning in New South Wales, June 2007, 34.
4
Ibid. 4.2.
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Macro water plans will not include the greater Sydney metropolitan area…Other water
planning processes will deal with these areas.5

The decision to proceed with a macro planning approach is contrary to the
Government’s stated intention not to do so in the course of assessments of the State’s
performance in the implementation of the 1994 COAG Water Reforms and the NWI –
where that statement of intent offered support to the Government’s claims that its
water planning processes met its commitments under those reforms. Published
documentation that has been disseminated with the Draft Plan confirms that the Draft
Plan would not be a macro plan.
The Greater Metropolitan Region river water sources are characterised by highly competitive
demands on supply. They provide drinking water to Australia’s largest urban agglomeration. They
have been identified by the NSW Government as complex systems that required individual attention
to develop water sharing plans.
The NCC submits that the application of the macro planning approach to the river water sources of
the Greater Metropolitan Region (GMR) does not provide an appropriate basis for development of
water sharing rules for the Greater Metropolitan Region river water sources in accordance with the
objectives of the WMA 2000 and the National Water Initiative.
Further the NCC submits that the documentation made available with the Draft Plan does not
demonstrate the adequacy of the ecological science applied through the macro planning process to
inform decision making for the GMR. The NCC seeks independent evidence from the Office that the
macro planning process adopted has provided a sufficiently robust scientific basis for development of
the water sharing rules for a complex river system that is highly regulated and impacted by urban
water demands.

D

A Minister’s Plan

The WMA 2000 creates a framework for water management planning in Chapter 2 that
permits the development of water management plans by two processes:


by water management committees in accordance with inclusive consultative
procedures set out in Part 3 of Chapter 2; and
 by the Minister as Minister’s plans under Part 4 of Chapter 2 where community
consultation can take place at the Minister’s discretion.
As far as the NCC is aware all of the water sharing plans now in force in NSW are
Minister’s plans. The Draft Plan is a Minister’s plan made under section 50(1A) of
Chapter 2, Part 4 of the WMA 2000.
The Minister is granted broad discretion under Part 4 in relation to the area that can
be covered by a Minister’s plan; the matters that will be dealt with in the plan;
whether the consultation provisions set out in section 36–41 of the WMA 2000 will
apply to the planning process; and, in the case of section 50(1A) plans, whether to
dispense with other provisions of the Part 3 process.

5

Macro Overview ‗What is a macro water plan?‘ A similar statement appears in the NSW National
Water Initiative Implementation Plan. Greater metropolitan Sydney is referred to in the Implementation
Plan as one of four complex unregulated river systems that require very specific water sharing rules and
that would not be dealt with as macro water plans. See for example discussion of the Group D plans at:
NSW Government, NSW National Water Initiative Implementation Plan, 12, 17.
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The NCC notes that it has been the practice in NSW to place Minister’s plans on public
exhibition and invite submissions – as is the case with the Draft Plan. However, in
relation to the Draft Plan:


The Minister has exercised a choice under the WMA 2000 to make a Minister’s
plan.



The NSW Government has decided to ignore its stated intention not to use the
macro planning approach to develop the Draft Plan.



The Minister has not declared the Greater Metropolitan Region river water
sources to be regulated rivers.



The NCC is not aware of the creation and involvement of an advisory
committee to take part in the preparation of the Draft Plan.



There has not been a clear timetable associated with the development of the
Draft Plan and little if any information available publicly throughout the process.



Community consultation has been restricted to ‘targeted consultation’ and the
public exhibition of the Draft Plan.6



The exhibition period, although extended, is short and the complexity of the
issues to be considered in that short time is astounding.



The extent of the geographical area covered by the Draft Plan, and the variety
of issues that arise in water management across that area, prohibit considered
examination by the NCC of the detailed provisions of the Draft Plan.



Lack of community involvement in the development of the Draft Plan until this
late in the process limits the usefulness of submissions to the outcome of the
planning process.

The NCC acknowledges that legislative discretionary powers granted to decision makers give
those agencies freedom to choose from a range of options within any applicable confines
imposed by that legislative framework. However the NCC is concerned at the extent to which the
exercise of discretionary powers has influenced water management planning for the GMR.
It is the NCC’s recollection that the substance of the inclusive water management planning
process embodied in Chapter 2 Part 3 of the WMA 2000 has supported assessments of NSW’s
compliance with nationally agreed water planning reforms through the 1990s until now. That
assessment of compliance has brought with it financial reward in the form of entitlements to
Commonwealth Government incentives associated with those reforms.
Although it is an element of the WMA 2000 planning framework, the NCC did not foresee that the
opportunity to by-pass the Part 3 process by producing Minister’s plans would ultimately become
the sole process by which water management planning in NSW would be undertaken. Since the
inception of the WMA 2000 its environmentally friendly provisions have been progressively
whittled away.
The NCC submits that in relation to the Draft Plan neither the process nor the outcome meet the
6

The NCC participated in the targeted consultation phase by facilitating a presentation on the proposed
water sharing rules for surface and groundwater at its office. The NCC is not aware of the overall extent
of the targeted consultation or of the identity of other targets. Information sessions arranged as part of the
public exhibition process were at limited venues, addressed local issues, and offered little opportunity for
meaningful interaction with NSW Office of Water representatives. The NCC was represented at two of
the presentations.
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National Water Commission expectation that a fully effective water planning regime will:


provide a clear and secure basis for water access entitlements and allocations, thereby
providing certainty to water users and the environment.



enjoy the support of the community, by appropriately balancing economic, social and
environmental considerations, drawing on and utilising the best available science,
socioeconomic analysis and community input.



clearly establish how to deal with currently overused and/or overallocated systems,
thereby helping return necessary water to the environment and ensure environmental
7
and resource sustainability.

The NCC is of the view that the Draft Plan:


fails to address the complexity of the whole of the GMR water cycle, omitting the new
sources of water from the regulatory framework so that access to and use of valuable
sources of water ‘fit for purpose’ remain under the control of water service providers.



fails to take account of contributions made to the total water balance by alternative
water products such as recycled sewage and wastewater, desalinated seawater, and roof
water collection.



is too complicated; too difficult to navigate; tries to deliver optimised outcomes to meet
too many disparate environmental, social and economic demands; and, relies on
government policy to determine significant aspects of the water sharing framework

Consequently, the NCC is of the view that the Draft Plan may fail to effectively deliver any
positive outcomes for the environment in the GMR.
The Minister is afforded numerous discretionary powers under the Draft Plan. What
processes will be followed to ensure that the community is included in decision-making and
that it is kept informed in such a way that the government can act in partnership with the
community to manage the water of the GMR sustainably?

E

Specific Comments on Draft Plan provisions (references to clause are
references to clauses in the Draft Plan unless otherwise indicated)
Part 1 Introduction

1. Clause 2(2) states that the Draft Plan is a plan for water sharing that deals with
matters set out in WMA 2000 sections 20 and 21(a) to (c) and (f). Notably section
21 (d) is omitted from this list. Section 21 (d) of the WMA 2000 refers to ‘water
sharing measures for the protection and enhancement of the quality of water in
the water sources in the area or for the restoration of water sources or their
dependent ecosystems’.
The note to clause 9 (which sets contribution to the maintenance and
improvement of water quality as an objective of the plan) indicates that whilst
there are no specific strategies in the Draft Plan to maintain or improve water
quality the environmental water provisions of the Draft Plan would do so.
Water quality is fundamental to the health of the rivers of the GMR, the ecosystems those rivers
support, and to the provision of safe drinking water to Sydney. The Draft Plan should specifically
address this element of water planning.
7

See Australian Government National Water Commission, Australian Water Reform 2009: Second
biennial assessment of progress in implementation of the National Water Initiative, NWC Canberra 2009,
14.
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2. Parts of four water management areas covering six water sources that are divided
into 78 management zones are covered by the Draft Plan. [See clauses 4 and 5].
Clause 5(3) of the plan provides that the Minister can amend clause 5(2) ‘to change
an existing management zone or to establish a new or additional management
zone in the tidal pool in these water sources’.
Is the power to amend clause 5(2) intended to be restricted to tidal pool management in those
Management Zones listed in the explanatory note?
The note to clause 5(3) explains the intent of the provision however it is not clear from that
explanation how this power may be exercised. As the notes in the text of the plan do not form
part of the plan, and as the comments in the note are substantive in so far as they limit the
Minister’s discretion to change the specific provisions in the plan, the substance of the note
should be clarified and incorporated into the body of the plan.
Will any such amendments be subject to the general provisions of section 45 of the WMA 2000?

Part 2

Vision, objectives, strategies and performance indicators

3. The Vision clause in the Water Sharing Plan for the Central Coast Unregulated
Water Sources 2009 (Central Coast Plan) recognises respect statements for
Aboriginal values in its water sources.
Clause 8 of the Draft Plan does not include any such statement.

4. Clause 9(a) sets out the objective of providing water supply for the people of GMR.
The Central Coast Plan includes as an objective the management of major utility
water supply security for the benefit of the community whilst recognising the
environmental needs of the water source.
The Draft Plan should include similar recognition of the environmental needs of the water sources
in Clause 9(a). In particular subsequent clauses that accommodate the needs of major utilities
(Sydney Catchment Authority in particular) should specifically recognise and incorporate the
needs of the environment in decision making (see for example: cl 16(1)(n) *Minister’s note+; cl
rd
nd
16(3)(b) *Minister’s note+; cl 16(3)(d) *3 Note]; cl16(3)(e) [2 Note and Minister’s note+;
cl16(4)(b)*Minister’s note+; cl19(9)*Minister’s note+; cl21(10)*Minister’s note+; cl 22(9)*Minister’s
note+; and, cl23(9)*Minister’s note+.

5. Clause 9(b) states that it is an objective of the Draft Plan that it contributes to ‘the
sustainable and integrated management of the water cycle across the Greater
Metropolitan Region Unregulated River Water Sources’.
The Draft Plan cannot meet this objective as it does not accommodate contributions to the water
cycle from ‘non-natural’ water sources that will impact flows into and out of the unregulated river
water sources.
Have water use calculations within the area covered by the Draft Plan taken into account the
contribution being made by water obtained from ‘non-natural’ water sources that will decrease
reliance on drinking water supplied from the unregulated river water sources?
Is the Draft Plan based on a water balance calculated for the whole of the water cycle across the
Greater Metropolitan Region? Have contributions to the water cycle from new sources, (such as
recycling of sewage and stormwater and production of drinking water from seawater) been taken
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into account in water balance determinations for the water cycle? Has wastewater (sewage and
stormwater) extraction and usage been accounted for in water balance determinations for the
water cycle?
Has consideration been given to amending the WMA 2000 to accommodate new water products
and new sources of water so that the Draft Plan’s objective to contribute to ‘the sustainable and
integrated management of the water cycle across the Greater Metropolitan Region Unregulated
River Water Sources’ can be met?
Clause 90 of the Draft Plan arguably anticipates access licences for stormwater harvesting. Are
access licences for sewage contemplated? If not, why not?

6. Clause 9(l) sets out implementation of ‘Government decisions on environmental
flow regimes for the Hawkesbury-Nepean River Water Source and the Shoalhaven
River Water Source’ as an objective of the Draft Plan.
What are these decisions? Are they objectives that will be set in the new Metropolitan Water
Plan? If so, how will the Draft Plan secure the implementation of ‘decisions’ made under another
non-statutory plan which can be amended/changed without formal process set out in legislation?

7. Clause 9(m) sets out implementation of ‘Government policy of establishing a longterm average annual extraction limit within the life of the plan’ as an objective of
the Draft Plan.
As many of the provisions in the Draft Plan rely on LTAAEL as a reference to what extent will
effective implementation of the Draft Plan rely on this determination? The note to the clause
seems to indicate that it is Greater Sydney’s sustainable use that is to be determined and not an
LTAAEL. The intent of this clause should be clarified.

8. The performance indicators set out in clause 11(1)(e) include assessment of the
extent to which ‘reasonable use’ requirements are met.
What are these and how have they been determined? Will they become statutory
restrictions on basic landholder rights?

9. The performance indicators set out in clause 11(1)(h) include assessment of the
extent to which ‘spiritual, social and customary values of water to Aboriginal
people’ have been recognised in implementing the plan.
One of the objects of the WMA 2000 is to recognise and foster significant social and economic
benefits to the State that result from sustainable and efficient use of water, including benefits to
the Aboriginal people in relation to their economic use of land and water. [WMA 2000 Section
3(c)(iv)]. The Draft Plan does not recognise the economic values of water to Aboriginal people.

10. The Minister is to undertake an assessment of the performance of the Draft Plan
against the performance indicators after each five year period of operation [cl
11(2)].
Does this provision replace the audit requirements set out in section 44 of the WMA 2000? If so
has the Minister dispensed with the section 44 provisions in accordance with section 50(2A)(b)?
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Part 3

Basis for water sharing

11. Part 3 of the Draft Plan is intended to give effect to section 5(3) of the WMA 2000
which sets out water management principles relating specifically to water sharing
(cl12).
When and how will the other water management principles set out in section 5 of the WMA 2000
be realised in relation to the water sources of the GMR?

12. Clause 16(7) enables the Minister to amend provisions relating to the flow classes
in 48 water management zones in certain circumstances.
How will these amendments be made? What provision will be made for public consultation?

13. Clause 16(7)(f) contemplates amendment relating to flow classes in the Lower
Wingecarribee River Management Zone and Upper Wingecarribee River
Management Zone ‘based on the NSW Government’s long term decision regarding
run-of-river transfers by Sydney Catchment Authority along the Wingecarribee
River’.
How will the decision regarding run-of-river transfers by Sydney Catchment Authority be made?
What public consultation process will be followed in the decision-making?
The second note to cl 16(3)(e) refers to these amendments and suggests that they depend on
‘finalisation of proposed future water transfer options by Sydney Water Corporation’. What are
these options? What is the role of Sydney Water Corporation (and indeed Sydney Catchment
Authority) in water management planning for the GMR?

14. Clause 17 provides for the Minister to make announcements regarding flow classes
‘from time to time’.
What is the meaning of this clause? What will trigger such announcements? What will be the
impact of such announcements on water users?

Part 4

Environmental water provisions

15. Planned environmental water for all water sources is to be identified and
established as the volume of water in excess of long-term average annual
extraction limits determined for each water source with additional specific rules
applying for each water source. In other words the environmental water
provisions are based on volume remainders.
Clause 21 deals with planned environmental water in the Upper Nepean and
Upstream Warragamba Water Source. A Minister’s note to Clause 21(1)(f) advises
that environmental flows for the Warragamba River and Nepean River below
Warragamba Dam are to be determined by the NSW Government ‘in accordance
with the schedule of the Metropolitan Water Plan’. Flows adopted by the
government are to be included in the Draft Plan.
What is the schedule of the Metropolitan Water Plan? How have environmental water rules been
developed under the Metropolitan Water Plan? Can environmental water rules developed under
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the Metropolitan Water Plan be changed and how would such changes be effected? How will
changes to the Metropolitan Water Plan be included in the Draft Plan?

Part 9

Limits to the availability of water

16. Clauses 40(4)–(6) set out the circumstances in which the Minister can amend the
LTAAEL to accommodate changes in usage by major utilities and ‘to account for
average annual evaporation and other water losses from Penrith Lakes as
estimated by the Minister’.
How often are such amendments likely to be made? When will they be made? The Minister’s
actions under these clauses must be open and transparent.

17. Clause 42(8) provides for a ‘review’ to be conducted when Sydney Catchment
Authority exceeds certain extraction limits.
What will be the outcome of such reviews? Will environmental externalities be taken into
account is assessing the impact of Sydney Catchment Authority’s actions?

18. Clause 42(9) includes stormwater harvesting in the relevant calculations.
All new sources of water should be taken into account in determining water sharing rules for the
GMR.

Part 14

System operation rules

19. The note to clause 79(6) advises that the transfer rules ‘may be further reviewed
and amended by the Minister during a severe water shortage period’.
What is ‘a severe water shortage period’?
How will the environmental impact of any decisions made under Part 14 be determined and
addressed by the Minister in the exercise of discretionary powers granted under this part?

Part 15

Amendment of this plan

20. Clauses 87–91 set out the circumstances in which the Minister can amend the Draft
Plan. These provisions extend the general amendment provisions of section 45 of
the WMA 2000 but are exercised subject to those provisions.
Provision should be included in the Draft Plan to mandate consultation on any amendments to be
made pursuant to these provisions. Consultation should not be left to the Minister’s discretion.
Sydney Water Corporation’s role in determining environmental benefits and potential socioeconomic costs of releasing environmental flows into Manly Creek under clause 89 raises
questions of conflict of interest. Is it the appropriate agency to conduct such a study?
Amendments contemplated under clause 90 relate to a ‘non-natural’ water source. The inclusion
of other non-natural resources (such as wastewater) should be similarly contemplated and
accommodated.
The NCC notes that a water sharing plan for the coastal waters is to be prepared. The NCC
supports this action.
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Schedule 1
21.

Dictionary

Appropriate definitions of the terms ‘regulated river’ and ‘unregulated river’ that relate
specifically to the GMR should be included to avoid confusion with other usages of the terms.
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PAPER E(d): Submission prepared as a member of the Water Advisory Group of the NSW
Nature Conservation Council for the Council: Presentation to IPART: Review of the Water
Administration Ministerial Corporation Water Management Charges (23 July 2010).

Thank you for the opportunity to appear at this hearing today on behalf of the water
advisory group of the NSW Nature Conservation Council.
I refer to the submission made by the NCC on 16 June 2010. To preface what I have to
say today I would like to reiterate the main issues raised in that submission:
1. The Government agency or agencies in which the State’s water rights are vested,
and the roles and responsibilities of that agency or those agencies must be clearly
identified. Clarification of the roles and responsibilities of these agencies will
enable efficient service delivery to support ecologically sustainable development.
2. The real functions of the WAMC under the WMA 2000 should be identified – and if
there is not an effective and efficient ongoing role for WAMC under the WMA 2000
then that matter should be addressed in legislation.
3. The proper allocation of rights to access and use new water sources – wastewater
(including sewage), stormwater and seawater – in NSW requires deliberate action
to ensure that the functions of asset management and resource management
remain the responsibility of separate entities; to ensure efficient delivery of
management services in relation to those water sources; and to ensure that the
objectives of ecologically sustainable development are actively, effectively and
efficiently pursued in NSW.
Now I would like to expand on two aspects of the NCC’s submission with particular
reference to the Greater Metropolitan Region
The two issues I would like to discuss are:
1. Whether the notion of what constitutes a ‘monopoly service’ for the purposes of
the IPART (Water Services) Order 2004 truly reflects the current water regulation
regime in the GMR.
2. Who is exercising the State’s right to the control, use and flow of water in the
Greater Metropolitan Region – and what is water?
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Why choose one area?
The Greater Metropolitan Region is an area defined with some precision in the draft
water sharing plan that has been prepared by NOW for that region. It takes in the
operating areas of SWC and the SCA and covers parts of several catchment
management authority areas of operation. Water sources in the region – unregulated
rivers and groundwater sources – provide water to over 20 per cent of Australia’s
population. Water service providers in the region have pursued a range of new watersourcing opportunities to provide ‘sustainable’ water supply for the region. The region
is also endowed with environmental and ecological assets of national and international
significance.
By focusing on that one region the NCC hopes to highlight some important issues that
should be considered in this review of water planning and administration pricing–
issues that are pertinent to the GMR now and will become increasingly important in
other regional areas of NSW with the uptake of water supply augmentation initiatives
over time.

1. What should constitute a ‘monopoly service’ for the purposes of the IPART
(Water Services) Order 2004?
Pricewaterhouse Coopers has been reluctant to undertake extensive interpretation of
the IPART (Water Services) Order 2004 noting that the services outlined in the Order
‘can be variously interpreted’. They reach their own conclusion of what constitutes
the ‘making available of water’ and other activities contemplated by the Order (and
hence monopoly services) and in the process do explore approaches taken in other
Australian and international jurisdictions.
In its analysis Pricewaterhouse Coopers places particular emphasis on the provisions of
paragraph 67 of the National Water Initiative. This paragraph provides for the
identification of all costs associated with water planning and management to bring
into effect consistent approaches to pricing and attributing costs of water planning and
management. The paragraph specifies some that are related to the water trading
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objectives of the NWI but excludes activities undertaken for the government such as
policy development.
Paragraph 66ii) of the NWI on the other hand calls for the development of pricing
policies for recycled water and stormwater that are congruent with policies for potable
water, and stimulate efficient water management no matter what the source.
Pricewaterhouse Coopers then examines the draft NWI Pricing Principles. The Draft
Principles state that ‘water planning and management does not include activities
undertaken to manage land-based impacts’ *Princ 5+; that the water planning
component of wpm is concerned with establishing ‘transparent (statutory based)
frameworks for ensuring an appropriate balance between economic, environmental
and public benefit outcomes’ *Princ 7+; and that the water management component of
wpm is concerned with operationalising water planning, including the implementation
of statutory plans which aim to codify water management decisions to meet economic,
environmental and social objectives’ *Princ 8+.
Pricewaterhouse Coopers cites one example of international experience where water
management activities have been expressly identified and defined for the purposes of
cost-recovery. The South African Department of Water Affairs and Forestry defines
water resource management to include planning for the development of alternate
water supply options such as wastewater reuse.
So the issues become:


should catchment activities be taken into account in the pricing review?



Should the water planning focus of the review be on statutory instruments alone?



Or does principle 8, by contemplating that the water management component of
wpm is concerned with operationalising water planning, including the
implementation of statutory plans permit the inclusion of activities to
operationalise plans other than statutory plans that aim to codify water
management decisions to meet economic, environmental and social objectives’?

Water management planning and regulation in the Greater Metropolitan Region is
currently being implemented under a range of instruments that have varying degrees
of influence:
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Since 2004 the National Water Initiative has driven water reform in rural and urban
Australia –it is an intergovernmental agreement that is aspirational, it is not a
legislative instrument and it has no enforcement mechanism. Nevertheless it is
highly persuasive in driving water policy in NSW. Indeed we note the Tribunal’s
reliance on water pricing principles developed under the NWI to guide their
deliberations in this review.



In response to the reforms agreed to under the NWI NSW prepared a National
Water Initiative Implementation Plan. That implementation plan set out specific
directions that water management would take in rural and urban NSW – with
ambitious timetables. It is not a legislative instrument, it has no enforcement
mechanism, and no consequences for non-compliance now that the NCP payments
have ended (other than federal grants that may be contingent upon certain works
being undertaken).



Nevertheless under the NSWNWIIP the Metropolitan Water Plan has come into
being. It is not a legislative instrument, it is not prescriptive in its content but it is
aspirational. However, over and above other policy instruments it is gaining
momentum in its influence in driving water management and planning in the
Greater Metropolitan Region – even to the extent that the Tribunal referenced the
plan in its review of the Operating Licence for SWC – and the draft water sharing
plan for the Greater Metropolitan Region incorporates provisions of the
Metropolitan Water Plan.

All of these ‘plans’ are persuasive not legislative. They are instruments that arguably
go beyond the legislative framework that the NWI itself contemplated for water
planning. The Metropolitan Water Plan is undoubtedly a codification – albeit a soft
law or quasi-regulatory version of one – that aims by its own terms to meet economic,
environmental and social objectives in securing Sydney’s Water Future.


The NCC contends that the current emphasis on statutory mechanisms to
determine what constitutes a ‘monopoly service’ for the purposes of the IPART
(Water Services) Order 2004 does not truly, or appropriately, reflect the
management regime that operates in that area.
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In calling for pricing policies for recycled water and stormwater that are
congruent with policies for potable water Paragraph 66ii) of the NWI opens the
doors for the inclusion of costs associated with management and planning for
water sources other than rainfall (wastewater and stormwater) to be included in
pricing reviews so that efficient water management will be realised no matter
what the source.



The MWP has achieved such status that the costs associated with its
development and implementation should be taken into account (without the
restrictions now imposed in relation to activities associated with new sources of
water) in the review of the WAMC water management and planning costs.

2. Who is exercising the State’s right to the control, use and flow of water in the
Greater Metropolitan Region – and what is water?
Water management and planning in the Greater Metropolitan Region is not all soft law.
The Water Management Act 2000 emerged in response to the 1994 COAG Water
Reform Agenda as part of the national Competition Policy suite of reforms. The draft
water sharing plan that I referred to before is a creature of the WMA 2000. However,
in the Greater Metropolitan Region the Water Act 1912 is still what regulates access to
and use of natural water resources. This complex legislative framework relates only to
natural sources – rainwater collected in rivers and streams, groundwater and the
coastal waters of NSW. In the course of this review the Tribunal has identified the
agencies responsible for implementation of these legislative water management and
planning objectives. The NCC’s submission highlighted its confusion concerning the
delineation of responsibilities in that regard.
Access to and use of new resources – stormwater and wastewater – is a different
matter. To undertake sewer mining it is necessary to reach agreement with SWC in
the form of a sewer mining agreement, and there is an agreement setting out the
terms and conditions of access to SWC’s sewer network. More recently indicative
stormwater harvesting and re-sue agreements have been released by SWC. There may
well be some similar developments with regard to the local council stormwater
‘resources’ but I am not aware of any.
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This scenario suggests that the right to the control, use and flow of these valuable new
sources falls to the service providers.
So who is entitled to exercise the State’s water rights? And should those rights extend
to water in the form of wastewater and stormwater (water in artificial channels)?
The NCC submits that the following issues need to be addressed:


Should a service provider be responsible for the allocation of access (under
contract) to ‘water resources’ under its control? OR



Should the ‘new sources’ of water be brought within the scope of the legislative
management regime so that secure entitlements to those new sources can be
made available, planned for and managed within a framework that strives to
achieve ecologically sustainable development?



Integrated management is essential to achieving sustainability – natural
resources cannot be managed in isolation from one another. Water quality is
intimately connected with land management issues. The inclusion of land
(catchment) management costs in determining water management and planning
prices will provide a more complete pricing structure that will recognise the need
for, and support, sustainable water management.



New sources of water increasingly being used in urban areas (sewage and
stormwater) should be part of the overall water management framework and
accounted for in calculations of water balances for water management areas.



Water management and planning is subject to the adage that if you can’t
measure it you can’t manage it. At the moment in the Greater Metropolitan
Region I think there is a reasonable consensus that measurement of water
extraction is wanting. There is no water balance for the region that measures the
ins and outs of the system – but I am led to believe that work is progressing.
Unless that balance takes into account the ‘new’ resources then it will not be
complete. The NCC submits that water is water – albeit sometimes with
substances in solution or in suspension that may or may not be desirable.
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Nevertheless Integrated water catchment management and integrated urban water
cycle management are objectives of the national reforms. Implementation of
management systems to achieve these goals comes with a cost. When that cost is
identified and included in pricing determinations from catchment to tap – for water fit
for different purposes from natural and wastewater sources – only then will water
users, including residential consumers in the Greater Metropolitan Region, be able to
appreciate the value of a scarce resource. In that process it is to be hoped that the
notion of environmental externalities will emerge as tangible costs.
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